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II.
A B S T R A C T .
This Thesis deals with the role of the Constitution and the Dom­
estic Law in the implementation of the modern international standards 
of human rights as defined under the United Nations Covenants on Human 
Rights of 1966. It seeks to explain some aspects of the obligation of 
states parties to take legislative measures for purposes of the effec­
tive implementation of the Covenants at the domestic level. The study 
is conducted in the context of a case study of Jordan as a state 
party,
The Thesis consists of three main parts, divided into seven Chap­
ters and followed by Chapter VIE which is a general conclusion.
Part One, contains two Chapters dealing with the relationship 
between the modern international standards of human rights and the 
domestic legal systems, Chapter I is a brief legal and historical 
background. It seeks to highlight some of the major developments in 
the legal background of the modern international standards of human 
rights and the legal system of Jordan. Chapter II discusses the 
applicability of the international rules of human rights within the 
domestic legal systems with special reference to Jordan.
Part Two, is devoted to the first part of the role of the consti­
tution and domestic law in the implementation of the modern inter­
national standards of human rights; namely, the adoption of equivalent 
standards at the domestic level. It also contains two Chapters. 
Whereas Chapter III focuses on the civil and political rights,
Ill
Chapter IV deals with the economic, social and cultural rights. A 
list of four rights has been selected from each catalogue in order to 
define precisely what are the legislative measures required in the 
case of each right.
Part Three, deals with the other part of the role of the consti­
tution and domestic law, i.e. the introduction of sufficient domestic 
legal safeguards. It contains three Chapters. Chapter V discusses 
the role of the Judiciary as the vindicator of human rights, and the 
independence of the judiciary as a legal safeguard against human
rights violations. Chapter VI deals with the rights to judicial re­
view of administrative actions, as a guarantee against excess or abuse 
Df powers by the administrative authorities, and as an inevitable re­
quirement for the rule of law and respect for human rights in prac­
tice. Chapter VII discusses emergency powers and the impact of the 
state Df emergency on human rights; and considers the question of
derogation under Article 4 of the Political Covenant. It focuses on 
the role of the Constitution and the domestic legislature in imposing 
restrictions on the right of the national authorities to declare a 
public emergency and on the emergency powers themselves when the state 
of emergency is declared.
Finally, the concluding Chapter VIII is a general assessment of: 
The role of the constitution and the domestic laws in the imple­
mentation of the modern international standards of human rights, the 
present system of international scrutiny of the domestic legislative 
measures, and the performance of Jordan as a state party and the
existing legal system of Jordan in general.
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A SPECIAL MOTE.
Except for the Constitution, for which we have accepted the Offi­
cial translation, the Jordanian Statutes and Cases are translated from 
Arabic by the present writer, The Statutes are cited by their
official titles and numbers, and whenever possible with reference to 
the number, the date and the page of the issue of the Official Gazette 
in which they were published. For example, the Law of Print and 
Publication, would be cited as, 'The Law of Print and Publication, Law 
Ho. 33/1973, JOG Ho. 2429 of 1/7/1973, p, 8.'
The Jordanian Cases are cited in accordance with the ordinary sys­
tem of citation in Jordan, that is by mentioning the number of the 
case and if the case is reported, by reference to the yearly volume of 
the JBR and the page where the case is reported. For example Case 
Ho.l of 1987 would be cited as follows: 'Case Ho. 1/1987, JBR <1987)
p. 100.'
Arabic references are cited in English; references in other 
European languages are cited in their original. When more than one 
work of the same author is cited a catch phrase is used to distinguish 
the various works. The term, 'op.cit', is used to indicate that the 
work has been cited earlier. If the reader wishes to investigate the 
full title of the work, the edition, the place and year of publication 
he may refer to the first citation or to the list of the bibliography.
Domestic implementation of the international law of human rights 
is often seen as a political issue and widely discussed in interna­
tional forums and political conferences. As a legal question it does 
not appear to have received enough attention from lawyers and legal 
researchers yet. There are considerable gaps in the contemporary lit­
erature of human rights in general and the domestic implementation in 
particular. Domestic implementation of the international instrument of 
human rights by means of domestic legislative measures is considered 
one of the most complicated areas for legal research for it does not 
only require the study to be conducted in both international law and 
municipal law simultaneously, but also touches almost every part of 
the domestic law of any country. Until recently and in many parts of 
the world, lawyers and governments have turned a blind eye on this 
issue, partly because they thought it was not very important and 
partly because it was very problematic and complicated. As we live in 
what may be described as 'the age of the international protection of 
human rights', domestic implementation has become an increasingly im­
portant subject. Recently, governments have found themselves under 
legal obligation to secure the effective implementation of a consider­
able body of international law of human rights within their respective 
domestic legal systems. The need for action and legal research has 
thus become more urgent than ever before.
Vhen the United Rations Covenant on Human Rights entered into 
fyrce in 1976 (The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1966. Hereinafter referred to as the Covenants), 
governments and lawyers reacted in a manner which clearly showed the
2lack of a clear approach and legal research. However, European law­
yers and governments have gained the upper hand in terms of legal re­
search and experience in dealing with the issues of domestic imple­
mentation, thanks to the European Convention on Human Eights which has 
been in force since 1953. Many Third World countries had failed even 
to report on their domestic legal systems, others had introduced un­
satisfactory reports. They did not seem to know what they were 
required to da, or what to report. The United Nations Committee (HRG) 
had, therefore, to issue guidelines to help states parties to intro­
duce satisfactory reports. Nonetheless, many reports remained 
seriously overdue, and in most cases the HRC had to ask for additional 
information.
In the present work, the intention is to examine the role of the 
Constitution and domestic laws in the implementation of the modern in­
ternational standards of human rights. The phrase 1 modern interna­
tional standards of human rights' as used here refers to the minimum 
standards established under the United Nations Covenants on Human 
Rights of 1966. The latter have assigned an important role to the 
national legislator to play in the process of their domestic imple­
mentation by requiring it to introduce all the necessary legislative 
measures through the national Constitution and the relevant laws. The 
question would thus be: What is this role and how could it be per­
formed? What are these required legislative measures which each 
state party undertakes to introduce and for what purposes?
It is to these specific questions that we intend to address our­
selves in the present work in order to explain the various aspects of 
the role of the constitution and domestic laws in securing the effect­
ive implementation of the modern international standards of human
3rights, and the legal implications of the undertaking by states part­
ies to take legislative measures for that purpose. Considering the 
aims, the text and the provisions of Article 2 of both Covenants, it 
would appear that the role of the Constitution and the domestic laws 
consists of two main parts: namely, the adoption of equivalent stand­
ards at the domestic level and the introduction of sufficient domestic 
legal safeguards.
Obviously, theoretical treatment of this subject would not suf­
fice. Alternatively, it calls for a case study and requires a critic­
al legal analysis of the legal dimensions of the substantive rights in 
order to define the necessary legislative measures required for the 
implementation of every particular right.
Jordan has thus been chosen as a case study for this purpose. It 
is not only a good example of a developing country which encounters 
special political and economic difficulties in securing domestic im­
plementation of the modern international standards of human rights, 
but also represents the Arab and Muslim states parties who share spe­
cial religious and cultural traditions which have influenced their 
domestic legislation and indeed their conception of certain rights and 
freedoms.
In addition to the fact that this part of the law of Jordan has 
never been researched before, the Jordanian legal system itself is an 
interesting mixture Df different legal traditions. As well as the 
Islamic law and traditions inherited form the past and the Ottoman 
laws, it possesses an element of the English law transmitted directly 
during the Mandate of Trans-Jordan and Palestine. There is also a 
distinctive French element which has been conveyed to Jordan through 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.
4As a country, Jordan was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end 
of the First World War. In 1921, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was 
established by the late King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussain, and was placed 
under the British Mandate until the end of the Second World War. In 
1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was declared an independent 
state and subsequently joined the United UatiDns as such. Following 
the withdrawal of the British from Palestine in 1948, the Jordanian 
Armed Farces entered Palestine and managed to save a strip of land on 
the other side of the river Jordan, known as the West-Bank. The 
latter joined the East-Bank and became part of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan until it was occupied by Israel in 1967.
For the purpose of the domestic implementation of the Covenants, 
the title 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* applies to the East-Bank 
only because the West-Bank has been under military occupation since 
1967. Practically speaking Jordan has lost control over that part of 
its territory and some of it has already been annexed by Israel. From 
a legal viewpoint, since 1974, Jordan has surrendered its legal rights 
and obligations over that part to the PLO, when the latter was re­
cognized as the sole legitimate representative of the population of 
the West-Bank. That is true, although most of them still hold 
Jordanian Passports for practical and political reasons.
Jordan signed and ratified the Covenants in 1975, and they entered 
into force in 1976. It is thus important to remember that the com­
mitments of Jordan as a state party to the U.M. Covenants on human 
rights are limited to the population of the East-Bank and to those who 
are under its jurisdiction. In assessing the performance of Jordan in 
this connection only the laws and practices in force in the East-Bank 
may be taken into consideration.
5As for the structural aspects, each of the two parts of the role 
of the Constitution and domestic laws in the implementation of the 
modern international standards of human rights will be treated separ­
ately in the latter two parts of this work. Before this, however, the 
relationship between the modern international standards of human 
rights, and the domestic legal system will be discussed in the first 
part. Accordingly, the thesis is divided in three parts:
Part One: The Relationship Between the Modern International Stand­
ards of Human Rights and the Domestic Legal Systems.
Part Two: Adoption of Equivalent Standards at the Domestic Level.
Part Three: Introduction of Domestic Legal Safeguards.
PART onsns.
7THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS,
In order to understand the legal nature of the modern interna­
tional standards of human rights which each state party is required to 
implement within its domestic legal system, a brief consideration of 
the relationship between the two legal systems seems inevitable. It is 
thus important to begin by highlighting the most important 
developments which have led to the creation of two distinctive, but 
not conflicting systems, and to describe the manner in which modern 
international standards of human rights were derived from the domestic 
legal systems. It is equally important to examine the applicability 
Df the modern international standards of human rights, as rules of 
international law, within the domestic legal system.
Accordingly, this part may be divided into two Chapters:
I. Legal and Historical Background
II. Applicability of the Modern International Standards of Human 
Rights within the Domestic Legal Systems, with special reference 
to Jordan.
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LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
The idea of human rights is as old as mankind itself. That is to 
say, since the existence of the first human couple on the face of this 
earth, the idea of having certain rights and the need to protect them 
from violation has also existed. Methods of protection and 
implementation of these rights have varied considerably throughout 
history.c15 However, the idea of regulating and protecting the rights 
and freedoms of the individual by the law can be traced back to
antiquity and to the Semitic religions. From among the ancient 
nations, the Babylonians and their famous code known as "The Code of 
Hammurabi", c 2 * which dates back to the 23rd century B.C., is one
example.<3:* The Code was discovered in north Iraq earlier this 
century, and has been studied and translated into many languages. <j4;> 
It has been described as a codification of the customs and human 
relations of that time.<s> It recognized the right to private property 
and protected it against violation.<e> It also protected the right to 
life, to the extent that, any one who accuses another of a crime
punishable by death, he himself would be executed if he could not
prove his allegation, and any witness in such a crime, would be 
executed if his testimony proved to be false .<7>
Although the actual text was not discovered until the 20th 
century, according to some legal historians, its principles and the 
Babylonian customs were transferred to more recent traditions, through 
the medium of successive civilizations.ceo
9Raman civilisation and Raman law also recognized the notion of
rights and freedoms. One of the most famous Roman laws was the law of
the Twelve Tables (.Lex duodecim tabularum), which recognized equality 
before the law of both the rich and the poor, and the right to private 
property as well as family rights. The Roman Civil Law (Jus Civile), 
was influenced by the Jus Gentium which recognized equal rights far 
the citizens of the. empire in all classes. * In the 6th century all 
Roman laws were codified in six codes known as the Corpus Juris 
Civilis whose influence was reflected greatly in later European 
laws, *1o;>
Ancient Greece also played a great role in legal history in 
general and in the history of human rights in particular. c 115 It was 
there that the idea of natural law and natural rights was born. c 125
The rational school called for a rational explanation of nature and
the natural surroundings of human beings in order to derive some 
necessary rules from them. This is what later became known as 
'naturalism', which argued that reason is not separated from nature, 
it is nature Itself, To explain this, they said: "God is nature and
reason is God", which regulates everything. Therefore, there should be 
a law consistent with the nature of the universe and derived from it, 
which can define the nature of all creatures and the relations between 
them. This was the idea of the unwritten natural law which found its 
sources in nature and which was supreme to all man-made laws,*13* 
Therefore, the positive law must be made consistent with the natural 
laws and all rulers should respect the natural rights of man which are 
derived from the natural law, not from their positive laws. The 
individual thusmay not adhere to the positive law if it is incom­
patible with his natural rights.*14:1 This was the very beginning of
10
the idea of the natural law and natural rights, which has had a
considerable place in political and philosophical writings, and which
has attracted lawyers and revolutionaries throughout the ages,
Holy scriptures and the teachings of the prophets have contributed
greatly towards the promotion and the protection of the dignity and
freedom of mankind. The oldest of the three Semitic religions is
Judaism, where most of the religious teachings are contained in the
Talmud. <1S:> It contains a substantial body of rules relating to human
relations and human rights. <ie:)
Christianity enriched the theory of human rights and political
philosophy in Europe with fundamental ideas, which had a great
influence on the declarations of human rights centuries later.C17'> It
confirms the dignity of man and the limited powers of the rulers
because only God has unlimited power. cie:> It preaches the spirit of
love and brotherhood amongst mankind, In the Gospels it says: "Glory
be to God on high and peace among men on earth". c 1 Also "You shall
love . . . your neighbour as yourself". <so;>
Islam developed in the Arab peninsula, when there was no law
except for some inhumanetraditions and customs, It regulates the whole
life of the individualby practical rules concerning his everyday life,
dogma and worship. In the Qur'an it says:
",.,.you were enemies and he united your hearts in 
love, so that by his grace you became brothers... and 
let there be amongst you a body of men who invite to 
all that is good and enjoy equity and forbid 
evil..."<21?
According to many Islamic scholars,42:23 the theory of human 
rights in Islam is based on the following principles:
1- Democratic political system, based on Shura and political 
participation by all members of the Muslim society.
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2- Equality before the law.
3- Respect for the right to private property, freedom of worship, 
freedom of thought, opinion and expression,
4- Recognition of the right to work and education, as rights and 
duties at the same time.
Islamic law has flourished in the Arab and Islamic world for about 
fourteen centuries and it is still almost the sole law in Saudi Arabia 
and remains one of the most important sources of legislation in other 
Arab and Islamic countries. This is probably what is meant by P. 
Sieghart, when he says: "It is difficult to understand the secular law 
of Muslim countries without understanding the history of Islam".
This remains true, although there have been considerable changes in 
the laws and practices of many Muslim countries due to the influence 
of Western legal traditions. Jordan, for instance, still applies 
Islamic law as the law of personal status, CES5 and with some modifi­
cation as the new Civil Code, whereas in the field of consti­
tutional and administrative law, it seems to have adopted more from 
the English and French legal systems.427*
As far as contemporary human rights are concerned, there is strong 
evidence that Islamic law has recognized and provided for most of them 
since the very beginning. As an example, we may refer to the
first Article of the French Declaration which, as will be 
explained, c2951 could be regarded as the 'legal father' of most of the 
present human rights, whether those included in national constitutions 
or those declared by international instruments, This Article reads as 
fallows:
"Men are born and remain free and equal in rights, social distinction 
may be based only upon general usefulness." This Article seems to re­
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semble a literal translation of the rule declared by the second Muslim 
Caliph, Umar bin Al~Khatab, when he said; "when did you enslave the 
people, though they were born free of their mothers?"
This was in the year 641, when the son of the Muslim Governor of Egypt 
had whipped an Egyptian Copt, who subsequently went to Medina and 
complained to the Caliph. The latter immediately summoned the Governor 
and his son to his court. When they appeared before him and the son 
admitted his deed, the Caliph handed a whip to the Egyptian and asked 
him to whip the son of the Governor in his presence. When the Egyptian 
had done what Umar said, the Caliph turned to the Governor and 
pronounced the above doctrine, <305 As a matter of fact, this rule was 
not invented by Umar, but it was based upon earlier precedents and on 
the practice of the Prophet himself.'315 It was an authoritative 
interpretation of many Qur'anic verses and sayings of the Prophet, all 
of which strictly confirmed equality and freedom for all mankind 
without discrimination on any ground. To quote the Qur'an; "Oh man­
kind, we have created you from a male and a female." In other words, 
all human beings are brothers and they are all the descendants of one 
father and one mother.
"...and we set you up as nations and tribes so that you may be able 
to recognize each other. . ..Tndeed, the noblest among you before God are 
the most heedful of you".'3255 This verse was explained by the 
Prophet in one of his sayings: "no Arab has any superiority over a
non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any over an Arab, nor a black man 
have any superiority over a white man, no white man has any 
superiority over a black man."'335
According to Islam, God has given man the right to equality as a 
birth right, and therefore, no man may face discrimination on the
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grounds of the colour of his shin, his place of birth, his race or the 
nation in which he was born.
These precepts were conveyed to modern documents of human rights 
through European thought and philosophy. The latter had demonstrated 
its great interest in Islamic law and history through many academic 
missions to Islamic universities and by the studies and researches of 
orientalists, not to mention direct contact with Islamic culture in 
Spain, or during wars and crusades against Muslims.
If we stay with the same example (Article 1, of the French Declar­
ation), it is evident that it has been circulated through many 
national constitutions and eventually adopted as Article 1, of the 
UDHR, in 1948 and again as Article 8, of the Political Covenant in 
1966.4345
During the Middle Ages and the 17th and the 18th centuries the 
idea of the natural law and natural rights which dates back to 
antiquity was revitalised and elaborated by many western 
philosophers. 43B:> Theories such as those of the social contract, C3s:i 
and the writings of Rousseau437* and Montsquieu in his book 'Esprit 
des Lois' published in 1748,4335 helped to prepare the ground for a 
new era in the effort to promote and protect human rights.4335 In the 
same period, several important documents relating to human rights were 
declared in Europe4'*05 and the United States of America. 4'*15 The most 
important of these documents was the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen of 1789. 4'*25 It was so because, it was the first 
and probably the most important step towards the internationalization 
of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Contrary to the other 
declarations of that era which were concerned only with the rights of 
the citizens of the particular countries, the French Declaration was
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designed as an international instrument. Before 1789, rights and
freedoms were not recognized as belonging to the individual in his
capacity as a human being, but rather as being a member of a given
class, society or religion, and therefore, the legal system of the 
rights and freedoms used to vary considerably according to the tribe, 
class, society or religion to which the individual belonged. The 
international character of the declaration is manifested by its title, 
preamble and the wording of its various articles. It is evident from 
the title (The Rights of Man and Citizen), that the drafters meant to 
provide a list of such fundamental rights and freedoms which ought to 
be recognized as the rights of the individual in his capacity as a 
human being, regardless of any other consideration, and of those of 
the citizen in his capacity as a citizen of the state, any state,
whereever it be.
The Declaration was largely successful in achieving its 
objectives; Its principles have been widely accepted and Implemented 
by national constitutions w o r l d w i d e . T h e  constitutions of the 19th 
and the 20th centuries in Europe, the United States and Latin America 
were fast to adopt its principles and s t y l e . B e t w e e n  the two world 
wars, the Declaration found yet a new opportunity to spread throughout 
the constitutions of the newly independent states in Europe, Africa 
and Asia, which all followed the model of the French Declaration.
In the Arab world, almost all Arab*475 constitutions echoed the 
French style with or without direct reference to the Declaration it­
self ■ <4S:> Some of the Arab states in Africa referred directly to the 
French Declaration, when they drafted their constitutions after inde­
pendence. The Constitution of Mauritania of 1961, in its preamble 
says: "Confiding in the all-powerful God, the Mauritanian people
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proclaim their attachment to the luslim religion and to the principles 
of democracy as defined in the declaration of the rights of man of 
1789".
In Morocco, after independence and the return of King Mohammed V. 
some temporary ordinances concerning human rights were promulgated, 
until the first Constitution was proclaimed in 1962, The Constitution 
of 1970, which altered the latter, was also altered by the present 
Constitution in 1972. it refers to human rights in rather general
terms, but nonetheless contains most of the classical rights of man of 
1789.<eo:> A similar approach was taken by Tunisia.<S13
The other Arab countries inherited the doctrines of the French De­
claration from the Ottoman laws and constitutions and the Constitution 
of Turkey of 1928. The Arab world had formed a part of the Ottoman 
Empire until the First World War. In the 19th century and under
the pressure of national movements, the central government published 
some documents concerning human rights until eventually the ordinance 
of 'Kolkhaha' was proclaimed in 1839. The second document on human 
rights was the ordinance of 1856 (A1 Khat Alhamoioni) which upheld the 
same principles of 1789, especially with regard to personal liberty, 
the right to private property, equality before the law, no punishment 
without due process of law and the freedom of warship. The first 
Constitution was proclaimed in 1876, and was abolished after the 
Turkish revolution and replaced by the Constitution of 1908, which re­
established the same rights and freedoms, which remained in force 
until the downfall of the Empire and the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic, The Republican Constitution was proclaimed in 1928. It used 
similar terminology, vividly reminiscent of the Declaration of 1789. 
"Every Turk is born free and lives free... the limits for everyone's
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freedom, which is a natural right, are the limits of the freedom of 
others" . <635
In 1923, the Monarchical Constitution of Egypt was proclaimed. 
This showed affinity with the Turkish Constitution and incorporated 
almost all of the principles of 1789. However, the scape and the range 
of those rights varied in accordance with the changes in the political 
system and ideology. The present Constitution was proclaimed in 1971.
It provides for the traditional rights and freedoms in a very detailed 
manner. It seems that the Egyptian legislature has deliberately
married the socialist conception of human rights, with the classical 
principles of 1789 ce6) and the principles of Islamic juris­
prudence. <66:’ Article 29, for instance, stipulates that, "Property is 
subject to the control of the people and protected by the state, there 
shall be three categories of property; public property, co-operative 
property and private property." In Article 11, it provides that; "The 
state shall ensure to women... her equality with men in the political, 
social, cultural and economic domains, without prejudice to the 
principles of Islamic law."'675
As a part of the Ottoman Empire, Jordan had experienced the 
principles of the French Declaration through the Ottoman constitutions 
of 1876 and 1908, Vhen the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was established 
after the first World War, the first Constitution was proclaimed in 
1928. In the second chapter it provided for the 'rights of the peop­
le' , which were almost identical to those in the Egyptian and Turkish 
constitutions, and which echoed those of the French Declaration of 
1789,<ee:’ After independence, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
established, and the Monarchical Constitution was introduced in 1946. 
It contained a new chapter on the 'rights of the people', but made
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only limited modifications to the Constitution of 1928. Following the 
war of 1948, a part of Palestine (The West-Bank) joined Jordan, and 
the present Constitution was promulgated in 1952. In the second 
chapter, it refers to the rights and duties of the Jordanians in gen- 
eral and sometimes in rather vague terms, It has however, re-intro- 
duced the same traditional rights from>the former constitutions, with 
some enlargements in the scope of those rights and the role of the 
state in their enforcement. Nevertheless, as will be explained in the 
coming chapters, its provisions still need further development and 
amendments, in order to match the modern standards of human rights.
In spite of the various and frequent amendments to the 
Constitution, chapter two remained undeveloped, even after the
ratification of the Covenants by Jordan in 1975. Whether this means 
that the Jordanian Constitution is a perfect match to the Covenants or 
mere carelessness on the part of the Jordanian Legislature, no
definite answer can be given at this stage.
At the international level, the impact of the French Declaration 
on the modern international standards of human rights, is by no means 
less evident than its impact on the national constitutions and 
domestic legal systems. Indeed, the former was channelled through 
the latter. That is to say, by the time the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights had started its work on the UDHR,<S£*5 the principles of the 
French Declaration were already recognized and adopted by almost all 
major legal systems. In other words, they have become general
principles of law, within the meaning of para(3) of Article 38, of the 
statute of the International Court of Justice. In the words of H. 
Lauterpacht, "they were general principles of constitutional law of 
civilized states."<eco This seems to have facilitated the task of the
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Commission, who gathered those recognized principles and included them 
in the UDHE. Comparison between the provisions of the UDHR and the 
sections on human rights in any of the major western constitutions of 
the forties, would show that their differences are negligible.
Comparison between the French Declaration and the UDHR also shows that 
their substance is almost identical. It is quite clear that the latter 
has borrowed the style and most of the contents of the farmer. Article 
1, for example is identical to Article 1 of the French Declaration. It 
says: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights,..".<ei> Article 4, provides for the prohibition of slavery 
and the banning of all forms of the slave trade, in order to preserve 
the dignity and freedom of man. Most of the remaining Articles of the 
UDHR deal with the same traditional doctrines of the French Declar­
ation.
As the UDHR was intended to be an introduction to an interna­
tionally binding agreement, the work of the Commission had to proceed 
towards drafting an international convention on human rights. <esi:> The 
latter was meant to be signed and ratified by all member states and to 
provide for the minimum international standards of human rights, which 
all parties undertake to implement by every appropriate means, 
including legislative measures.
However, after frequent meetings and lengthy discussions, the com­
mission decided to draft two covenants on human rights; the Political 
Covenant and the Economic Covenant.c 5 The Covenants seem to embody 
an enlarged codification of the fundamental rights and freedoms, which 
had already been declared by the UDHR. That is to say, with further
details and expansion, almost all the rights referred to in the UDHR
are included in the Covenants.
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It is in this very way that the French Declaration and the nation­
al constitutions and domestic laws in general have influenced the 
Covenants or the modern international standards of human rights. Such 
influence is quite evident in the case of the Political Covenant. The 
wording of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 8, for instance, bears 
great affinity to Article 1, of the UDHS and Article 1 and 4 of the 
French Declaration. The remainder of its provisions also deals with 
the same traditional rights and freedoms. Amongst these, one may men­
tion the right to personal freedom, equality before the law, freedom 
of thought, opinion and conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion and freedom of movement . . . etc,
These rights and freedoms have been adopted and developed to 
constitute minimum international standards of human rights, applicable 
all over the world and as such they have begun to influence the 
national constitutions and domestic legal systems of all states 
parties. Since 1976, the latter have been under legal obligation to 
take legislative measures and to adjust their national constitutions 
and domestic laws in conformity with the modern international 
standards of human rights,<et5> In other words, they have pledged 
themselves to bring their legal systems and practices into line with 
the provisions of the Covenants,
However, by doing so, states parties are not pledging themselves 
to implement an entirely alien legal system. That is true, because as 
mentioned above, those provisions were essentially derived from the 
various domestic legal systems themselves. They have been processed at 
the international level and presented as a uniform catalogue of rights 
in accordance with which all states parties are required to adjust 
their domestic legal systems.
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LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH SPEC I AL REFEREN C E  T_Q.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the applicability of the 
modern international standards of human rights in the domestic legal 
system and to define their legal status in the law of Jordan, Since 
the modern international standards of human rights are part of inter­
national law, we shall be discussing the relationship between interna­
tional law and municipal law in general and then we shall attempt to 
analyze the laws and the practice of Jordan in this regard.
Accordingly, the subject may be divided into two sections as fol­
lows:
1- The relationship between international law and municipal law.
2- The applicability of the Human Rights covenants in the law of 
Jordan.
This is a topic which has always been a fertile field for theoret­
ical controversy dividing the Jurists into two major schools of 
thought; 'Monism and Dualism'. It is not our intention however, to 
discuss these theories in depth; a task which is constantly performed 
by many writers in text books. < 1:1 Alternatively, thus, only the main 
underlying ideas of these theories will be exposed here, fallowed by a 
short assessment of the international practice in this area.
According to the Dualism theory, international law and municipal 
law are two entirely different legal systems, each being superior in 
its own sphere; there should, therefore, be no conflict between
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them. C25 The dualists emphasize that the two systems are different in 
more than one sense: they are different as regards their sources, the 
relations they regulate, and their substance.<35 They support these 
arguments by pointing out the differences between international law 
and municipal law; while the former is considered a body of rules 
based on the common will of the states, functioning solely between 
them, the latter is the will of the state operating upon individuals 
within its jurisdiction,c45 Thus, " . , , . when the sovereign by an act 
of municipal law violates his international obligations, his act is 
not void, it merely means that he has violated international
law. . CS5
The monistic theory, among whose recent exponents are the writers 
of the ‘Vienna School', such as Kelsen, Verdross and George Scelle, 
regards all laws as a single unity composed of rules which are binding 
on the states and individuals. As the science of law is a homogeneous 
field of knowledge, the decisive point then is whether or not interna­
tional law is a true law. If it is so, the two systems are part of a 
universal body of legal rules binding all human beings,ce5
Nonetheless, the monists are divided amongst themselves over the 
question of primacy. The conclusion that there is a unity between in­
ternational law and municipal law raised the question of which one is
superior to the other: opinions on this diverge significantly. While
some of them have held that the supremacy belongs to the municipal 
law, the majority argued that such a conclusion would lead to the 
denial of international law as law, and decided that in the unified 
legal order, international law must be the superior part. C7'5
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However, both theories have been criticised by many writers as 
being inconsistent with international practice. In the words of Prof. 
O' Connell
"While the monist incorrectly deduced from the unity 
Df all law the inherent jurisdictional superiority of 
international law in municipal courts, the dualist, 
equally incorrectly, deduced from a priori dichotomy 
of international and municipal law the conclusion that 
the rules of international law, if they form part of 
municipal law at all, dD so on the latter's initia­
tive" . <e:>
Therefore, in order to side-step the contradiction, between strict 
monism and dualism, various views have been expressed by international 
lawyers concerning theories on transformation, adoption and harmon­
isation. C35
According to O'Connell,
"The theory of harmonisation assumes that interna­
tional law, as a rule of human behaviour, forms part 
of municipal law and hence is available to municipal 
judge: but in the rare instance of conflict between
the two systems this theory acknowledges that he is 
obliged by his jurisdictional rules. If there is any
merit in speaking of the relationship of the two sys­
tems in geometric terms, the correct position must 
merely be that one system is no more elevated than the 
other, but that both are on the same plane. "clco
However, it is quite evident that state practice does not corres­
pond exclusively to any of the above theories . Every state draws up 
its attitude in accordance with its own constitutional system and the 
relations between its constitutional institutions. In practice a clear 
distinction has been made between customary rules of international law
and treaty law. As far as customary international law is concerned, it
is generally recognised as part of the law of the land in almost all 
countries, without any specific act of incorporation, providing that 
it is not in conflict with a domestic rule of law.*113 The above
principle has either been established by explicit constitutional pro­
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visions, or indirectly by judicial application. Among those constitu­
tions are the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. c 1S1 
The Federal Constitution of Austria stipulates that, "the generally 
recognised rules of international law are valid parts of the federal 
law”. *1:35 Similar provision is provided for in Article 10 of the 
Italian Constitution “Italy's legal system conforms with the generally 
recognised principles of international law". In many other countries 
customary international law is recognised as part of the domestic law 
by judicial application, as in The letherlands, Switzerland, France, 
Syria, Egypt, The United States, Great Britain etc.<1A> In British 
practice, for instance, it has been recognised as part of the law of 
the land and enforced as such by British municipal courts; providing 
that such rules are not inconsistent with a British statute, whether 
the statute be earlier or later in date than the particular customary 
rule concerned.*1
Although there is no direct reference to customary international 
law in the Constitution of Jordan, the Jordanian legislature has 
always complied with the customary rules of international law, 
especially with regard to' diplomatic and consular immunities, even 
before the entry into force of the Vienna Conventions for Jordan,c165 
Article 11 of the Penal Code of I960, for instance, exempted 
diplomatic agents and foreign consuls from the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts in accordance with the customary rules of 
international law. Jordanian courts also applied customary
international law as part of the law of the land, though sometimes 
they interpreted it in a rather narrow sense. In a case regarding the 
French Consulate in Jerusalem, 1958, the Supreme Court stated that: 
"Foreign consuls enjoy immunity against municipal jurisdiction with
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regard to their official actions only, which do not include con­
tractual relations such as the renting of properties''. In this case 
the court interpreted the term 'official actions' in a restricted 
manner and denied immunity from judicial proceedings, although the 
matter would usually he regarded as an 'official action', The dispute 
resulted from a rent contract signed by the Consul on behalf of his 
government and approved by the French Foreign Ministry, for a building 
used to house the offices of the French Consulate in Jerusalem.cie) 
However, in a more recent case, The Algerian Embassy Case, the same 
court, this time applying the Vienna Convention, declared the case 
inadmissible on the grounds of diplomatic immunity. <1331
Practice of States with Regard.to Treaties:
The operation of international treaties within the domestic legal 
system is a highly controversial issue which touches the core of the 
constitutional system of every state. Therefore, constitutions usually 
contain special provision(s) concerning treaty-making powers, their 
relation with the municipal laws and their application by domestic 
courts. In other words, the practice of states in this field differs 
from one state to another according to their respective constitutions 
and the nature of the relationship between constitutional in­
stitutions. nonetheless, a close inspection shows some common elements 
in this practice, from which the following general principles might be 
deduced:
1) Conclusion of and accession to treaties (Treaty-making Power) is 
always an executive province. C20:‘
Governments initiate the negotiations and draw-up, authenticate 
and sign treaties. In the American Constitution, for instance, Art-
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icle, II. provides that; "He (the President) has power..... to make
treaties".
According to Article 26j of the Norwegian Constitution, "The King
shall have the right to...conclude and denounce treaties...". The
French Constitution also provides for similar provision; "The Pres­
ident of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties".c315 The
Constitution of Jordan has also reserved the treaty-making power to 
the King, the revised Article 33(1) provides that "The king shall... 
conclude treaties and international agreements" . C:ES 5
In countries where there is no written Constitution a similar approach 
has been adopted by practice for a long time. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, treaty-making power is an executive province . As 
Lord Atkin has put it: "Within the British Empire, there is a well- 
established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive 
act. .
2) A distinction has been made between two types of international 
treaties: treaties of special importance which always require the
approval of the legislature on the one hand, and those which may 
become operative upon signature or ratification by the Executive 
without the interference of the legislature on the other. The French 
Constitution provides that:
"peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements rel­
ative to international organisations.... shall go into effect only 
after having been ratified or approved", C:2S5 
In the Constitution of Kuwait, "...treaties of peace and alliance, 
treaties concerning the territory of the state... public or private
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rights of citizens, . . . shall come into force only when made by 
law". <Ee5
According to the Italian «5mstitution all treaties of political na­
ture, or which provide for arbitration or imply modification to the 
nation's territory or financial burdens or laws must be approved by 
the chambers.(2:75
In the United States, the distinction has been made between 
treaties which need the approval of two-thirds majority of the Senate 
and so-called "executive agreements", that are made by the President 
on his own authority. cs:s:>
3) The third element of international practice in this field is that 
after a treaty is concluded by the competent body (the executive) and 
upon completion of all required constitutional procedures, it
becomes binding on the states, at the international level and in many 
countries at the domestic level as well. This causes the problem of 
defining the status of treaties in the domestic legal system; and 
their position in the domestic legal hierarchy. A review of the 
relevant provisions of various constitutions shows that; in some 
instances, constitutions have recognised a superior place to treaty- 
law on the domestic plane, For some of the constitutional systems
treaty-rules cannot, in any circumstances, change or modify the dom­
estic laws, unless they are made law by parliament. c311 > According to 
many other constitutions, treaties that have been duly concluded and 
assented to by the competent bodies have an equal standing with the 
domestic laws, in terms of their applicability.t325 Constitutions 
like those of Jordan and Italy, prescribed the legal requirements for 
the conclusion of international treaties without defining their status
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viz-a-vis the municipal laws, leaving the matter to the courts to 
decide.
Assessment:
From the above discussion of the juristic theories and the 
practice of states in regard to the relation between international law 
and municipal law, it is quite clear that the practice varies consid­
erably and as mentioned earlier does not exclusively correspond to any 
of those theories. On the contrary, such a theoretical controversy has 
obscured the facts of this relationship and led to misinterpretation 
of the attitudes of many constitutions in order to give support to one 
theory or another.
Practical attitudes of states on this point are always based on 
their domestic constitutional structure, rather than the jurists* 
arguments. Therefore, if the establishment of general theories on such 
an issue is indispensable, they must be deduced from the real practice 
of the states, and not the other way round. However it seems that the 
issue of the relationship between international law and municipal law 
arises only with regard to the customary rules of international law. 
Since this problem has been resolved in almost all countries by 
recognising the former as part of the latter as mentioned above, 
such juristic theories would lose much of their significance. When it 
comes to international treaties and their relation with the domestic 
law of any given state, there are only two possibilities. Either the 
state concerned is not party to the treaty, and there is no connection 
at all between the treaty and the domestic law of that state (exactly 
the same as the relationship between the Jordanian law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights); or the assumption is that the
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given state is a party to the treaty, who has duly concluded and 
ratified it as prescribed by the law. In most cases the treaty becomes 
part of the law of the state concerned, whether directly or through a 
special subsequent legislative act. Thus, a conflict between the 
provisions of the treaty and the municipal laws is a conflict within 
the domestic law and not between international law and municipal law, 
because the treaty has become part of the municipal law. If, for any 
reason, the treaty is not considered part of the domestic law of the 
state, the treaty remains outside the circle of the domestic law and 
therefore inapplicable before the domestic courts. In this case the 
treaty can not compete with the domestic law , because the treaty can 
not be invoked before the domestic courts in the first place. That is 
so although in some cases the court may interpret the domestic law in 
the light of the international commitments of the state, but this is a 
principle of interpretation and would only apply in cases of ambiguity 
or un certainty in the domestic law. The mere fact that the treaty is 
part of international law does not make it enforceable by the domestic 
courts. Indeed, there are special requirements and conditions in every 
country and if such conditions and requirements were not fulfilled the 
treaty would remain inapplicable at the domestic level although the 
state concerned is a party to the treaty. In Jordan for instance, a 
treaty that has been signed and duly approved by the National Assembly 
and assented to by the King, but has not been published in the JOG is 
not enforceable by the Jordanian courts, although it might be binding 
on the Jordanian Government at the international level.
Accordingly, as far as international practice is concerned, the 
theoretical debates concerning the relationship between international 
law and municipal law are of limited importance, As has already been
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observed, in practice every state decides the relationship between its 
law and international law in accordance with its own constitutional 
system regardless of what the jurists' theories may suggest in this 
regard. Furthermore, international practice has shown that it is not 
accurate to speak of a relationship between international law in 
general on the one hand and municipal law on the other, States
have distinguished between customary rules and treaty rules of 
international law and made each of them subject to a different system 
in terms of its relationship with the domestic law as explained 
above,<3E5 A state may accept the customary rules of international law 
as part of its domestic law, applicable by its courts, but it may not 
always recognise international treaties, as such, to be part of its 
domestic law or it may make their application by the domestic courts 
subject to special conditions and requirements.
As far as the human rights Covenants are concerned, none of the 
above juristic theories can be invoked on its own to determine their 
status and their applicability within the domestic legal systems of 
the states parties, However, the Covenants seem to come under the 
category of international agreements of special importance for which, 
in many countries approval by the national legislature is required as 
explained above, <3s:> Once they have been approved by the national 
legislature, their applicability and their legal status in the 
domestic legal system varies from one state to another in accordance 
with its respective constitutional system.
However, there is no obligation on the states parties as regards 
the direct incorporation of the Covenants into their domestic legal 
systems. What is required is a result, i.e. effective implementation 
of the Covenants. The choice of the appropriate means and techniques
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is therefore left to each state party to decide in accordance with its 
own domestic legal system, as stipulated in Article 2 of both 
Covenants, If the Covenants are recognized as part of the law of the 
state party, whether through direct incorporation or otherwise and 
unless special requirements are specified under the law of the 
particular state, then application by the domestic courts would 
normally be subject to the same general principles concerning the 
application of domestic law.
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2. AFPLlCABILIXY^QE__.THE_...imHmATJ_DmL,_ C D T O M AMTS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS . II THE LAW .03? J O R D AN,
Being International agreements, human rights Covenants in the 
Jordanian system are governed by the rules governing the conclusion 
and application of international treaties in general. These rules have 
been in continuous development in accordance with the democratic 
system and political situation in the country, Article 19 of the Con­
stitution of 1928 (the organic law of Trans-Jordan)*375 provided 
that, His Highness the Emir concludes treaties, but His Britannic 
Majesty may if necessary enter on behalf of Trans-Jordan into any com­
mercial treaty or, into any general international agreement when His 
Majesty is a party on behalf of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, ‘■'s*135
After the proclamation of independence of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan in 1946, the Monarchical Constitution was promulgated, and 
reserved the power to conclude and ratify treaties to the Executive 
without the approval of the Parliament, Article 26(b), provides that; 
"The King declares war and concludes treaties upon the approval of the 
Council of Ministers. Such an absolute power was criticised and
therefore modified by the present Constitution which provides for the 
approval of the National Assembly to all treaties of special import­
ance. Article (33) of the Constitution of 1952 reads as follows:
"The King declares war and makes peace and ratifies 
treaties. However, treaties of peace, alliance, trade, 
navigation, and any other treaties that imply modifi­
cation of territory of the state or its sovereign 
rights or involve financial commitments to the treas­
ury or affect the public or personal rights of 
Jordanians, shall not be enforceable unless they are 
approved by the National Assembly, In no circumstances 
shall any secret conditions contained in any treaty or 
agreement be contradictory to the openly declared 
conditions".
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The question put forward then was: which types of international a- 
greeraents are those that must be approved by the National Assembly in 
order to operate within Jordanian legal system?
Upon the request of the Council of Ministers, The High Council, estab­
lished under Article 57 of the Constitution, > interpreted art.33, 
and decided that; it is clear that the legislature has divided treat­
ies into two main categories:
First; treaties of peace, alliance, trade and navigation.
Second: treaties that imply modification of the territory of the
state or its sovereign rights or contain financial commitments to its 
treasury, or affect the public or personal rights of Jordanians.
Treaties of the first category are not enforceable unless approved 
by the National Assembly, no matter what kind of commitments they con­
tain, hence such treaties would by their very nature affect the fund­
amental sovereign rights of the state over its territory. So far as 
the second category is concerned, approval of the National Assembly is 
not required unless they imply some modification of the territory of 
the state or affect the public or personal rights of Jordanians.
Treaties which do not have such effects are operative upon rati­
fication by the executive without the involvement of the National As­
sembly.
Until 1958, this resolution was part of the constitutional law of 
Jordan and was applied by the Jordanian courts as such. c*3;)
However, in 1958 Article (33) was amended as follows:
" (i) The King declares war, concludes peace and con­
firms treaties and agreements.
(ii) Treaties and agreements which involve financial 
commitments to the treasury or affect the public or 
personal rights of Jordanians shall not be enforceable 
unless they are approved by the National Assembly. In 
no circumstances shall any secret condition contained
38
in any treaty or agreement be contradictory to the 
openly declared provisions".
In this amendment the phrase 'treaties of peace, alliance, trade, 
navigation and any other treaties that imply modification of the ter­
ritory of the State and its sovereign rights' was eliminated. This 
gave rise to the question of whether these treaties are now within the 
powers of the King, without the approval of the National Assembly, or 
still subject to that approval despite such an amendment.
According to the Deputy Prime Minister in his statement in the House 
of Representatives, the phrase "....treaties which contain modifica­
tion to the territory of the State or its sovereign rights" was elim­
inated because these treaties were prohibited under Article 1, of the 
constitution. Therefore, they would remain unconstitutional even
with the approval of the National Assembly. Moreover, treaties of
peace, alliance and trade are still subject to the approval of the 
National Assembly, despite the amendment on the grounds that they are 
sure to affect the public or personal rights of Jordanians.<*■'*> The 
revised Article (33) had also added for the first time the term
'agreement' after the term 'treaties': on the difference between the
two terms, the High Council stated that:
"the difference is in practical usage rather than in
the legal consequences: the term 'treaty' is usually
referred to in more precise meaning, as to the most 
important political agreements such as those of peace 
and alliance,... while the term 'agreement' or 'conven­
tion' is used in the less important and non-political 
international agreements" .
Many Jordanian writers have criticised this terminology and stated 
that it would have been much clearer, if the legislature had chosen 
one of the two terms.CA95
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However, it seems that the decisive point is whether or not the 
matter in question is an international agreement between the Govern­
ment of Jordan and any other international person(s); if it is so,
then it must be sanctioned by the National Assembly within the above
criteria, whatever the name or title it bears,treaty, agreement,
convention, covenant etc.
Accordingly under Article (33) all important international agree­
ments must be approved by the National Assembly. This is intended to 
serve as a means of Parliamentary review to the activities of the 
Executive. A rather interesting constitutional and practical problem 
was raised as to whether or not the Government (the Council of Minis­
ters) could sanction international agreements by the provisional laws
referred to in Article 94 of the Constitution, when the Assembly is
not in session.<sco It reads as follows:
"In cases where the National Assembly is not in
session, the Council of Ministers has with assent of 
the King, the power to issue provisional laws covering 
matters which require necessary action and which could 
not be delayed or to approve urgent expenditure which 
cannot be delayed. Such laws, which should not contra­
vene the provisions of the Constitution, shall have 
the force of law, providing that they be placed before 
the National Assembly at the beginning of its next
session and the Assembly may sanction such laws or
amend them. . . "
This question has special importance in the present context, since 
the human rights Covenants were approved by the Council of Ministers 
in 1975 by a provisional law. According to the majority of Jordanian 
constitutional lawyers, international agreements cannot be sanctioned 
by such provisional laws. They justified their views on the ground of 
the doctrine of separation of powers, as an essential element of the 
Parliamentary system, which requires the balance between powers 
through the Parliamentary review of the Executive's activities in
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international relations.<S13 Alternatively they suggested that the 
Government must wait until the next session of the National Assembly, 
and that international agreements should remain unenforceable until a 
positive resolution is passed by the Assembly.
However, in the administrative practice of the Jordanian Govern­
ment, the Council of Ministers has constantly issued provisional laws 
to sanction international agreements whenever the National Assembly is 
not in session. Therefore, many treaties, including the United Nations 
Covenants on human rights, have initially been approved by provisional 
laws, since the entry into force of the present Constitution in 
1952. <e3:> The present writer however holds the view that Article 94, 
explicitly conferred on the Council of Ministers the power to issue 
all the necessary provisional laws, with no exception and thus 
treaties must be included. All that is required for this power to be 
invoked, is that the National Assembly is not in session. Any 
suggested limitation in this regard would be unfounded in the light of 
the explicit provisions of the said Article*3^ 3 Thus any 
international agreement could be approved by the Council of Ministers 
by a provisional law, provided that it is submitted to the Assembly at 
the beginning of the next session. The second objection, that the ap­
proval is a means of 'check and control* is similarly unfounded, be­
cause the right of the Assembly in this respect is always re­
served, as the submission of those agreements to the Assembly at
the beginning of its next session is a mandatory procedure under the 
same Article<se>
Thus, the Constitution has distinguished between two kinds of 
international agreements: those which become operative upon signature 
and ratification by the Executive on the one hand, and those which
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require the approval of the National Assembly on the o t h e r . T h e  
latter are not enforceable unless they are sanctioned, by the Assembly. 
For their domestic application by the Jordanian courts and 
administration <as any other legislation) both of them need to be
assented to by the King and published in the JOG. Upon the completion 
of all these Constitutional procedures, both of them become an
indivisible part of the Jordanian law, applicable by the courts and 
binding upon both administration and the individuals. cse:>
According to the established view of the Jordanian^ courts 
application of international agreements is subject to the same general 
principles governing the application of domestic legal rules. 
Principle such as ' Lex posterior derogat priori* and the hierarchical 
legal order, al-tashre'a al-a'aJa you-qide al-adna wala ax (The higher 
rule abrogates or modifies the lower one and not vice versa); and the 
rule, al-khass you-qide al-a*am or Lex specials derogat generali 
(special law supersedes the general one) are all applicable. As
treaties usaually regulate particular subjects, they take precedence 
over the general provisions of a statute or an ordinance in case of
conflict. That is to say, when Jordan and other countries conclude an
agreement amongst themselves regulating specific matters such as the 
employment of their citizens within this group, taxation, tourism, 
transport by land or air, shipment of goods by sea or immigration, the 
provisions of such an agreement would be regarded as a special 
legislation regulating the subject concerned, providing of course, 
that the agreement has received all the required constitutional 
measures. Should a case involving the subject matter of the agreement, 
be brought before a Jordanian court, the latter would apply the 
provisions of the agreement rather than the provision of the general
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domestic law governing the issue; this is not because it is an
international agreement,but because it is a special law (.Lex
sped a I/s') regulating this specific issue. Let us imagine an immigration
agreement between the Arab countries. In a case of an Arab immigrating
to Jordan, the domestic courts would apply the provisions of the 
agreement as a Lex special/s instead of the immigration law which is 
the Lex generalis in this case.
In a case before the Supreme Court of Jordan in 1963, involving 
the Warsaw Convention on Air Transport, an Air Line Company argued 
that the amount of compensation payable to those killed in a plane- 
crash was the Islamic Deah (blood-money) in accordance with the 
Islamic Civil Code applicable in Jordan especially since it was a 
Jordanian Company, The court rejected this argument and decided that 
the applicable law was the Warsaw Convention <To which Jordan was a 
party) as a special law regulating the issue of compensation in the 
case of death or damage resulting from the air-crash, and not the 
Civil Code which deals with civil compensation in general,<ss** In 
another case in 1966, the same court decided that the provision which 
should have been applied by the Court of Appeal was the provision of 
Article 22 of the above mentioned Convention rather than the Labour 
Code of Jordan for the same reason. Again in 1970, the Supreme
Court also ruled that the Brussels Convention on Carriage of Goods by 
Sea of 1922 was the applicable law in all issues involving shipment 
of goods by sea and not the Jordanian Civil Code. It was stated that 
the agreement was duly ratified by the Government of Jordan and 
therefore that it was applicable in Jordan as a special law regulating 
special types of legal relations and in this capacity it takes
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precedence over the provisions of the Civil Cade with regard to the 
matters regulated by the agreement. <ei?
Yet, some Jordanian scholars who are in favour of the theory of 
monism and the 'supremacy' of international law over the domestic law, 
have misinterpreted the attitude of the Supreme Court and concluded 
that, "The Jordanian courts applied the theory of monism and 
acknowledged supremacy of international treaties over the domestic 
laws of Jordan".<e2s Apparently, what they have failed to notice was 
that the Supreme Court was applying them as special Jordanian laws, 
lawfully passed and assented to by His Hajesty the King and published 
in the JOG as required by the Constitution, and not as international 
agreements,
As a result of this misinterpretation the Jordanian Government 
reported to the HRC that the Jordanian courts accord international 
agreements a superior status over the domestic laws. It says <in the 
report) that:
"... it should be noted that international agreements 
which Jordan ratifies or accedes to have the force of 
law and have precedence over all domestic laws with 
the exception of the Constitution, This has been 
repeatedly confirmed by various courts decisions 
especially the highest court of the land, and in 
particular judgment No. 310/66 by the Court of 
Cassation which is the highest court of the land. In 
other words any individual in Jordan may invoke the 
covenant or any part thereof in any court of the 
land."CS3>
One may agree with the first sentence of this statement, that duly 
ratified agreements have the force of law in Jordan; and also with the 
last sentence, that any individual in Jordan may invoke the Covenant 
or any part thereof before the Jordanian courts, but one may dispute 
the statement that Jordanian courts consider international agreements 
(as such) superior to the domestic laws. In none of the above
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mentioned cases, including Case No. 310/66 referred to in the report, 
has the Supreme Court or indeed any other court made such a statement. 
Again in all the cases where an international agreement was given 
precedence over the Jordanian law, it was made clear by the court that 
this was because the agreement was treated as a special Jordanian law 
regulating the subject matter and not because it was an international 
agreement.
Obviously, human rights Covenants, are within the category which 
requires the approval of the Rational Assembly. "Treaties and 
agreements... affect the public or personal rights of 
Jordanians. <e45 As the Assembly was not in session in 1975 when 
Jordan signed and ratified the Covenants, they were approved by a 
provisional law. Like all international agreements in this category, 
human rights Covenants are of the rank of "Parliamentary Law" or 
"Statute", which occupies the highest rank after the Constitution in 
the hierarchy of the Jordanian laws. Concequently, in accordance with 
the general principles of legality, they cannot be denounced or 
modified except by a duly passed later piece Df legislation of an 
equivalent level 'Act of Parliament' (statute), or of an even higher 
rank still 'Constitutional provision', in the case of conflict 
with legislation of the same rank (statute) the above mentioned 
general rules of 'Lex posterior derogat priori' and al-khass you-qide 
al-a'am or Lex specials derogat generali (a special statute supersedes 
a general one) should apply.
Accordingly, the Covenants are part of the law of Jordan, and dir" 
ectly applicable before the Jordanian courts. Nonetheless, as will be 
shown from the case law in the coming chapters, the Covenants have 
never been applied by the Jordanian courts, nor have they been invoked
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by advocates before these courts, despite the numerous occasions where 
they could have been invoked,
The crucial question is how the Jordanian courts are going to 
interpret and apply the Covenants. It is not quite clear yet whether 
the Jordanian courts shall regard the Covenants as special laws 
regulating human rights and therefore giving them precedence over the 
Jordanian statutes in cases relating to human rights or not.
Some may argue that the Covenants are only general instruments
relating to human rights in general and therefore they may not
supersede the other laws which deal with specific aspects of human 
rights. If the provisions of the Political Covenant, for instance, 
were invoked against the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in 
a criminal case before a court, the latter should regard the Criminal 
Procedure Code to be the special law which regulates the proceedings 
in criminal cases and not the Covenant which deals with criminal
proceedings among other issues. This argument, if adopted by the 
Jordanian courts could have a serious impact on the applicability of 
the Covenants in Jordan; because almost all the rights referred to 
under the Covenants are regulated by special laws which are currently 
in force and therefore would supersede the Covenants.
In the light of the present practice of the Jordanian courts, it
is not likely that they would give effect to the provision of Article
19 of the Political Covenant for instance, against the provisions of 
the Law of Print and Publication with regard to the freedom of
expression and information; or the provisions relating to equality 
between the sexes and many other issues, simply because Jordan has 
special laws regulating these matters, which according to the present
practice supersede the Covenant in the case of conflict. Thus, it is
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*■ for the Jordanian legislature to take legislative measures to bring 
these laws into line with the provisions of the Covenants as will be 
explained in the coming chapters.
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(5) H.H. Ghanira, Principles of Public ...International Law, Cairo,
1968, p.136,
Furthermore he recommended this solution to be applied by the 
Egyptian courts in case of conflict between the laws of Egypt 
and international law; see also M, Akehurst, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law. 5th ed. , London, 1984, p.44
(6) Greig, op. cit.. p.53; Starke,op . cit.. p.76.
(7) For further details on the idea of the monists and the re­
lation between the legal norms of ’the technical order* see 
Hans Kelsen, The General Theory of Law and the State, 
translated by A, Vedberg; Rew York, 1973.
<8) See O'Connell, op. cit, p.45 .
(9) See for instance: O'Connell, op. cit.. pp.45-46.
C. Rousseau, op. cit., pp.39-40,
M.T. Al-Ghunaimi, op. cit.. p.224.
(10) Ibid: In the same direction he also decided that:
if contradictory rules in fact exist, it does not fallow that 
one of them must be void; but neither does it follow that the 
systems which give rise to them are mutually incompatible. It 
is one of the principal functions of juristic reasoning to 
eliminate contradiction by harmonizing the points of 
collision, not by pretending that they da not exist, nor by 
crushing the one with the other, p*44.
Identical views are held in 'Arabic International Law 
Jurisprudence' by Professor Ghaniam, op. cit.; pp,135-136
(11) There are some examples where the customary law even takes 
precedence over the national legislation. See for example Art.
48
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(15a)
(16)
(17)
(18) 
(19)
, (20) 
(21)
25; of the German constitution "The general rules of public 
international law shall be an integral part of the federal 
law. They shall take precedence over law".
JbicL.
See The Constitution of 1929», Art, 9, as amended in 1981.
See Greig, op. cit.. p. 78.
In Mortensen v. Peters, (1906) 8F (FC) 93, a Scottish court
acting under an Act of Parliament that restricted fishing in
an area beyond the 3-mile limit, convicted a Norwegian with 
these words: For us an Act of Parliament of duly passed by 
Lords and Commons and assented to by the King is supreme and 
we are bound to give effect to its terms."
For further details concerning the Anglo-American practice in 
this respect see:
Starke, pp. 74-82; Brownlie, op. cit.. pp. 45-47;
Pavithran, op. cit., pp, 104-107;
S. A. Romahi, Studies . in, Intei:na.t.i..anal-.Law and Diplomatic 
Practice, Tokyo, 1980, p.108.
The only reference in the Constitution is the provision of 
Art, 103, which refers to international practice with regard 
to the application of foreign laws, it says: "The regular 
courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters in accordance with the law for the time being in force 
in the Kingdom provided that, in matters affecting the 
personal status of foreigners, or in matters of civil and 
commercial nature in which it is customary by international 
usage to apply the law of another country, that law shall be
applied in a manner to be prescribed by law."
Vienna Conventions entered into force for Jordan in 1971.
Penal Code, Law No.16 of 1960, see the JOG, No. 1484, 1960, p.
324, hereinafter referred to as Penal Code. Similar provision 
is also included in the Criminal Procedures Code, law No, 9 of 
1961, JOG, No, 1539 of 1961, p.311; see also the Income Tax 
Act of 1964, JOG, No. 1800, 1964, p.1462.
Unreported case,
Case No. 119/73, published in the Jordanian Bar Review, 
hereinafter referred to as JBR, (1973) p. 330. Jordanian cases 
are cited by numbers and not by names of the parties, They 
will be cited here by mentioning the number of the case and 
the year of registration, followed by the yearly Volume of the 
JBR in which it is reported and the page number.
Heads of states, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers are 
internationally recognized competent bodies in this field.
Art. 52.
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<22)
<23)
<24)
<25)
<26)
<27)
<28)
<29)
<30)
<31)
<32)
Similar constitutional provision can be found in the con­
stitutions of many countries. See for instance:
The Constitution of: - Egypt; <1971) Art,151;
- Kuwait; <1962) Art. 70;
- Austria; <1929) Art. 50;
- Switzerland; <1874) Art. 98;
- Germany; <1949) Art, 59;
- Italy; <1947) Art. 80.
See Brownlie, op, cit.t p. 35; O'Connell, op. cit.. p. 59,
The Privy Council advice in A.G for Canada v. A.G. for Ontario 
[19373 A.C, 326 at p. 347.
See: Art. 53.
The Constitution of Kuwait of 1962, Art. <70). For identical 
warding see the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 Art. 151.
Similar provisions are also included in almost all Arab 
constitutions.
Constitution of 1947, Art. 80.
See E.S. Corwin; The Constitution and What.It Means Today. 
Revised by H.W. Chase and C.R. Ducat, 14th ed.^
Princeton, 1978, p. 173,
This may vary one country to anthr depeding on the respective 
constitution of each state;in Jordan forinstece, while some 
treaties are recognised as law merely after ratification by 
the executive, others need to be approved by the Parliament 
.In both cases the Royal assent and publication in the JOG are 
required.
This is the case in the French Constitution of 1958. Art. 55, 
stipulates that 'treaties or agreements duly ratified or 
approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority 
superior to that of law...'
The British System, Lord Denning, referring to the European 
Convention on Human Rights stated: "But I would dispute 
altogether that the Convention is a part of our law. Treaties 
and declarations do not become part of our law until they are 
made law by Parliament ". R. v. Chief Immigration Officer 
[1976] V.L.R. 979. Court of Appeal.
The American Constitution stated that the treaties that had 
been approved by a two thirds majority of the senators become 
in terms of force equal to the federal law. See Art, 6<2), see 
also the Constitution of Egypt, Art. 152<2), "...the treaties 
will have the power of law ..." similar provisions also 
provided for in Art. 70 of the Constitution of Kuwait,
<33) See Art.s 33 and 80 respectively.
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(34) See above pp.27-28
(35) See above pp.27-32
(36) See above p.30
(37) The full text is published In the JOG, No, 188, p.9.
(38) Such a provision resulted from the agreement signed on
February 20, 1928, which in Art,(2), stated:
"The power of legislation and of administration entrusted to 
his Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine shall 
be exercised in that part of the area under mandate known as
Trans-Jordan by His Highness the Emir.
Through such constitutional government as defined and 
determined in the organic law of Trans-Jordan and any 
amendments there is made with the approval of His Britannic 
Majesty."
For further details on Jordan under British mandate, and the 
British Trans-Jordan relations, see:
Ali Mahfzh, British Jordanian RelatioiLJbet_we.ei]L__19_21". 1957. 
Beirut, 1973.
(39) See: JOG Mo. 886 1/2/1947.
(40) The Constitution was published in JOG Mo. 1093, 8/1/1952.
(41) The High Council was entitled to give official interpretation 
of the Constitution under Art. 122:
"The High Council provided for in Art. 57 shall have the right 
to interpret the provision of the Constitution either at the 
request of the Council of Ministers or by a decision taken by 
any House of the National Assembly, ...such interpretation 
shall be implemented upon its publication in the Official 
Gazette."
(42) See: The High Council's Resolution No. 2/28/2/1955 published
in JOG No. 1224, 16/3/1955.
(43) See: Case No. 27/55, JBR (1955), p. 118.
(44) See: JOG No. 1396, 1/1/1958.
(45) Art.l of the Constitution provides that: "The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan is an independent Arab state. Its 
sovereignty is indivisible and no part therefrom may be 
ceded..."
(46) See: Al-Hiyari, Constitutiona1 Law and the Constitutional 
System of Jordan, 1st ed., Amman 1972 p. 698.
(47) This is the preponderant opinion among the Jordanian writers
and lawyers. See for instance: Al-Hiyari, Ibid; S. Keswany;
Principles of theConstitutional Law, Amman, 1983, p.243. See 
also: the 'Resolution of the High Council', above note 42.
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(48) See: Resolution Ho, 1 of 1962.
(49) See: above note 47.
(50) Art. 94.
(51) See S. Keswany, op. cit.t p. 247;
Al-Hiyari, op. cit., p. 703.
(52) Ibid.
(53) See A. Al-Hiyari, op. cit., p, 704.
(54) See the text of Art. 94 above p.39
(55) What the Council of Ministers does is a necessary, temporary
measure until the Parliament be reconvened. That is why it is 
called a provisional law.
(56) See Art. 94.
(57) See Art. 33.
(58) Case Ho. 5/65, JBR (1965) p. 865.
(58a) Ibid, see also notes 59-61.
(59) Case Ho. 100/62, JBR. (1966) pp. 528-31.
(60) Case Ho. 310/66, JBR. (1966) p. 1153.
(61) Case Ho. 12/70, JBR. (1970) p. 222.
(62) See for instance M, A1 Wan, "International Treaties in the 
Legal System of Jordan", JBR. (1976), p. 349.
(63) See U.H. Doc. Ho. CCPR/C/l/Add.55, p. 2 (1981).
(64) See Art.33, para., 2.
(65) For further details on the principle of legitimacy and its
application in Jordan and the legal hierarchy of the legal 
norms in the law of Jordan, see H. Hddah, The Administrative 
Courts in Jordan. Amman, 1972, pp. 7-82.
(66) Available records (until January 1987) do not indicate that 
the Covenants have yet been applied by any Jordanian court. 
However, during the consideration of the second supplementary 
reports of Jordan (CCPR/C/l/Add.56) in 1982, the 
representative of Jordan (Mr. Khouri) cited Case Ho. 32/82, 
and claimed that the Supreme Court of Jordan had stated that 
"International covenants and treaties supersede the local 
laws." However, inspection of the records and the ruling of 
the court in this case does not seem to support such a 
statement. See the summary records of the 361st meeting of the 
HRC, U.H. Doc. Ho, CCPR/C/SR. 361, p, 7(W$X)'
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ADOPTION OF EQUIVALENT STANDARDS AT THE
DOMESTIC LEVEL.
A major part of the role of the national Constitution and domestic 
law in the implementation of the modern international standards of hu­
man rights, is the introduction of domestic legal provisions which 
provide for equivalent standards at the national level, The scope and 
the nature of these domestic legal provisions varies in accordance 
with the nature of the scope of the obligation of the state parties.
The latter vary from one Covenant to the other. Under the Political 
Covenant, states parties undertake to guarantee the immediate and full 
implementation of the rights recognized therein, from the moment the 
Covenant enters into force, whereas under the Economic Covenant 
states parties undertake to adopt programmes and introduce laws 
intended for the progressive implementation of the economic, social 
and cultural rights. Some may argue however that the notion of 
progressive implementation applies to the economic and social planning 
with a view of achieving the full realization of these rights, only, 
and does not include the introduction of the domestic legal provi­
sions. This argument may contain part of the truth, but the crucial 
difference is, that if the state party does not introduce the required 
legislative measures for the full implementation of the economic 
social and cultural rights, it would not be in breach of its obliga­
tion, whereas under the Political Covenant it would be in plain 
violation of its obligation, (compare the provision of Article 2 in 
both covenants)
Furthermore, the scope of the legal obligation of the states par­
ties and consequently the required domestic legislative measures do
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not vary from one dovenant to the other, only, but within the same 
Covenant from one right to the other. The required, legislative mea­
sures for the implementation of the right to fair trial for instance 
differ from those required for the implementation of the right to 
freedom of religion. Likewise the right to education, requires dif­
ferent legislation from what is required for the right to work for 
instance.
Accordingly, this part shall be divided into two chapters, each of 
them dealing with a different set of rights separately.
Chapter III, Civil and Political Rights, Chapter IV, Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights.
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G  HJLPTTlSiR III.
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
Implementation of civil and political rights presents special 
problems and difficulties for states parties; partly because of the 
nature of the issues involved with these rights, and partly because 
states parties are under legal obligation to guarantee the full and 
immediate implementation of these rights from the moment the Covenant 
entered into force. Furthermore, every particular right in this cate­
gory calls for separate treatment and requires special legislative 
measures. This means that each state party should carry out a compre­
hensive review of its existing laws and eliminate those which are 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Covenant and also introduce 
the required measures in order to bring its Constitution and domestic 
laws into line with those provisions.
In this Chapter, we shall enquire into the laws and practices of 
Jordan in order to examine them viz-a-viz the minimum international 
standards of the civil and political rights, provided for in the pol­
itical Covenant. Four rights have been selected for this purpose, 
namely: the right to life, the right to personal liberty, the right 
to equality before the law and the right to freedom of expression, 
These four fundamental rights are chosen because each of them is as­
sociated with some problematic issues, which require, careful treat­
ment by the national legislature when assessing the existing laws and 
introducing the required legislative measures for the domestic imple­
mentation of the rights concerned. Issues such as abortion, the death 
penalty, freedom from arbitrary arrest and double jeopardy, the right 
to fair trial, freedom of the press and publication, discrimination
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and equality between the sexes, are all closely associated with these 
fundamental rights.
In the case of Jordan, as a Muslim and third world democracy, such 
issues are of great importance. In third world countries in general, 
where development of the democratic and constitutional institutions is 
still under way, the state tends to exercise control over the mass- 
media and appears to be more suspicious of the manner in which civil 
and political rights are exercised.
To define the scope of the obligation of the state party and the 
role that has been assigned to the national Constitution and the do­
mestic law in the implementation of any specific right, one must first 
start by analysing each right as set up by the relevant Article (s) of 
the Political Covenant and then turn to the existing laws and prac­
tices of Jordan, in order to judge them against the international 
provisions. Whenever the former falls short of the latter, the re­
quired legislative measures to bridge the gap will be suggested,
i~ THE RIGHT TO LIFE:
A- LIFE AS A H U M  RIGHT;
In ancient primitive societies, where there were no laws or 
official authorities, every man had to protect his awn life by all 
available means.C15
Although human life was not highly regarded by the laws of some of 
the ancient civilizations, it was strictly protected by most of them 
and by religions as well^25 According tD Islam for instance, the 
killing of a human being is totally prohibited unless in due process 
of law. 1:35 Even suicide is forbidden and considered a grave sin, as
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the Qur'an says: "Do not hill yourselves"5 Intentional hilling is
punishable by the death penalty in all cases.<s> These rules are still 
applicable in some Muslim countries. In Jordan, the legislature has 
departed from the traditional Islamic rules and adopted a modern 
western style of penal policy.
Since all human rights and freedoms can only be accorded to or 
claimed by a living person, the right to life has thus been regarded 
as the most important among the recognized rights of man, and has 
occupied a prominent position in almost all major international 
instruments of human rights,
As far as the Political Covenant is concerned, Article 6 
stipulates that: "Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. Mo one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life", paragraph (1).
Obviously, the first sentence of this paragraph is a declaratory 
statement with extremely important implications. The term "inherent" 
indicates that the right to life is not a right which has been created 
by the framers of the Covenant, but rather a right which has always 
existed and been recognized by law from time immemorial. It is a right 
which has been recognized and protected under general or customary 
international law, and therefore it is binding on all countries even 
those which are not parties to the Political Covenant. Some have 
stressed that the norms protecting the right to life in the 
contemporary international law possess the status of jus cogens 
rules, <y,:> The fact that the right to life is the only right in the 
Covenant to be described as "inherent" indicates the superior value of 
this right and that it is one without which, protection of the other 
rights would be meaningless, In a recent resolution the General
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Assembly confirmed that, all peoples and all individuals have the 
inherent right to life and that the safeguarding of this foremost 
right is an essential condition for the enjoyment of the entire range 
of social and cultural rights. <s:i
The second sentence of this paragraph, requires that this right be 
protected by law. It is true that the terra "law" is broad and includes 
not only the constitutions and the statutes but also administrative
regulations, courts' decisions and even unwritten laws. Therefore,
some may argue that protection by administrative regulations may 
suffice. The term "law" as used here should be interpreted in the 
light of the required result which is the effective protection of the 
right to life. Accordingly, the law should be mobilized at the highest 
level, i.e. the constitution or a statute or both together. Therefore, 
every state party is required to introduce in its constitution and 
statutes sufficient legal provisions declaring the right to life as a 
human right and protecting it from violation. If taken in conjunction 
with Article 2(1) of the Covenant, the obligation of the state party 
under this paragraph goes far beyond the mere introduction Df legal 
provisions. It is the obligation to "respect" and to "ensure". The 
obligation to "respect" requires the authorities of the state party to
refrain from taking life in an arbitrary manner. In the course of
their official activities official authorities of the state must show 
a high degree of respect for the life of human beings. A proper 
consideration must always be given to the possibility that in the 
course of such official activities - though they might be perfectly 
legal and justifiable - some innocent people may lose their lives, and 
therefore the authorities must avoid over reaction and careless 
actions which may deprive human beings of their lives. In its general
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comment on Article 6, the HRC stated that; "...deprivation of life by
the authorities of the state is a matter of utmost gravity. Therefore,
the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a
person may be deprived of his life by such authorities,"e The state
must also show respect for the right to life by fulfilling the other
part of its obligation. That is the duty to "ensure" which requires
the state party to take practical measures and to intervene to protect
life and to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life from taking place.
This undertaking applies not only to deprivation of life by illegal
actions but also to any other hazards and threats to life either by
human beings or even by natural disaster. Again, commenting on Article
6, the HRC stated that:
"... the Committee considers that states have the 
supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and 
other acts of mass violence causing arbitrary loss of 
life. Every effort they make to avert the danger of 
war especially thermo-nuclear war, and to strengthen 
international peace and security would constitute the 
most important condition and guarantee for the 
safeguarding of the right to life,..The protection 
against arbitrary deprivation of life which is 
explicitly required by the third sentence of article 
6(1) is of paramount importance... states parties 
should take measure^ not only to prevent and punish 
deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to 
prevent arbitrary killing by their security forces... 
states parties should take specific and effective 
measures to prevent the disappearance of individuals,
. . . states should establish effective facilities and 
procedures to investigate thoroughly cases of missing 
and disappeared persons in circumstances which may 
involve a violation of the right to life,"c10>
For this purpose the HRC stated that the "inherent right to life"
guaranteed under this paragraph;
"cannot properly be understood in a restrictive 
manner, the protection of this right requires that 
states adopt positive measures. In this connection, 
the Committee considers that it would be desirable for 
states parties to take all possible measures to reduce 
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy,
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especially in adopting measures to eliminate mal­
nutrition and epidemics."c115
It should be made clear however, that the obligation to "respect" 
and to "ensure" the right to life, does not require the state party to 
provide a personal bodyguard to every individual who may think that 
his life is threatened, A margin of appreciation must be left to the 
authorities of the state to assess the need for intervention and 
protection in the light of the surrounding circumstances.c The 
exercise of such an appreciation by the national authorities is 
subject to the control of the international bodies of supervision, 
which may or may not agree with the judgement of the national 
authorities.
A state party may thus violate this right (the right to life)
either "by action or by omdssian"« That is to say, by acting when it
should have refrained, and by refraining when it should have acted to
prevent arbitrary deprivation of life from taking place when it was
likely to occur. In Case Ho. 84/j981, a person lost his life in some
mysterious circumstances while in police custody . As the HRC was
unable to arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether the victim had
committed suicide, as claimed by the authorities, or was driven to
suicide or killed by others while in custody as was claimed by the
complainant, the HRC stated that:
"The inescapable conclusion is that in all the 
circumstances the state party's authorities either by 
act or by omission were responsible for not taking 
adequate measures to protect his life as required by 
article 6(1) of the Covenant. " c 13:1
The EUCM. has made it clear that the phrase: ’shall be protected
by law1 used in Article 2 of the EHR. requires the states not only to 
refrain from taking life, but also to take appropriate steps to
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protect life,*131315 In Cyprus v, Turkey, the EUCM. held that the
killing of Cypriot civilians by Turkish soldiers commanded by an
officer in activities unconnected with any war, contravened Article
In the same way, the Inter-American Commission on Human Right
- with regard to Article 1, of the American Declaration - stated
that, although the government is responsible only for violations
committed by its officials or agents, it could not remain passive in
the face of attacks on individuals' rights to life in the course of
armed struggle between hostile factions.
"The duty of the state is to guarantee the security of 
the population, and it could be failing in this duty, 
both by action and by aimission. Accordingly the state 
cannot remain indifferent to such a fundamental 
matter, and must do everything in its power
effectively to protect these rights".<1eJ
The third sentence of the same paragraph, 'Mo one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life,' clearly indicate that the right to 
life is not an absolute right, and therefore deprivation of life is a 
permissible measure so far as it is not 'arbitrary'. What is pro­
hibited under this sentence is arbitrary deprivation of life only.
However, the difficult question that has been raised from the very 
beginning, which still causes a great deal of controversy among 
lawyers and writers is this: What is an arbitrary deprivation of life? 
Is it 'illegal' or merely 'unjustifiable'? Heated debates were 
recorded during the framing of Article 6, and widely divergent points 
of view were expressed by the delegates of different countries, 
especially the UK, USA, USSR, and Lebanon.<ie> Further arguments and 
counter arguments were also occasioned by the discussion of Article 6 
in the Third Committee.c17> Some legal commentators have argued that,
if the term 'arbitrary' or 'arbitrarily' means only 'illegal', this
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would render all the despotic acts of national governments
unchallengeable so far as they were in d Ctordance with the domestic
l a w . I t  has been stated that the drafters, with fresh memories of
the atrocities and inhuman practices that the world had experienced
during and immediately before the Second World War, intended to reduce
the legal discretion of states.cls:> The adverb 'arbitrarily' must not
be taken as a synonym of 'illegal'. According to P.Hassan, "The reason
for the use of the word 'arbitrary' or 'arbitrarily' was to protect
individuals from both 'illegal' and 'unjust' acts".*205 Professor
R.B.Lillich, questioned this interpretation and stated that: "Even if
one accepts this view, however, the question of what constitutes an
'unjust' deprivation of life remains".<215 Nonetheless, he did not
attempt to answer the question himself. According to C.K.Boyle:
"The concept embraced in the clause 'no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life' requires that a 
deprivation be justifiable by reference to pre­
existing law in the first instance. But that is not a 
sufficient requirement; in addition, the law itself, 
the powers it prescribes from culpability for taking 
life, must conform to explicit and implicit standards 
in the covenant on the protection of the right to
life,"
Prof. Y. Dinstien, admitted that the term is controversial and not 
easily definable, but did not provide us even with a general criterion 
to distinguish 'arbitrary' from 'permissible' killing, He stated 
that: "The term 'arbitrary'... is not easy to define. Its use in 
Article 6 was indeed criticised at the time of drafting as ambiguous 
and open to several interpretations" . Others have introduced broad
definitions using some terminology, which in itself calls for 
definition.
D. D. Nsereco stated that:
"Taking into account the meaning assigned to the term 
'arbitrarily' by the various delegations, its meaning
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in common parlance, and the totality of the human 
righto regime which the instruments establish, the 
present author would posit the following definition, 
Deprivation of life would be ’arbitrary' if:
a) it is made without due regard to the rules of 
natural justice, the due process of law; or
b) it is made in a manner contrary to the law; or
c) it is made in pursuance of a law which is 
despotic, tyrannical and in conflict with 
international human rights standards or 
international humanitarian law".<:s'*>
The general comments of the HRC do not provide a clear definition
Df "arbitrary deprivation of life": in its general comments on Article
6, the Committee stated:
"The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life 
which is explicitly required by the third sentence of 
Article 6(1) is of paramount importance. The Committee 
considers that state parties should take measures not 
only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by 
criminal acts, but also prevent 'arbitrary' hilling by
their own security forces, The deprivation of life by
the authorities of the state is a matter of the utmost
gravity".
However, the view expressed by the Committee in The de Guerrero 
Case (communication Ho,R,11/45) is of great i m p o r t a n c e . 3 The 
communication was brought on behalf of the husband of Maria Fanny S.
de Guerrero, who was killed during a police raid on a house in the
district of Bogota. The raid was ordered in the belief that there was 
a kidnapped person held prisoner in the said house. Having searched 
the house without finding the kidnapped person, the police decided to 
hide in the house to await the arrival of the suspected kidnapper (s). 
Seven persons, including Mrs, de Guerrero were shot dead by the police 
as they arrived at the house.
Police inquiries and subsequent trial by the Police Court 
acquitted the police officers and considered their action justifiable 
under the domestic law of Colombia, particularly under the legislative 
Decree Ho, 0070,
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The author of the communication argued that the victims were
arbitrarily deprived of their lives by the police and that the action
of the police was unjustified because the forensic report, the
ballistic report and the result of the paraffin test, showed that none
of the victims had fired a shot and that they had all been hilled at
point-blank range, some of them shot in the bach or in the head, and
that most of them had been shot while trying to save themselves from
the unexpected attack. The forensic report showed that Mrs. de
Guerrero was shot several times after she had already died from a
heart attack. It was also alleged that the victims were not given the
opportunity to surrender, and that subsequent police investigation did
not prove that they were kidnappers. Referring to Article 6 of the
Political Covenant the Committee stated that:
"The right enshrined in this article is the supreme 
right of the human being, It follows that the 
deprivation of life by the authorities of the state is 
a matter of the utmost gravity, .. The requirements that 
the right shall be protected by law and that no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, means that 
the law must strictly control and limit the cir­
cumstances in which a person may be deprived of his 
life by the authorities of the state..."'12'75
It was also added that:
"it is the Committee's view that the action of the 
police resulting in the death of Mrs. de Guerrero was 
disproportionate to the requirements of law en­
forcement in the circumstances of the case and that
she was arbitrarily deprived of her life contrary to 
Article 6(1),., in as much as the police action was
made justifiable as a matter of Colombian law by
legislative Decree Mo. 0070 of 20th January 1978, the 
right to life was not adequately protected by the law 
of Colombia, as required by Article 6 (1).
The Committee had insisted that the right to life should be in­
terpreted in its widest possible meaning, and criticised the narrow 
definition given to this right by some states parties^ and held the
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action of the police to be disproportionate and unjustifiable and 
therefore amounting to ’arbitrary deprivation' of life. In this case, 
the Committee has introduced a crucial element in this regard, namely 
the element of proportionality and justifiability in the light of the 
circumstances of the case concerned.
Accordingly, arbitrary deprivation of life may be defined as; in­
tentional hilling of a human being, which is unjustifiable on both, 
legal and factual bases. That is to say, in order not to be regarded 
as an arbitrary deprivation of life, it must not only be justifiable 
under national and international law, but also justifiable on a 
factual basis in the surrounding circumstances of the case. In other 
words, deprivation of life would be considered 'arbitrary' even though
i
it might be permissible under both national and international law, if 
it is not justifiable on a factual basis; for instance, both national 
and international law allow the release of hostages by force if 
necessary, which may involve deprivation of life, nonetheless it would 
remain arbitrary deprivation of life when it is not justifiable in the 
exigence of the situation. However, on its own, factual justification 
is equally insufficient. On the factual side, a brutal murder would 
provide justification for depriving the murderer of his life, but if 
the domestic law does not prescribe the death penalty, the execution 
of the murderer would be regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of life, 
because it is not justifiable on a legal basis.
Accordingly, it is the duty of the national legislature to 
establish the right to life as a human right and to punish arbitrary 
deprivation of life as a capital crime. ¥hen such a crime is directed 
(in whole or in part) against the right to life of a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group, it might be regarded as a genocide. ess,:>
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In Jordan, there is no express provision in the Constitution 
recognizing the right to life as a human right. Nonetheless, it could 
be argued that it is implied in Article 7 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d  
protected under the Penal Cade. According to the latter, Intentional 
killing of a human being (arbitrary deprivation of life) is an 
offence, punishable by hard labour for a term of fifteen years.C31J 
The sentence is to be increased to hard labour for life if the felony 
has been committed on more than one person or in the case of torturing 
the victim before murder, C32:> The death penalty itself may be imposed 
in protection of the right to life. Article 328, provides that: 
"Intentional killing is punishable by the death sentence if committed;
a) with previous planning and determination;
b) to facilitate the way to another felony;
c) against one of the offender's forbears,"<33*
If the death resulted from arson, the arsonist is to be punished by 
death sentence in all cases provided for in Articles 368-369 and by 
hard labour in those of Articles 370-371. C3-i:'
According to Article 339, any person who encourages or aids 
another to coiumit suicide shall be punished by imprisonment from three 
to fifteen years, "If the suicide was not successful, the punishment 
shall be imprisonment from three months to two years. , . and up to 
three years if it resulted in permanent disability". C3E>
Peaceful enjoyment of the right to life has also been guaranteed 
under various Articles of the criminal law of J o r d a n . A r t i c l e  107 
of the Penal Code for instance, prescribes a sentence of up to fifteen 
years hard labour for any two or more persons who establish a felony 
or conclude an agreement between themselves to commit violence on 
individuals, The imprisonment should not be less than seven years if
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the aim is to commit murder. Moreover, any group of three or more 
persons which appears on public highways, roads or in the countryside 
as an armed gang with the aim of ruination , violence or any other 
such activities, is to be punished by a sentence of hard labour for a 
term of not less than seven years. This should be extended to life 
imprisonment if the said group actually carried out such 
activities. <37:,The death sentence may be imposed in case of torture 
and murder resulting from the said activities.
The Supreme Court of Jordan has held that : " it is enough for the 
purposes of the above Article to prove that the defendants had 
participated in the throwing of stones which resulted in death"
In practice, the Jordanian Government seems to have always <even 
before the entry into force of the U.M. Covenants in 1976) complied 
with its duty to intervene to preserve order and to protect the life 
of individuals whether threatened by illegal action or natural
disasters, The Government has always performed its duty to protect
individuals from terrorist attacks. In September 1970, the Jordanian 
Government intervened by force to protect the lives of innocent people 
who were being killed. In order to prevent the crime of genocide and 
all terrorist activities, waged by Palestinians against Jordanians,
all guerillas were evacuated from Amman and consequently from 
Jordan.CA15 Another precedent was the terrrorist attack on the 
Intercontinental Hotel in Amman on November 17th 1976, when a group of 
terrorists occupied the hotel and took hostages inside. The Government 
fulfilled its duty and ensured the release of the threatened
hostages.
As for the duty of states parties to refrain from arbitrary 
deprivation of life, Jordan seems also to have complied with this
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obligation so far. That is to say, one cannot see obvious or official 
'state activities' which may be regarded as a form of arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life by the Government or its agents. This 
of course does not rule out the possibility that individual cases 
might occur from time to time, but nonetheless, these would remain 
very rare and isolated incidents.
B- SOME CORRELATED QUESTI CMS: (Abortion and Peath Penalty).
Both abortion and the death penalty are closely related to the 
right to life and they could certainly affect the legal dimensions of 
this right and the protection being given to it. They are both highly 
debatable issues and they raise complex questions which need to be 
treated separately.
1- Abortion.
Abortion has become an increasingly important subject over which 
widely diverging views and attitudes have been expressed by writers, 
lawyers and legislators, especially concerning its legitimacy.
national legislatures are divided into two camps, those who 
prohibited abortion on the one hand and those who legalized it on the 
other. It is interesting to notice that none of the two camps have 
agreed on unified grounds for prohibiting or legalising abortion. As 
regards the former, various justifications for the prohibition of 
abortion have been put forward. According to some of them, abortion is 
regarded as an offence against morals and public feelings. In this
camp stand the Jordanian and Syrian legislators. Although neither of 
them has defined the phrase 'moral and public feelings' the Syrian 
Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber) has defined it as "those learned
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norms of moral excellence and social conduct, recognized by society as 
suck, and of which any violation would hurt the public feelings", 5 
Some other penal codes classify it as an offence against persons, that 
is women, and punish it as such, Finally, there are those which
treat abortion as an offence against the family. <*T'> On the other 
hand, countries which have legalized abortion have justified it on 
different bases, such as the right of the pregnant woman to 
privacy, or her life or health.
However, despite the modern trend among Western legal systems41505 
abortion is still, according to many others illegal and against the 
religious teachings of many r e l i g i o n s . >
The troublesome question which has frequently arisen is this: When 
does the life of the foetus start? Article 6 of the Folitical 
Covenant, does not provide an explicit answer to this question. As it 
stands at the present time Article 6(1) declares the "inherent" right 
to life and requires that it be protected by law, but it does not 
specify the time when the required protection should commence. During 
the discussion of this Article in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly, an amendment was suggested whereby the phrase "from the 
moment of conception" would be inserted,c 152 J but this was rejected on 
the following grounds:
1) The state is not able to determine the moment of conception and 
therefore cannot determine the moment from which protection of the 
life of the foetus should be provided.
2> This is a matter on which internal regulations differ 
considerably and therefore it is inappropriate to include such a 
provision in an international instrument.
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One may wonder whether any or both of these grounds are sufficient 
enough reason to reject the amendment and to leave such a crucial 
question unanswered, causing difficulties in defining the scope of the 
guaranteed right and the protection required thereto. As regards the 
first point, the uncertainty about the moment at which life begins, 
should, if any thing, support the proposal that protection must be 
provided from the moment of conception. If it is too difficult to 
define precisely the moment of conception, the moment from which
protection should be provided would be the moment when pregnancy 
becomes Known because before that moment the question of abortion is 
irrelevant, One cannot speak of abortion unless one knows for certain 
that there is a human being at some stage of its development in the 
womb and which we seek to destroy. Once pregnancy is confirmed, it is 
obvious that conception has taken place and thus protection should 
commence. As for the second reason, (that internal regulations vary 
considerably on this question) it should be remembered, that abortion 
is not the only issue on which "internal regulations vary
considerably". Several examples may be mentioned here such as; the
death penalty, sexual equality, freedom of expression, freedom of
trade unions. Variation in domestic laws on these issues did not
prevent their inclusion in the Covenant. On the contraryj domestic
variations should be a reason to include this issue in order' to settle
such differences and to provide unified international standards,
rather than an obstacle, Another reason to include such a phrase is 
the provision of paragraph (5) Article 6 which provides that "Sentence 
Df death shall not... be carried out an pregnant women". One may ask 
why not? Is not the reason to protect the right of the child to life? 
If so, is there not a right to be born, a right of which the child may
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not arbitrarily be deprived. Is it not paradoxical to reject the above 
amendment and to include this provision in the same Article? Under the 
present Article 6, if a woman who has been pregnant for three weeks is 
executed, Article 6 would be violated because the child has been 
deprived of his right to life. On the other hand if an abortion is 
performed on a woman who has been pregnant for six months and her 
moving and kicking child is killed, Article 6 would not be violated. 
One may ask those who rejected the amendment how they could justify 
the difference and why they recognized the right to life for the child 
of a criminal woman and denied the same right to the child of an 
innocent woman.
Furthermore, Article 4 of The Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child 1959, stipulates that: "The child... shall be entitled to grow 
and develop in health; to this end, special care and protection shall 
be provided both to him and to his mother, including adequate pre­
natal and post-natal care.,."
Drafters of the AMR have made it clear that protection of life 
should start at the moment of conception. Article 4 thereof provides 
that: "Every person has the right to have his life respected, This 
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of 
conception. . . " .
Divergent views have been expressed by writers and legal comme­
ntators on this issue. According to J. Feinberg,
"unborn children are among the sort of beings of whom 
possession of rights can meaningfully be predicted, 
even though they are (temporarily) incapable of having 
interests, because their future interests can be 
protected now" ,
As D, Lasok has insisted:
"Termination of pregnancy does not consist of the 
removal of an unwanted piece of jelly (as suggested by
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a high-ranking churchman) hut of a deliberate des­
truction of a human being. Whatever form the operation 
takes, there can be no mistake that abortion consists 
of the extraction of the whole or parts of a human 
being at some stage of development towards a unique 
person. Putting aside press reports of moving babies 
being incinerated and the lucrative business of 
abortion clinics, the ethical and legal question which 
society has to face squarely, is whether the gains on 
the side of the protection of the rights of the unborn 
can be allowed to be neglected by licence to 
kill".CSB>
fkc
As for other commentators favouring/ right to abortion, Richard
Lillich has stated that:
"The legality of abortion ... is a much debated 
question, turning as it does upon the determination of 
when the life to be protected commences;... if there is 
not already an absolute right to abortion, such a 
right at least exists during most of a woman's 
pregnancy and it is not incompatible with the norm 
governing the right to life...[since it is] a matter 
of ’legitimate diversity1; it would seem preferable to 
interpret the right to life norm tD permit states, at 
their option, to sanction limited use",<es5
One may find it difficult to agree with professor Lillich*s 
jltar
argument/the right to abortion "exists during most of a woman's pre­
gnancy". This may be true in the case of some legal systems but not all 
of them; and thus it is not a general rule. The present writer shares 
the view that the right to life exists throughout the period of 
pregnancy and therfore protection shoud be provided from the moment of 
conception.
The HRC has not had an opportunity to pronounce upon this question 
yet. Whether the HRC shall accept the view that the right to life 
starts at the moment of conception and therefore protection by law is 
required from that moment and consequently declares the laws which 
permit termination of pregnancy to be inconsistent with Article 6, 
shall remain to be seen. However, it is not likely that the HRC would 
agree that protection is required from the moment of conception,
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partly because of the legislative history of Article 6(1) and partly 
because of modern trend towards the liberalization of the laws
relating to abortion.
The theoretical debates and the noticeable trend in many legal
systems, particularly in the West, towards the liberalization of laws 
regarding abortion seem to have influenced the views of some lawyers 
and the attitude of the legislature in Jordan. Until recently, the
latter has upheld the prevalent view in Islamic jurisprudence,
according to which, abortion (at any time and by whatever means) is a 
gross violation of the right to life, and therefore forbidden. It is 
permissible only under the principle of necessity, when it is the only
way to save the life of the mother. As far as the Penal Code is
concerned, this view is still upheld.
Article 321 of the latter provides that: "Any pregnant woman who 
miscarries herself or permits anyone else to do so, shall be confined 
in the penitentiary for a term of six months to three years."
According to Article 322 thereof, anyone, who by any means, miscarries 
a pregnant woman with her consent, shall be punished by imprisonment 
from one to three years. CE?r5 if the operation or the means used to 
procure abortion results in the death of the pregnant woman, the 
person who performs it shall be punished by hard labour for a term of 
not less than five years, css:* Although abortion in these cases is 
meant to be produced upon the request of the pregnant woman or by her 
consent, the legislature provides a greater punishment for the person 
who performs the operation than for the woman herself.
Obviously, this is intended to prevent such persons from
practising their' immoral' and dangerous activities, and to protect 
the life of the foetus. However, if the abortion is being performed
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without the consent of the pregnant woman,'1 the offender shall be
punished by hard labour of not more than ten years, and not less than 
that if it results in the death of the pregnant woman" , 5 553 J Here
again, the law has increased the punishment in order to protect the 
right of the embryo and of the pregnant woman to life. The punishment 
is to be increased by one third in all cases, when the operation is 
being performed by a physician, pharmacist or a midwife.
It seems that the legislature wants to prevent these people from 
abusing scientific skills, which would be of great harm to society. It 
could be stated thus, that the Penal Code of Jordan has prohibited 
abortion in all cases and at any time of the pregnancy, with or
without the consent of the pregnant woman.<ei> Nonetheless, it has
been permitted, in certain exceptional cases by some recent specific 
legislative Acts. One of these is al-Dus-Tour al Teby (The Medical 
Constitution) of 1970, which legalised abortion if procured to save 
the life of the pregnant woman,<e2:>
Art. 43 thereof provides that when there are no other possible means 
to save the life of the pregnant woman, pregnancy may be terminated 
subject to the following conditions: c6,35
a) termination of pregnancy is recommended by two physicians as 
the only possible way to save the life of the pregnant woman. One 
of the two physicians is to be the performer of the operation, who 
must mention that in his report;
b) the operation must be agreed to by the pregnant woman or her 
husband or any other authorised person according to the situation;
c) if the pregnant woman refuses the operation in spite of the 
doctors' warning, then the latter must adhere to her will;
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d) unless urgently needed, a physician who - for reasons of 
personal conscience - would not recommend the termination of the 
pregnancy, must pass the case on to one of his colleagues. In the 
case of Caesarean Section, the doctor must decide - without 
emotional considerations - whether to save the life of the mother 
or that of the child, if necessary.
In yet another, mare important recent development, the influence
of the Western legal systems, especially the British Abortion Act of 
1967, on the law of Jordan, became self-evident.
In 1971, the Jordanian legislature departed from the traditional 
Islamic rule, which forbids abortion unless it is to save the life of
the pregnant woman, to the Western point of view, which legalizes
abortion if it is considered necessary to preserve her health.
Article 62 of the Law of Public Health of 1971, permits the ter­
mination of pregnancy to save the health of the pregnant woman. It
provides that:
"A physician must neither give any prescriptions 
intended to miscarry a pregnant woman, nor should he
perform an abortion. However, abortion may be
performed in a hospital or a licensed clinic, if it is 
necessary to save the life Df the pregnant woman or 
her health, subject to the following conditions:
1) Receipt of previous written approval from the 
pregnant woman. When she is incapable of writing or 
speaking, the approval is to be signed by her husband 
or any other authorized person.
2) Two registered medical practitioners must certify 
that the operation is necessary for the preservation 
of the life or the health of the pregnant woman*'. c >
Subject to the above conditions, the same Article exempts any
person<s) who procures abortion or participates in it, in any
capacity, from any criminal liability under the Penal Code: ". . .
shall not be guilty of any offence under the Penal Code." *63,15 5 As
regards this new far-reaching step, some Jordanian commentators have
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asked the following question: "To what extent should the health of the 
pregnant woman be threatened, in order to make the termination of 
pregnancy permissible?" The prevalent view is that the continuance of 
pregnancy must cause extraordinary damage to the health of the woman, 
beyond the ordinary damages and difficulties of the pregnancy, C an  
imminent and extraordinary threat').<S7>
In conclusion, it must be confirmed that the law of Jordan 
considers abortion to be a violation of the right to life which com­
mences at the moment of conception. Therefore, it prohibits abortion, 
at any time during the pregnancy and by whatsoever means. There are 
only two exceptional cases where abortion is permissible: firstly, if 
it is the only passible way of saving the life of the pregnant woman; 
secondly, when it is certain that continuance of the pregnancy would 
cause serious damage to the mental or physical health of the woman. 
Thus, no other social or economic reason could in any circumstances 
justify the termination of pregnancy. Poverty, national policies of 
birth control, or the possibility of having an abnormal or deformed 
child, are not valid grounds. Accordingly, and in the light of the 
above explicit provisions, one cannot accept the argument of Dr. 
Assa'eed, that poverty may be considered as a threat to the pregnant 
woman's health, and therefore, that pregnancy may be terminated on 
such grounds.<ee> Finally, the so-called 'right to abortion* has not 
been recognized by the law of Jordan. CS3:>,
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2. The Death Penalty.
The death penalty has been recognized as a lawful sentence for a 
long time and has been entrenched in many ancient and contemporary 
legal systems. However, the validity of the sentence has recently 
become subject to serious theoretical debates and various inter­
national conferences which has resulted in a clear movemnet within 
some legal systems towards the abolition of the sentence. C7,o:> 
Nonetheless, the death penalty still exists in many domestic legal 
systems. Therefore, drafters of international instruments on human 
rights were not expected to introduce provisions expressly providing 
for its abolition, though many restrictions have been imposed by such 
instruments to limit the application of the death sentence in 
practice.
As far as the Political Covenant is concerned, an amendment 
submitted by Colombia and Uruguay stating that "the death penalty 
shall not be imposed on any person",C715 was oppposed by the majority 
of representatives. Article 6, as adopted by the General Assembly, 
recognizes the death penalty as a lawful sentence.<y,s> Nonetheless, 
the text and the drafting history of this Article indicate that the 
sentence should be exceptional and should be restricted to the 
narrowest possible range of crimes. Furthermore, it was agreed that a 
provision should be added stating that nothing in this Article should 
be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of capital punishment by 
any state party. During the framing of Article 6(2) most
representatives seemed to agree that adequate safeguards should be 
introduced in order that the death sentence would not be applied 
unjustly or capriciously in disregard to the right to life. The 
difficulty, however, seemed to be the framing of the said safeguards
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□r restrictions. * A glance at Article 6(2), clearly shows that the 
following restrictions have been accepted:
1. The death sentence must be confined to the " most seriou$ crimes". 
There is no indication in the text of Article 6 as to how serious 
a crime must be in order to justify the imposition of the death 
penalty. The preparatory works also do not provide a precise 
definition of this phrase ,<7S) The use of the phrase "most 
serious crimes" was criticized as lacking precision, hence, the 
concept of "serious crimes" differed from one country to an­
other. <'7S> It is true that paragraph (2) may give the impression 
that the matter is left to the discretion of the individual states 
parties to decide upon the seriousness of the crimes which may 
justify the imposition of the death sentence, but the HRC has made 
it clear that such discretion is not as absolute nor as free as it 
may appear. The HRC, has stressed that, although states parties 
are not obliged to abolish the death penalty, they are nonetheless 
obliged to limit its use to the most serious crimes. It stated:
"The Committee is of the opinion that the expression 
"most serious crimes" must be read restrictively to 
mean that the death penalty should be a quite excep­
tional measure. It also follows . . . that it can only 
be imposed in accordance with the law in force at the 
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary 
to the Covenant. ...the procedural guarantees therein 
prescribed must be observed, including the right to a 
fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presump­
tion of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the 
defence, and the right to review by a higher 
tribunal.These rights are applicable in addition to 
the particular right to seek pardon or commutation of 
the sentence"'7"70
Furthermore,the HRC urged the states parties to abolish the death
sentence though this was not required by the Covenant and
concluded that all measures of abolition should be viewed as
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progress in the enjoyment of the rights recognized under the 
Covenant and should thus be reported to the Committee.
2. Bo 'ex post facto' laws should apply; that is to say, the'serious 
crime' must be so in accordance with a previously enacted piece of 
legislation.
3. "... not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide". This clause means that the death sentence may not be 
imposed as a result of the exercise of any of the rights 
guaranteed under the Political Covenant and the guarantees 
provided thereunder may not be disregarded. The reference to the 
Genocide Convention suggests that the death penalty may not be 
imposed in a discriminatory manner, i.e. the law imposing the 
death sentence for a serious crime must not be directed against a 
religious, racial or ethnic group.
4. "The death penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgement rendered by a competent court." The Covenant does not 
require that the court be previously established. Some may thus 
argue that the setting up of a special court after the commission 
of the crime, to punish the offender (s), is not contrary to the 
Covenant. However, it is clear that this requirement refers to the 
right to fair trial which has been referred to in some other 
Articles, It is directed against summary executions and therefore 
the court must observe all procedural requirements whether it has 
been set up after the commission of the crime or previously estab­
lished,
5. The convicted person must be given enough time to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence, Although this does not establish a
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right to pardon or amnesty, it is meant to emphasize that every 
effort should be made to avoid the carrying out of the death 
sentence. It also implies that a convicted person has the right 
to have his request for pardon or commutation properly considered 
and examined in good faith, C7S:>
6. The death penalty must neither be imposed for crimes committed by 
persons under eighteen years of age, nor be carried out on a 
pregnant woman.
In Jordan, the law imposes the death penalty for a range of
crimes, which from the point of view of the Jordanian legislature, are 
serious enough to justify the imposition of the sentence, The Penal 
Code of 1960 provides the death penalty for crimes such as murder, (if 
it was premeditated, committed to protect other criminals, to 
facilitate a criminal act or if committed against one of the 
murderer's forbears)c <B<>>, offences against external state security;
conspiring with an enemy, in an attempt to paralyse national defence
in wartime;tei5 offences against internal state security, such as
incitement to civil war, and attacks on the life of His Majesty the 
King or the Crown Prince, c®25
Article 158(3), provides the death sentence for the parties to a 
criminal conspiracy, if this results in death or torture, Under
Articles 138 and 139 the death penalty may be imposed for attempts to 
prevent the official authorities of the state from performing their 
constitutional duties, or attempts to change the constitutional system 
of the country by illegal means.
All these and other provisions providing the death penalty for 
"serious crimes" under the law of Jordan, were reported to the HRC, in 
the initial report (CCFR/C/1/Add.24) in 1978 and in the supplementary
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report (CCPR/C/l/Add.55) in 1981, and particularly in the second 
supplementary report <CCPR/C/1/Add, 56) where a detailed list of these 
provisions was included on pages 7-9. The Jordanian representatives 
explained the situation in Jordan and the manner in which the sentence 
is being applied and executed in practice. They also confirmed that 
from the point of view of Jordan these crimes were all serious enough 
to justify imposition of the death sentence.
Members of the HRC, seemed sympathetic with the position of Jordan
in general, but nonetheless they asked many questions as regards the
available legal safeguards and procedural guarantees, the yearly
average of actual executions and the manner in which the sentence was
carried out. it was suggested that Jordan should reduce the number
of serious crimes for which the death penalty was imposed, and further
information on this matter was also required.The most radical remarks
in this regard were the remarks of Mr, Prado Vallejo. A summary, of
his views has been reported as follows:
n ... it could be noted from the report of Jordan, that 
the latter supports the death penalty, although the 
Covenant tended to encourage states to abolish it. ... 
he also added that, not only armed rebellion, but also 
felonous attempts to prevent the established auth­
orities from exercising their functions in accordance 
with the Constitution were punishable by the death 
penalty ... . As there were many established
authorities, from the Head of State to provincial or 
municipal authorities, he wondered whether the death 
penalty could be inflicted on someone who attempted to 
prevent a municipal authority from exercising its 
functions .,. Article 136 of the Penal Code (page 7 of 
the report) also referred to an attempt ("any person 
attempting to change the Constitution of the state by 
illegal means”) that was punishable by the death 
penalty. Although such criminal acts should be 
punished, he did not think that persons who had simply 
intended to commit them should be subject to the .death 
penalty. "
In reply to Mr. P. Vallejo, the Jordanian representative quoted 
Article 138 of the Penal Code in full, and added:
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"The Jordanian Constitution clearly described the
powers of the Government, It had to ensure the proper 
administration of the country and any one who pre­
vented it from fulfilling its functions by committing 
a serious crime, for example a coup d'etat, was 
subject to the death penalty, But to date, no one had 
been condemned for such a crime. "css
However, it is not clear whether Mr. P. Vallejo, was objecting to
the imposition of the death sentence for these crimes because he
thought that they were not serious enough to justify the imposition of
the sentence, or to the application of the sentence to the mere
attempt of these crimes.
As for the second limitation (Ho 'ex post facto' law should
apply), Article 93, of the Constitution, stipulates that every draft
law passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives only becomes
operative upon the King's assent, and after the lapse of thirty days
from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, unless
specifically provided for in the law or the Royal Decree that it shall
come into force on any other specified date. Furthermore, Article 3 of
the Penal Code of 1960 forbids any 'ex post facto' effect of criminal
legislation:"lo sentence shall be imposed unless it is provided for by
the law in force when the crime was committed," In a recent case, the
Supreme Court has held that: "...it is a well established principle
that the new law must have no ex post facto effects. . ,
In its intial report under Article 40 of the Covenant, Jordan
stated that:
"It should be pointed out that no penalty may be 
imposed that was not prescribed by the law at the time 
when the crime was committed, and furthermore that any 
law modifying the conditions of the incrimination in 
favour of the accused applies retrospectively to acts 
committed before its entry into force. In the same way 
any new law abolishing a penalty or imposing a lighter 
one is applied to crimes committed before its entry 
into force; and in cases where, after a sentence has 
been pronounced, a new law is promulgated to such
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effect that the act for which thesentence was pronoun­
ced. ceases to be a punishable offence, execution of 
the sentence is halted and the conviction set aside.
On the other hand, a law imposing heavier penalties is 
not applied to crimes committed before its entry into 
force,"ce,s:>
Members of the HRC were impressed by the law and the practice of
Jordan with regard to this and other related issues. During the
discussion of the said report it was stated that:
"Two aspects of the Jordanian legal system mentioned 
in the report were especially praiseworthy: the fact
that new laws which modified punishment to the benefit 
of the convict were retroactive, and the existence of 
juvenile jurisdiction distinct from the ordinary penal 
jurisdictions. It could be said that those two
measures went beyond the requirements of the
Covenant. "
According to the Juveniles Act of 1968, cso:> the death penalty is 
not applicable to persons under eighteen years of age the death 
penalty or... shall not be imposed on a juvenile",< 5
The law defines a juvenile as a person between seven and eighteen 
years of age, As for pregnant women the Jordanian law also seems
to go much further beyond what is required under Article 6(2). Article 
17 of the Penal Code stipulates that the death sentence may not be 
imposed on a pregnant woman and in this case the sentence should be 
substituted by life imprisonment.
In order to ensure the rights of the convicted person, to a final 
judgement served by a competent court, and to seeh a pardon or 
commutation of the sentence, it is mandatory by law for all death 
penalty cases to be submitted by the Chief of the Public Prosecution 
to the Supreme Court for r e - e x a m i n a t i o n . F a l l o w i n g  the decision of 
the Supreme Court, the Chief of the Public Prosecution refers the case 
to the Minister of Justice with a brief statement on the merits and 
the evidence, along with a recommendation on the carrying out or
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commutation of the sentence, C9S:> The Minister of Justice, in turn 
refers the case to the Prime Minister to lay it before the Council of 
Ministers which recommends the execution or the alteration of the 
sentence. The recommendation and the reasoning in both cases must be 
submitted to His Majesty, The King, for his a p p r o v a l , 3
If the death sentence is approved by the Kingc375 the convicted 
person shall be hanged Inside the building of the prison, in 
accordance with Article 358, unless another place is defined by the 
Royal Decree. However, the hanging must not take place on a holy day 
according to the religion of the convicted person, or on an official 
or public holiday. <se:’ The sentence is to be carried out under the 
supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, upon a notification from 
the Chief of the Public Prosecution, showing that all the required 
procedures have been completed, According to Article 359, the 
following persons must attend the execution as witnesses:
1) The local public prosecutor, or his deputy;
2) The clerk of the court in which the case was decided;
3) The doctor of the prison;
4) A priest of the religion or sect to which the person belongs;
5) The director of the prison or his deputy;
6) The Chief Constable of the capital or the province in which the
execution takes place,
Before the hanging, the Public Prosecutor must ask the person 
whether he wants to say anything or to make any statement. Anything he 
may say must be written down in a special report to be signed by the 
Public Prosecutor, the Clerk and the witnesses of the execution.
The hanged person must be buried at the expense of the Government, 
if he had no relatives, or if they refused to take the corpse to bury
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it, Finally, a report on the proceedings must be written by the Clerk 
and signed by the witnesses of the execution mentioned in Article 359, 
for the purposes of the record.
C- ASSESSMENT,
Apart from the death penalty and the controversy over what serious 
crime may or may not justify the imposition of the sentence, no 
serious inconsistency between the law and the practice of Jordan, and 
the provision of Article 6 of the Political Covenant may be found. On 
the contrary in some aspects of the right to life, the law of Jordan 
seems to give much wider protection than is actually required under 
Article 6. The latter makes no indication as to the moment at which 
the right to life commences, or of that at which projection must be 
provided. Such an ambiguity has caused great confusion and 
contradictions among lawyers and legislators, especially over the 
question of a b o r t i o n . A r t i c l e  6 only forbids the carrying out of 
the death penalty on a pregnant woman, while under the law of Jordan 
the sentence can not be imposed on her in the first place. Under the 
law of Jordan protection of the right to life is not restricted to the 
basic requirements of the physical existence of the human being which 
ends at the moment of death; the protection begins at the moment of 
conception and includes the peaceful enjoyment of life, the dignity, 
pride and reputation of the person,c1005 and extends after death to 
include the "right to a grave" and to be buried with dignity and 
respect. Furthermore, it includes the protection of the body in the 
grave, c1015
However, what one should always keep in mind is that what is 
guaranteed under Article 6, is only the minimum standard that ought to
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be guaranteed by all states parties to those subject to their 
jurisdiction. Conformity with the requirements of Article 6 of the 
Covenant is not the end, it only means that the state party is not in 
breach of its obligations. In the case of Jordan, three recommen­
dations may be put forward in this regard; firstly, separate provision 
may be included in the Constitution, declaring the right to life as a 
constitutional right, from which nobody may be deprived, except in due 
process of law. Secondly, the Government must put increasing emphasis 
on the sanctity of the right to life, especially through 
administrative instructions to its agents, in particular the Police, 
the Armed Forces and General Intelligence Services, in order to avoid 
any misconduct leading to arbitrary deprivation of life by the 
government agents. Thirdly, although not specifically required under 
Article 6, the death sentence must be confined to the crime of 
intentional deprivation of life, and must not be extended to any other 
offences no matter how serious they may be.
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2. - THE RIGHT TQ LIBERTY AM) SECURITY QP THE FBRSQff.
The right to personal liberty and security of the person is a 
central feature of civil and political rights. Alongside the right to 
life it is rooted deeply in the history of mankind. As has already 
been mentioned, the notion of personal liberty was known in , re­
ligions and ancient civilizations.c102*
The concept of personal liberty was extended by the revolutionary 
philosophy of the eighteenth century and expressed in their declara­
tions of human rights, especially those of the American and French 
Revolutions. Modern constitutions especially contain provision(s) 
providing for the right to personal liberty as a human right to be 
protected by law,
In the age of international protection of human rights, personal
liberty is a common element in all general international human rights
instruments. For instance, according to the UDHR, every human being
has the right to liberty and security of person, and no one may be
subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention,K1020 Article 5 of the
EHR provides that:
"Every one has the right to liberty and security of 
person. Mo one shall be deprived of his liberty save 
in the following cases and in accordance with a pro­
cedure prescribed by the law. ,
Similar language has been used in the AMR with more detail and ad­
ditional safeguards included.c1055
The Political Covenant has laid down in detail the right of every­
one to liberty and security of person and additional guarantees and 
safeguards, such as the rights of the arrested persons and those who 
have been accused of or convicted on a criminal charge,<los> Before
88
examining the Jordanian law in relation to those provisions, the main 
features of these rights as expressed in the Political Covenant will 
be highlighted, so that the legislative measures required for their 
implementation may be defined. It seems, therefore, appropriate to 
discuss the subject under the following four sub-headings:
A. Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention,
B. The rights of an arrested or detained person.
C. The rights of the accused person.
D. The rights of the convicted or acquitted person.
A. FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST AID DETEMTIQU.
Article 9(1) of the Political Covenant provides for this element
of the protection of personal liberty. It states that:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. lo one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention. Mo one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established by law,"
This paragraph prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, as a prima 
f a d e  violation of the right' to personal liberty. The term 'arbitrary1 
should be given the same definition as in Article 6, regarding ’arbi­
trary deprivation of the right to life'.*1075 Accordingly, in order 
not to be 'arbitrary', deprivation of personal liberty must be lawful 
(in accordance with the law), and justifiable on a factual basis. In 
R. Tillich's words: "...the deprivation of liberty therefore must not 
only be, accordance with the law, but also in conformity to the 
principles Df Justice".*los5 According to J. Swarup: "Arrest or 
detention is arbitrary if it is on the grounds or in accordance with 
procedures other than those established by law, or under provisions of
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law, the purpose of which is incompatible with respect to the right to 
liberty and security of person."c1035 If the municipal law lays down 
unreasonable grounds upon which arrest or detentions may be permitted, 
or unjust procedures to be followed thereafter, it would still be 
regarded as an arbitrary deprivation. In short, the deprivation of 
liberty must be neither 'illegal' nor 'unjust'. The Article under 
examination does not define the meaning of 'arbitrary arrest or de­
tention* . Yet, the second sentence of paragraph Cl) provides that:
"Ho one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law," There is 
no indication as to what those generally accepted grounds for lawful 
deprivation of personal liberty are. Such an ambiguity may provide a 
basis for some states parties to argue that arbitrary arrests and 
detentions have been carried out in accordance with their domestic 
constitutions and laws and therefore do not contravene the Covenant. 
The answer to this is that the HHC would have the last word in the 
assessment of the compatibility of these laws and constitutions with 
the provisions and the spirit of the Covenant and therefore may 
pronounce the detention to be arbitrary though it was carried out in 
accordance with the domestic law, In Communication Ho. R.12,/52. the 
HRC pronounced the detention of the victim to be arbitrary and 
contrary to Article 9(1) although the state party argued that his 
detention was carried out in accordance with the "Prompt Security 
Measures", and that the person was charged under the Military Penal 
Code of Uruguay.c1103
Commenting on this paragraph the HSC stated that the right to 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention has often been somewhat
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narrowly understood in the reports of states parties. It was also
pointed out that this provision was
"applicable to all deprivations of liberty, whether in 
criminal cases or in other cases such as, for example, 
mental illness, vagrancy, drug addiction, educational 
purposes, immigration control etc, It is true that
some of the provisions of Article 9 (part of paragraph
2 and the whale of paragraph 3) are only applicable to 
persons against whom criminal charges are brought. But 
the rest, and in particular the important guarantee 
laid down in paragraph 4 ... applies to all persons 
deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention"c111 *
In order to meet their legal obligations under this Article read 
in conjunction with Article 2, states parties must firstly abolish all 
incompatible legislation and practices. Secondly, they must enact the 
required legislative measures within their legal systems. Such mea­
sures are to protect personal liberty and prevent arbitrary arrest or
detention, by defining the grounds upon which a person may be deprived 
of his liberty, and the procedures to be followed thereafter. Third­
ly, adequate remedies must be made available to those unlawfully 
detained or wrongfully convicted. Finally, to ensure compliance with 
the above measures, disciplinary and criminal penalties must be 
imposed upon anyone who unlawfully deprives a person of his personal 
liberty, whether the offender is a private person or a government 
official acting in his official capacity,c1125
The Jordanian Constitution of 1952 provides that "personal 
liberty shall be safeguarded" (Article 7). According to Article 8, 
"Id person may be detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the 
provisions of the1aw".Similar provisions may also be found in other 
Arab constitutions’11135. But what kind of laws are those by virtue of 
which deprivation of personal liberty may be acceptable? Who enacts 
those laws? Who applies them? In practices,however,those constitution-
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al provisions do not seem to offer much protection to the lil^rty of
the individual because of the manner in which the law is being enacted
and applied in most of these countries.In Jordan, this right is
protected under Article 346 of the Penal Code of 1960 which renders
unlawful deprivation of personal liberty a criminal offence punishable
by law. It reads as follows:
"Anyone who detains a person, depriving him of his
liberty in an unlawful manner, ' shall be punished by
imprisonment for a terra not exceeding one year or a 
fine not exceeding 50 J,D."C11‘*>
If the detention was made in a false official capacity 
or warrant, imprisonment shall be six months to two
years."
Furthermore, under Article 178,
"Unless authorised by law, any government officer who 
detains or arrests a person, shall be liable on con­
viction to imprisonment from three months to one
year."
Similar sentences are also applicable to prison officers or guards 
or any other person of such function if they admit any person without 
a warrant or judicial order, or if they keep that person in jail 
beyond the date defined therein. c 1 ls:> If the above persons or any 
constable, police officer or civil servant refuses or delays the 
bringing of an arrestee or a detainee before a competent judge, he 
shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
six months or a fine not exceeding 50 J . D ^ 11® 5 However, it seems 
that those penalties have never been implemented in practice, 
apparently, not because the above provisions have never been violated, 
for the HCJ itself has issued many writs of habeas corpus relating to 
unlawful imprisonments and arbitrary deprivation of personal 
liberty,c1175 It has never imposed sanctions on those persons 
responsible, neither has any other court (s). c 1 't&:> If unlawful arrest
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is a criminal offence under the law of Jordan, then what are these
grounds and procedures for lawful arrest and detention? As far as the
Criminal Procedures Code is concerned, a distinction is made between
arrest with a warrant and that without. According to Article 99:
"Any member of the Judicial Police*111® 3 may order the 
immediate arrest of the offender who is present, when 
there is sufficient evidence to prosecute him in any 
of the following cases:
1. Felonies;
2. If caught 'red-handed' in a misdemeanour punishable 
by six months imprisonment or more;
3. A misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment, when the 
offender is under police control or has no address 
in the Kingdom;
4. Misdemeanours of theft, assault, resistance of 
public authorities by force, and offences 
involving moral turpitude."
Also, any person may arrest without a warrant an offender caught 
'red-handed' in the course of the commission of an arrestable offence, 
and bring him to the nearest public authority. < 1£° :'
In all the above cases arrest is permissible without a warrant. To 
confirm the exceptional nature of this procedure Article 103 provides 
that: "Mo person may be arrested or detained unless upon a valid
warrant issued by a competent authority in accordance with the law," 
Therefore, any arrest without a warrant other than in the specified 
cases, must be regarded as an arbitrary arrest or detention and 
consequently an evident infringement of Article 9 of the Political 
Covenant. The ordinary procedures to be followed in the case of a 
criminal offence are, firstly, that the public prosecutor should sum­
mon the prisoner and then after interrogation he may issue a warrant 
of commitment if he deems it necessary. Secondly, commitments must 
not exceed fifteen days initially, extendable if necessary by a new 
warrant. Thirdly, in the case, where the defendant does not appear 
before the public prosecutor on the defined day, or it is most likely
93
that he would abscond, the latter may issue a warrant of arrest.c1 5  
Fourthly, arrest warrants should be signed by the public prosecutor, 
stamped by his official stamp and should clearly indicate inter alia 
the full name of the person to be arrested and the reasons for the 
arrest, c 1 > Fifthly, a warrant of commitment should mention inter
alia the nature of the charge(s), the specific Article<s> under which 
it has been made and the period of detention. c In both cases, a 
copy of the warrant must be handed to the defendant,
However, what might have been a lawful arrest and detention in ac­
cordance with these requirements, could became, in some cases, an ar­
bitrary deprivation of personal liberty not only in breach of Article 
9(1) of the Political Covenant but also of the above legal provisions 
themselves. In practice when the defendant appears before the public 
prosecutor, and after initial investigation, the latter may deem it 
necessary to remand him in custody for further interrogation for 
fifteen days in accordance with Article 114. In some cases however,the 
fifteen day limit expires without the person being released or a new 
commitment warrant being issued.c1SS3
During field work in September 1984, the present writer inter­
viewed two persons who were in the process of bailing out their 
relatives at the Palace of Justice in Amman. Sixteen days had passed 
since the first commitment warrant had expired and nine days in the 
case of the second. In both cases no new warrants had been issued nor 
had the detainees been released, ¥hen the present writer applied for 
permission to visit the central prison in Amman to investigate other 
such cases, access was denied.
Moreover, despite the wide powers to arrest without a warrant granted 
under Article 99, especially paragraph (4) thereof, the Jordanian
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legislature has substantially expanded those powers under various 
exceptional legislation, such as the Defence Law of 1935 and the 
regulations made thereunder. c ',52e> and the Martial Law Instructions of 
1967;<13i:r> which as will be shown (in Chapter VII) below have been 
widely abused in practice in terms of administrative detention and 
arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty regardless of the procedural 
guarantees provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code.
It seems that Mr. Tamuschat (a member of the HRC )was referring to 
this situation when he asked the representative of Jordan whether the 
normal procedures for arrest were respected in practice; and whether 
administrative detention was applicable in Jordan and how long could 
it last? In reply the Jordanian representative categorically stated 
that in Jordan 11, . . no one could be arrested unless he was charged 
with an offence."*120> Obviously, this statement is not entirely 
correct because Article 9A of Defence Regulations Mo. 2 of 1939, which 
is frequently invoked in practice, entitles the administration to 
order indefinite detention of any person without any specific charge 
being brought against him.*t350
If the protection of the right to personal freedom requires the 
prohibition of all forms of arbitrary arrest and detention, it equally 
requires the preservation of the rights of those lawfully arrested or 
detained.
In order to execute a lawful arrest the following rights of the 
arrested person have to be observed:
1) The right to...be informed at the time of arrest of the reasons and
grounds for such arrest. Since the individual is required to submit
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and not to resist the police or public authorities in exercising their 
lawful powers, he is in return entitled to be told, when being 
arrested, the reason for the police action and of the crime which he 
is alleged to have committed.This is a fundamental safeguard, directly- 
derived from the general rule providing for the entitlement of 
everyone to his personal liberty and applies to both arrest with or 
without a warrant.
In the words of Lord Simmons:
" It is a condition of lawful arrest that the man ar­
rested should be entitled to know why he is arrested,
...The law requires that, where arrest proceeds on a 
warrant, the warrant should state the charge on which 
arrest is made, I can see no valid reason why this 
safeguard for the subject should not equally be his 
when the arrest is made without a warrant. The 
exigency of the situation, which justifies or demands 
arrest without a warrant, cannot, as it appears to me, 
justify or demand either a refusal to state the reason 
of arrest, or a mis-statement of the reason. Arrested 
with or without a warrant, the subject is entitled to 
know why he is deprived of his freedom, if only in 
order that he may without a moment's delay take such 
steps as will enable him to regain it.*1305
Article 9(2) of the Political Covenant provides that:
"Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time 
of the arrest of the reasons for his arrest and shall 
be promptly informed of any charges against him.
The HRC has put more emphasis on this right. Having considered a 
number of initial reports of the state parties under Article 40 of the 
Political Covenant, the HRC asked for more information on pretrial 
procedures, especially the right of the person arrested to be informed 
of the reasons of his arrest. Members of the HRC have made it clear 
that the reasons must be set forth at the time of arrest, and 
expressed doubts that doing so 'as soon as is reasonably practicable' 
would satisfy this requirement. < 13s:> In Case Mo. 43/1979. the HRC
concluded that Article 9(2) was violated because the victim was not
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informed, at the time of his arrest, of any reason for his arrest and 
of any charges against him. c 133 5 In another case the HRC stated that 
this right was violated because the victim was not informed of the 
reasons for his arrest until over two years later. c 1 3j4:>
In the law of Jordan, there is no explicit provision providing for 
this safeguard, but nonetheless it could be argued that it is included 
in the general provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution read 
together.
However, it seems that the judiciary has not had an opportunity to 
pronounce upon the practices of the police in this regard, apparently 
because such practices have never been challenged before a court of 
law. C13JS:> ¥hather this means that this right has never been violated, 
or never existed in practice, no definite answer can be given. To the 
best of the author's knowledge, the police do state the reasons for 
the arrest in most cases.
Such an explanation is not required if the arrested person is caught 
'red-handed' in the course of a criminal act or when he himself makes 
it impossible to be informed of those reasons. The arrestee cannot 
argue that he was not informed with the necessary information if he 
had immediately engaged in a fight with the police or ran away, As to 
the form in which he is to be informed of the reason of his arrest, 
there is no conventional formula or defined procedure to be followed. 
It can be made in writing or delivered orally, by reading out the 
warrant or merely by handing it to the person. The warrant in itself 
would give sufficient information for this purpose. Detailed infor­
mation about charge<s) is not necessary at the time of the arrest. 
All that is required is a general statement of the nature of the 
offence and the true reasons of the arrest,c133J
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What if the arrestee does not understand the language in which he 
is informed? This question poses a practical difficulty. From a legal 
point of view, it could be argued that, in order to fulfil the purpose 
of such information, it must be expressed in a language understandable 
to the arrested person. On the other hand, one cannot expect all 
arresting officials to speak the appropriate language.
Therefore, in such cases a later translation may be satisfactory, 
However, Article 9(2) of the Political Covenant does not mention this 
problem at this stage.
Although Article 5(2) of the EHH has made it clear that the infor­
mation is to be conveyed in a language understandable to the arrested 
person, the EUCM has held that this requirement has been complied 
with even though the warrant was drawn up in Flemish, since the 
applicant was interrogated in French, which was a language he 
understood.<:iai7r5
In Jordan, it has been said that the police always do their very 
best to employ foreign languages if Arabic is not understood by the 
arrested person.*13eo However, the legislature has made it mandatory 
by law to provide (at the expense of the government) a translator in 
all subsequent proceedings, in the case of a person who does not un­
derstand or speak Arabic. A similar right has also been guaranteed to 
deaf persons,4133>
2) The right to be brought before a judge or a .judicial officer.
An arrested person must be given the opportunity to challenge the 
validity of the grounds upon which he has been arrested, especially 
the existence of the wrongful act alleged to have been committed by 
him and the adequacy of the reasons to believe that he is guilty of
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such an offence. Post-arrest proceedings provide vital protection for 
the right to personal liberty. An immediate recourse to a review of
the validity of the arrest makes it possible to restrict the drastic
effects of the police powers to arrest on mere suspicion, and prevent 
abuse of such powers. It also acts as a check on the arrestee’s 
physical condition before it becomes too late.
The Covenant requires that: "Anyone arrested or detained on a
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. .."c1^°> The HRC 
has made it clear that the term "promptly", requires that the period 
must not exceed a few days.c1415 However, in a number of cases where 
an extended period of time lapsed without the person being brought 
before a judicial officer, the HRC held that Article 9(3) was
violated.c On the other hand the HRC found no violation of Article 
9(3) where the person was arrested on the 28th of September '1978 and 
charged before a military examining judge on the 7th of November '1978. 
A period of six weeks was thus deemed to be within a reasonable
time.
The Jordanian Constitution lacks a provision necessitating the im­
mediate judicial review of the legality of an arrest. Leaving aside 
the exceptional powers to arrest for indefinite periods of time under 
the Defence Law and Regulations, and the Instructions of The Martial 
Law Administration, c 1 **5 the matter ultimately rests with the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Under the latter the competent officer is the public 
prosecutor. For this purpose a distinction is made between two
types of cases. On the one hand, a person arrested upon a warrant
issued by the public prosecutor, must be interrogated by him within 
twenty-four hours of arrest.c1^ > On the other hand, a person
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arrested without a warrant, may be kept for forty-eight hours in 
police custody for questioning. If this time limit is about to expire 
but the police still suspect him, he should be presented to the public 
prosecutor within the time limit. * In both cases, if twenty-four
hours expire without any interrogation, the guard of the Nasarh (the 
place for temporary custody) must take the person(s) to the public 
prosecutor, who may order his release or issue a commitment warrant
for fifteen days renewable if he deems it necessary. *1 3
However, the Supreme Court of Jordan does not seem to regard those 
restrictions as an important safeguard for personal liberty against 
arbitrary detention. Thus, the court has decided that, disregard of 
these provisions does not render the detention illegal, In Case 
Ho.67/75, the defendant was confined in custody much longer than the 
law permits, without being brought before any judicial authority, ( 
public prosecution). The court stated that "The expiry of the deadline 
provided for in Article 100 of the Criminal Procedure Cade should 
not affect the legality of any subsequent proceedings... it only meant
to speed the interrogation up, nothing less or more".<1'*®> In another
case, the same court held that "...the fact that the public prosecutor 
had not interrogated the arrested person until four days after his 
arrest by the police, does not affect the legality of his detention 
nor of the latter proceedings".<ieo* Evidently this is inconsistent 
with Article 100 of the Criminal Procedure! Code and Article 8 of the 
Constitution, which says, "Ho person shall be detained or imprisoned 
except in accordance with the provisions of the law", and in some 
cases may not be permissible under Article 9 of the Political 
Covenant, All the above provisions were mentioned in the reports of 
Jordan, but no reference to the judicial interpretation was made.*1^1*
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3) The right to humane treatment while in custody (freedom from 
topture).
Infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the arrested 
person in order to obtain information about another person, or to 
force him to confess his guilt, is a practice known and used in in­
terrogation from time immemorial. In contemporary legal systems 
torture has been strictly prohibited. All major international human 
rights declarations contain provisions prohibiting any form of 
torture, degradation or ill treatment,<1 The (political (Covenant 
provides that: "All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person", Article 10(1). "Io one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment..."(Article 7).
According to many writers and legal commentators, the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman treatment has been regarded as an integral part 
of Customary International law, and it may even have acquired the 
status of a peremptory norm of general international law, i.e., jus 
cogens, c 163 31
However, neither the Political Covenant nor the other general 
human rights instruments give a definition of the term 'torture*. 
Such a definition appears in the General Assembly Declaration on the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman^treatment adapted in 1D75.<1SA> It 
says:
"Torture means any act by which severe pain or suf­
fering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted by or at the instigation of public officials 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or confession, punishing 
him for an act he has committed, or intimidating him 
or other persons. It does not include pain or suf­
fering arising only from inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the 
standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners.
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Torture constitutes an aggravating and deliberate form 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish­
ment" .
Similar definition has also been adopted under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture of 1984.<1SB> According to Dinstein:
"The key elements of this definition are beyond dis­
pute. First, torture may be either a mode of punish­
ment (for instance, drawing and quartering) or a form 
of treatment having other purposes. Second, the rea­
son motivating torture —  including confessions, 
eliciting information, instilling fear (in the victim 
or other person) or even sheer sadism —  is
immaterial. Third, torture may be either physical or 
mental as applied to the individual, i.e., whether the 
victim's particular tolerance to pain may be a de­
termining factor in establishing whether a specific 
act amounts to torture or not".<1se>
The jurisprudence and practice under the EHR are helpful in
clarifying these terms. In the 1 Greek Case1, the ECUM had considered
the relationship between the terms used in Article 3 and stated that:
"All torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and inhuman treatment also degrading and that the word 
'torture' is often used to describe inhuman treatment 
which has purposes, such as the obtaining of inform­
ation or confessions, or the infliction of punishment 
and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman 
treatment" .
In Ireland v. U.K., the EUCT while agreeing with the Commission's 
view that the five techniques used by the British security forces in 
Northern Ireland constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, the 
majority of the Court defined torture as "deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering", and held that the conduct 
established did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and 
cruelty implied by the word 'torture' as so understood.*lse5
Although the HRC has not committed itself to a specific definition 
of the term "torture", it has stressed that the prohibition under 
Article 7 of the Political Covenant is not limited to torture as it is
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"normally understood", but also includes the kinds of ill treatments
referred to under this Article. The HRC has declined to establish
precise definitions of the concepts mentioned in Article 7 of the
Covenant and seems to prefer to judge individual cases in the light of
the surrounding circumstances of every case. It was also added that in
the consideration of such cases, the provision of Article 10(1) must
be taken into consideration because of the link between the two
provisions. It says,
"As appears from the terms of this article, the scope 
of protection required goes far beyond torture as 
normally understood. It may not be necessary to draw 
sharp distinctions between the various prohibited 
forms of treatment or punishment, These distinctions 
depend on the kind, purpose and severity of the 
particular treatment. In the view of the Committee the 
prohibition must extend to corporal punishment,
including excessive chastisement as an educational or
disciplinary measure. Even such a measure as solitary 
confinement may, according to the circumstances, and 
especially when the person is kept incommunicado, be 
contrary to this article. Moreover, the article 
clearly protects not only persons arrested or
imprisoned, but also pupils and patients in
educational and medical institutions. , . , For all 
persons deprived of their liberty, the prohibition of 
treatment contrary to article 7 is supplemented by the 
positive requirement of article 10(1) of the Covenant 
that they shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
... In particular, the prohibition extends to medical 
or scientific experimentation without the free consent 
of the person concerned (article 7, second
sentence)."c1
In Communication lo, R7/28, brought before the HRC on behalf of 
Mr. I Weinberger in May 1978, it was said that, the government had de~ 
nied that he had been detained for over a hundred days, until his name 
eventually appeared on a list of detained persons. Yet his family was 
not informed of his place of detention nor allowed to visit him during 
the first 10 months of the detention. Throughout that period he was 
kept blindfolded for most of the time, with his hands tied together,
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and was forced to remain sitting on a mattress for fourteen hours a 
day, <160:> The Committee had inter alia held that Articles 7 and 10(1) 
were contravened because of the treatment which I. Weinberger 
received during the first ten months of his detention,c1ei5
In another case (Communication Ho. R 14/63) submitted on behalf of 
Mr. R. S. Antomaccio, the HRC decided that Articles 7 and 10(1) were 
violated because he was held in solitary confinement in an underground 
cell, and was subjected to torture for three months in 1978 and was 
also denied the medical treatment which he needed while in 
detention. *
The Covenant has guaranteed unqualified protection to the arrested 
person against torture or any other kind of inhumane treatment under 
all cirumstances. Thus, states parties are required to bring their 
practices and laws into conformity with such a prohibition. *1S35 
Constitutional provisions recognising this right as a constitutional 
right and penal provisions providing for penal punishments for those 
who may inflict torture or inhumane treatment on arrested persons, 
must be introduced if not already provided for by the existing laws. 
States parties should also take any practical violations of this 
prohibition by their agents very seriously. The HRC has in this regard 
expressed the view that where the complainant has given adequate 
particulars of the acts concerned, including the names of their 
alleged perpetrators, "a refutation of these allegations in general 
terms is not sufficient. The state party should have investigated the 
allegation in accordance with its laws and obligations under the 
Covenant, and brought to justice those found to be responsible".<ie45
The Constitution of Jordan 1952, was promulgated before the 
adoption of the UH Covenants in 1966. The human rights provisions pre-
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dated even the UDHR (1948), because (as has been mentioned)<16,e5 the 
chapter on the rights and duties of the Jordanians in the present
Constitution is a copy (with some expansions in certain aspects) of
the analogous chapter in the Constitution of 1946. c So, as a 
result, no reference was made to the prohibition of torture nor to 
the treatment of the arrested person in the Constitution. By contrast 
all other recent Arab Constitutions contain provisions providing for 
the protection of arrested person(s) against torture and inhuman 
treatment, c 1 *
However, so far as the ordinary laws are concerned, the Jordanian
Penal Code 1960 provides in Article 208(1) that;
"Anyone who inflicts any form of violence or cruelty 
not permitted by law on a person in order to obtain 
from him a confession of an offence or related infor­
mation thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment from 
three months to three years" . c iee,:’
Being the only available legal protection for arrested persons 
against torture and inhuman^ treatment, it falls short of the inter­
national standards required under the Covenant. According to the 
above Article, the prohibition applies only to 'violence or cruelty 
not permitted by law1. It appears as if the Jordanian law may permit 
such actions in certain circumstances whereas this is absolutely pro­
hibited under the Covenant. On the other hand, the said Article does 
not render such a confession or information inadmissible as an evi­
dence in the trial before a court of law. On the contrary, Article 
159 of the Criminal Procedures Cade made a confession admissible if 
the public prosecution submitted 'a convincing explanation' proving 
that it was given voluntarily. < 1 Apparently, the public
prosecution is never short of 'convincing explanations', whatever the 
circumstances may be. In most cases, it is rather difficult, and some­
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times quite impossible for the defendant to prove that duress or 
inhumane treatment has been inflicted during police questioning. 
What usually happens in practice is that while being questioned by 
the police, the accused may under pressure of compelling methods, give 
any information or confession(s) to avoid any further torture on his 
person or, on any member of his family. In doing so he may hope to 
rely on the independence of the court before which he will have the 
opportunity to tell the truth, freely and without any threats or 
inducements. Therefore, revocation of the confession by the accused 
person before the court should be considered in itself an indication 
that it was not made voluntarily; and therefore, the court must take 
this in consideration. nonetheless, the Jordanian courts have con­
stantly taken the view that the confession obtained by the police is 
admissible evidence, unless it has been proved by the defendant that 
it was given under duress or compelling measures.This has been the 
established view of the Jordanian courts since 1955. In 1955, the 
Supreme Court stated that:
"...revoking of the confession by the defendant before 
the 6’ourt Df first "Instance, does not affect the ad­
missibility of such evidence, so far as it has not 
been proved to have been taken by coercion."c1^°*
In another case, the same court stated:
"...Although the information was given in the police 
station, it was still valid evidence since the defend­
ant failed to prove that it was obtained by coer­
c i o n . " 5
Furthermore, with direct reference to Article 159 above, the court 
held that:
"...any information or confession given by the 
defendant —  even though it was not given before the 
public prosecutor —  could be used against him; 
notwithstanding the allegation that it was obtained by 
coercion. " < 17'a:>
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The Jordanian courts seem to have followed the example of the
Egyptian Court of Cassation, which in 1944 held that:
" it is the established view of the court that the 
court may disregard the allegation before the public 
prosecutor and at the hearing, that the confession 
made during the police questioning was not freely 
given by the defendant. . . if it was not proved to be 
made under coercion. " c 1'73>
However, in the rare instances where it was possible to prove
that the confession was not made voluntarily, the courts held it to be
inadmissible, In Case Ho.173/84, the Supreme Court stated that:
HAlthough the confession was made before the public 
prosecutor, the court may consider it inadmissible 
evidence if it was satisfied that the confession was 
not made voluntarily ...it has always been the right 
Df the accused to prove that he confessed before the 
public prosecutor under duress and pressure. ”c 17'A:*
In another case, the same court upheld the judgement of the Court
of Appeal and held that:
M... It is the duty of the Court of Appeal to disregard 
the confession, since it has been proved that the 
defendant (arrested person) has been beaten in order 
to confess his guilt of the alleged offences."c17S>
In Mahmued-Masser1 s Case, in October 1980 the Military Court
rendered the report of the investigating officer (commander of the 
military unit) and consequently the confession included therein, 
inadmissible evidence. In his testimony before the court the investi­
gating officer said: "I beat him (the defendant) all night long till
I made him confess the truth included in this report."c 176:1
The burden of proof should not be placed on the arrested person, 
because in most cases it is far too difficult to prove that there has 
been torture and ill treatment. The ECUM has dealt with this problem 
in the * Greek C a s e and drawn attention to the inherent 
difficulties in proving an allegation of torture or inhuman treatment:
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"First, a victim or a witness able to corroborate bis 
story might hesitate to describe or reveal all that 
has happened to him for fear of reprisal... Secondly, 
acts of torture or ill-treatment by agents of the pol­
ice or armed services would be carried out as far as 
possible without witnesses, and perhaps without the 
knowledge of higher authority. Thirdly, where alle­
gations of torture or ill-treatment are made, the au­
thorities, the police...or the ministers, must 
inevitably feel that they have a collective reputation 
to defend... In consequence there may be reluctance of 
higher authority to admit, or allow inquiries to be 
made into facts which might show that the allegations 
are true. Lastly, physical traces of torture or ill- 
treatment may with lapse of time become unrecog­
nizable, even to medical experts, particularly where 
the farm of torture itself leaves little external 
marks.c 170 5
Although it is difficult to prove torture in practice, Jordan has 
submitted contradictory reports regarding torture. In the first 
supplementary report <CCPR/C/1/Add.55) submitted in 1981 it was stated 
that
"As to Article 7, the laws of Jordan outlaw any form 
of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment and prosecute all persons who perpetrate 
such treatment whether they have an official function 
or otherwise. There are sometimes excesses by some 
public security personnel but these excesses are not 
institutionalized and have always been condemned and
outlawed. Equally, no one may be subjected without his
consent to medical or scientific experimentation, All 
security personnel are trained to observe the laws of 
Jordan against torture and similar treatment as they 
are part and parcel of their training,
Furthermore, evidence procured by illegal means
such as by torture or cruel or inhuman means is not 
admissible in a court of law. This is well 
substantiated in article 159 of the Criminal Law
Procedure Law Ho. 9 of 1961."c
It is true that the law of Jordan outlaws such practices and
that excesses by the official authorities or their agents do occur 
from time to time; it is also true that the law does not permfcAr 
medical experiments be carried out on a person without his consent.
As for the second paragraph, it seems that the authors of the report
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were not aware of the case law and of the manner in which the courts 
have interpreted the provision of Article 159 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, As mentioned above the Jordanian courts have 
interpreted this provision to mean that a confession procured by such 
means is admissible evidence unless proved by the defence that it was 
not freely given,
In the second supplementary report (1982) Jordan has categorically 
denied that torture or similar treatments have been committed in 
Jordan. It says, "With regard to torture, to which, Article 7 of the 
Covenant, no person is to be subjected to, we confirm that the 
practice of torture has not been adopted either by the judicial or the 
investigative authorities in Jordan. " c 15305
arrest .or. detent i on.
To be dealt with under the rights of a convicted person. <The 
right to enforceable compensation in the case of false imprisonment or 
miscarriage of justice),c1S15
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C. THE_RIG_HT_S_QF THE ACCUSED PBFSPI.
A person, whether lawfully arrested or otherwise, cannot be legal­
ly held in custody for an indefinite time without a specific charge 
being made against him. Most of the national constitutions and muni­
cipal laws therefore require that arrested persons be brought before a 
court or^ jL judicial officer within a short time after his arrest 
(usually 24 or 48 hours) so he may be charged or otherwise released. 
This is the rational outcome of the entitlement of everyone to his 
personal liberty. If the arrested suspect is indicted, he is regarded 
as an accused person and therefore is entitled tD some minimum rights 
and safeguards, They include:
1- The right to be informed, in detail, of the charges brought 
against him.
2- the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court 
of law.
3- The right to be released on bail pending trial.
4- The right to a fair trial,
1) The right to be _ inf armed ...in detail of the charges brought against
him.
To answer the charge and initiate his defence, the accused person 
must be "informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under­
stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him",(t®21 This 
is different from the right to be informed at the time of arrest. For 
the latter, a brief statement of the reasons of the arrest, and of the 
charge is considered suf f icient, c ’s*35 while at this stage the 
indicted person should be provided with substantial information about 
the charge, including the facts upon which it has been based, the 
legal classification of the wrongful act, and the legal provisions
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infringed by that act, Noting that states parties do not explain how 
this right is respected and ensured in practice, the HRC stated that 
this right;
"applies to all cases of criminal charges including 
those of persons not in detention. The Committee notes 
further that the right to be informed of the charge 
"promptly" requires that information is given in the 
manner described as soon as the charge is first made 
by a competent authority. In the opinion of the 
Committee this right must arise when in the course of 
an investigation a court or an authority of the pro­
secution decides to take procedural steps against a 
person suspected of a crime or publicly names him as 
such. The specific requirements of subparagraph 3(a) 
may be met by stating the charge either orally or in 
writing, provided that the information indicates both 
the law and the alleged facts on which it is 
based.,l(ie4)
In the Jordanian legal system, the accused should be brought be­
fore the public prosecutor within the time limit as prescribed by 
Article '139 of the Criminal Procedures Code. However, Article 63(1)
of the same Code stipulates that: "When the suspect appears before
the public prosecutor, the latter shall... recite the charge upon him 
and ask for an answer". In this Article, the Jordanian legislature 
has used the word 'yatloo' (recite) which does not meet the 
requirements of Article 14 (3a) of the Covenant. Under the latter, 
substantial information clarifying the details of the charge and 
identifying the relevant legal provision(s) of the law that have 
allegedly been violated, must be made available to the accused person. 
Although the arrest warrant must contain most of the required 
information, the right to receive full information upon indictment 
must be observed, Therefore, Article 135 is very important in this 
respect, for it makes it mandatory that a Bill of Indictment, whether 
signed by the public prosecutor or the Attorney-General, contains the 
following information:
Ill
a) The full name of al-mushtaki (the complanaint) if any;
b) The full name, age, address.,* of the defendant;
c) If in custody, the date of his detention;
d) Statement of the facts;
e) The date of the offence and the legal nature of the charge and the 
evidence
f) The applicable legal provisions, and
g) The reason upon which the indictment has been issued.
This information seems sufficient enough to meet the requirements
of Article 14(3)(a) of the Covenant, and since it has been made a man­
datory requirement for the validity of the Indictment Bill, it has 
usually been adhered to. In any case where these requirements are not 
complied with, the Indictment Bill would be considered invalid and 
subsequent deprivation of personal liberty would be considered 
arbitrary.In a number of cases where substatial information about the 
charges was not made available to the victms,the HRC has held that 
Aticle 14(3)(a) was violated by the state party concerned.e1SS*
2) The right to be presumed innocentuntil proven guilty by a court 
of . law,.
A man is innocent by his very nature, and therefore, who ever ac­
cuses him of any offence against the law, whether it be the community 
(public prosecution) or a private person, must prove his allegation, 
This general rule was adopted in criminal procedures under Islamic law 
in the seventh century,c 1se> but later on it was neglected and 
disregarded inside and outside of the Islamic World, It was not 
until late in the eighteenth century that this rule re-emerged through
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the revolutionary declarations of human rights of that epoch. The 
rule of presumption of innocence has been adopted by all major inter­
national human rights instruments and expressed in almost identical 
language. Article 14(2) of the Political Covenant provides that: 
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law".
Accordingly, the gravity or seriousness of the alleged offence
should not deprive the accused of his right to be presumed innocent.
He is entitled to be treated as such until his guilt is established
according to a final judgement by a competent court. The presumption,
therefore, does not collapse upon mere confirmation of the charge(s)
or introduction and submission of evidence by the public prosecutor or
other person<s), The principle of the presumption of innocence thus
requires that on the one hand the court should not be predisposed to
find the accused guilty. On the other hand, the accused should at all
times be given the benefit of the doubt on the rule in dubio pro
reo. In the words of the HRC:
"By reason of presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof of the charge is on the prosecution and the 
accused has the benefit of doubt. lo guilt can be 
presumed until the charge has been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. Further, the presumption of 
innocence implies a right to be treated in accordance 
with this principle. It is therefore a duty for all 
public authorties to refrain from prejudging the 
outcome of a trial. <iee:>
The presumption of innocence serves many purposes in the proper 
administration of justice. First, it protects the accused person from 
being treated as guilty before his innocence has been proven. Second­
ly, it prevents improper convictions simply because the accused has 
failed to prove his innocence, Finally, disregard of the presumption
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would certainly decrease the confidence of the public in the courts 
and the public prosecution. K 16135
The crucial elements of the presumption of innocence are:
a) Placement of the onus of proof on the prosecution, i.e., the ac- 
cused is not required to prove his innocence because it is pre­
sumed by law. The prosecution must prove that the offence was 
committed by the accused himself,
b) Giving the accused the benefit of the doubt. If the court
harbours any doubt that the alleged offence has in fact been
committed by the accused person, such doubts are to be interpreted 
by the court in favour of the innocence of the accused.
c) Treatment of the accused as an innocent person until pronounced
guilty by the final judgement of a competent court. Any pre-trial 
or conviction, action by the police or the investigating judge or 
any publicity that refers to the accused as a guilty person, may 
constitute an infringement of this right.41305
Most of the modern Arab constitutions and penal codes provide far 
the presumption of innocence as a legal safeguard for the liberty of 
the accused person.c1311 In the case of Jordan, neither the 
Constitution nor the Penal Code contains any provision relating to 
this right. Some Jordanian' lawyers have adopted a rather broad inter­
pretation of Article 7 of the Constitution, arguing that it implicitly 
provides for the presumption of innocence, Judge Kilany says: "The
logical consequence of the wording of Article 7 (personal liberty is 
safeguarded) is the right to such a presumption". c 13:25 Such an 
interpretation seems to lack a legal foundation, and is too broad to 
be acceptable, Therefore, an explicit provision in the Constitution, 
providing that: "A person accused of a criminal offence shall be pre­
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sumed innocent until lie is pronounced guilty in a final judgement of a 
competent court", would appear indispensable. Similar provision may 
also be added in the Criminal Procedures Code. In the initial report 
of Jordan under Article 40 of the Covenant, it was stated that; "... 
the Jordanian courts proceed on the principle that an accused person 
is to be considered innocent until his guilt has been legally 
established at a public trial."*133J
As far as the case law is concerned, the Supreme Court has indi­
rectly implemented the principle as a whole, or at least some of its 
elements. In 1953 the court ruled that "...in a criminal charge, 
the court should not convict the accused unless undoubted evidence has 
been introduced proving that the alleged offence was committed by the 
accused himself",*1345 Three years later, the court changed its view 
and ruled that: "It is the accused who must prove that he had acted
in good faith and that all due taxes and duties were properly 
paid".
In 1965, the court reverted to implementing some of the elements 
of the presumption of innocence. It said that: "If the public pro­
secution presented doubtful evidence, such doubt is to be interpreted 
to benefit the accused and consequently the accused should have been 
acquitted from the alleged offence" .*13e:>
Yet, in other cases the court has turned the presumption of in­
nocence 'up-side down', since it has required the accused to prove 
that his confession in the Police Station was obtained 
involuntarily.
On matters and facts relating to the defence pleas, the court has 
constantly required the accused to prove the facts or his good faith.
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In other words the court seems to have presumed him guilty and 
required him to prove his innocence,<19e5
In criminal proceedings, the accused must be presumed innocent, 
it is the prosecution which is required to prove the facts, not vice 
versa. Accordingly it could be stated that the Supreme Court of 
Jordan has neither explicitly denounced nor confirmed the right to 
presumption of innocence as a human right under the law of Jordan. 
Nonetheless, there are some cases where the court has implemented some 
elements of this principle. In many other cases, the court has simply 
ignored it.<13S,:* Thus, the statement that the Jordanian courts proceed 
on the basis that the accused is innocent until his guilt is proven by 
a final judgment is not fully supported by the case law; and therefore 
a new provison providing for this right at the constitutional level is 
required.
3) Lh^xlgh±..jLQ_r,el„ea^_p^dijqg^rial.
As a general rule alawfully detained person against whom a
criminal charge (or charges) has been properly made, is entitled to be
released an bail pending trial. This right has been provided for in
Article 9(3) of the Political Covenant, which says:
"...It shall not be the general rule that the persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for 
trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, 
and should arise for execution of the judgement."
This right to release on bail stems directly from the right to be 
presumed innocent, therefore its denial without reasonable justi­
fication implies denial of that right also. Obviously it is not an 
absolute right, but may be subject to limitations and conditions. A 
just balance between the right of everyone to his personal liberty and
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the legitimate interests of the community as a whole has to be 
maintained.
Bail in criminal cases is meant to guarantee the appearance of the 
accused to answer the charges and to submit to the judgement of the 
court. It is not an end in itself, but rather a means, and therefore, 
if forfeited or paid, it is still not a satisfaction for the offence 
or a punishment. Observation of this right Is useful for both the 
accused and the proper administration of justice. That is to say, it 
protects those who have been wrongfully accused from suffering 
imprisonment until they are acquitted by the court. It also enables 
the accused to plan and conduct his defence via legal consultations 
and searches for evidence and witnesses.
Despite the above advantages release on bail always involves great 
risks, such as absconding. A wide discretion is therefore given to 
the court to decide upon each case depending on the adequacy of the 
guarantees given by or on behalf of the accused.
However, in the modern legal systems the guarantee takes the form 
of a 'bail bond' Dr a 'sum of money', or both, to ensure the appear­
ance of the accused on demand. Since it depends largely on the dis­
cretion of the judge, his decision should, therefore, always be sub­
ject to higher judicial review.c201>
In Jordan, the right to release on bail is usually respected in 
practice, although restrictions may be imposed depending on the
circumstances of the particular case. A separate chapter has been 
devoted to this right in the Criminal Procedure Code 1961, which deals 
with it in detail. <2°2;* Both of the above forms of bail are
applicable on the choice of the public prosecutor or the court.<32035
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The legislature has divided criminal offences for the purposes of bail 
into two categories:
a) Non-bailable offences, "No release on bail shall be guaranteed to 
a person who is accused or convicted of a crime punishable by the 
death penalty, hard labour or imprisonment far life,"c=3:OA;> Some other 
felonies are also unbailable as a general rule. Nonetheless, under 
special circumstances, the court may order release on bail if it is 
satisfied that such release would not be prejudicial to justice or 
public security,<33:os:i The Supreme Court has stated that: "...bail is
impermissible if the provided punishment is the death penalty, hard 
labour or imprisonment for life. In other felonies where punishment 
ranges from temporary to hard labour for life, only the court may 
order the release on bail" . czoe:>
b) Bailable offences. According to Article 121, the public prosecutor 
may order the release of anyone detained for a misdemeanour. The 
court may also do so when the case is referred to it.'20,75 In 
practice, release on bail is usually guaranteed for most of the 
bailable offences, if and when sufficient guarantees have been 
introduced. However, the decision itself, the form and the amount of 
the bail are all matters for the public prosecutor or the court to 
decide at their own discretion according to the situation. A right to 
appeal against the decision is provided under Article 124. Decisions 
of the public prosecutor in this respect may be appealed to the Court 
of First Instance, decisions of the latter and the Justice of the 
Peace are to be appealed to the Court of Appeal within three days. 
The Supreme Court has classified those decisions as administrative 
decisions, which means that they could be reviewed or withdrawn by the 
same court that passed them in the first instance, with or without a
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new application. <SO£5:' In another case, the same court (the Supreme
Court) overruled the decision of the Court of First Instance and
decided that the latter;
"should have considered the appeal against the 
decision of the public prosecutor rejecting the 
release on bail, despite the fact that it was not
submitted to it in its capacity as a court of appeal 
when it should have been according to the law. "
4, The__Right„to,,Eal r,,TriaLl.
A lawfully arrested person, with a criminal charge properly
brought against him, and presumed innocent, whether released on bail
or not, must be brought to a fair trial as soon as possible. Article
14(1) of the political Covenant provides that:
"In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at 
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair trial and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."
As is clear from the provision of this paragraph and as has been
emphasised by the HRCC21o:>, the right to a fair hearing applies not
only to those charged with criminal charges, but also to any suit at 
law for the determination of one's rights and obligations. In con­
junction with Article 2(3) it gives rise to the right to judicial 
review of administrative action by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal.<S11>
The term 'fair trial' may be defined as; a public and speedy trial 
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, in which all 
guarantees necessary for the defence are fully observed. Accordingly, 
fair trial consists of four essential elements: these are the
character of the tribunal, the public nature of the hearings, speedy 
trial and the defence guarantees.
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a) The character of the court: or the tribunal.
A court conducting a criminal trial must possess tlie three re­
quired qualifications of independence, impartiality and competence. 
The first two qualifications will he discussed elsewhere in this 
work.
However, the term independent, as used here, should be interpreted 
in the sense of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the judge 
or the court must not be subject to the control or influence of the 
executive or the legislature, c21:3;:, Impartiality requires the equality 
of the parties before an unbiassed court, conventionally translated in 
the doctrine that; "Ho man may be a judge in his own cause", <214,) The 
third requirement 'competence' has been referred to in the Covenant 
as, a "competent. .. tribunal established by law", As is used here the 
word competent refers to jurisdiction, not to the ability of the court 
or its members,*21155 It seems that this requirement is directed at 
all ad hoc and special tribunals. Therefore, a trial before any 
illegally created court or a court-like institution, would constitute 
a violation of Article 14(1). If so, does the court have to be pre- 
established? In other words, does the institution of a special tri­
bunal, (lawfully created after the commission of the offence), for the 
purpose of trying the offender(s), contravene the requirement of a 
competent court? Taking into consideration the present wording of 
Article 14(1), the answer would be negative. An amendment, therefore, 
was suggested by some Latin-American members of the commission*21 
to include the word 'pre-established' and also to cover all ad hoc 
tribunals. This was firmly opposed and overwhelmingly defeated, c:217;» 
However, as Harris has observed, the limited value of the texts as it 
stands makes it difficult if not impossible to improve upon it by any
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other formal prescription. He says; "...the important consideration 
is whether the court observes certain other requirements once it be­
gins to function, however it might be created". The emphasis is to be 
put on the due respect given to the other requirements of fair hear­
ings before that tribunal, no matter if it was pre-established or 
not. However, the drafters of the AMR seem to have managed to
avoid such difficulty by providing explicitly for the pre-establish­
ment of the court, <2:13 3
In Jordan, Chapter Six of the Constitution entitled 'The Judi­
ciary' , contains some guarantees for the independence and impartiality 
of the courts, leaving the distribution of and the limitations on 
their jurisdiction to the relevant laws. It says: "Judges are
independent in the exercise of their judicial functions, they are 
subject to no authority other than that of the law."<220> It also 
provides that the regular courts exercise their jurisdiction over all 
persons in all matters, including claims brought by or against the 
government.c231J On the other hand, the Constitution has also 
authorised the Government to establish special courts and tribunals, 
provided that they are bound by their particular laws. Article 110 
states that, "Special courts shall exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
with the provisions of the law constituting them". Under that Article 
various types of special tribunals have been established.
b) Speedy trial (without undue
This is an important feature of the fair trial. The right of the 
accused person to fair trial would not be fulfilled if he were to face 
interminable criminal proceedings. A prolonged trial adds to the an­
xiety and pressure experienced by the accused, and impairs his
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endurance and his ability to conduct his defence. Simply because of 
undue delay in the proceedings an innocent man may be imprisoned far a 
long time before a final judgement is passed. Even if he is event­
ually convicted, he may already have been kept in custody for a period 
much longer than the due imprisonment actually prescribed by the law.
Commenting on Article 14(3) (c), the EEC stated that:
"this guarantee relates not only to the time by which 
a trial should commence, but also the time by which it 
should end and judgement be rendered; all stages must 
take place "without undue delay". To make this right 
effective a procedure must be available in order to 
ensure that the trial will proceed "without undue 
delay", both in first instance and on appeal."
However, what is required is a speedy trial not speed for its own 
sake. Unreasonable speed or a hasty trial could have even more 
damaging consequences for the accused, therefore speed is a matter of 
degree, dependent upon the circumstances of the trial itself. There 
is no general provision in the law of Jordan providing for this right, 
Nonetheless, inspired by the importance of this element of fair trial, 
the Jordanian legislature has established Nahkamat al-Genait al-Cuopra 
(The Court of Capital Felonies). Allowing the public prosecution
to take its time at the investigating stage in conducting the investi­
gation and preparation of the case, the legislature has imposed 
restrictive time limits for the proceedings before the court.
The jurisdiction of the court is restricted to certain types of crim­
inal offence (capital felonies) which usually attract great public 
concern. These are included in Article 326, 327, 328, 330, 338, 292, 
and 302 of the Penal Code, i.e., committed and attempted murder, in­
tentional killing and sexual offences. Article 8-13 of the special 
law establishing the court (law No. 33 of 1976) reflect the object of 
the court to work intensively and speedily on the case under its
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jurisdiction. It provides that the public prosecutors should carry 
out all investigations in a speedy manner and that they personally are 
liable to criminal prosecution in case of an undue delay in the pro­
cess. It requires the public prosecutor to indict the suspect
within seven days of the conclusion of the investigations. His deci­
sion is to be referred to the Attorney-General who must issue a bill 
of indictment within seven days also. Within the following three 
days the case must be referred to the court and registered with the 
secretariat. c:2K7r* The court has to proceed with the case within ten 
days of the registration. Hearings should continue on daily basis. 
Adjournments should not exceed 48 hours unless absolutely necessary 
for defined reasons to be mentioned in the same decision.<2:2S> Final 
Judgements should be pronounced within ten days of the conclusion of 
the trial. c2:235
In practice, the court has been staffed by judges with long ex­
perience and a high degree of competence, supported by a highly train­
ed staff. After about ten years in operation the court has shown much 
success in achieving its objectives. Therefore, it seems to be a
standard model to be imitated by other Arab countries, and perhaps the
Third World countries, where delays in criminal trials are all too 
caramon,
c) Public trial.
Publicity is also an essential element of a fair trial. In the
darkness of secrecy, evil in every shape has full rein. Indeed:
"where there is no publicity there is no justice ... It keeps the 
judge himselfwhile trying under trial in the sense that the security 
of securities is publicity."<:S:;305 A court of justice is a public 
forum. It is through publicity that the citizens are satisfied that
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the court renders even-handed justice, and It Is therefore necessary 
that the trial should be open to the public, There should be no re­
straint on the publication of the reports of the court proceed­
ings. e& 315 Article 14(1) of the Political Covenant provides that: 
"...everyone shall be entitled to a fair public hearing...." 
Publicity is intended to serve as a safeguard against arbitrary ac­
tions by the prosecution or by the court.4s2» If that is the case, 
the question that might be asked is, whether the right to public trial 
is a personal right of the accused or one that belongs to the public? 
Divergent answers may be given to such a question. Some may argue 
that, it is a personal right belonging to the accused. If this is 
difficult to accept, it is also equally incorrect to argue that it 
belongs to the public, and has nothing to do with the accused 
person, Therefore, the argument that it belongs to both of them
seems more accurett<j/ It protects the interest of the accused in his 
personal liberty and the legitimate interest of the public in a proper 
administration of justice, ¥hen considering the question, Lord 
Denning stated that:
" It must always be remembered that besides the inter­
est of the parties in a fair trial... there is another 
important interest to be considered. It Is the 
interest of the public in matters of national concern, 
and the freedom of the press to make fair comment on 
such matters. The one interest must be balanced 
against the other.
But how public should a trial be? Does it require the actual pre­
sence of the public during the whole trial or any part of it? What 
if some people are denied admission to the court because available 
seats are already occupied? Endless problems and difficulties might 
be experienced in practice with regard to this guarantee. Nonethe­
less, a public trial may be defined as a trial that takes place in an
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open court with relatively adequate number of available seats and free
admission for those who m y  wish to attend. It certainly does not
include the right of the spectators to photograph, record, televise or
transmit the proceedings to the public outside the court without
permission. However, the HRC has provided a clear and direct answer to
that question. It says:
"The publicity of hearings is an important safeguard 
in the interests of the individual and of society at 
large. .,. the Committee considers that a hearing must 
be open to the public in general, including members of 
the press, and must not for instance, be limited only 
to a particular category of persons. " <£34-e*3
Further, the HRC seems to require that not only should the 
hearings be made public but that also the judgement of the court , 
except in exceptional cases, be made public as well. InCase
Ho.44/1979 the HRC concluded that Article 14(1) was violated because
the victfm was^denied the right to a public hearing because the
judgment render^ against him was not made public. CS3e:>
Since the right to public trial is not an absolute right, there 
are some circumstances where secrecy might be permissible or even re­
quired by law. Therefore, Article 14(1) of the Political Covenant 
provides that:
"...the press and the public may be excluded from all 
or part of the trial for reasons of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, or 
when the interest of the private lives of the parties 
so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in 
the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
j ustice."
As far as this provision is concerned one may firstly observe that 
although the first three limitations (morals, public order and nation­
al security) are also reasons to impose restrictions on other rights 
in the Covenant,C237) "they are broad enough to cover almost any
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denial of the right to public trial. Secondly, although it is a
general rule of interpretation that limitations must be construed in a 
rather narrow way, the insertion of the phrase "in a democratic 
society", is apparently intended to put more emphasis on the limited 
character of the permissible restriction on the right to public trial 
and to enable the HRC to control the correctness of the application of 
those limitations by a domestic court. Yet the question one may pose 
here is what is a democratic society?
So far, the HRC has not provided an authoritative interpretation 
Df these terms and phrases, and prefered to judge individual cases in 
the light of surrounding circumstances, nonetheless, in a number of 
cases the HRC has decided that the requirements of publicity were 
infringed, In Case Ho,70/1980, for instance, where it was established 
that the victim "was tried in cameraf the trial was conducted without 
her presence and the judgement was not rendered in public" the HRC 
held that this constituted a violation of Article 14(1) "because she 
[the victm ] did not have a fair and public hearing". K2:39* In another 
case (Ho,44/1979) where the victim was sentenced "in a closed trial 
conducted in writing and without his presence and the judgement of the 
court was not made public", it was also concluded that Article 14 (1) 
was violated.
In Jordan, the right to public trial is protected by the Con­
stitution. Article 101 provide that:
"(I) The courts shall be open to all and are free from
any interference in their affairs, (II) Hearings
shall be public unless the court deems it necessary to
sit in camera for the sake of public order or
decorum. "
The Criminal Procedure Code has followed along the same line, but 
with more restrictions. Article 171 therein provides that:
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"trials shall be public unless the court decides it to 
be held in camera for the sake of public order or de­
corum; in all circumstances juveniles or any category 
of the public may be excluded".
It is clear that the right to public trial is a constitutional
right, which may not be restricted except by the court, on either or
both of the limitations as defined by the Constitution. Nonetheless,
the legislature has added a new limitation, authorizing the court to
exclude any category of the public, or to prevent them from attending
the hearings,<240aJ Such limitation appears to fall outside the
constitutional restrictions. Yet the constitutionality of Article 171
of the Criminal Procedure Code has never been challenged before any
court. Furthermore, in 1968 the Juvenile Law was enacted.<2415
Article 10 of the latter reads as follows:
"A juvenile shall be tried in camera, no one may be 
admitted to the hearing except the Moraqeeb assulwok 
<The social worker), the parents or the guardian, the 
lawyers and other persons directly involved in the
case."
Prima facie, this is an unwarranted legislative restriction on the 
right guaranteed under the Constitution. In 1976, the constitutional­
ity of this Article was questioned before the Court of First Instance 
in Amman. The court pronounced it unconstitutional and therefore held 
the trial publicly, although the accused was a juvenile. The Court of 
Appeal overruled the lower court on the grounds that it had violated 
Article 10 of the Juvenile Law. When the case eventually came before
the Supreme Court, the majority Df the court reversed the Appeal
Court's decision, stating the following principle:
"Since the Constitution has conferred the power to
decide on the secrecy Df the trial solely on the
court, Article 10 of the juvenile law by making it ob­
ligatory upon the court to sit in camera in all cases 
involving juveniles, is inconsistent with Article
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101(2) of the Constitution,The Constitution supersedes 
the other laws."<£42)
In his dissenting opinion, Justice A. Ko'ath argued that: "since
the rules relating to publicity and secrecy of trials have nothing to
do with the requirements of justice or the rightsof the defence,but
only relate to public order and decorum , in accordance with Article
a
101(2) of the Constitution. .. such/violation is not fundamental and 
therefore does not require that the decision of the Cout of Appeal be 
reversed. " c2431 * Obviously, the argument of Justice A . Mo'ath, 
reveals a gross misunderstanding of the nature of this guarantee and 
the rale it plays in criminal proceedings,
few months later, the Supreme Court changed its attitude and de­
parted from the previous decision in an almost identical case. In
this case the Court of Appeal adopted the view expressed by the 
Supreme Court in the previous case, and this time upheld the decision 
of the Court of First Instance. Having reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court stated the following reasoning:
", . , (2) secret trial in a criminal case is designated 
for the maintenance of public security*24-43 and 
decorum as provided in Article 171 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, A public hearing when the trial should 
have been held in camera, renders the judgement 
void...Para. 2 of Article 101 of the Constitution
authorizes secret trials if publicity would be 
prejudicial to public order or decorum. .. When the 
legislature imposed secrecy on all proceedings in­
volving juveniles (Article 10) it was done for the 
sake of public order and decorum, and so that the
youngsters would not have to stand before the public 
as accused criminals, a situation which might affect 
them psychologically or morally in a detrimental
It seems that these contradictory decisions are the result of the 
vagueness of the limitations provided for by the Constitution and the 
Criminal Procedures Code. In the first case, the Supreme Court had in
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mind the explicit provision of the Constitution, (Article 101(2)) 
which makes the court the sole authority that may decide upon secrecy 
and publicity in the trial. So the imposition of secrecy upon the 
court in all cases involving juveniles, by Article 10 of the Juvenile 
Law, was on the face of it an unconstitutional measure. Thus the 
verdict and the reasoning seemed correct in the light of the explicit 
wording of Article 101(2), which confers an exclusive discretion on 
the court.
On the other hand, the second judgement (the contemporary attitude 
of the court) is difficult to defend on the basis of the present 
constitutional provisions, even though it seems sounder than the 
previous decision . The standing opinion of the court and Article 10 
of the Juvenile Law have brought the judicial practice and the law of 
Jordan into line with the Political Covenant, which requires special 
procedures, in the case of an accused juvenile that takes into 
consideration his age and the desirability of promoting his 
rehabilitation. C2:AS:> it seems that the Supreme Court had this 
objective in mind when it stated in the reasoning that Article 10 of 
the Juvenile Law is a necessity to protect the youngsters from 
appearing before the public in the court as accused criminals, a 
situation which could lead to lasting psychological and moral 
problems,
Here we have two inconsistent judicial opinions delivered by the 
same court on the same issue. The first correctly upheld the 
provision of the Constitution as it stands. The second has carried 
the constitutional provision much further than it could legally reach, 
and has stretched it in an unappropriate way in order to give consti­
tutional justification to Article 10 of the Juvenile Law. Although
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the second opinion is more desirable in practice because it brings the 
law of Jordan into harmony with the international standards of human 
rights, it is difficult to sustain in the light of the present pro­
visions of the Constitution,
In order to overcome such a legal and practical difficulty, 
Article 101 of the Constitution should be amended to enable the court 
to follow special procedures in the case of a juvenile person, as is 
required under the Covenant. This could be achieved by adding a 
third paragraph to Article 101. There is no reason why it could not 
be paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the Covenant itself, which reads as 
fallows:”In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such 
as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting 
their rehabilitation”.
However, apart from the views of Justice Mo'ath,and the confusion 
over the constitutionality of Article 10 of the Juvenile Law, the 
right to a puplic hearing is provided for in the law of Jordan and 
implemented in practice .Judgments of the courts are always rendered 
in public even if the hearings were conducted in camera, Except in 
some special cases judgments of the regular courts are regularly 
reported in the JBR; the Jordanian press also sometimes report and 
make comments on the decisions of the courts especially those of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. Access to unreported cases by 
those who may be interested, requires a special permission from the 
Clerk of the court where the records are held,
In the case of the Military and the Administrative Governers 
Tribunals publicity is not always observed in practice^ Because the 
decisions of these tribunals are not subject to appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the latter is unable to assess their appreciation of the
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interest of public order and national security, most cases before 
these tribunals are tried in camera on the grounds of public order and
national security. Decisions of these tribunals are not reported and
/c?
access^their records is very restricted. This practice does not only 
raise a violation of Article 14<1) of the Political Covenant but also 
of Article 102 of the Jordanian Constitution itself.
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5) The right to a proper defence.
A proper defence requires the observation of certain 'minimum' 
guarantees, Article 14 of the Political Covenant provides that "In 
the determination of a criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality". 
Describing them as 'minimum guarantees' clearly indicates that they 
are essential, but by no means exhaustive. Deprivation of any of 
these guarantees in itself may be interpreted as a denial of the right 
to fair trial.
Such essential guarantees are enumerated in paragraph (3) of the 
same Article, and in addition to the right to be informed in detail of 
the nature of the charge <s)<1ZAr75 they include the following:
a) The right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of one's defence;
Time is a crucial factor in criminal proceedings and either 
extreme can be detrimental. That is to say a prolonged criminal trial 
could hinder the ability of the defence either by the sheer psycholo­
gical pressure which usually accompanies such trials or by the loss of 
valuable evidence of a witness. Hasty proceedings and convictions, on 
the other hand open a wider margin for errors and deprive the accused 
of a proper presentation of his defence.
However, what may be regarded as an 'adequate time' is a matter of 
appreciation, dependent on the exigencies of each case. The word 
'facilities'<2435 should be interpreted to include all information 
and objects which the defence may reasonably need. These may include 
official, non-confidential documents and police reports.
In Case Ho, 158/1983, the person who was convicted on a traffic 
offence claimed that he was not able to prepare his defence adequately
because the court did not provide him with copies of all relevant
documents about the traffic violation. Declaring the case
e
inadm isslble the HRC stated that;
"from 26 August to the date of the hearing on 21 
October the author could have examined, personally or 
through his lawyer, documents relevant to the case at 
the police station. He chose not to do so, but 
requested that copies of all documents be sent to him.
The Committee notes that the Covenant does not 
explicitly provide for a right of a charged person to 
be furnished with copies of all relevant documents in 
a criminal investigation, but does provide that he 
shall have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing. Even if all the 
allegations of the author were to be accepted as 
proven, this would be no ground for asserting that a 
violation of Article 14- paragraph (3) Cb) 
occurred. " <3:505
The law of Jordan, guarantees a minimum period of seven days for
the preparation of the defence. Article 207 of the Criminal Procedure
Code provides that ^the public prosecutor shall communicate the 
indictment along with the list of witnesses, at least seven days ahead 
of the day of the hearing'*, Whether such a period of time is 
equivalent to ’adequate time' required under the Covenant or not, is a 
matter which varies from one case to another. However, Article 207 
prescribes a minimum period, so the public prosecutor or the court may 
balance the time given with the facts of the case. On the other hand, 
the defence may also plead for additional time in order to complete 
the necessary preparations.
The Supreme Court of Jordan does not seem to appreciate the im­
portance of this right. It has pronounced upon this guarantee and in 
effect denied the accused this basic right. In a celebrated case 
before the court, the defence argued that the minimum time to prepare 
the case had not been given. The Supreme Court stated that:
",.,the procedure established under Article 207 is not 
a fundamental one. Hon-communication of the indict­
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ment to the accused before the hearing as prescribed 
under the said Article, does not render the judgement 
of the Court of First Instance voidable. Thereupon 
violation of this kind is not a valid reason for 
revision by the Supreme Court.1 C2:S1 >
This interpretation appear*inconsistent with both Article 14
of the Covenant and Article 207 itself. However, in case of modi­
fication of the charge by the court during or after the first hearing, 
the established practice varies according to the nature of the 
modification. If such a modification would suggest a graver punish­
ment, the court must inform the defence of such changes and postpone 
the hearing for any period of time considered necessary by the
court,*2525 In one of its typical judgements in this context, the
Supreme Court stated;
"In case of modification in the charge, the court 
should inform the accused of such modification, and 
give him adequate time to prepare his defence in ac­
cordance with Article 234.,."C2E3>
This may seem fair and compatible with the requirements of the
Covenant, but nonetheless in the case of a mitigating modification in 
the charge that suggests a lesser punishment, e.g. from murder to 
homicide, there is no similar provision, and the established practice 
of the Supreme Court does not recognise the right to have the hearing 
postponed for the preparation of the defence in accordance with the 
modified charge. Such a practice is a severe encroachment on the
defence's rights, and is contrary to the basic principles of criminal 
justice. The defence may have a sound argument and evidence to prove 
the initial charge false. The modified charge, although mitigated, if 
proved because of the shortcomings or weaknesses of the defence, would 
still entail serious consequences affecting the personal liberty of 
the defendant.
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It is difficult to see any legal or rational justification for the 
distinction between the two cases, and therefore, it could be sug­
gested that Article 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code be amended in 
the sense that such a distinction be eliminated. An adequate time for 
the preparation of the defence in both cases must be guaranteed.
As to the second requirement for the preparation of the defence, 
'facilities', it seems that access to documents and materials 
necessary for the defence is usually respected in practice unless it 
requires the disclosure of private or official confidential documents. 
In Case Ho. 56/73, the HCJ rejected the request of the defence to 
obtain a copy of the letter of the Director of the General Intelli­
gence Agency, because it was testified by the Prime Minister that it
was confidential and that the disclosure of its contents would be
harmful to national security.
However, Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code entitles the 
defence to copy, at his expense, all documents which he deems 
necessary for his case. This may include police reports, investigation 
documents, decisions of the court in previous cases, testimonies of 
witnesses and all other official but non-confidential documents.
b) The right to legal assistance (to be defended by a counsel).
The Covenant requires that every person charged with a criminal
offence be given the right,
"to defend himself in person or through legal assis­
tance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does 
not have legal assistance, of this right, and have 
legal assistance assigned to him in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it,"*3*57*
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Undsr a free legal aid system, the choice of a lawyer has always 
been left to the state. The accused cannot insist that the state pay 
the lawyer he selects. If the lawyer is paid by the accused himself 
or anybody else on his behalf other than the state, then the rule of 
free choice becomes applicable. ECUM, for instance, has held that the 
state is free to regulate the use of legal aid and to exclude par­
ticular lawyers. Therefore, the state is responsible for the conduct 
of the case by the lawyer appointed under legal aid. <:2SS:> 
Accordingly, the state's control of legal aid must not impair the 
adequacy of the defence, the 'equality of arms' or any other aspect of 
the right to fair trial.
In Jordan, legal representation is generally an optional right be­
longing to the accused. However, in cases where the prescribed pun­
ishment is death, imprisonment or hard labour for life, legal rep­
resentation becomes mandatory. This right commences at the very be­
ginning of the inquisition and continues throughout the whole 
proceedings. Article 63 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that:
"When the suspect appears before the public 
prosecutor... the latter shall recite the charge upon 
him and ash the suspect to answer it, reminding him of
his right not to answer unless in the presence of his
lawyer, such a reminder must be mentioned in the 
report. If the suspect refuses to appoint a lawyer or 
the latter fails to appear within twenty-four hours, 
the interrogation shall be resumed without him. n
However, paragraph 2 of the same Article has laid a significant 
limitation on this right. It says, "In case of urgency because of the 
fear of losing the evidence, the suspect may be interrogated without a 
lawyer, providing that all the records be made available to him (the 
lawyer) later."
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This is a widely drawn exception, which is liable to abuse in 
practice as it could be argued that the element of 'urgency' may exist 
in most cases on the sole judgement of the public prosecutor, and may 
be used as a pretext, in order to avoid the presence of lawyers at the 
most important initial stages of the investigation, where the accused 
may be induced or misled into making serious admissions. Knowing that 
all statements or confessions made before the public prosecutor are 
admissible evidence unless proved to have been obtained under coercion 
(a task which is extremely difficult, if not impassible to prove in 
the majority of cases),c260* one may appreciate the importance of
this stage.
Another important aspect of this right is the duty of the public 
prosecutor to remind the accused of his right to have legal assistance 
and not to answer the charges unless in the presence of his lawyer.
The importance of the right to be informed stems from the fact that
most of the accused are laymen who are usually not aware that they are 
entitled to such a right. Therefore Article 14(3)Cd) of the Covenant 
puts emphasis on the right of the accused person to be specifically 
informed of this right.
Both the public prosecution and the Supreme Court of Jordan seems
reluctant to recognise this right as such. It seems that the public
prosecution is always in a hurry, and it does not seem to have respect
for the right of the accused to be informed of his right to have legal
assistance. In a considerable number of cases the Supreme Court has
ruled that it is not one of the fundamental defence rights. If has
not been observed, it does not render the proceedings voidable. In
one of those cases the court stated that;
"... non-recitation of the criminal charge to the ac­
cused or reminding him of his right to remain silent
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and not to answer unless in the presence of his 
lawyer, does not make the proceedings void, "<:2ei *
It seems that the established opinion of the Jordanian courts 
(directed by the Supreme Court) is that, as far as there is no formal 
objection by the accused to the proceedings without legal representa­
tion, the proceedings are held to be lawful. In 1079, the Supreme 
Court had clearly embodied that conclusion in the following words: 
"If the records do not include any objection by the accused to him 
being tried without legal assistance, proceedings in the absence of 
the lawyer would be lawful." <se2:* This justification seems far from 
being acceptable unless the accused is informed in the first place of 
his right to abject, and then if he does not so do, it might be 
interpreted as a relinquishment by the accused of his right to have 
legal assistance.
It was not until 1981 that the Supreme Court departed from its
previous attitude to a more appropriate judicial interpretation. In
Case No. 52/81t the court stated the following view:
"If the public prosecutor does not inform the accused 
of his right not to answer the charge without the pre­
sence of his lawyer, and mentions this in the records, 
he would be violating the law and neglecting a funda­
mental defence right guaranteed under the law.
There have been no reported cases on this issue since this judge­
ment has been passed, However, the wording of this judgement and its 
future context clearly suggest that it was intended to establish a new 
method of judicial interpretation, to be followed in future cases.
Turning again to the Criminal Procedure Code, we find that the 
legislature has introduced a somewhat strange limitation under Article 
65(1): "None of the parties may be helped by more than one lawyer".
This seems an unnecessary limitation, since the lawyer(s) is not al-
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lowed to speak unless permitted by the investigator. Where such 
permission is not granted, it must be mentioned in the report, and the 
right of the lawyer to include his observation in written form is re­
served. C26il3 The most serious limitation on the right to be defended 
by a lawyer has been imposed by Article 66, whereby the public prose­
cutor may prevent or sever any contact between the accused and his 
lawyer<s) at his own discretion, without even offering any reason for 
t h a t . W h e n  applied to specific cases this may be regarded as a 
violation of Article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant. It would also under­
mine another important guarantee of this right, provided under Article 
152 which says: "Correspondence between the accused and his lawyer
shall not be admissible evidence." Such an important guarantee would 
be meaningless if the accused was deprived of any contact with his 
lawyer. Therefore, it has to be amended in order to meet the 
international standards of this right. Accordingly, the last sentence 
of paragraph (2) of Article 66, "...unless the public prosecutor so 
decided", must be eliminated.
As has been pointed out, legal assistance in certain cases becomes
mandatory by the law. Article 208C1) provides that:
"In all cases where the prescribed punishment may be 
the death penalty, imprisonment or hard labour for 
life, the president of the court or a delegated judge 
from among its members, must summon the accused and 
ask him whether he has chosen a lawyer tD defend him 
or not. If he has not and is financially unable to do 
so, the president Dr the delegated judge shall assign 
a lawyer for him. "
Paragraph (2) of the same Article requires that such a legal 
assistance be furnished free of charge. < >  Accordingly, the free 
legal assistance systems in Jordan is restricted to some serious 
offences only. Jordan has reported to the HEC that under the
Jordanian legal system, when the accused is
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"summoned, to appear and, if the charge against him is 
punishable by the death penalty or by hard labour for 
life or imprisonment for life, he is asked whether he 
has chosen an attorney to defend him, If he has not 
chosen an attorney because his material circumstances 
are not such as to enable him to appoint legal 
counsel, the presiding judge or his deputy , appoints 
an attorney to defend him at Government expense."C2eeo
Commenting on this paragraph of the report Mr, Bouziri asked
"whether that meant that the accused was judged without an attorney
when he did not risk the death penalty or a life sentence; that would
be contrary to the provisions of article 14, paragraph 3(b) of the
Covenant,"c 5 In reply to this the Jordanian representative stated;
11. , . a person brought before the public prosecutor had 
to wait for an attorney before answering the charge 
against him, If there was no attorney, the prosector 
imposed a 24 hour deadline for the appointment of an 
attorney. No court could judge a person who was not 
assisted by an attorney if the person was subject to a 
prison sentence of over five years; if the accused had 
no money to pay for an attorney, the Government paid 
for one, For less serious offences (minor offences) 
the presence of an attorney was not compulsory, but in 
such cases the court took charge of the interests of 
the accused and asked him questions for his benefit as 
if a lawyer was there. " c2-705
Obviously, the representative of Jordan had misinterpreted the law 
(Article 208 of the Criminal Procedure Code) and was not aware of the 
case law especially the judgement of the Supreme Court in Case 
Mo.18/74 where the court explicitly stated that free legal assistance 
did not apply in crimes where the prescribed punishment was the 
B'atiqal Mou'akat (3-15 years imprisonment).
However, in a complaint before the HRC where the author claimed 
that his right to free legal assistance under Article 14(3) (d) was 
violated, the state party argued that the right to free legal 
assistance "must be seen in the light of the nature of the offences 
with which he was charged". The latter were trivial and ordinary
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traffic violations and the punishment was light (a fine of Mr. 1,000 
or 10 days imprisonment if the fine was not paid). Declaring the
v
communication inadmissible, the HRC stated:
"The Covenant foresees free legal assistance to a 
charged person in any case where the interests of 
justice so require and without payment to him in any 
such cases if he does not have sufficient means to pay 
for it. The author has failed to show that in his 
particular case the interest of justice would have 
required the assignment of a lawyer at the expense of 
the state party," >
However, it still could be argued that the law of Jordan does not 
meet the requirements of the Political Covenant with regard to this 
right, because it has restricted the right to free legal assistance to 
the cases of death penalty, imprisonment or hard labour far life 
whereas, under the Covenant legal assistance should be made available 
to "everyone charged with a criminal offence", i.e., any criminal of­
fence without restricting it to certain categories of criminal 
offences. It seems that the sole qualification is that the accused is 
financially unable to engage a lawyer to defend him and that legal 
assistance is required in the interests of justice. States parties 
appear to be therefore, under legal obligation to provide free legal 
assistance to everyone charged with any criminal offence, when the 
interests of justice so require if he does not possess the means to 
engage a lawyer at his own expense.
c> The right "to examine, or to have examined, the witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same condition as witnesses against 
him" . (272)
It is important that the accused should always be enabled to stand 
on an equal footing with the public prosecution, especially in respect 
of summoning and examining witnesses. However, the phrase 'on his be­
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h a l f , as Interpreted by the ECUM, does not give the accused the right 
to nominate as witnesses whoever and as many as he wants. The court 
may refuse to summon a witness(es) if his/their appearance before the 
court is not likely to assist in discovering the truth. In the words 
of the ECUM,
"it (the right) ...does not permit an accused person
to obtain the attendance of any and every person and
in particular of one who is not in a position by his
evidence to assist in establishing the truth...does 
not forbid the court to refuse to call persons who
cannot be witnesses on behalf of (the person 
charged).<273)
In Jordan, this right has been adequately provided for by the law 
and highly respected in practice. During preliminary investigation, 
Article 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code, empowers the public prose­
cutor to summon all persons whose names are mentioned in the complaint 
and any other persons whom the suspect may nominate. Those persons 
are to be notified of the proceedings twenty-four hours before the day 
on which they are requested to appear for testimony, person
nominated and duly notified must appear before the public prosecutor 
at the defined date under penalty of law. <27S5 However, the suspect’s 
forbears, descendants, wife or husband are exempted from the duty to 
testify, If they wish to do so, their testimonies on oath are ac­
cepted as valid evidence for or against the suspect,<27e)
During the proceedings before the court, the latter may summon 
upon its own initiative any person if it deems that his testimony may 
be significant. As a general rule all testimonies should be given on 
oath. Should a witness refuse to take the oath or to answer the 
questions without a reasonable justification, the court may imprison 
him for a period not exceeding one month.c 277:1
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With regard to summoning, examining and cross-examining witnesses, 
the law has placed the accused person and the defence on an equal 
footing with the public prosecution. According to Article 173(1), the 
court should summon and hear the witnesses for the prosecution, to 
whom the prosecution, al -mushtakl < the complainant) and the defence 
may put questions and discuss the answers. If the accused does not 
have a lawyer, the court should ask him after each testimony whether 
he wishes to ask the witness any questions, Both the questions and 
the answers must be documented in the record of the hearing. As
to the defence witnesses, Article 175(2) provides that: "After the
accused makes his statement, the court shall ask him whether he wishes 
to summon witnesses, if so the court must summon and hear them.1 < 5 
The defence and the accused may ask the defence witnesses questions, 
on which they may be cross-examined by the prosecution and the 
complainant as well.
Another fundamental guarantee in this respect has been provided 
for under Article 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It stipulates 
that the list of the prosecution witnesses must be communicated to the 
accused seven days before the day of the hearing. According to Article 
217, neither the Public Prosecution nor the complainant may summon any 
witness whose name is not included in such a list unless the accused 
(the defence) has received a special notification for that 
purpose. >
It seems that the Jordanian courts have always observed the right 
of the accused to summon and cross-examine witnesses. The Supreme 
Court has confirmed this right from the very beginning, in 1953 the 
court overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal and stated: 
"... acceptance of the medical report in the evidence without summoning
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the authors, would deprive the defence of the right to examine their 
testimonies and discuss their conclusions, " CSie;2:> Acting under the 
present Criminal Procedure Code, the court has reconfirmed its pre­
vious attitude in rather determined language. It says: "...the Court
of First Instance should have heard all the defence witnesses summoned 
on "behalf of the accused."c2335
Similar language was used in another case; ". ,.no prosecution 
witness may be admitted unless his name has been previously comr 
municated to the defence."c2845
Finally, as mentioned before,<SQ55 the court may disregard the 
request of the accused to summon someone, without infringing this 
right, if the court considers his testimony insignificant or otherwise 
unacceptable. In Case Ho. 9/57, the Supreme Court of Jordan rejected 
the request of the defence to summon the public prosecutor of Amman as 
a witness in that case on the grounds that the statement made by the 
accused before him was not accepted in the evidence anyway.
d) The right to an interpreter.<2e7>
It is unfair to bring a person before a court if he cannot speak 
or understand the language used therein. The assistance of an 
interpreter is therefore an indispensable requirement for a fair trial 
in such cases. The services of the interpreter must be free of 
charge, but does this right apply to the whole proceedings, or only to 
the oral pleadings before the court? According to the actual wording 
of the relevant clause in the Covenant, it applies to the latter 
only. <2ee:’ Taking into consideration that, what is guaranteed under 
the Covenant is merely the obligatory minimum standards, it may be 
argued that the state should provide this service free of charge at
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all stages of the trial, especially if the accused person is finan­
cially unable to pay for the service.
In Jordan, such a right is guaranteed under Article 227 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, it reads as follows:
"If the accused or any of the witnesses are not compe­
tent in the Arabic language, the president (president 
of the court) must assign an interpreter to him, the 
interpreter must not be under eighteen years of age 
and should take the oath to translate accurately and 
honestly to him and to the court.'1
Two noteworthy observations may be pointed out regarding the 
wording of the above Article. On the one hand, the right to an inter­
preter is extended to the witnesses and not only to the accused per­
son, while it is obligatory only with respect to the accused.
This would allow the accused to summon nan-Arabic-speaking witnesses 
without worrying about the costs if he thinks that their testimony may 
be of some significance for the defence. On the other hand, the ser­
vices are made available to any witness or the accused who cannot 
'properly' speak or understand Arabic, that is, merely being acquaint­
ed with the Arabic language would not be enough to deprive him of such 
assistance. Obviously, the legislature meant to enable the person to 
express himself clearly, and nothing therefore would be more satis­
factory than his mother tongue, or any equivalent language.
To ensure the implementation of this guarantee, Article 227 
provides that: "non-compliance with the provisions of this Article
shall render the whole proceedings voidable."4290> However, being a 
free service, does not mean that it may be an arbitrary one, the in­
terpreter therefore must be impartial. The law stipulates that, in no 
circumstances, may he be selected from among members of the trying 
court, even with the consent of the accused and the prosecution. <2£>13
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Accordingly, the defence as well as the prosecution may abject to the 
appointment of a person as an interpreter in a particular trial, 
providing that he has valid reasons upon which the court shall 
pronounce immediately, if this is the situation, could then the
interpreter be a relative of the accused? There is no reason why he 
should not be, on the contrary, it seems to serve the purpose of this 
service in an effective way.
This guarantee has also been extended to deaf or dumb accused per­
sons or witnesses in accordance with Article 230 and 231 of the 
Criminal Procedures Code, The Supreme Court has ruled that there was 
no violation of the defence guarantee, since the dumb defendant was 
assisted by her husband as an interpreter in accordance with Article 
230, so far as all the gestures made by her were translated into words 
by her husband (who was accustomed to communicating with her) to the 
court.
e> Freedom from self-incrimination (the right to remain silent).
In the Covenant it says that no one shall "be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess g u i l t I t  has been mentioned
that<:E3e3 obtaining confessions Dr statements by physical or 
psychological pressure, violates the right Df the arrested person to a
humane t r e a t m e n t , I t  also violates the right of the accused to
freedom from s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e ,  the accused must be 
allowed to give or withhold evidence if he wishes, or to make unsworn 
statements, or to remain silent.
As far as Jordan is concerned, this right has been provided for by 
the law and implemented by the courts in practice.
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According to Article 63 of the Criminal Procedures Code, when the 
accused appears before the public prosecutor, the latter should recite 
the charges upon him and "ask him to answer". During the hearings the 
accused is also under no obligation to make any statement or con­
fession. Article 216 reads as follows:
"...the president shall ask the accused to answer the 
charge. If the accused admits the charge, he (the
president) shall order that it be recorded in the 
original words of the accused... If the accused 
remains silent Dr denies the charge, the court should 
proceed to examine the evidence as normal.n<2395
Thus, according to the law, the public prosecutor and the court
should only ask the accused to answer the charge, nothing more,
nothing less. His right to remain silent must not be interpreted as a
confession of his guilt, on the contrary, the law explicitly provides
that it must be understood as a denial of the alleged charge. <3°o:>
His right to speak and defend himself in person (even though he has a
lawyer) is always reserved. Article 175 says: "As the public
prosecution has demonstrated the evidence the court shall ask the
accused if he wishes to make a statement defending himself..."c3cn *
In the second supplementary report of Jordan to the HRC, it was
stated that;
"At the beginning of the trial, the clerk of the court 
reads out the charge and other relevant papers or 
documents, after which the representative of the 
Public Prosecutor's office and the plaintiff, or his 
attourney, explain the circumstances of the case. The 
court then asks the accused how he wishes to plead. If 
the accused denies the charge or refuses to answer, or 
if the court is not satisfied with his plea of guilty, 
the evidence is heard in accordance with the code of 
the court procedure, " *13025
Turning to the case law, it appears that, this right is 
adequately observed before the courts. In an early case, when the
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Supreme Court was working under the previous Criminal Procedure Code
(the Ottoman Code),*3035 it was stated that:
"... at the beginning of the hearing the court should 
ask the accused, before the pleading of the 
prosecution, if he admits the charge as has been 
defined in the indictment bill. Having examined the 
evidence against him, it should ask the defendant 
again whether he wishes to make any statement." <3°A:i!
In another case, it was decided that: 1 the silence of the accused 
should not be interpreted or used in support of the prosecution's 
evidence."<303;*
Under the present Code, the court has constantly confirmed its 
established view. In 1975, the court overruled the judgement of the 
Court of First Instance and stated the following: "...as the pro­
secution has concluded its pleadings the court should have asked the 
defendant whether he wishes to make any observations, without any 
comment or remarks by the court."t30e>
In 1982, the court held that the interrogation was lawful, since 
the public prosecutor had told the accused that he did not have to 
answer the charge, but he had chosen to speak and defend himself 
personally.
It has already been mentioned that, in all cases where it was 
proved that the accused was compelled to speak or to make an 
involuntary confession, the Jordanian courts have considered it void 
and thus inadmissible as evidence. 1:30435
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D - THE RIGHT OF A CONVICTED OR ACQUITTED PERSOH.
Deprivation of personal freedom as a penalty for violating valid laws 
is a long-known and acceptable punishment. If it is invoked upon valid 
grounds and in accordance with lawful procedures it cannot be described 
as an arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty contrary to the inter­
national standards of human rights. However, even though all the above 
discussed guarantees and rights of the accused person were fully ob­
served, if convicted the person would be entitled to the following rights:
1> The Right to Appeal.
Considering the grave nature of criminal conviction and the fact that 
criminal tribunals are composed of human beings, liable to error and mis­
takes, the right to appeal would seem to be a substantial guarantee far 
the protection of personal freedom. It is true that, if the judge (court) 
knows from the beginning that his judgement is subject to a subsequent 
review by a higher tribunal, he will take extra care in examining the 
merits and applying the law respectively.
The Covenant requires that: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have 
the right to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tri­
bunal according to iaw."C30S° The wording of this clause may cause some 
ambiguity in practice. The phrase review according to law may give the 
impression that the matter rests ultimately with the municipal law. 
However, in Case No.64/1979. the HRC has clarified the situation and 
pronounced that:
"... the expression 'according to law' in Article 14(5) of 
the Covenant is not intended to leave the very existence 
of the right to review to the discretion of the states 
parties, since the rights are those recognized by the 
Covenant, and not merely those recognized by domestic 
law. Rather, what is to be determined "according to law"
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is the modalities by which the review by a higher 
tribunal is to be carried out,"<3105
On the nature of the criminal offence, it says: ''convicted of a
crime.” In many countries, including Jordan, criminal offences are
divided into three main categories: tfukhalfat 'violations', Jbnah
'Misdemeanours', and Gen'ayat 'felonies'. For each of these categories
procedural as well as substantive laws vary even within the same country.
Commenting on Article 14 of the Covenant the HRC stated that: "Particular
attention is drawn to the other language versions of the word "crime"
("infraction", "delito. "prestuplenie") which show that the guarantee is
not confined to the most serious offences."4311 > In Case No.R,14/611 the
HRC concluded that:
"It is true that the Spanish text of article 14(5) which 
provides for the right to review, refers only to 
"undelitp." while the English text refers to a crime and 
the French text refers to "une infraction". Nevertheless 
the Committee is of the view that the sentence of 
imprisonment imposed on Mrs. Consuela Salger De Montego, 
even though for an offence defined as "contravencion" in 
domestic law, is serious enough, in all circumstances, to 
require a review by a higher tribunal as provided for in 
article 14(5) of the Covenant."*131525
Another difficulty that may arise in practice is that of the type and 
status of the reviewing tribunal, which may satisfy the requirement of 
this clause. It requires a review by a higher tribunal whether this means 
a court of appeal, before which both the merits and the application of 
the law may be examined, or merely a court of cassation before which only 
legal questions may be discussed without examining the merits again is 
not clear. In the case of Jordan this question is of special importance. 
Since 1976 the most serious criminal offences are being reviewed only by 
way of cassation before the Supreme Court only.<313> The question to 
pose here is whether a review by an administrative authority would fulfil 
this obligation or not? The Covenant says: "tribunal".
150
Obviously, the office of the Prime Minister, for instance, or the head 
of the relevant department, is not a tribunal, within the meaning of 
Article 14(5).
In Jordan, the Criminal Procedure Code 1961, has guaranteed the right 
to appeal from the decisions of the various criminal courts,'31'*5 either 
to the competent court of appeal, or directly to the Supreme Court. Most 
of the laws establishing special tribunals also contain provisions 
relating to appeals from the final judgements of those tribunals. Only 
two types of those special tribunals may be regarded as incompatible 
with the requirements of Article 14(5) since there is no way of appealing 
against the sentence passed by them, namely; The Administrative 
Governors' Tribunals and Martial-law Courts. So far as the latter is 
concerned, their decisions are executable upon approval by the Martial 
Law Governor-General, or the King if the sentence happens to be the death 
penalty. It has been stated that decisions of that court shall not be 
subject to any review by any tribunal whatsoever,'3135
Administrative Governors are also vested with wide judicial powers 
under various pieces of legislation. They may pass sentences ranging 
from small fines to indefinite detention. In most cases, these decisions 
may not be reviewed save by the Minister of the Interior.'31® 5
Such legislation is manifestly incompatible with the requirements of 
the Covenant, which explicitly requires that every criminal conviction 
should be made subject to appeal to a higher tribunal. After more than 
ten years of the entry into force of the Covenant, nothing has been 
changed.
151
2) Freedom from double jeopardy; "The rule non bis in idem1
Trying a man twice for the same crime is one of the oldest griev­
ances to be found in the history of civilization. Its roots run deep into 
Greek and Soman times/317"3 The idea that one trial and one punishment 
were enough remained alive through the canon law and the early Christian 
teachings. Those teachings were revived in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and became part of the American Constitution/3*533
The theme of this safeguard is that the state with all its powers 
should not be empowered to keep individuals under perpetual threat of 
penal trials and punishment for an offence for which they have already 
been tried. That is to say, where a person was tried for an offence, 
whether convicted or acquitted, he should not be subjected to trial again 
for the same offence. If that is to be permitted, personal liberty would 
be in continuous jeopardy, when and as the state pleases. Therefore 
Article 14(7) of the Political Covenant provides that: "No one shall be 
liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finalty convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law 
and penal procedures of each country." According to Harris, "This final 
qualification robs the text of its character as an international 
guarantee."5:3133 That might be true, but the sentence "in accordance with 
the law and penal procedures of each country", does not seem to add any 
real limitation on this guarantee, since trials would always be conducted 
within the municipal law of the state concerned. The real difficulty that 
might be experienced in the light of such a qualification is when a 
person is tried (acquitted or convicted) in state 'A' for an offence which 
is also a criminal offence in accordance with the law of state 'B\ his 
home country. Some may argue that, trial and punishment of the same
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person for the same offence in both countries would not fall under the 
prohibition of Article 14(7) because of that sentence.
In Jordan, neither the Constitution nor the Criminal Procedure Code 
offers any protection against double jeopardy, Although Article 56(1) of 
the Penal Code provides that " a person may not be punished more than 
once for the same offence", practice, however, reveals grave violations 
of this right, especially on the part of Administrative Governors acting 
under emergency laws and regulations. As it will be explained later, these 
laws and regulations, which confer sweeping emergency powers on the 
administration, have been applied continuously for a long time in 
Jordan.c 320 5
a) Acquitted persons.
In 1964, the Governor of Jerusalem had Imposed compulsory residency 
in the city of Al-KJbaleel (Hebron) on Mrs. X for two years under direct 
police control, in accordance with Articles 8 and 18 of the Defence 
Regulations Ho, 2, 1939. The lady was acquitted by the court of the al­
leged charge (pimping). When the lady complained against the 
administrative order, the HCJ upheld the Governor's decision and pro­
nounced it lawful.*3215 Accordingly, that lady was punished for the same 
offence even though she had been tried and pronounced innocent by a final 
judgement of a competent court of law.
b) Convicted persons
Here one may find several precedents of 're-punishing' persons after 
they have already been tried and punished for the same offence. From 
among these the following may be mentioned:
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Mr. X was convicted by the competent court in Amman on 2nd January 
1952, and sentenced to four years of hard labour in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Anti-Communism law. Before he finished his 
sentence, the Minister of the Interior had tried him in absentia on 
21st November 1954 and issued a Defence Order providing for his 
detention for an indefinite period, in accordance with Article 18 and 
9A of Defence Regulations No, 2, 1939. When the case was brought 
before the HCJ, the decision was overruled by the court, who stated 
that:
"An order issued by the Minister of the Interior, de­
taining a person for an undefined period in accordance
with the Defence Regulations, on the grounds that the 
said person had committed an offence against the public 
interest and public security while this person was actu­
ally convicted under the Anti-Communism Law and hitherto 
serving his sentence, is void and therefore must be 
abrogated<G:s::s 5
Another Mr. X was tried and convicted by the competent court in
Amman on spying activities and sentenced to seven years of hard
labour. Having served his sentence and on the day he was due to be
released, the Administrative Governor of the capital tried him in
absentia and passed a Defence Order detaining him for an indefinite
period on the same charge. When the validity of the administrative
decision was challenged before the HCJ, the majority of the court
held that the Governor’s decision was a lawful administrative
measure. It seems that only Justice N, Reshidat had heard of the
right, not to be subjected to double jeopardy or not to be punished
twice for the same offence. In his dissenting opinion he stated:
"Since it is known for sure that the complainant was in 
jail serving his sentence... and therefore he could not
have committed any offence against the safety of the 
Kingdom... he has already been punished for the original 
offence that he had committed seven years ago and there-
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fore he must not be punished again for the same of­
fence."*323*
In another case (No. 83/62), the Supreme Court itself stated that:
"Trial and conviction of a person before the Governor of 
the Capital on a charge (smuggling and distributing 
drugs) in accordance with Defence Regulations JTo. 23,
1960, does not prevent the ordinary courts from trying 
him for the same charge."*324*
It seems that the Jordanian courts and the administration have 
misunderstood the rule "non bis in idem" and did not believe that a man 
must not be tried twice for the same offence. It also shows that the 
authors of the Jordanian report under Article 40 of the Covenant 
(CCPR/C/l/Add.56) and the representative of Jordan were not aware of the 
Jordanian case law when they stated in the report that "it is a 
recognized principle in both jurisprudence and judicial practice that no 
person may be tried or punished twice for the same of fence."*3240 *
3) m e  ngnr no emoi
personal freedom.
A man, unlawfully deprived of his personal liberty, should receive 
compensation. This is the last and minimum protection of the right to 
personal liberty if all other guarantees have failed, The state has 
various weapons by which it may deprive any individual of his liberty. 
The individual has only one way to restore his liberty, and that is legal 
proceedings which usually take a long time and may cost him everything 
he possesses. Accordingly, this right has acquired a great deal of 
attention from the Human Rights Commission. Two provisions have been 
included in the Political Covenant in order to cover all forms of unlawful 
deprivation of personal liberty. Article 9(5) states that: "Anyone, who 
has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention, shall have an
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enforceable right to compensation." If the person is detained for a 
certain period of time without trial or without being convicted of any 
criminal offence, either because he was not the right person or because 
the alleged wrong act had not, in fact, been committed, payment of 
compensation will be the least that one would hope for. Unlawful arrest 
Dr detention is in itself a valid reason for compensation, but does the 
length of the detention matter? In the light of the explicit wording of 
Article 9(5) above, it should not affect the entitlement to compensation
even if it was for one day or less. Yet, the length of the period (among
other factors) would certainly effect the sum of the compensation in­
volved .
However, if the judicial proceedings ensue and result in an erroneous
conviction of the accused, the unfairness and oppression would be even
graver. Therefore, Article 14(6) provides that:
"When a person has by a final decision been convicted of 
a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction 
has been reversed or has been pardoned on the ground 
that the new or newly-discovered fact shows conclusively
that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person
who has suffered punishment as a result of such convic­
tion shall be compensated according to law, unless it is 
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in 
time is wholly or partly attributable to him."
This right applies only when the miscarriage of justice is redressed 
by a reversal or pardon based on a newly-discovered fact. The new fact 
might relate to the constituents of the alleged crime itself, or to a 
fundamental error in the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, compensation 
is not required if the accused is responsible for non-disclosure of the 
fact.
The right to compensation in the case of miscarriage of justice, 
Article 14(6), and in the case of unlawful arrest or detention, Article 
9(5), is an essential part of the legal protection of personal liberty.
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Apparently this right could cause some practical difficulties in respect 
of its implementation, since it has been referred to the domestic law to 
decide the issue of compensation, "...shall be compensated according to 
law..." The question that arises here is, who shall pay the compensation? 
The government or the agent <s) who made the error or violated the law? 
What about the traditional argument that the judiciary is an independent 
branch of the government, and therefore the latter is not responsible for 
its wrongful actions? So far, in many countries the domestic law is yet 
to establish the responsibility of the state for wrongful judicial 
actions.
All these are valid arguments and questions, but they fall outside 
our concern here, they relate to adjacent subjects, namely, the respons­
ibility of the state for wrongful action of the judiciary/3:23:1 What 
concerns us here is the legal obligation of the state party under the 
above international provisions,
To meet this obligation, states parties should introduce sufficient
municipal provisions guaranteeing adequate compensation to the injured 
person. It is a matter of little importance, after that, who in fact will 
pay, the government or the individual agent at his own expense. That is 
so because the relation between the three branches of national government 
and their relations with their officials and agents, is a matter which 
rests within the domestic law of the state concerned.
As far as Jordan is concerned, payment of compensation for arbitrary 
or unlawful deprivation of personal liberty is a cumbersome issue, and a 
basic right that has received little attention in practice. The Con­
stitution lacks a provision entitling the individual to receive 
compensation in such cases. The only provision in the law of Jordan is
Article 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which entitles <upon the
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request of the defendant) the court to award compensation against the 
complainant if his claim is proved to be false or illfounded, but not 
against the Government. On the contrary, the law of the Government 
Proceedings has exhaustively enumerated the cases in which an action may 
be brought against the Government for payment of compensation.c 323 5 
Arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty is not included in these cases, 
and therefore, actions against the Government in this context would be 
considered inadmissible.
However, this leaves open the possibility that an injured person may 
bring an action for tort against the individual agent, who has violated 
the law, in his personal capacity. nonetheless, available records and 
sources do not indicate any cases where such an action has been brought 
against those individuals, nor that any such compensation has been 
awarded by any Jordanian court so far.
Available records and resources however, reveal that in some cases a 
person is arrested upon an administrative decision, issued by an 
Administrative Governor, which provides for his detention for an 
indefinite period of time. Most of these decisions are made immune from 
judicial review by the HCJ under Article 20 of the Instructions of the 
Martial Law Administration of 1967. As for the rest, the regular courts 
are practically unable to assess the legality of those decisions because 
the law does not require the administration to state any specific reason 
for its actions; all that is required is to mention that the decision has 
been issued in accordance with the relevant Article(s) of the Defence Law 
or Regulations or the Martial Law Instruct ions.*327 5
When individuals are eventually released after a period of detention, 
they, generally, do not seek compensation through the court and in the 
very rare instances when they do, they are faced with the fact that the
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administrative decision upon which they were detained was a valid deci­
sion since it was not nullified by the HCJ, and therefore no compensation 
can be awarded as a result of a lawful measure. As the Supreme Court has 
put it;
"...If not abrogated by the Administrative Court (the 
HCJ) during the time limit <60 days), the administrative 
decision would be treated as a lawful decision, and 
therefore the ordinary courts are powerless to question 
its validity, even for the purposes of 
c o m p e n s a t i o n >
Consequently, the right of the injured person has been trapped be­
tween an administrative court, which is prevented from nullifying the 
administrative decision, and a civil court which is powerless to award 
any compensation unless the administrative decision (the detention order) 
is nullified by the administrative court.
It seems that the Jordanian courts do not have much regard for the 
right of the individual, who is unlawfully deprived of his personal liber­
ty, to receive compensation. In a case before the HCJ, a person was un­
lawfully detained for a period of two months, in accordance with an 
administrative decision. When he had been released, he raised a complaint 
before the HCJ, in order that it might pronounce his detention unlawful, 
so he could sue the administrative agent for tort before the ordinary 
courts. The HCJ rejected the complaint, and stated that:
"... Hence, the period of detention (two months) has
already been served and the complainant is released... 
the complaint must be rejected because there is no merit 
in passing any judgement in this case."*323*
Accordingly, this person was unlawfully deprived of his personal 
liberty, and also lost his legitimate right to be compensated. Had the
HCJ pronounced his detention unlawful, he could have claimed damages be­
fore the ordinary courts, Without such a pronouncement the latter cannot 
award any compensation because the administrative decision has not been
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nullified by the competent court and therefore must be treated by the 
ordinary courts as if it were a lawful decision,
Such legislative and judicial practice is a plain violation of the 
minimum international standards granted under the provisions of the 
Political Covenant. As a state party, Jordan is under legal obligation to 
bring its laws and practices into line with the requirements of the 
Covenant in this respect. A new constitutional provision adopting the 
theme of Articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the Covenant should be introduced. 
The jurisdiction of the HCJ may also be extended to enable the court to 
award compensation in cases of unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of 
personal liberty. Until such adjustments are made, Jordan shall continue 
to be in breach of its obligations under the Political Covenant.
In a considerable number of cases under the latter where it was 
proved that the victims were unduly deprived of their personal liberties, 
the HRC had pronounced that the authorities of the states parties 
concerned should pay fair compensations.C329a)
160
3 - THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM QF E X P R E S S I O N .
A ~  IN GENERAL,
The right to express one’s views and beliefs is a fundamental human 
right/3305 The relation between this right and all other cultural and 
political rights is rather special, that is to say, the amount of regard 
and protection it receives in any country, reflects clearly the true situ­
ation of human rights in that country. According to a leading human 
rights lawyer in the Middle Bast*3315 the disregard for freedom of 
expression in most of the Third World countries has led to the neglect 
and suppression of all other human rights. The experience of the Arab 
World indicates that, man’s fears to express his views and opinions, 
because of the increasing number of exceptional laws enforced by secret 
tribunals which strip him of his rights and deprive him of any guarantee, 
have in many cases led to violence and revolts against the legal and 
political systems/3335
Historically speaking, this right was denied by many ancient civil­
izations. Men were prosecuted for expressing what were then considered 
to be dangerous or heretical views/3335
However, it was not until late in the eighteenth century that this 
freedom was recognized as a human right/3345 According to Article 11 of 
the French Declaration of 1789,
"The unrestrained communication of thought or opinion 
being one of the most precious rights of man, every cit­
izen may speak, write and publish freely, provided he is 
responsible for the abuse of this liberty in the cases 
determined by law."'13335
Thus, ever since the struggle between public authorities and indi­
viduals over the freedom of expression has become worldwide, and this 
right has begun to flourish and spread gradually in the constitutions of
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.*336* However, most modern con­
stitutions contain provisions providing far the right to freedom of ex­
pression as a constitutional right.
B -  ISLAMIC LAV.
According to many Islamic jurists, exercise of the right to freedom 
of expression is "not only a right but also a duty of all believers".
According to A. Mawdudi, for instance, this right is guaranteed to every 
one in order to advocate righteousness and to fight evil. He says:
"Islam gives the right to freedom of thought and expression to all citi­
zens of an Islamic state on condition that it is used far propagating 
virtue and not for spreading evil."*337*
It is interesting to notice that this concept is somewhat similar to 
the communist concept of the freedom of expression. As to the latter,
expression is free as far as it serves the aims and objectives of the
Communist Party. Communism may tolerate criticism, but certainly not 
opposition. *33S *
Although there is no explicit reference to the right to freedom of
expression in the ’Qur'an, Muslim jurists*333* argue that it is implied
in many Qur'anic verses.*340* However, the Prophet was reported to have 
said:
"If any one of you comes across an evil, he should stop 
it with his hand, if he is not in a position to do so, he
should try to stop it by means of his tongue, i.e., he
should speak against it,"*34'1 *
The Islamic D.H.R. provides that:
"a) Every person has the right to express his thoughts 
and beliefs so long as he remains within the limits 
prescribed by the law. Mo one, however, is entitled 
to disseminate falsehood or to circulate reports 
which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in 
slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory aspersions 
on other persons.
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b) Pursuit of knowledge and search after truth is not 
only a right but a duty of every Muslim.
c) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to protest 
and strive (within the limits set out by the law) 
against oppression..,.
d) There shall be no bar on the dissemination of in­
formation provided it does not endanger the security 
of the society or the state and is confined within 
the limits imposed by the law.
e) Mo one shall hold in contempt or ridicule the reli­
gious beliefs of others or incite public hostility 
against them. Respect for the religious feelings of 
others is obligatory on all Muslims.I":34s:’
C - M O D E M ..INTERNATIONAL LAV.
The right to freedom Df expression has been entrenched in all major 
international human rights instruments. Article 19, of the UDHR provides 
that:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex­
pression; this right includes the freedom to hold opin­
ions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any medium and regardless 
of frontiers."43433.
Article 19 of the Political Covenant stipulates that:
"(2) everyone shall have the right to freedom of ex­
pression, this right shall include freedom to seek, re­
ceive or impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium 
of his choice."43443
Freedom of expression cannot be established as an absolute
right,43433 therefore, paragraph (3), of the same Article, provides that:
"The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 
of this Article carries with it special duties and re­
sponsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are pro­
vided by law and are necessary:
a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others.
b) For the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public) or of public health or morals."
In order to define the scope and the legal dimensions of the obli­
gation of states parties with regard to the right to freedom of expres­
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sion, one must analyse the structure and the terms of Article 19 of the 
Covenant, as well as the limitations provided for by the same Article:
1) A comparison between Article 19 of the Political Covenant and its
counterpart in the UDHR, clearly shows that the former has distinguished
between the right to freedom of opinion and that of freedom of
expression.4343 3 They appear in two separate paragraphs.43*173 It is
also explicitly stated that the limitations mentioned in paragraph (3)
apply only to freedom of expression, and not to the freedom of opinion,
paragraph <1). In the UDHR they are both subject to the same limitations
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referred to under Article 29, This/ probably what Partsch meant when he 
said that the Covenant had improved upon the UDHR in this respect.43433 
Thus, it is evident that the right to freedom of opinion is an absolute 
right, and therefore no restrictions may be imposed thereupon, whereas
freedom of expression, as a public matter of social importance requires 
some limits. The right to hold opinions without interference, excludes any 
limitation whatsoever. A proposal to limit the prohibition to interference 
by public authorities only, was rejected on the grounds that, an opinion 
is a private matter which should be protected from outside interference 
of any kind.43433 To this end the HRC stated that "this is a right to 
which the Covenant permits no exception or restriction." <3so Accordingly, 
states parties should not impose any restrictions nor should they
sanction any interference with the right of individuals to hold opinions. 
The state must intervene to prevent official agencies as well as private 
individuals from interfering with this right.
2) It seems that the Article under examination has borrowed the
terminology of Article 19 of the UDHR, it says: "this right shall include 
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information...". Indeed, freedom to 
"impart" information through a medium of one's choice is an integral part
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of the freedom of expression. If freedom to "receive” information is 
considered part of the freedom of expression in the sense that it is a 
means whereby one could form and express one's views and opinions, some 
may ask, in what sense could the freedom to "seek" information constitute 
a part of the freedom of expression? Therefore the inclusion of this 
element caused a great deal of opposition during the framing of Article 
19. The principal objection was that it was irrelevant and might provide 
a means of interference into the affairs of others.c 331 5 This objection 
was rejected on the ground that such fears were inconceivable under the 
limitations of the clauses of paragraph (3) of the same Article.
However, the HRC has stressed that,
"paragraph <2) requires protection of the right to 
freedom of expression, which includes not only freedom 
to "impart information and ideas of all kinds", but also 
freedom to "seek" and "receive" them "regardless of 
frontiers" ... , Hot all states parties have provided
information concerning all aspects of the freedom of 
expression ... . In order to know the precise regime of 
freedom of expression, in law and in practice, the 
Committee needs ... pertinent information about the rules 
which either define the scope of freedom of expression 
or which set forth certain restrictions, as well as any 
other conditions which in practice affect the exercise of 
this right. It is the interplay between the principle of 
freedom of expression and such limitations and 
restrictions which determines the actual scope of the 
individual's right,C3SS>
Accordingly, the HRC has made it clear that the right to freedom of 
expression embraces the three elements (seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers) and 
therefore, states parties are under legal obligation to implement these 
elements together. The HRC has also required the states parties to 
provide it with "pertinent information" on the laws which define the 
scope of the freedom of expression and the restrictions imposed thereby, 
nonetheless the HRC did not provide precise definitions of the meaning of
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the terms and the concepts used in Article 19<2). Thus, until an 
authoritive interpretation is pronounced by the HRC the exact scope and 
legal contents of these concepts remain uncertain. This however, should 
not discourage one from casting some light on the main aspects of each 
of these concepts. Reports of the states parties offer little help in 
this regard, for, as has been noticed by the HRC, they are not only brief 
on this particular Article, but also tend to generalize. What may be 
helpful in this respect are the comments made and the questions raised 
by the individual members of the HRC during the consideration of the 
reports of the various states parties. Summary records of the meetings 
where these reports were considered Indicate that members of the HRC 
were more concerned with issues such as the right of the person to 
express political views different from those preached by the official 
authorities;*3535 and one's right to manifest peacefully ideas and beliefs 
of one's choice without undue restrictionsjc35-** censorship of the printed 
press, radio and television programmes, films and video tapes, and other 
cultural and political enterprises/3555 One of the most frequently raised 
issues especially in the more recent discussions, is the availability of 
foreign newspapers, books and films, and the free flow of information and 
data to and from the country. Openness of the government about official 
and nonconfidential data and information is also becoming an increasingly 
important subject/3555
During the consideration of the second report of Hungary 
(CCPR/C/37/Add.l), for instance, members of the HRC wanted to know what 
restrictions were imposed on the freedom of the press and the mass media 
by the law, and whether the courts and the administrative authorities 
could impose restraints on the expression of political views, Mr. N'dlye, 
noted that two questions were left unanswered during the discussion of
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the initial report of Hungary, "namely whether a person who did not agree 
with the social order could express his views openly, and whether there 
were political prisoners or detainees in Hungary who had not undergone 
trial". He also added that the provision of Article 19(2) could only be 
implemented in practice when individuals have access to information, and 
asked what means were available to an individual to influence public 
opinion in a manner which could result in an amendment to the 
Constitution and the political system. Professor Higgins, noticed that the 
Press Act of 1985, mentioned in the report, was of special importance 
because it increased restrictions and, "seemed to tie in with the
provision on incitement of hatred contained in article 269 of the 
Criminal Code". She also added that she knew that, "fines for the 
publication of unauthorised literature in recent months had become very 
large", and asked for further information about the Press Act. With regard 
to the latter Mr. Opsahl asked about the justification for restricting the 
establishment of periodicals only to certain bodies, such as state 
organs,*337 5
In the consideration of the initial report of Jordan
(CCPR/C/l/Add.24), Mr. Hanga, noted, the importance of Arab culture and 
wandered, "whether that culture was made accessible to the broad masses 
of the population and to what extent their participation was assured in 
the active and passive use of the mass media."*333 * During the
consideration of the second supplementary report of Jordan
(CCPS/C/l/Add.56) Mr.Tranopolsky, referred to the part of the report 
dealing with Articles 19, 22, 25, and 26 of the Covenant, which in general 
terms, confirmed freedom of opinion and association and the right to 
equality, and asked,
"whether the enforcement of martial law required every 
person holding a government position, to take an oath of
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allegiance or to undergo security clearance. Although 
those procedures were justified for certain positions 
when those holding them were likely to know secrets of 
state, their extension to all citizens would be in 
conflict with the provisions of the Covenant."*333*
Taking into consideration the above discussion, the general rules of
interpretation, the nature of the right to freedom of expression and the
ordinary meaning of the words used in Article 19 (2), the three concepts
(impart, receive and seek) may be interpreted to include the fallowing.
The right to "impart" information and ideas of all kinds, includes
the right of everyone (without discrimination) to express his ideas and
to disseminate information to the outside world through a medium of his
choice, Subject to the permissible limitations referred to under paragraph
(3), this right is not limited to verbal communication or writing, but it
also includes gestures, drawings and cartoons as well as all other
methods and mediums of expression and communication between individuals.
As for the mass media instruments, it has generally been accepted that
this right does not entitle every member of the public to a share of
their time or space in order to express his ideas or opinions. In Cage
ffo.61/1979, the HRC held that;
"While not every individual can be deemed to hold a 
right to express himself through a medium like TV, whose 
available time is limited, the situation may be different 
when a programme has been produced for transmission 
within the framework of a broadcasting organization with 
the general approval of the responsible author­
ities."* 3305
In the same direction the ECUM held that this right does not entail a 
right to be granted radio or television time to express one's views and 
ideas/365,1 * Yet, denial of this right for a specific group(s), a political 
party or a particular minority, may be challenged on different grounds.
The question that may be asked in this regard is, whether this right 
entitles the individual to establish a private radio or television station
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in order to impart his views or any other information he may wish to 
broadcast to the public. As a starting paint, the answer should be 
positive. Nonetheless, because of the nature of this function, it is a 
commonly acceptable practice for the state to impose some restrictions 
and conditions on the establishment of private radio and television. So 
far as such regulations are not discriminatory they may not be regarded 
as a violation of Article 19(2) of the Covenant.
Without prejudice to the provision of Article 19(3), this right 
entitles the individual to express "ideas and information of all kinds." 
As interpreted by the ECUT; this right (the right to impart) is not 
limited to " 'information' and 'ideas' that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the 
p a p u l a t i o n " . i n  Case Io,61/1979, relating to censorship of radio and 
television programmes on homosexuality, the HRC accepted that the rights 
of the complainants under Article 19(2) of the Covenant were restricted, 
but nonetheless found that the restrictions were justified under 
paragraph (3) and therefore held that no violation of Article 19(2) had 
occurred,*333 ? In a number of other cases the HRC has held that Article 
19(2) of the Covenant was violated when the victims were prosecuted for 
expressing political views, In Case No.28/1978, for instance, the HRC 
found that Article 19(2) had been violated, because the victim "was 
detained for having disseminated information relating to trade unions 
act i vit les." 4 3eul 5
Finally, it may be asked whether Article 19(2), interpreted in the 
light of Articles 18 and 19(1) of the Political Covenant, could protect 
the right of the individual to abstain from performing military service 
as a form of expression of his personal convictions and ideas. The HRC
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declared a communication inadmissible on the ground that, "the Covenant 
does not provide for the right to conscientious objection; neither article 
18 nor article 19 of the Covenant..., could be construed as implying that 
right. "<3ee:> Although the records do not indicate whether Article 19(2) 
was specifically invoked or not, the HRC dismissed the communication
without analysing the nature of the objection and the scope of the
provision of Article 19(2). Instead it had relied on the conclusion that 
the right of conscientious objection was not included in the Covenant. 
This conclusion seems questionable, because Article 19(2) of the Covenant 
entitles the individual to express (within the limits of paragraph (3) )
opinions and ideas "of all kinds" and not only those referred to under
the Covenant. The question that the HRC should have addressed itself to 
was, whether or not the objection to military service on the ground of 
personal convictions and beliefs may be regarded as a form of expression 
of such personal convictions and beliefs within the meaning of Article 
19(2).
The right to "receive" information and ideas of all kinds without 
obstacles or undue restrictions is closely related to the right to 
"impart" such information and ideas. This includes the right of the 
individual and the public at large to be properly informed of matters of 
personal or public concern. Although it does not require the state party 
to inform everyone, in his individual capacity, of matters which may not 
be of specific concern to him, it nonetheless imposes an obligation to 
keep the public informed of matters of public concern. The public is 
entitled to receive adequate information on such matters from the 
official authorities, as well as from the mass media, Official authorities 
must not interfere with the right of the mass media to function freely, 
and to provide the public with facts and information and to make fair
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comments on such matters in order to keep the public properly 
informed.*3335
Freedom to receive information includes everything that is available 
provided that it is by its nature open to the public. Subject to the local 
regulations it also includes the right of the individual to erect a 
powerful antenna or to install a satellite dish in his garden in order to 
receive radio and satellite programmes from foreign and distant stations. 
Another important aspect of this element of the freedom of expression is 
the right of the individual to import for his personal purposes foreign 
books, newspapers, films and video tapes even if the production or 
publication of such materials is illegal in the country. When the 
production or publication of such materials is illegal in the country the 
authorities may lawfully prevent the person from "imparting", publishing 
or distributing such materials in that country.*337 5
The third element of the right to freedom of expression as expressed 
in Article 19 <2) is the right to "seek" information and ideas of all kinds 
regardless of frontiers and through a medium of one's choice. This 
element is more difficult to define than the other two. Contrary to the 
right to "receive" information and ideas, it does not impose an obligation 
on the state authorities to provide the individual with information and 
ideas. Like the right to "impart" information and ideas, it imposes, in 
the first place, a passive obligation on the state not to interfere with 
this freedom. Primarily, it means access to public and non-confidential 
information and data. In the words of the ECUM, it is "a right of access 
by interested persons to documents which although not generally 
accessible are of particular importance for its own position."*3335 
Accordingly, official authorities may not deny the individual access to 
such records and information though they are not intended for publication
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and the individual does not have to justify his interests because he is 
entitled by law to have access to them. Within the limits of the
permissible limitations provided for in Article 19(2) it also imposes an 
obligation on the state not to interfere with the freedom of research and 
journalistic investigations and the rights of those who are interested to 
investigate any matter of public or private concern in order to establish 
the facts and discover the truth. Freedom to seels: information entitles
the individual to leave his country in order to seek knowledge and
information abroad, but does it impose an obligation on a state party to
grant entry visas to foreigners who wish to seek knowledge and 
information in that country? The position is not quite clear yet, but two 
basic factors should always be kept in mind. On the one hand, this right 
overlaps with other rights which may be subject to different conditions 
and limitations; on the other hand, freedom of information is an essential 
feature of the democratic society. C3<53:,However, as for private foreign
individuals, once they are inside the country and are subject to the
jurisdiction of the state party they are normally entitled to this freedom 
just like its own citizens. As far as foreign correspondents and
journalists are concerned the state party should enable them to fulfill 
their task and in normal circumstances may not subject them to 
continuous surveillance and censorship. However, under special 
circumstances the state may impose reasonable limitations on their 
activities without infringing this right, providing that these limitations 
are not discriminatory and apply to all foreign correspondents and
journalists equally.
3) Paragraph (3) also contains some concepts which are difficult to 
define and liable to different interpretations. Although the limitation
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clause in Article 19 (3) is the only one in the Covenant to be preceded 
by a preamble, it nonetheless has followed in the general trend with 
regard to the terminology. Terms such as 'morals', 'public health', and 
'national security* have also been used as restrictions on other rights in 
the Covenant.
The HRC does not seem to have committed itself to precise definitions 
of these phrases and prefers to judge individual cases in the light of 
their own circumstances. However, some of these phrases are more 
difficult to define than others and therefore, are more liable to 
different interpretation from one country to another. 'Public morals' for 
instance are a matter of social conception which varies from one country 
to another and, even within the same country from time to time. What may 
be regarded as immoral in this country may be quite acceptable in some 
others. What may be regarded as acceptable behavior nowadays might have 
been considered immoral ten or twenty years ago. In Case ¥o.61/1979r when 
this particular ground was invoked by the state party to justify the 
action of the national authorities, the HRC stated that, "public morals 
differ widely. There is no universally applicable common standard. 
Consequently, in this respect a certain margin of discretion must be 
accorded to the responsible national authorities."43,70* The concept of 
public order (ordre public) is also difficult to define in a precise 
manner. It varies from one state to another depending an the nature of 
its political and social system and the development of its public 
institutions. It is certainly wider than the concept of public security 
and national security or public safety, but it is quite impossible to draw 
an exclusive list of the matters which maybe included under the concept 
of public order as applied in all countries. However, phrases such as 
public health are less problematic, because what may constitute a threat
173
to public health in one country is usually so with regard to another, 
Article 12, of the Economic Covenant provides an important indication as 
to what may come under public health. Some have suggested that "what a 
state is required to do by that article is surely permissible under the 
Covenant, even if it entails small, normal limitations on other individual 
rights"43715
As to the concept of "national security", A.C, Kiss suggested that a 
definition could be derived from the two words "national" and "security". 
He says;
"The word "national" is generally used to refer to that 
which concerns a country as a whole, Thus, restrictions 
on human rights can be adopted under this concept only
if the interest of the whole nation is at stake, This
excludes restrictions in the sole interests of a 
government, regime, or a power group."
With regard to the word "security" he stated that; "... it may be suggested
that the term security used in the Covenant corresponds to the term
"national security" as used in the Charter."43725
To explain this he argued that the U.I. Charter stipulates for the
maintenance of international peace and security i.e peace between states
and the security of every state. To this end the Charter forbids the use
or threat of force against the political independence or territorial
integrity of another state, and then concluded that;
"national security in the Covenant means the protection 
Df territorial integrity and political independence 
against foreign force or threats of force. It would 
probably justify limitations on particular rights of
individuals or groups where the restrictions were
necessary to meet the threat or the use of external 
force, It does not require a state of war or national 
emergency, but permits continuing peacetime limitations, 
for example, those necessary to prevent espionage or to 
protect military secrets."4373 ?
Indeed, this argument contains a great part of the truth, but it has
to be admitted that threats to national security are not limited to
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"threat or use of external force" which is prohibited under the U.H. 
Charter, It should be remembered that the Charter refers to "national 
security" in the context of international relations between states, while 
the Covenant refers to it in terms of domestic implementation and 
domestic circumstances, For the purposes of the Covenant national secu­
rity could seriously be jeopardized by the threat or the use of internal 
forces from within the state, In addition to the prevention of espionage 
and the protection of military secrets, preservation of national security 
may justify other measures and limitations on the right to freedom of 
expression if they are deemed necessary in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances which may not necessarily involve a threat or use of 
external force.
However, one common element among all the grounds for permissible
limitations under Article 19(3), is that they are all difficult to define
and that they leave a margin of appreciation to the national legislature
when imposing limitations on the freedom of expression. Furthermore, all
the permissible limitations under these grounds are subject to the the
requirement that they should be "provided for by law and are necessary".
This in itself poses considerable difficulties. One may wonder, whether
the term "law" as used here is limited to legislation or whether it also
includes national customary laws ? This question is of special importance
in the case of such a universal document which is meant to be
implemented in many countries which all have remarkably different
customary laws. The question was raised under the corresponding provision
of the EHR (Article 10), In the Sunday Times Case; it was asked whether
or not freedom of expression may be restricted by limitations imposed by
unwritten common law. The ECTJT stated:
"The court observes that the word "law" in the 
expression 'prescribed by the law' covers not only 
statute but also unwritten law... . It would clearly be
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contrary to the intentions of the drafters of the 
Convention to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue 
of the Common Law is not 'prescribed by law' on the sole 
ground that it is not enunciated in legislation".'37'1’-3
The word "necessary" is an important qualification on the discretion 
of the domestic legislature in this regard, It means that in order for 
the restrictions to be legitimate it is not enough that they be provided 
for by the domestic law, they must also be necessary for the protection 
of one or more of the values enumerated under subparagraphs (a,b) of
Article 19(3), The question would thus be, who may decide upon the
necessity of or the need for such limitations? Obviously it falls, in the 
first place, to the national legislature to assess the need for any
limitation to protect national security, moral or public order in the 
light of the domestic circumstances, Nevertheless, assessment and 
appreciation of the need for such limitations by the national authorities 
are not final and are subject to the judgement of the HRC who may
disagree and consider the restrictions to be unnecessary and therefore 
contrary to the requirements of the Covenant.
The HRC has stated that:
"Paragraph 3 expressly stresses that the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression carries with it special 
duties and responsiblities and, for this reason certain 
restrictions on that right are permitted which may
relate either to the interests of other persons or to 
those of the community as a whole, However, when a state 
party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of expression, this may not put in jeopardy the 
right itself, Paragraph 3 lays down conditions and it is 
only subject to those conditions that restrictions may 
be imposed. The restrictions must be "provided by the
law"; they may only be imposed for one of the purposes 
set out in subparagraph (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and 
they must be justified as being "necessary" for that
state party for one of those purposes. "<37e 3
The state party is thus under obligation to show that the
restrictions imposed by the law are necessary in the case of that
176
particular country or otherwise they would he considered impermissible 
restrictions. During the consideration of the second periodic report of 
Hungary,437,65 Professor Higgins referred to this particular requirement 
with regard to the Press Act 1985 of Hungary and asked "why restrictions 
which were not regarded as necessary in other countries were considered 
essential in the case of Hungary."437,75
However, the effectiveness of the assessment of the need for and the 
legitimacy of the restrictions imposed by a state party on the freedom of 
expression, may be hindered by the vagueness of the concepts used in 
paragraph <3), That is to say, that the task of the HRC is not always an 
easy one. This is because the reasons or the grounds upon which the 
imposition of those restrictions may be justified are very vague and not 
easily definable, In Case No.61/1979, for instance, where the state party 
Invoked "public morals" to justify its action, the HRC experienced the 
difficulty of defining those grounds and the permissible limitations 
which may be allowed under any one of them. Although the HRC had 
accepted that the rights of the authors under Article 19<2)/it noted that 
"public morals differ widely" and that there was no "universally 
applicable common standard" and thus a margin of appreciation should be 
left to the "responsible national authorities." Consequently it was 
concluded that
"the Committee finds that it can not question the 
decision of the responsible organs of the Finnish 
Broadcasting Corporation that radio and TV are not the 
appropriate forums to discuss issues related to 
homosexuality, as far as a programme could be judged as 
encouraging homosexual behaviour."43735
As a result the HRC pronounced that no violation of the authors' rights
under Article 19 <2) was found.
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In conclusion one must agree that these are very vague grounds and 
that the HRC will always face difficulties in judging limitations under 
these grounds, but the basic fact that one should always keep in mind is 
that the restrictions are exceptional and as such that they must always 
be construed restrictively. In the interpretation of such restrictions 
attention must be given to the general rules of interpretation, the nature 
of the right to freedom of expression and the circumstances of the 
particular country,
D - THE LA¥S OF JORDAN.
In Jordan, the right to freedom of expression has been developing in
a parallel line with the development of the constitutional system itself.
In the first Constitution (1928) for instance, no Article was devoted to
this right, but it was briefly mentioned (among other rights) under
Article 11. It provided that:
"All Jordanians, are entitled to express and publish 
their opinion and beliefs, and to hold meetings together, 
to establish and join societies in accordance with the 
law."
Although it did not go much further than its predecessor a separate
Article was devoted to the right to freedom of expression in the Con-
stitution of 1946. Article 17, provided that:
"Freedom of opinion shall be guaranteed, everyone shall 
have the right to express his thought, orally and in 
writing, within the limits of the law."
The present Constitution (1952) has expanded upon this right and
legitimized many new forms of expression, it also added, for the first
time a new paragraph providing for the freedom of the press/3735
Article 15 (1) provides that:
"The state shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every 
Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by 'word 
of mouth', in writing or by means of photographic re­
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presentation and all other forms of expression within 
the limits of the law."*3005
Obviously, this Article refers only to one element of the right to 
freedom of expression, namely, freedom to "impart” ideas and information 
through a medium of one's choice. It has already been mentioned that 
Article 19(2) of the Political Covenant includes three elements (freedom 
to seek, receive and impart ideas, and information of all kinds), thus on 
the face of it Article 15(1) of the Jordanian Constitution is not in total 
conformity with Article 19(2) of the Political Covenant, It falls short of 
the international standards, and therefore the Jordanian legislature may 
take this into consideration and extend this right to include freedom to 
seek and to receive information and ideas of all kinds regardless of 
frontiers,
As mentioned earlier the right to freedom of expression is not an 
absolute right, the legislature therefore, may impose some restrictions on 
the exercise of this right. If these restrictions are necessary and do 
not negate the right itself, they might be regarded as legitimate 
limitations, and therefore could not be seen as an infringement of Article 
19 of the Political Covenant. Since the Constitution has referred the 
matter to the legislature, we shall be reviewing the relevant legislation 
to consider the existing limitations, in order that we may be able to 
assess them, and their real impact on the scope of the right to freedom 
of expression in practice.
A general review of the 'ordinary' laws of Jordan let alone the ex­
ceptional laws (emergency powers),*3015 would show that there are va­
rious limitations on the freedom of expression. They could be summarized 
under several subtitles according to the values they intend to protect;
a) The security of the realm (national security)
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It is prohibited under penalty of law, to express by any means of 
publicity any opinion or point of view which in effect might endanger 
national security. Several Articles have been devoted to this purpose in 
the Penal Code of Jordan/33^ 3 Under the latter, a term of five years 
hard labour is the prescribed sentence for any Jordanian who incites by 
means of speech or writing, the detachment of a part of Jordanian 
territory and its annexation to a foreign country/3333 According to 
Article 161, anyone who encourages another person(s), by means of writing 
or speech, to commit any of the offences enumerated in Article 159, is to 
be sentenced to two years of imprisonment/3343 Furthermore, printing, 
publishing or selling, displaying or sending by post of a boolc, pamphlet, 
manifesto or a newspaper for or on behalf of a banned society or poli­
tical party, is an offence punishable by six months imprisonment or a 
fine not exceeding 50JD/3353
b) Dignity of the government and the financial credibility of the state.
Any display of contempt towards the Monarch or any member of the
Royal Family, the national symbol of the state or the flag by any means
of publicity, is a criminal offence under the law of Jordan and is
punishable by imprisonment from one to three years/3333 Among the
other offences punishable under the Penal Code, are censure or abasement
of the Royal Armed forces, members of the public administration and
defamation of civil servants, in connection with the execution of their
official duties. It says,
“Slander or abasement <al~tham) shall be punishable by 
imprisonment from three months to two years, when it is 
directed against the Rational Assembly or any one of its 
members during or in connection with his official 
function; or against one of the official authorities or a 
court or any other department of the public 
administration or the Armed Forces or any civil servant 
during or in connection with his official d u t i e s 3
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Similar prohibitions apply to protect the national economy and national 
currency. According to Article 152, publication or broadcast of rumours, 
false news or propaganda by writing, verbally or by any other means of 
publicity, in order to devalue the national currency or to decrease the 
credibility of or the faith in the financial ability of the state, are all
offences punishable by imprisonment from six months to three years and a
fine not exceeding 100 J.D..<3S3> The same punishment is also applicable 
to anyone who may use similar methods of publicity to urge the public to:
1. Withdraw the money deposited in the public funds and banks.
2. Sell government bonds or any public bonds or to refrain from buying 
them/339 5
c) Safety, dignity and reputation of individuals.
Indeed, freedom of expression does not entitle a man to cry 'fire' in
a crowded theatre. lor does it include the right to defame the reput­
ation of others. The safety, dignity and reputation of others are all 
strictly protected under the Penal Code of Jordan/3905 According to 
Article 189, any disparagement, censure or defamation by any means of 
publicity, whether verbally, (paragraphs 1 and 2), or in writing (paras.3 
and 4), is totally prohibited and punishable by imprisonment from one to 
six months. According to paragraph(3)"slander" by print shall include 
open letters and postcards, as well as daily and periodical newspapers 
and pamphlets, or any other forms of printed publications/3915
The dignity of courts and the proper administration of justice.
Unruly behaviour in a court of law may be regarded as contempt of 
court and considered to be a criminal offence. Under Article 191 of the 
Penal Code, contempt of court and slander of judges during or in 
connection with their official duties are punishable by imprisonment from 
six months to three years. Freedom of expression cannot be used to cause
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disorder in the court. Those who attend the hearing are required to 
observe order and decency.c33231 Thus, the general rule of public trial, 
freedom of expression and publication, may be restricted in some cases 
where the proper administration of justice so requires. The latter 
prevails in many cases over the right of the press to make fair comment 
on trials of public concern, when such publicity may prejudice the 
conduct of a case pending trial. The Penal Cade of Jordan, forbids the 
publication of any news, information or criticism that may influence a 
judge or a witness, or prevent any person from revealing vital 
information^393s According to Article 225, a fine of 5 to 25JD has been 
prescribed for the publication of any of the following:
~ a document of a criminal investigation before being used in a public 
hearing;
- secret trials;
- any part of a trial if the court has decided that it should not be 
published/334 >
e) Broadcasting and Television.
In Jordan, as in many other countries, the national television station 
and Radio Jordan are state owned. In a developing country these in­
stitutions play a crucial role in the social and cultural development of 
the society. This is probably what makes state control a common pheno­
menon in all Third World countries/3335 In Jordan, however, not only 
radio and television, but also all other mass media institutions are 
either owned by the government or placed under the control or 
supervision of the Ministry of Information, The latter supervises and 
censors all films, movies and video tapes. It has been said in this 
regard that the purpose of the censorship is to protect public morals and 
religious feelings of the public and to place such restrictions (age
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limits) considered, necessary to protect youngsters from the effect of 
seeing films or other entertainments of an obscene or violent nature.
It (the Ministry of Information) also censors and licenses all cinema 
enterprises, drama and fairs.*33*55 Television and radio in Jordan have 
joined together to form one public institution which enjoys administrative 
and financial independence and which is managed by a board of directors. 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Information seems always to have found ways 
to interfere in its policies when it deems it necessary,
f) Copyright and registered trade marks.
The rights of others pose an overall limitation to the freedom of 
expression. Specially protected rights, such as copyrights, patents and 
trade marks, are of special importance in this regard. These rights are 
strictly protected under the law of Jordan, especially law Mo. 22 of 
1953.*337 5 The latter protects the rights of authors, composers and 
designers and forbids publication or reproduction of their works without 
their consent. Freedom of expression does not entitle the individual to 
violate the lawful rights of others; and therefore any form of expression 
which may violate such rights is prohibited under the law. Criminal pen­
alties may be imposed in this regard in accordance with Article 416 of 
the Penal Code.
These are some of the general limitations imposed by the ordinary 
laws of Jordan on the right to freedom of expression. Obviously, they 
are widely drawn restrictions and not all of them may be justified under 
Article 19(3) of the Political Covenant. Most of them are expressed in 
general terms and therefore they are liable to misinterpretation and 
abuse. As an example one may refer to the provision of Article 191 of the 
Penal Code which refers to slander and defamation of civil servants in
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connection with the execution of their official duties. Although Article 
188 defines the meaning of slander and defamation, Article 191 refers to 
civil servants in general and does not specify in what sense the 
defamation may be regarded as "in connection with the execution of their 
official duties," Similar criticism may also be raised with regard to the 
protection of the national currency and the financial credibility of the 
state <Article 152). The provision of this Article is undoubtedly capable 
of wide interpretation to the extent that it could be applied to 
unfavourable analysis of the national economy, the balance of payments or 
the financial market.
Further restrictions have also been introduced under exceptional
legislation (emergency powers) and also by special provisions in the Law
of Print and Publication. In accordance with the Defence Law and
Regulations, for instance, the Government is endowed with absolute power
to control and seize any pamphlets, books, maps, manuscripts, photographs,
etc. including radio sets if it deems it necessary in the interests of
public safety and national defence/3335 Under Defence Regulations Efo. 5,
1948, the administration is empowered to prevent the publication of any
book, pamphlet, manifesto or any other printed material, if it is deemed
harmful to public safety or defence of the realm/333 5 This is to be
carried out through final administrative decisions, which may not be
challenged before any court of law. As one example, the case of F. Kilany
may be mentioned here. In a decision dated 22 May 1972, the Director
General of Print and Publication invoked the above Defence Regulations
and banned the circulation of the book 'Shariat Al-a'sha'ir fi A1 Watan 
*
Al-Arabi\ (Tribal Law in the Arab World) written by Judge F. Kilany. 
This was a text book dealing with the laws, the judicial systems and 
legal practices among tribes in Jordan and some other Arab countries.
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The administration did not state any reasons for the administrative
action save that of maintaining public safety and national security.
A complaint was therefore brought before the HCJ on behalf of the
a u t h o r . T h e  decision was challenged on various grounds among which
was the unconstitutionality of the decision itself and of the Defence
Regulations upon which it was based.0401 * On this point, however, the
HCJ pronounced the Regulation and consequently the decision,
constitutional,04025 In the court's view, Article 124 of the Constitution
permits the introduction of the Defence Law of 1935,<4035 in accordance
with which the Censorship Regulations were issued.04045 It says:
"Hence, paragraph (1) (a) of Article 4 of the Defence Law 
of 1935, which was issued in accordance with Article 124 
of the Constitution, considers the censorship of printed 
materials a matter of public security and national de­
fence, Censorship Regulation Ho. 5, 1948, did not con­
tradict Article 124 of the Constitution, nor Article 4 of 
the Defence Law."*1'4-035
In short, the court accepted the argument of the Attorney General 
that the banning of that book was a matter of public security and that it 
was done in defence of the realm, though it was a law book dealing 
exclusively with legal issues. The court did not examine the need for the 
administrative action, in order to ensure that it was necessary for the 
protection of public safety or defence of the realm, Instead, it had 
relied on the provisions of the Defence Law and Regulations which 
confirmed discretionary powers on the Government to act when it (the 
Government) deems it necessary,
However, an "ordinary" law (the Law of Print and Publication) was 
enacted to regulate the publication of printed materials.04035 It 
contains some exceptional provisions imposing severe restrictions on the 
freedom of expression, especially by means of printed material.040^5
185
It gives the Government direct control over all means of freedom of 
expression and enables it to have the final word on the scope of this 
freedom.*'40530 It regulates and governs the publication of all printed 
materials whether they are books, newspapers or even invitation 
cards.<A°3> The Law of Print and Publication imposes severe restrictions 
on the freedom of printing and publishing houses and makes all types of 
printed materials subject to administrative censorship prior to 
distribution.
The distinction has been made between Matbou'ah (printed article)
which applies to printed materials in general including journals,
newspapers, books, pamphlets and all other kinds of printed articles
om
using words, shapes, letters, pictures or drawings on thej hand; and 
Matbou'ah Sahafyeh (regular press) on the other which according to 
Article 2 includes daily newspapers, magazines and regular periodicals of 
all kinds.
In this section the intention is to examine the main restrictions 
imposed on the freedom of information in general i.e. those which apply 
to all forms of printed materials. Provisions and restrictions relating to 
the freedom of the press in particular, shall be considered separately in 
the relevant section below.
Article 38 of this law imposes rigorous restrictions on the freedom 
of expression and freedom of information, and forbids any form of 
publication of the following categories of news or information by any 
means of publicaton except as prescribed by this Article itself.
1 - News of the King or the Royal Family unless previously 
authorised by a special official of the Royal Palace.
2 - Deliberations and discussions of the confidential meetings of the 
National Assembly.
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3 - Reports, books, letters, articles, pictures and news which may be 
regarded as offensive and repugnant to public morals.
4 ~ Articles which imply disrespect for any religion or religious 
group or sect whose religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution,
5 - Any information about the size of the Armed Farces or its 
weaponry, ammunition, stations or movements, unless previously authorised 
by a responsible army official; or any other news, reports or comments 
which may cause disorder or confuse public opinion concerning any matter 
related to the Armed Forces, the Public Security Services or General 
Intelligence Agency,
6 - Letters, papers, files, information or news, which the Minister of 
Information may regard as confidential.
7 - Articles or informations which imply slander or disrespect for 
the the Heads of "Friendly States" (.al-dowal al-^sadeeqah).
8 - Political declarations and statements issued by the foreign 
representatives in Jordan, unless authorised by the Director of Print and 
Publication.
Unauthorised publication of any of the above news or information is 
punishable under Article 42, by imprisonment of not less than one year 
and a fine of not less than 500 J.D,. Article 40, forbids nonpolitical 
press from publishing any news, research, cartoons or any comments of a 
political character. According to Article 41, what may be regarded as a 
political matter for the purposes of Article 40, includes Inter alia, news, 
comments and cartoons concerning official persons; any praise or slander 
of any person which is intended for political or election propaganda far 
or against such persons. A violation of the provisions of Articles 40 or 
41, is punishable by imprisonment of a period not less than one month 
and a fine of not less than 10 J.D..
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According to Article 54, nobody may own or run a printing bouse 
without a valid licence issued by the Ministry of Information. The licence 
must indicate the names and the address of the owner and of the manager 
if different, in addition to the name and the address of the printing 
house and the kinds of machines and the shape of letters which it uses. 
Any change in any of these particulars must be notified to the Ministry 
of Information within one week (Articles 55-60). The law also requires 
that the manager of the printing house maintains a register in which all 
articles printed in the house are listed by serial numbers with the
number of issues, their titles and names of their author also denoted 
alongside. The register must be made available far inspection by official 
authorities on request and at any time.'410 5 Article 62, requires the
manager of the printing house to provide the Ministry of Information with 
two copies, free of charge and before distribution, of any article printed
t
in his house. This applies to all types of publication except journals 
which are subject to a different provision. The Minister may confiscate 
any printed material if he considers its publication to be prejudicial to 
the public i n t e r e s t . 1 5
Anybody who wishes to establish a publishing house, a bookshop or a 
distributing house in Jordan must apply for a licence from the Ministry 
of Information. The application must include inter alia, the name and the
address of the applicants, the name and address of the house and of its
manager, the name and address of the printing house where it is to print 
its publications and the name and address of the manager of that 
printing house. If the applicant is a company, the application must also 
include the names of the members of the board of directors, their 
nationalities and addresses, a copy of its internal regulations and a 
registration certificate from the Ministry of Trade and Industry showing
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its registered capital. If the application is complete the Minister is 
obliged by law to issue a licence.c412>
The law permits the import of foreign books, newspapers and all 
kinds of printed materials. Nonetheless, Article 71 requires the 
distributors or sellers to provide the Ministry of Information with a 
copy of any printed material imported from abroad for sale or dis­
tribution inside Jordan, for approval prior to sale or distribution, The 
same Article empowers the Director of Print and Publication to confiscate 
or to prevent the circulation of such articles if he deems it to be 
harmful to the public interest.
These are the restrictions placed by the Law of Print and Publication 
on the freedom of printing and publication of printed material whether 
printed in Jordan or imported from abroad. As mentioned above, there are 
some provisions and restrictions which apply to the press only.
E - FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**13 >
The word "press" is used here in the same meaning as defined in
Article 2 of the Law of Print and Publication i.e. it applies to all
regular or periodical journals and newspapers, including daily and weekly
newspapers and magazines and all other regular pamphlets, newsletters and
journals. In essence freedom of the press means freedom from restraints
which is essential to enable editors and journalists to enlighten public
opinion by making fair comments on matters without which democracy would
not be maintained.**1 Therefore freedom of the press is an essential
rquirement of the democratic society,
In Jordan, Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of
the press and stipulates that:
"II. Freedom of the press and publication shall be en­
sured within the limits of the law. III. Newspapers
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shall not be suspended from publication nor their 
permits withdrawn except in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the law. IV. In the event of the declaration 
of martial law or a state of emergency, a limited cen­
sorship on newspapers, pamphlets, books and broadcasts 
in matters affecting public safety or national defence 
may be imposed by law. V. Control of the resources of 
newspapers shall be regulated by law."
It might thus, be said that the Constitution offers a fair protection 
to freedom of the press. What seems to have been misconceived by the 
Jordanian legislature is the phrase "within the limits of the law," The 
legislature seems to interpret this to entitle it to impose any 
restrictions it pleases, so far as it is provided by the law. The 
Jordanian courts seem to approve of this interpretation,*
In reality, the Jordanian press is relatively limited in its size and 
its influence on public opinion. This may be attributed to many political, 
social and legal factors, and, to the short history of the Jordanian 
experience in this regard/"11 s 3 Because there are no political parties in 
Jordan there is no opposition press. As Mr I. Bakr has put it, "except for 
some specialized periodicals, the Jordanian press is merely a news 
publishing commercial press, owned by individuals and private corpo- 
rations/co-operatives"/"117'3 However, the Jordanian Government does not 
seem to agree that political parties play an important role in promoting 
the right to freedom of expression. Replying to a question raised by a 
member of the HRC (Mr. P. Vallejo) regarding the impact of the absent 
political parties on the right to freedom of expression, the 
representative of Jordan stated: "... the right of individuals to freedom 
of expression did not depend on political parties, The existence of po­
litical parties was guaranteed by the Constitution, although the Gov­
ernment had had to dissolve some of them in 1957" Z'111® 3 The statement of 
the Jordanian representative may give the impression that there are some
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political parties in Jordan. In fact, there have been no licenced political
parties in Jordan since 1957.
In addition to the various restrictions imposed on the freedom of the
press by the emergency powers, and the restrictions imposed on the
freedom of information and printed materials in general by the Law of
Print and Publication, the latter contains several restraints and
limitations which apply to the press in particular. Contrary to its
predecessor, the present Law of Print and Publication (Law No. 33 of
1973) lacks a provision guaranteeing freedom of expression for the press.
Instead, says a prominent Jordanian lawyer, the law is molded into,
"numerous definitions, restrictions and restraints which have in effect
rendered 'journalism* a monopolised personal profession rather than a
vehicle for freedom of expression and participation in the conduct of
public affairs".*'41535
Perhaps it was because of such discrepancy that the Government of
Jordan chose to report to the HRC in 1978 a law which had been repealed
since 1973, instead of the law in force. Although the previous Law of
Print and Publication, Law No. 16 of 1955, was repealed in 1973 and
replaced by the contemporary Law of Print and Publication, Law No. 33 of
1973, the report stated thati
"with regard to the press, article 2 of Act No. 16 of 
1955 provides that the press, printing and publishing 
shall be free and that everyone shall have the right to 
express his opinion and to disseminate truthful news and 
opinions through the various publication media, and that 
this freedom shall not be restricted otherwise than by 
law.
Under the above-mentioned Act, any person, whether 
Jordanian or not, may issue printed publications such as 
newspapers or periodicals, provided, in the case of an 
alien, that he is resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and that there is a reciprocal arrangement 
regarding such matters between Jordan and the country of 
which he is a national...".CAS;0>
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It can not be confirmed whether the drafters of the report and the
representative of Jordan were unaware of the fact that Law Mo. 16 of 1955
was already repealed and replaced by the contemporary law which does not
contain such a provision or whether they sought to mislead the HRC on
this issue. As mentioned above, the present Law of Print and Publication
imposes many restrictions on the freedom of the press and enables the
Government to have the final word on the scope of this freedom. It
confers absolute discretion on the administration, with regard to
licencing, censorship, confiscation and suspension of any newspapers or
journal. As far as licencing is concerned, the law requires all newspapers
and journals and any other periodicals to obtain valid licences from the
the Council of Ministers through the Ministry of Information. Providing
that all the formal and substantive requirements including that of the
deposition of 1.000 J.D. as a financial guarantee (Article 14), are
fulfilled, Article 16 empowers the Council of Ministers to grant or
withhold the licence at its own discretion. The decision of the Council of
Ministers in this regard is final and can not be reviewed by any court of
law in any sense whatsoever, Article 16 reads as follows:
"<l)The Council of Ministers, upon a reccomendation by 
the Minister (Minister of Information) may issue, re­
issue, refuse to issue, suspend or cancel the licence of 
any journal. When issuing or re-issuing a licence, the 
decision must be sanctioned by a Royal Decree.
(2) The decison of the Council of Ministers under
paragraph (1) of this Article shall be final and may not
be questioned in any court of law in any sense what­
soever. The Minister shall inform the applicant or the 
owner of the journal of the decision".
Any journal published without a valid licence or before the deposition of
the financial guarantee is liable to suspension and confiscation of all
its copies by the Minister of Information, and its owner is punishable
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under Article 75 by one year of imprisonment or a fine of not more than 
100 J.D., or both.
According to Article 32, if a journal publishes false or incorrect
news or information concerning a public institution, the Minister of
Information or an official delegated by him may require the journal to 
publish, free of charge, a correction or a statement stating that it was 
false news or information. This should be published in the "next edition 
and in the same place and shape", Should the owner or the editor-in- 
chief refuse to publish the correction or the required statement, he will 
be punished under Article 75 by imprisonment of up to one year or a 
fine of up to 100 J.D., or both, The same applies to foreign journals, and
in the case of refusal to publish the correction, the Minister of
Information must ban its circulation and distribution in Jordan.*'4213
The right to reply is also guaranteed for private persons, whether
they are natural or legal persons, Article 33 described this right as an
absolute right and extended it to industrial owners, authors, artists and
scientists in the case of comment/concerning their works. It says:
"(1) If any news or information is published in a 
journal with a direct or indirect reference to a specific 
natural or legal person, he is entitled to reply... This 
is an absolute right and may be exercised by authors, 
artists and scientists with regard to comments 
concerning their works,
<2) When the reply exceeds the size or the space of the 
original article or news, the journal may require the 
payment of charges for the extra parts. In the case of a 
deceased person, the right to reply may be exercised by 
one of his heirs on behalf of them all".
If the journal refuses to publish the reply for any reason, the 
person may complain to the Minister of Information who must issue a 
final decision within one week, If the Minister decides that the reply 
should be published, it must be published as explained above, in the next 
edition, Should the journal refuse to execute the decision of the Minister,
193
it would. be regarded as a violation punishable under Article 75. In the 
latter case the reply may be published in any other journal at the 
expense of the first journal.
Like all other hinds of printed materials, journals are subject to 
administrative censorship prior to distribution. Article 26, stipulates 
that;
"The Editor-in-Chief of the journal must submit five 
copies of any edition, to the Directorate of Print and 
Publication in the Ministry of Information, so the 
Director or his deputy may authorise its distribution".
One of the most serious restrictions imposed on the freedom of the
press in Jordan by the Law of Print and Publication is the provision of
Article 23. The latter contains some rather vague grounds upon which the
Council of Ministers may revoke the licence of or suspend the publication
of any journal. It says;
"If the newspaper publishes anything that may be re­
garded as harmful to the national entity or which may 
endanger the safety of the state or the public interest 
or the constitutional foundations of the realm...1
However, what may be considered harmful is a discretionary matter 
and rests ultimately with the Council of Ministers.'4233 The judiciary 
would have no opportunity to pronounce upon the validity of those meas­
ures, because paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that: "the
decision of the Council of Ministers shall be final and may not be 
reviewed by any court in any sense whatsoever."'424* When this provision 
was invoked on the first of June 1981, there was only one daily 
newspaper remaining in the whole country.'4235 A similar provision was 
introduced in the previous law (Law Mo. 16 of 1955) under Article 62. In 
1971, the Council of Ministers invoked this Article and cancelled the 
permit of a newspaper called 'Al-Defa'a' (The Defence). A complaint was 
therefore raised before the HCJ, in order to pronounce the administrative
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decision void. The constitutionality of Article 62 was challenged on the
grounds that it contravened Article 15 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the freedom of the press, as well as Article 101 and 102 with
regard to the right to access to court.
The court upheld the validity of the administrative decision and
declared Article 62 of the haw of Print and Publication, constitutional. 
It ruled that:
"...the Article in question does not contradict Article 15 
of the Constitution, because the latter does not say that 
the press is free without limitations... indeed it says 
free... within the limits of the law."44265
This argument can not stand up to critical legal analysis. It seems 
that the court has interpreted the phrase "within the limits of the 
law" to entitle the legislature to introduce whatever limitations it 
pleases. This was surely not the intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution. As to the other point, the court ruled that Article 62 does
not deprive the applicant of the right to access to court. It only
provides those decisions with ’an immunity against judicial review'. 
According to the HCJ imposition of such restrictions on the jurisdiction 
of the judiciary by means of a statute is a measure entirely permissible 
under Article 100 of the Constitution. In other words, the court has 
recognized the right of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts even with regard to the constitutional rights. It calls denial of 
access to court, 'immunity against judicial review', and therefore 
considers the latter to be permissible under Article 100 of the 
Constitution. The court seems to have failed to notice that Article 100 
of the Constitution only allows the legislature to distribute the
jurisdiction between the various courts, but not to oust any part of this 
jurisdiction by preventing the courts from pronouncing upon any
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particular type of dispute by providing immunity from judicial
review/*-12^
F - Afl ASSESSMENT.
Having examined the scope and the contents of the right to freedom 
of expression as embodied in Article 19C2&3) of the Political Covenant, it 
is clear that it is not an absolute right and therefore states parties 
may lawfully impose some restriction on the exercise of this right, if 
deemed necessary for the protection of certain values referred to under
paragraph (3) of the same Article. Such restrictions must be provided by
the law and are necessary as explained above. In any case they must not 
be such as to destroy the right itself nor to deprive it of its sub­
stance, otherwise, the state party would be in violation of its 
obligation under the Covenant. As far as Jordan is concerned, we have
examined the provision of Article 15 of the Constitution and the relevant 
provisions in the ordinary law as well as the emergency powers. The 
reports of Jordan to the HRC under Article 40 of the Covenant are ex­
ceptionally brief with regard to the right to freedom of expression, for 
they do not seem to go much further beyond the provision of Article '15 
of the Constitution. Restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression 
under the law of Jordan were not reported to the HRC, and therefore the 
latter had no opportunity to consider them. However, during the dis­
cussion of the initial report of Jordan in 1978, some members of the HRC 
did ask for additional information regarding the restrictions imposed on 
the rights referred to under several Articles, among which was Article 
19.c,d:2S> In response it was stated in the supplementary report submitted 
in 1981, that,
"... the right of freedom of thought within the purview
of Article 18 of the Covenant is guaranteed by Article
196
15(1) of the Constitution. The said Article 15(1) states 
that the state guarantees freedom of thought and that 
any Jordanian may express his thoughts freely either
orally, in writing or in print, etc., provided that such 
expression is manifested within the limits of the law of 
the land....
From reading the foregoing paragraph, it will be 
noted that the principles embodied in Article 19 of the
Covenant have already been dealt with in the preceding
paragraph".
Indeed no restrictions were reported, although they were specifically
asked for by members of the HRC. The Government has managed to avoid
mentioning the contemporary Law of Print and Publication (Law lo. 33 of
1973), and thus, deprived the HRC of an opportunity to assess its
provisions, in the light of Article 19(2&3) of the Covenant.
As has been pointed out the ordinary law of Jordan imposes several 
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in general, under
various pieces of legislation. It was also noted that they were widely 
drawn restrictions and that not all of them may be justified under 
Article 19(3) of the Covenant, as being permissible and necessary 
limitations. When it comes to the exceptional powers conferred upon the 
Government under the emergency legislation, they must be looked at as 
emergency powers and as such they have special s t a t u s . 5 Subject to 
certain conditions, they could be made into permissible limitations by 
filling a notice of derogation under Article 4 of the Political Covenant. 
Jordan has not done so and thus, they remain unlawful restrictions and 
constitute an infringement of Article 19 (2&3), of the Covenant. As for 
the restrictions imposed under the Law of Print and Publication, they go 
far beyond what may be regarded as necessary limitations, and therefore 
they can not be reconciled with the obligations of Jordan as a state 
party to the Political Covenant. Articles 14, 38 and 40 of this law 
impose serious restrictions on the freedom of print and publication and
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freedom of information in general . Articles 26, 62, 70 and 71 have
subjugated all kinds of printed materials to censorship by the Ministry
of Information prior to distribution in Jordan whether they are printed
in Jordan or imported from abroad. Articles 16 and 23 have empowered the
administration (the Council of Ministers acting upon a recommendation by
the Minister of Information), to revoke or to cancel the licence of any
newspaper or journal, or to suspend its publication indefinitely at its
own discretion. Furthermore, the decisions of the Council of Ministers on
any of these matters are final and exempted from judicial review of any
kind. The judiciary has no role to play in this process. It can not
interfere in the trial of the newspapers by the Council of Ministers, nor
can it assess the legality of the administrative decision after it has
been made. Clearly, these powers are not only contrary to the Political
Covenant, but also to the Jordanian Constitution itself.
However, it must be observed that in practice freedom of expression
in Jordan is not as restricted as it may appear from the provisions of
the law, and, that it is far more respected than in many other
neighbouring Arab countries, This could be attributed to the rare
application of these provisions in practice and the fact that censorship
is being exercised in a relatively liberal minded manner, in addition to
the special nature of the political and social system of Jordan. One of
the most important provisions of the Jordanian Constitution, which is
also highly respected in practice, is the provision of Article 17 which
provides that:-
"Jordanians are entitled to address the public author­
ities on any personal matters affecting them, or any 
matter relative to public affairs, in such a manner and 
under such conditions as may be prescribed by law".
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There are no formal restrictions or limitations imposed on this right by 
the law, except for some general customary rules and traditions 
established by usage over a period of time on the manners of addressing 
public authorities. This provision is based on the Islamic concept of 
"accessibility" of the public authorities to the ordinary citizens, which 
goes back to the early days of the Islamic state/'431 1 In contemporary 
Jordan, Jordanians have made the most of this right to the extent that it 
is an observed practice for public authorities from the Administrative 
Governors to the King and Crown Prince, to make themselves accessible to 
the public and to listen to what they have to say whether in person or 
through correspondence. Open letters, telegrams and complaints to such 
authorities from ordinary individuals are not very uncommon in Jordanian 
newspapers.
It has been said that a member of the public addressed King Hussain 
directly in a public meeting with the following words, "We have not seen 
you for a long time, we have been oppressed by some government officials 
and I have many complaints", and then he produced a long list of 
complaints, some personal and others relating to public matters and of­
ficial policies. c'432:5
It seems that Jordanians do discuss politics in public and sometimes 
do express disagreement with the Government on political matters. 
Although it is difficult to confirm or prove this, it has been argued 
that, unless such views are followed by some kind of illegal action 
nobody may be prosecuted or imprisoned for expressing different or 
unfavourable political views. However, in some special cases individuals 
may be summoned to the offices of the General Intelligence Agency for 
questioning with regard to such matters .<A33>
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Freedom of academic and scientific research also seems to be res­
pected in practice. That is to say, available sources indicate that there 
are no reported or unreported cases where criminal charges have been 
brought against an author or a researcher for his academic work, though
restrictions on publication or distribution may be imposed in some
special cases.*'43'45
As for the availability of foreign books, newspapers and journals, it 
is a fact that newsstands and bookshops are full of such material. An 
inspection of a newsstand in Amman showed that there was quite a number 
of foreign newspapers, magazines and novels in various languages. 
However, it was said that there was a long black list of foreign news­
papers, journals, authors and publishers held by the Ministry of 
Information.
The Jordanian T.V, and Radio Jordan, though owned by the state, have 
been made into one independent public institution which is run by its own 
board of directors which enjoys administrative and financial indepen­
dence. lews and programmes are not subject to censorship prior to broad­
casting. In practice, however, there seems to be an unwritten code of 
conduct which is usually observed by all news-editors, programme planners 
and producers, and, that the work is carried out under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Information who tend to interfere by various ways and
means. The news departments of both the T.V. and radio of Jordan are
directly connected with many national and international news agencies; 
editorial teams receive the news through these agencies, editing and 
broadcasting them according to their own professional judgement. Yet it 
is not quite unusual for the Minister of Information or some other 
Government departments to telephone them to draw their attention to the 
importance of one national or international news item.
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As far as Radio Jordan is concerned, it has played an important role 
in giving effect to the concept of accessibility and availability of 
public officials to the ordinary citizen. For more than ten years it has
maintained a daily programme of two hours of live broadcast (.al-bath al~
moubasher 8 a.m. - 10 a.m.) where any individual can telephone and
express his opinion or point of view with regard to any public matter
directly on the air; if it is a personal complaint he may address it to
the department concerned or may ask to speak to the responsible
government official and discuss the matter on the air. Listening to this 
programme one hears all sorts of complaints and points of view regarding 
many matters of private and public concern, Usually it is a dialogue or a 
discussion between a private citizen and a government official or
Minister and, in some cases, the issue is settled over the phone.
As for the Jordanian newspapers, journals and periodicals, the pro­
visions of Articles 16 and 23 of the Law of Print and Publication are
very rarely invoked in practice, Over the last ten years, Article 23 has
been invoked only twice, in 1977 and in 1981.
Accordingly, some may argue that the restrictive provisions, whether 
those in the Law of Print and Publication or in the other laws are not 
intended to oppress the freedom of expression in practice, but rather to 
give the Government a flexible control which can be relaxed or tightened 
in accordance with the circumstances, The restrictive provisions also 
release the hands of the Government from legal bonds and enable it to act 
swiftly and effectively when there is a genuine need for action. This 
might be true, but it does not change the fact that the law of Jordan, 
as it stands at present, does not meet the requirements of Article 
19<2&3) of the Political Covenant; and that upon comparison, the former 
has fallen seriously short of the latter. Thus, it has to be concluded
201
that Jordan is in evident breach of its legal obligation under the above- 
mentioned international provision, In order to bring the law of Jordan 
into line with the minimum international standards of the right to
freedom of expression, the fallowing changes in the law of Jordan should 
be considered.
Article 15 of the Constitution which, as mentioned earlier, refers 
only to the right to express ideas and opinions should be amended in 
order to include the right of the individual to receive and to seek ideas 
and information of all kinds regardless of frontiers in accordance with 
the provision of Article 19 (2) of the Political Covenant. The general
restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression by the various laws 
should be relaxed and reduced to what is truly necessary for the pro- 
tection of the values mentioned in Article 19(3) of the Political
Covenant, As for the Law of Print and Publication, in particular, a pro­
vision guaranteeing freedom of the press in accordance with Article 15 <2) 
of the Constitution should be added. Restrictions imposed on the freedom 
of information and freedom of print and publication under Article 38, as 
well as those relating to prior censorship by the Ministry of Information 
under Article 26, 62, 70 and 71 may be repealed. It is also essential for 
the freedom of the press that Articles 16 and 23 be repealed or at least 
be d.mended in such a way that their application be made subject to a 
court order, or that the latter should be empowered to assess the 
legality of the decisions of the Council of Ministers when applying these 
provisions.
Finally, emergency powers (Defense Regulation of 1948), relating to 
censorship and control of print and publication and the mass media 
should cease to operate. It is not open for the Jordanian Government to
argue that the state of emergency still exists in Jordan and therefore
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that the application of emergency powers is a lawful measure, because 
even if such a situation does in fact exist, Jordan can not rely on that 
because it has not derogated from its obligations with regard to this 
right, or indeed from any other rights under the Covenant.< *
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4 - TgB L R IfiHX. TQ ^UAI,ITX BBEQ]RB_THE--LAW.
Equality is a notion which has attracted the attention of social 
reformers, politicians and lawyers throughout history,'"*3 3 * It has been 
regarded as the most cherished goal of many social liberation movements 
over the last few centuries. The wide usage of the term "equality" has 
led to a great deal Df confusion and misconception, Concepts such as
natural equality, social equality, political equality, non-discrimination,
etc,, are all used, even interchangeably.'* It is not our intention to 
deal with these concepts, what concerns us here is the principle of 
equality in its juridical sense, i.e. equality before the law as a human 
right. The latter may be defined as the right of everyone to have equal 
opportunities and equal protection by the law. As far as modern legal 
systems are concerned, such a right first appeared in the French
Declaration of 1789.<‘4i3e5 Ever since, the principle of equality before 
the law has become one of the general principles of modern constitutional 
law.'4350 Nonetheless, it was not until the second half of this century 
that discriminatory laws were at least officially denounced in some 
countries, Such legislation, not to mention policies and practices, are 
still in force in many others, especially Third World countries. As to 
Muslim countries, their legal systems are largely influenced by the
Islamic concept of the principle of equality before the law, and Jordan is 
no exception.
Therefore, before analysing the legal content of this right as em­
bodied in modern international law, particularly in the Political Covenant 
against which the law of Jordan shall be examined, one must briefly look 
at the Islamic concept of the right to equality before the law. As the 
question of the status of women (equality of the sexes) poses some spe­
cial difficulties in the case of Muslim countries, we shall deal with it
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separately. Accordingly, this section may be divided into four sub­
sections followed by an assessment.
A - ISLAMIC LAW.
As a universal law meant to be recognised and implemented throughout 
the world, Islam had to denounce all discriminatory practices and to 
establish the new community on a different basis, It starts from the 
very basic idea of the common origin of mankind and the concept of 
brotherhood of all human beings. In the Qur'an it says: "Oh mankind, we
have created you from a male and a female, and we set you up as nations 
and tribes so that you recognise each other."'4"*0 * Descending from the 
same father and mother, all human beings should therefore be treated 
equally. Based on this starting point, the Islamic concept of equality 
before the law was established. According to Mawdudi: "God has given
man this right of equality as a birthright. No man, should therefore be 
discriminated against.'441* Muslim scholars explain this as fallows:
Since all are brothers and members of one big family, no discrimi­
nation may be recognised by the law that governs the distribution of 
rights and duties among its members. On the contrary, the law should, or 
indeed must, seek to maintain just equality between them, even though it 
has sometimes to differentiate between them in order to achieve its aim 
in the long run.<d421
To quote the Qur'an again: "Indeed the noblest among you before God
are the most heedful of you."'443* Superiority of one member over 
another is only on the basis of God-fearing, not on that of colour, race, 
language or sex. Mo member is therefore justified in assuming an air of 
superiority over other members of the family. The Prophet was reported 
to have said: "Mo Arab has any superiority over a non-Arab nor does a
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non-Arab have any aver an Arab... You are all the children of Adam, and 
Adam was created from clay."'444*
Article 3(a) of the Islamic DHR, provides that: "All persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled to equal opportunities and protection of 
the law." Accordingly, race, colour, place of birth, property or social 
status are all irrelevant factors in the determination of rights and 
duties. Every member of the human family should have an equal to­
tal share of rights and duties, To maintain the balance the law may 
sometimes be weighted in favour of those who would otherwise have been 
handicapped by special rules. This is not to render them privileged but 
to make them equal with others,'443*
This is the basic concept of equality in Islamic law, which has been 
subject to various misinterpretations and criticisms even by some Muslim 
lawyers. Such criticisms reach a peak when it comes to the status of 
women.'443 *
However, the core of this philosophy has never lost its importance 
and still exerts a great influence on the contemporary legal systems of 
many modern Muslim states, including Jordan. Moreover, it has already 
been mentioned that the Islamic notion of equality between all members of 
the human community was adopted under Article 1 of the French Declar­
ation of 1789 and re-introduced in the universal declaration and the U.N. 
Covenants on Human Rights.'447'*
B - INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The right to equality before the law and freedom from arbitrary dis­
crimination has occupied a prominent place in the contemporary inter­
national law of human rights. It has dominated the general international 
instruments, as well as several others dealing with particular types of 
discrimination, such as sexual and racial discrimination.'443*
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The rather determined language and the emphasis placed on the right 
of every human being to equality with others by the U.U. Charter, were 
the natural result of the discriminatory policies and practices which the 
world had experienced during the first half of this century, The 
Charter has referred to it in more than one place, In the preamble, 
for instance, it confirms the faith of the peoples of the United Nations 
in the principle of equal rights and self-determination of p e o p l e s , 3 
and the promotion and encouragement of respect of human rights and fun­
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.CASO 3 Similar emphases and further details were also provided 
for in the UDHK. It recognises the equal and inalienable rights of all 
human beings without discrimination as a "foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the w o r l d . 5 More than one third of its thirty Articles 
have referred to the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, 
To quote but a few examples: Article 1 stated that "All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights". Article 2, provides that 
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour 41523 
From these provisions it can be said that a general rule of inter­
national law recognising the right to equality before the law and pro­
hibiting discrimination on any ground has existed since the very early 
stages of the U.U, era. This conclusion, however, was contested by the 
respondent state in the ’South West Africa1 Case before the ICJ in 1966. 
It was argued that such a rule did not exist in international law and, 
even if it had, it was not a binding one.<-aS3> In 1970, the court by an 
overwhelming majority adopted the view of Judge Tanaka in the previously 
mentioned case.CdSji:> In the 'Barcelona Traction* Case (second phase), the 
court recognised the existence of this norm in contemporary international
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law.*4555 The principles and rules concerning the basic rights of human 
beings, (including protection from slavery and racial discrimination) 
were referred to as erga omnes obligations.*45615 In other words, these 
principles possess the status of jus cozens, *45:r 5 by which all states 
are bound.*45® 5
The relentless international efforts towards the realisation and
protection of this precious right did not stop at this stage. Several
international declarations have been promulgated, all of which recognised
the right to equality before the law and denounced discrimination.*4555
In order to translate these general and declarationary provisions into
specific legal obligations, a series of international conventions and
covenants were drafted and ratified, both at the regional and universal
levels. As far as the former are concerned the best two examples are the
American (AMR)*4505 and the European (EHS)*4515 conventions of 1969
and 1953 respectively. At the universal level, under the auspices of the
U.M. and its specialised agencies, a number of international instruments
prohibiting discriminatory treatment in general or on particular grounds
have been enacted, creating a substantial body of rules in this
field.*45s> Prominent among these general instruments, is the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) .*4535
The Convention requires the signatories to take practical measures toward
the abolition of all farms of racial discrimination.*4545 It also
provides for special machinery for its enforcement.*4555 As defined by
the Convention, 'racial discrimination' means:
"...any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic 
origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life,*4555
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The Political Covenant refers to this right in more than one Article, 
namely, 2(1), 3, 14(1), and 26. In spite of the variation in the term­
inology, the theme of all these Articles taken in conjunction is the 
recognition of one fundamental human right (the right to equality before 
the law). The preparatory works clearly indicate that concepts such as 
equality, equality before the law, equality before the courts, equal pro­
tection of the law, non-discrimination and non-distinction were all used 
interchangeably during the d e b a t e s . 3
Article 26 provides that:
"All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without discrimination to equal protection of the law.
In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimi­
nation and guarantee to all persons, effective pro­
tection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, etc."
This Article contains a general prohibition of discrimination on any 
grounds whatsoever. The question which arises here, is whether this pro­
hibition is limited to the rights mentioned in the Covenant or not * 
Although Article 2(1) has restricted the prohibition of discrimination 
to the rights and freedoms catalogued in the Political Covenant and
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the states parties,
B. Ramcharan, argues that a violation of a right outside the catalogue in 
discriminatory manner would violate Article 2(1) as well as Article
26,<Ae9> In his view, for the purposes of Article 2(1), the right to 
equality before the law and freedom from discrimination has been recog­
nized as a substantive right in itself under Article (26),
Criticising Ramcharan's interpretation, Meron stated that the attempt
to reconcile the apparent conflict between Arts. 2(1) 
and 26 by suggesting that because equal protection is 
guaranteed in the latter article, equal protection can be 
regarded as a right recognized in the Political Covenant 
for the purposes of Art. 2(1), ... is attractive, but,
perhaps, not entirely convincing. The prohibition of 
discrimination stated in Art, 2(1) encompasses all
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substantive rights granted by the Political Covenant ...
Art. 26 addresses, however, an unlimited spectrum of 
national laws en dehors the Political Covenant, If 
Article 2(1) states that rights a, b, and c, are covered 
by the prohibition of discrimination, Article 26 would, 
according to Ramcharan's interpretation, add a 
prohibition of discrimination with regard to all the 
national laws, whatever their subject, thus outlawing 
discrimination in general.
One may agree with Heron's interpretation of Ramcharan's point of 
view, which in itself is correct, but one may equally disagree with 
Heron's conclusion that there is a real conflict between the provision of
Article 2(1) and 26 of the Political Covenant. It seems that this
confusion has resulted from the number of Articles in which the Covenant 
refers to the right to equality before the law and freedom from 
discrimination, and also from the loose usage of the language therein. A 
single and carefully warded provision would have sufficed and perhaps 
would have been more e f f e c t i v e . 3
The preparatory works are of no help in supporting either of the two 
interpretations and do not provide a clear answer to the question we 
posed earlier. As for the jurisprudence of the HRC the position is not 
quite clear. In previous applications under the Optional Protocol the HRC 
has concluded that whenever a substantive right in the catalogue is 
violated in a discriminatory manner, this would be considered to be a 
violation of both Articles 2(1) and 26 in conjunction with the relevant
Article of the Covenant/47:25 In a later case, the HRC adopted a different
point of view. In this case although the right at stake was from outside 
the civil and political catalogue, the main issue was the right to 
equality before the law. The author of the communication was a Dutch 
citizen who claimed to be the victim of a violation by the Dutch 
Government of Article 26 of the Political Covenant, The applicant was 
trained as a radio and TY-repairman, As he was unemployed for a long
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period of time, he managed to maintain his working capacity by taking on 
occasional work as a TV-repairman without obtaining a licence from the 
Chamber of Commerce. Consequently, he was subjected to criminal 
prosecution before the Dutch Courts. The applicant claimed to be 
discriminated against by the Dutch legislation which prevented him from 
gainful employment and punished him for seeking an alternative to being 
unemployed. He also referred to Article 6 of the Economic Covenant which 
guarantees the right to work as a human right.
Having examined the communication, the HRC concluded that:
"...no facts have been submitted in substantiation of the 
author's claim that he is a victim of a violation of any 
of the rights guaranteed by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political R i g h t s . " >5
and therefore, declared the communication inadmissible.
What makes the conclusion of the HRC questionable is that it did not 
consider the communication inadmissible because the author had failed to 
prove that he had been discriminated against or that the Dutch Law itself 
was discriminatory, and therefore Article 26 was inapplicable, but rather 
because there was no violation of a right guaranteed under the Political 
Covenant. It seems therefore that the HRC has restricted the prohibition 
of discrimination provided for under Article 26 to the rights recognized 
under the Political Covenant only. Such interpretation is contrary to the 
explicit clauses of Article 26 quoted above, What the HRC seems to have 
overlooked is that despite the technical complications, the right to 
equality before the law has been referred to as a substantive right in 
itself under Article 26 of the Political Covenant, and that it has been 
recognized as a human right under customary international law.
However, in a more recent case, the HRC seems to have abandoned the 
above interpretation and changed its opinion regarding the scope of the
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prohibition of discrimination under Article 26 Df the Political Covenant,
and concluded that the prohibition was not limited to the rights
recognised under the Political Covenant; and thus the said Article may be
invoked with regard to any discriminatory law or practice adapted by a
state party. It says;
"For the purpose of determining the scope of article 26, 
the Committee has taken into account the "ordinary mean­
ing of each element of the article in its context and in 
the light of its object and purpose ... The Committee 
begins by noting that article 26 does not merely dup­
licate the guarantees already provided for in article 2.
Its basis stems from the principle of equal protection 
of the law without discrimination, as contained in 
article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in 
any field regulated and protected by public authorities.
Article 26 is thus concerned with the obligations 
imposed on the states in regard to their legislation and 
the application t h e r e o f 5
Accordingly, in order to feature the elements of the legal obligation
of the states parties under the Political Covenant, one should read all
the above discussed provisions, together, and interpret them in the light 
of the international law of human rights. By doing so, it becomes
evident that each state party has pledged itself to do the following: 
first, to recognise the right to equality before the law as a human right 
and to abolish all domestic laws and practices of discriminatory effect; 
secondly, to provide by means of legislative and practical measures, an 
effective protection against discrimination on any grounds, and finally, 
not to sanction any discriminatory laws and policies in the future.
These are the legal requirements to which each state party is required to 
comply.
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C - THE LAWS OF JORDAN,
In Jordan the right to equality before the law (equal protection and 
equal opportunities) is regarded as a fundamental constitutional principle 
of the Jordanian legal system. The HCJ has repeatedly asserted this in 
all cases involving this r i g h t . I t  has also headed the catalogue of 
rights in the successive Jordanian constitutions ever since the first 
constitution in 1928.<'a-'76,:> As to the present constitution, Article 6 
initiated the Bill of Rights by declaring that: 11 (I) Jordanians are equal 
before the law"; and that: "...there shall be no discrimination between
them as regards their rights and duties, on grounds of race, language or 
religion." Beside the principle of equal duties provided for in the above 
paragraph, the authors added, for the first time, a new clause cited as 
Paragraph (II). It says: "...and (the Government) shall ensure a state of
tranquility and equal opportunities to all Jordanians." The theme of this 
Article and the principle it contains need hardly be explained. What may 
seem vague however, is the scope of this principle. Apparently such 
vagueness is due to the rather confusing wording of the second clause of 
paragraph (I), i.e. "there shall be no discrimination between them as 
regards their rights and duties, on grounds of race, language, or reli­
gion." The direct reference to these particular grounds may give rise to 
a crucial question, that is, whether the said three grounds are exclusive 
or merely exemplary. In other words, does the Constitution forbid 
discrimination based on some other grounds, for instance, colour, social 
origin, sex or place of residence? As it stands, the clause is vague 
and could be construed in either way. That is to say, two different 
arguments may be brought forward for the interpretation of this clause, 
each of them leading to an entirely opposing conclusion.
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On the one hand, some may contend that the structure of this clause 
has made it self-evident that those grounds are exclusive, and therefore 
discrimination on grounds other than those is permissible. Such a con­
clusion would rely upon the actual wording of the clause itself for sup­
port. The latter says: "There shall be no discrimination between them
(The Jordanians) ...on grounds of race, language or religion". If it were 
not the intention of the authors, to make it exclusive, they would have 
used the phrase 'such as' instead of the preposition 'of; so it reads: 
"...on grounds such as..."; or at least they could have put a comma instead 
of 'or' between the words 'language' and 'religion', to read: "...race,
language, religion... etc." Furthermore, if the reference to the said 
grounds were merely illustrative, the authors could have made that clear 
by adding an indication to that end. Instead of ending the clause with 
the word 'religion' they could have added the phrase 'or any other 
grounds' to indicate their real intention. In that case it would read: 
"...race, language, religion or any other grounds."
Finally, if the authors's intention were to bring about a total pro­
hibition of discrimination they would not have referred to any particular 
ground at all, and might have ended the first paragraph with the word 
'duties'. So the whole paragraph would become: "Jordanians shall be
egual before the law, there shall be no discrimination between them 
regarding their rights and duties." Consequently, since the authors did 
not use any of those alternatives and preferred to limit the prohibition 
to the particular grounds mentioned in Article 6, discrimination on 
grounds other than those mentioned therein is permissible under the Con­
stitution.
On the other hand, it also can be argued in favour of the other pas­
sible interpretation, i.e., that the grounds referred to in Article 6(1)
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are mere examples. They cannot he considered as the only grounds upon 
which discrimination is prohibited, despite the technical structure of
that clause which may suggest the contrary.
This interpretation could be supported by the Constitution as a whole 
body of rules, instead of analysing one Article on its own. Further
evidence also may be derived from the administrative and legislative 
practices of Jordan, as well as the judicial precedents. As far as the 
Constitution is concerned, the right to equality before the law is di­
rectly or indirectly mentioned in thirteen other Articles, lone of these 
Articles provides for any distinction whatsoever, and repeatedly 
assertained the right of all Jordanians to equality before the law,4'477'3' 
Article 9, for instance, provides that: "(I) Wo Jordanian shall be exiled..,
(II) Wo Jordanian shall be prevented from residing at any place, or be
compelled to reside in any specified place..." In this and many other 
Articles, terms such as 'all Jordanians', 'no Jordanians', 'any person' and 
'no person', have been constantly used to confirm over and over again the 
real intention of the drafters of the constitution, and to indicate an 
overwhelming tendency towards the equality of all Jordanians regarding 
their rights and duties. If it were the intention of the authors to 
permit discrimination on grounds other than those mentioned in Article 
6(1), they would not have repeatedly asserted the right to equality before 
the law in the other Articles.c^ s:* The only exception is the provision 
under Article 28 with regard to the succession to the Hashemite Throne. 
It says: "The Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom is limited by inheritance
to the dynasty of King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein in direct line through his 
male heirs as provided in the following..."<4-735 Such a distinction 
between male and female heirs is being justified in accordance with the
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principles of Islamic jurisprudence which has made the Imamate (the 
ultimate leadership) of the nation a masculine post.
Leaving aside the question of the equality between the sexes,*45305 
one cannot see any visible discriminatory elements in the legislative or 
administrative practice of Jordan. After a comprehensive survey of the 
Jordanian laws, whether presently in farce,<4-ai 3 ar those previously 
abrogated, the present author has failed to find a single Article that 
may be regarded as an expressly discriminatory provision. It seems that 
the administrative practice is also going in a parallel line.*'1®521 This 
remains true, although some discriminatory measures might have been or 
could be taken by the Administration from time to time. These are rather 
rare incidents and in no sense could they reveal an established policy or 
a consistent practice, Having considered such a possibility, the legis­
lature has provided for a judicial remedy by allowing the injured party 
to raise a complaint before the HCJ, In most cases the court nullifies 
the administrative measures if proved to be discriminatory.CAS3:>
Two examples from these discriminatory administrative measures may 
be mentioned here. The first, concerns a decision made by the Adminis­
trative Governor of Zaraqa, preventing certain persons from selling their 
goods in the city market, whereas other persons were selling similar 
goods in the same market without being subjected to the same prohibition. 
When a complaint was raised before the HCJ, the latter pronounced the 
administrative action illegal and a prima facie violation of the principle 
Df equality before the law.*'*®'*'1 In the other case,*4855 the Court held 
the decision of the Provincial Commission void, on the ground latter had 
violated the principle of equality between citizens which ought to have 
been implemented since they were in similar circumstances. The complaint 
was raised by Mr, X. against the decision of the Provincial Commission,
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whereby he was required to leave more empty space <irtidad) around his 
building than was required from his neighbour. Reversing the decision, 
the court firmly stated that; "...Ho distinction should have been made 
between the two neighbours, since the surrounding circumstances were the 
same.c Af3S 3
As for the judicial interpretation of this principle, we have already 
mentioned that the HCJ has repeatedly asserted its status as a funda­
mental constitutional principle. y In Case Ho.107/64 .the court 
nullified the administrative decision and concluded that: "...the
administration had infringed a fundamental constitutional principle in 
the legal system of Jordan (the principle of equality before the
la w ) , ,K 4 8 a J
However, as far as Article 6 of the Constitution is concerned, the 
court has made direct reference thereto in two cases. Although neither 
of them offers a decisive answer to the crucial question we have men­
tioned earlier, they both may be lined up in support of the second argu­
ment. The first incident concerned an administrative decision banning 
(Diesel-fuelled) Taxis from travelling in certain areas. When the 
complaint was made before the HCJ, the latter ruled that the banning was 
a discriminatory measure. It was s d , because its application was re­
stricted to Diesel-fuelled taxis, whilst some other Diesel-fuelled 
vehicles (private cars, busses and lorries) were allowed to travel in the 
same areas. Such decision was a plain violation of the principle of 
equality between citizens, It gave a right to some citizens and deprived 
others of the same right, though the circumstances were similar in both 
cases. Referring to Article 6(1), the court stated that; "...the said 
decision was a violation of Article 6(1) of the Constitution which pro­
vides that, Jordanians are equal before the law, and that there shall be
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no discrimination between them as regards their rights and d u t i e s , " 3 
It is interesting to note that, when quoting the Constitution, the court 
had cut off the controversial clause of Article 6(1), i.e, "...on the 
grounds of race, language or religion." lo reason for this partial 
quotation was given by the court, It is not presently clear whether it 
meant to undermine the role of that clause because it is an exemplary 
clause, or merely because none of those grounds was relevant in that 
case.
In the second case, the verdict was different, and the court con­
cluded that there was no violation of the principle of equality before the 
law. What concerns us most here is the judicial interpretation of the 
scope of the right guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the Constitution. On 
this occasion the applicant had inter alia challenged the 
constitutionality of the applicable law,*4905 on the grounds that it 
contravened the principle of equality before the law, provided for under 
Article 6 of the Constitution. Answering this allegation, the court 
stated:
"The established opinion of the Judiciary and the Jurists
is that what is meant by the right to equality before
the law, under Article 6 of the Constitution, is the
prohibition of discrimination between members of the
same category; not equality between a category of people 
such as (the civil servants) and another category (stu­
dents) for instance."<Jil£n J
On the face of it, this is a rather ambiguous interpretation, based 
upon an irrelevant comparison. In the case of Jordan, the ambiguity 
stems from the fact that the Jordanian HCJ had copied (word for word) 
part of an earlier judgement delivered by the High Administrative Court 
of Egypt.t492i The court was relying on an allegedly established opinion 
of the Judiciary and the Jurists. It may be legitimate for the Egyptian
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court to say so, but it is certainly not for the Jordanian one; simply
because there is no such thing in the case of Jordan.
However, both in Egypt and Jordan the judicial interpretation has 
become subject to many criticisms by legal commentators. In Egypt, Prof. 
F. Atta’ar criticised the attitude of the judiciary on the grounds that 
this allegation does not stand critical legal analysis, though it appears 
attractive. He says: "What was meant by the principle of equality before
the law was not merely the non-discrimination between members of the
same category; but indeed equality between all persons whenever their 
violated rights are the same,"**33* Commenting on the attitude of the 
Jordanian court, Judge F. Kilany argued that, the principle of equality 
before the law means equality between all citizens, i.e. equal rights and 
equal duties. lo matter, after that, whether they belong to the category 
of the civil servants or the students.**9**
Whether one agrees with the judicial interpretation of the meaning of 
the principle of equality or not, it is of no help at all in answering the 
question we raised earlier.**95* It has already been mentioned that the 
said Article (6) could be interpreted in two distinct ways, leading to
entirely different conclusions.**95* The first view which led to the 
conclusion that the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on any of 
the grounds listed in Article 6(1) only, and therefore, discrimination on 
grounds other than those is permissible. Such a conclusion is far from 
being acceptable and is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution itself, 
although the actual wording of Article 6(1) may support it. The second 
point of view, which led to the conclusion that discrimination is totally 
prohibited under Article 6(1) of the Constitution, seems more desirable. 
It also finds support in the preparatory works, and fourteen other 
Articles of the Constitution, all together with the established
2X9
legislative and administrative practices of Jordan. The reports of Jordan 
to the HRC also seem to give support to the second interpretation.> 
However, in order to avoid possible misinterpretation, the scope of 
the prohibition must be made clear. Therefore, Article 6(1) of the 
Constitution needs to be reformed, by adding the phrase 'or any other 
grounds' at the end of the paragraph (1), so that it would read as 
follows: 6(1) "Jordanians shall be equal before the law, There shall be
no discrimination between them as regards their rights and duties, on 
grounds of race, language, religion, or any other grounds".
Finally, it should be known that a similar problem does exist in most 
of the modern Arab constitutions. Article 6(1) of the Constitution of 
Jordan, and its counterparts in the others, could be traced back to a 
common legal and historical source which is Section II of the Egyptian 
Constitution of 1923. This says: "All Egyptians shall be equal before the 
law, there shall be no discrimination between them as regards their 
origin, language or religion." This section has been re-introduced by 
most of the subsequent constitutions, including those of Jordan and 
Egypt. The 'permanent' Constitution of Egypt (the present constitution) 
1971 provides that: "All citizens are equal before the law, They have 
equal public rights and duties, without discrimination between them due 
to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed, An almost
identical provision is introduced in the Constitution of Kuwait, Article 
29, which provides that: "All people are equal in human dignity, and in 
public rights and duties before the law, without discrimination as to 
race, origin, language or religion,H< 49:3 >
However, there are a few other Arab constitutions which did not 
follow this general trend and which have successfully escaped such a 
difficulty. They recognise the right of all citizens to equality, but with
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no reference to any particular grounds. Prominent among tliis group is 
the Algerian Constitution of 1976, which provides that "All citizens are 
equal in rights and duties,n<600:1
The idea of equal rights and duties for men and women is a major 
controversy facing the implementation of the right to equality before the 
law. It also poses some rather complicated legal questions in the case 
of all Muslim and Arab countries, including Jordan. Since the Second 
World War, the United Nations has put an increasing emphasis on the 
equality between men and women. Beside the various provisions included 
in the Charter and the UDHR, both the principal and the subsidiary organs 
of the Organisation have been intensively working towards this goal/6013 
One of the most active organisations in this field is the Commission on 
the Status of Women, a functional commission within the ECOSOC, esta­
blished in 1946/6025 Since the focus of its work is the realisation of 
legal equality between men and women, we shall be referring to two of its 
major achievements in this context (the Declaration and the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women), Ending four years of 
lengthy and detailed drafting debates in the Commission and the General 
Assembly, the latter unanimously adopted the Declaration in 196?/ 60a* 
In the preamble, the United Nations expressed its worries that despite 
the Charter, the Universal Declaration, the Covenants, and other documents 
Dn human rights, there continues to exist considerable discrimination 
against women/60** For the same reason the Commission continued its 
comprehensive work toward the drafting of an international convention for 
the elimination of discrimination against women. The convention was 
adapted by the General Assembly in 1979, opened for signature in March
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1980, and entered into force on 3 September 1981Z 6065 It defines
discrimination against women as:
"Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the 
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impair­
ing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
Df rights, by women, irrespective of their marital status 
on a basis of equality of men and women.., in the polit­
ical, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
fields.1"<SOSJ
States parties agreed to take all necessary measures to eliminate 
all forms of sexual discrimination. Among other things they pledged 
themselves to "embody the principle of equality of men and women in their 
national constitutions and to introduce appropriate legislative measures 
prohibiting discrimination against women,"c607* They also undertook to 
establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal footing 
with men through the national tribunals or other public institutions and 
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices, 
which in effect discriminate against women.<6°e> Jordan has not ratified 
the convention yet.
Nonetheless, Jordan and most Arab countries are parties to the 
Political Covenant, which demands similar measures and requirements. 
Also, it is equally significant to observe that none of these countries 
has made any reservation regarding these requirements/606:1 Under the 
Political Covenant, States parties are bound to guarantee all the rights 
enumerated therein, to everyone <men and women) without discrimination, 
and also, to abolish all legislation and practices that might be regarded 
as discriminatory on any grounds whatsoever, including sex,
So far as Jordan is concerned, we have already mentioned that the 
Constitution does not contain any discriminatory provisions, save that 
of Article 28, which excludes Hashemite women from the right to succeed 
to the throne of the Kingdom/6105 On the contrary, the Constitution has
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provided Jordanian women with special protection (positive 
discrimination) regarding some of the rights therein. It says: "It is
the right of every citizen to work... special conditions shall be made for 
the employment of women and juveniles",c S11 5 nonetheless, some have 
argued that the Constitution has discriminated against women and 
degraded them by making their employment subject to special conditions 
similar to those of juveniles. On the face of it, this argument is rather 
superficial and poorly founded. It only indicates a poor knowledge of 
the history of the Constitution as well as the labour law of Jordan. 
Accordingly, one might find it difficult to accept such an interpretation, 
simply because on the one hand, positive discrimination can by no means 
be described as sex discrimination in the real meaning of the term. 
Evidently, the right of women to work on an equal footing with men has 
been granted under paragraph (1) of the same Article, which recognises: 
"the right of every citizen to work." What is meant by sub-section (d) 
of paragraph (2) is the provision of more care and facilities in places 
where they might work.*5125 On the other hand, the clause applies to 
women and juveniles, which certainly includes both sexes; and therefore, 
it is not based on the sex factor at all. It also must not be seen as a 
degrading underestimation of the role of woman in the working sector, but 
indeed a constitutional guarantee to facilitate her access to work, and to 
enable her to play her role in the national development process.
The Jordanian approach to the question of equality between sexes, 
although less sophisticated than that of the Egyptian and the 
Iranian,CS135 is far more practical and realistic than many other Arab 
constitutions. As to the latter, most of them have tried to solve the 
problem by some general provision far equality between men and women, 
without taking into account the Islamic legal principles and their status
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in the hierarchy of their laws. In the case of Algeria, for instance, 
while Article 2 of the Constitution provides that: "Islam is the religion 
of the state", Article 42 declares that, "All political, economic, social 
and cultural rights of the Algerian woman are guaranteed by the constitu­
tion.I,<514 ? Such a contradiction has created a legal dilemma and renders 
the Constitution's provisions practically meaningless. Obviously, such 
constitutional provisions cannot be implemented in practice, side by side 
with the Qur'anic law of succession which gives the Algerian woman only 
one half of the share of her brother. Similar criticism also could be 
made in the case of the P.D.R. of Yemeni®165
The method of the Egyptian Constitution seems more practical and 
less problematic. It has successfully avoided the technical difficulties 
as well as the legal contradictions created by many other Arab constitu­
tions. Like most of them, it declares that: "Islam is the religion of the 
state",*151® 5 and, at the same time provides for the right to equality 
between men and women, but has added the provision of Article 11 which 
has made all the difference. The said Article stipulates that such a
right must be understood in the light of the principles of Islamic juris­
prudence. It says:
"The state shall guarantee the proper co-ordination be­
tween the duties of the women towards the family and
her work in society, considering her equal with man in 
the fields of political, social, cultural and economic 
life, without prejudice to the rules of Islamic juris­
prudence." *617 5
A similar approach has been adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Article 20, of the Constitution of 1979, provides that:
"All persons, whether men or women, shall be equal under 
the protection of the law and shall enjoy all human,
political, economic, social and cultural rights with due 
observance of the Islamic precepts."
Article 21 stipulates that:
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"The Government shall guarantee the women’s rights in 
every respect with due observance of the Islamic pre­
cepts and shall proceed to;
1- create a favourable atmosphere for upgrading the 
personality of women and restoration of their ma­
terial and spiritual rights,
2- protect mothers, especially during pregnancy and 
nursing, and also orphan children,
3- assign a competent court to protect the existence 
and survival of the family..."
In this way, the Constitution enables the courts to implement the 
right to equality between the two sexes without contravening Islamic 
norms, which in many aspects are being regarded as jus cogens rules.
It seems, therefore, highly recommendable for the Jordanian legislature to 
follow suit,
In Jordan, the supplementary laws introduced under the present Con­
stitution have progressively guaranteed considerable equal rights for men 
and women. At the political level, for instance, the right of women to 
vote and to be elected, to all national institutions including Parliament 
and municipal councils, has been implemented since 1974,<f51'9>
Jordanian women have held many high executive, diplomatic and polit­
ical posts. There are many successful professional Jordanian women
who have reached notable positions in all kinds of professions. The right 
to work has also been guaranteed for men and women on an equal footing 
in terms of opportunities and payment.<eE15 The author has failed to 
find any judicial precedent, whereby a case had been brought before the
court by a Jordanian woman claiming that she has been discriminated
against in her employment or payment on the grounds of sex.<SEE:> 
Elementary and preparatory education is compulsory for both girls and
boys under sixteen years of age. High School, University education and 
post-graduate studies are open to all, equally and on the same
competitive conditions. Sex, therefore, never seems to be taken into
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consideration for purposes of admission to such institutions. Figures 
from the latest statistics of the University of Jordan, for instance, 
indicate that the rate of female students is not only on a par, but in 
the case of some colleges, female students outnumber their male col­
leagues/3:23 ?
In these and all other rights, the law has proclaimed equal rights
for men and women. The sole exception is the law of inheritance, were
the Sharia Courts apply Qur'anic provisions which dictate that: "Allah
commands you concerning your children; a male shall have as much as the
share of two females."*321'15 Obviously, this rule is incompatible with the
requirements of the Covenant. Article 3, which explicitly requires full
equality between men and women is only one e x a m p l e , 5 Jordan has
reported to the HRC that:
"With regard to Article 2 of the Covenant, ... there are 
some distinctions between men and women with regard to 
inheritance. The differences with regard to inheritance 
are deeply rooted in the Islamic religion and are based 
on the Islamic sense of economic justice ...
Article 3 deals with the equality between the sexes and 
as has been pointed out earlier, there are no 
distinctions made between the two sexes except of course 
in reference to their physiological differences. As to 
political and civil rights, women now have the right to 
vote equally with men ...
Apart from the vague reference to the Islamic sense of economic jus­
tice and the physiological differences, Jordan has admitted that there are 
some distinctions between men and women based on sex, Undoubtedly, such 
distinctions constitute a violation of not only Articles 2 and 3, but also 
other Articles in the Political Covenant, Some may argue that such 
distinctions are required under Islamic Law and are justifiable in the 
context of an Islamic society. This might be true, but it does not change 
the fact that the law of Jordan, as it stands, is incompatible with the 
requirements of the Covenant. Jordan therefore, is in breach of its
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obligations under the Political Covenant. The dilemma consists of two 
conflicting facts: on the one hand, Jordan is a party to the Political 
Covenant and therefore it is bound by its provisions, On the other hand, 
neither the legislature nor the government of Jordan could abrogate or 
modify a Qur'anic provision.'537'5
Accordingly, since the accommodation of the two rules together is 
legally impossible, one of them would have to give way to the other, 
Because it is impassible to modify a Qur'anic provision, a reservation on 
the provisions of the Covenant seems inevitable, That is to say, Jordan 
should have reserved the right to interpret the provision of the Covenant 
in the light of the Qur'an and the general principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence.'5255 However, until such a reservation is made, Jordan
will continue to be in breach of the Covenant.
Equality between the sexes has given rise to many questions during
the consideration of the reports of Jordan by the HRC, Members of the
latter seemed very concerned with the welfare of the Jordanian women and 
wanted to know, to what extent they enjoy the declared rights in 
practice ■*' <S23:>
It has to be mentioned that the Jordanian women do not, in practice, 
enjoy the proclaimed rights on an equal basis with men. Declaring a 
right is one thing, but exercising it is something else. There are many 
drawbacks in the way of full enjoyment of equal rights. Women live in a 
society which has inherited rigid traditions and highly regarded social 
religious values, which are not expected to change over a short period of 
time. That is to say, in spite of the impressive achievements towards 
that end over the last few decades, Jordanian women are still short of 
being able to enjoy equal rights with men in all fields, The most impor­
tant thing is that there is a noticeable progress towards that goal, and
227
the government is taking practiC^ and legislative measures to overcome 
such difficulties and to open wider opportunities for women to enjoy 
equal rights in practice. However, the status of women in Jordan 
appears to be one century ahead of the status of women in many 
neighbouring countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. In Kuwait 
for instance, Parliament had debated a private members bill concerning 
the recognition of the right of women to vote.'5305 When the Parliament 
decided to seek a recommendation from the Ministry of Al-Awqaf (Islamic 
Affairs), a recommendation was passed, suggesting that such a bill must 
not become law because it is contrary to the Sharia (Islamic law),'6315
E - ASSESSMENT,
It has already been mentioned that the right to equality before the 
law has been provided for under Article 6 of the present Constitution of 
Jordan. We have also analysed the said Article in an attempt to feature 
the scope and the legal dimension of the right recognised thereby. It 
was made clear that the actual warding of Article Q as it stands now is 
insufficient and could give rise to some complicated legal problem. In 
order to remedy these inconsistencies a modification was suggested to 
ensure the prohibition of all forms of discrimination on any grounds 
whatsoever. As to the case law, the Jordanian courts have asserted, on 
more than one occasion that the principle of equality before the law is 
one of the fundamental constitutional principles of the legal order of 
Jordan. It was also mentioned that the supplementary laws enacted under 
the present Constitution, along with the administrative practices, reveal 
a relentless effort on behalf of the Jordanian authorities toward the 
promotion and realisation of this right,'5325 Naturally, the possibility 
of a discriminatory measure being taken by the administration has always
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been there. The legislator is aware of this possibility, and therefore, 
in most cases a judicial remedy has been made available. In practice, 
these incidents remain too rare to constitute a tangible official policy. 
On the contrary, the overall view is that all Jordanians are equal in 
their rights and duties, despite colour, religion...etc. They are all 
subject to the same laws and judicial jurisdiction. The vote of a woman 
or a blaclc man is just as valid as the vote of a white Jordanian male. 
All citizens are guaranteed an equal standing before a court of law.
So far as the status of women is concerned, we have uncovered same 
short-comings in the law of Jordan, particularly a situation which 
rendered Jordan in breach of the Political Covenant from the very moment 
it entered into force. In all previous cases where a breach has been 
discovered, the author has constantly suggested an amendment to the 
Jordanian law in order that it be brought into line with the provisions 
Df the Covenant. As the law of Jordan on this particular point is 
indispensable and beyond modification, we are faced with a rather 
delicate question. Therefore, it has been suggested that Jordan must 
reserve the right to interpret the relevant provisions of the Covenant in 
accordance with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the right to equality before the 
law is a common element between the two international covenants on human 
rights. States parties must implement this right with regard to both 
civil and political rights as well as to economic, social and cultural 
rights,
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Chapter III. NOTES.
(1) The first crime (homicide) on the face of this earth is said 
to have been committed in protection of the right to life. See 
Al-Tabari;'The Analyses, Vol.II, 1879, p.142
(2) See; Chapter I, p.8. For the Arabs before Islam, it was an 
acceptable practice for the father to bury his newly born 
daughter alive. See Mahmassani, op. cit., p. 101
6/151, also 5/32
4/29
2/178
"Everyone has the right to life..
"Every human being has the right to life" 
"Every person has the right to have his 
life respected,,,"
"Every person has the right to have his 
life... protected by law."
"Human beings are inviolable, every human 
being shall be entitled to respect for 
his life and the integrity of his person.." 
"Human life is sacred and inviolable and 
every effort shall be made to protect it.."
(3) The Qur'an;
(4) The Qur'an;
(5) The Qur'an;
(6) See for instance
TJDHR, Art. 3,
ADRDM, Art. 1,
AHR, Art. 4,
EHR, Art. 2,
AFR, Art. 4
Islamic BHR, Art. I.
(7) See for instance, ¥. P. Gormley, "The Right to Life and the 
Rule of Nonderogability; Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens", in
X M  Right  to,,,L ife  i n...Int.e.r n&.tJ.Qnal Lew. ed. by B. G.
Ramcharan, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1985, p. 121.
(8) See: Resolution No, 37/189 A, of 18 December 1982. See also 
the U.N.H.R. Commission's decision No. 7/1982 and 43/1983 of 
19 February 1982 and 9 March 1983 respectively.
(9) HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement No.40 (A/37/40) p.93 (1982).
(10)Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) See the EUCM, (5207/71) CD 39,99. See also H.A. Kabaalioglu, 
"The Obligation to 'Respect' and to 'Ensure' the Right to 
Life" in Ramcharan, the Right to Life, op, cjt«
p. 166,
(13) See HRC Report, GAORt Supplement No.40 (A/38/40) p. 132 (1983)
(13a) See No.7154/75 DR 14, 31 and No.6040/73 CD 44, 121.
(14) See Nos.6780/74; 6950/75, Report of 10 July 1976.
(15) See the Commission's Annual Report, 1976, p.19.
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<16) E/CH.4/SR.309-312, See also: the annotation prepared by the 
Secretary-General, 'Draft International Covenants on Human 
Hights', US’ Doc. Ho. A2929, pp. 82-85
(17) See GAQR, 12th Session, 1957, 3 Comm: A/C.3/SR, 762-834.
<18) See P. Hassan, "The Word 'Arbitrary* as used in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'Illegal' or 
'Unjust'?", IQ Harv, 225, 225 <1969).
L. Marcoux, "Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
under International Law", 5 Boston Coll.Int & Comp. L,R. 345
<1982)
<19) P. Hassan, "The International Covenant on Human Rghts: An
Approach to Interpretation", 19.,,BM.lalflu 1 1 Rev- » 35 <1969).
<20) P, Hassan, See above note 18, 254,
<21) R.B. Lillich, "Civil Rights",in Human Rights
inInternational Law, ed. by T. Heron, Oxford, 1984, Vol. I, 
p. 122, < herein after refer'd to as Lillich, Civil Rights)
<22) C.K. Boyle, "The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life,
in Ramcharan, The Right to Life", op. cit.. 221, 234
<23) Y. Dinstein, "The Right to Life, Physical Integrity
and Liberty", in The International Bill of Rights, ed. by L. 
Henkin, Hew York,1981, p.116 < hereinafter referred to as 
Henkin, The International Bill of
Rights).
<24) D.D. Hserenko, "Arbitrary Deprivation of Life: Controls
on Permissible Deprivation,in Ramcharan, The Right to Life, 
pp. 0.11. , p. 248
<25) Report of the HRC, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40 <A/37/40), p. 93 <1982)
<25a) Ibid. p. 137.
<26) It provides that:
"Art, 1. For so long as public order remains disturbed and 
national territory is in a state of siege, Art. 25 of the
Penal Code shall read as follows:
Art.25, The [Penal] act is justified if committed:
... <4) by members of the police force in the course of 
operations planned with the object of preventing and 
curbing the offences of extortion and kidnapping and the 
production and processing of and trafficking in narcotic 
drugs," Ibid, p. 142
<27) Ibid. p. 146
<28) "...The committee is accordingly of the view that the state
party should take the necessary measures to compensate the 
husband of Mrs. de Guerrero for the death of his wife and to 
ensure that the right to life is duly protected by amending 
the law." Ibid.
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(29) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 1948. Like all other war crimes, genocide 
is not subject to statutory limitations. See: The Convention 
on the Uon-applicability of Statutory Limitations to Var 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 1968.
(30) "Personal liberty shall be safeguarded."
Protection of personal freedom would necessarily include pro­
tection of life. However this is only one example of what was 
meant when it was stated earlier that the Jordanian consti­
tution refers to human rights in rather general and some times 
vague provisions. See above p.
(31) Art. 372.
(32) Art, 327, See also the Supreme Court/Case Ho. 29/74, JBR (1974)
p. 944
(33) See the Supreme Court Case Ho. 25/78, JBR. (1978), p.0|iL' .
The Court held that since the victim is one of the offender's 
ancestors, the offence is punishable by the death penalty in 
accordance with Art, 328(3),
(34) Art. 372.
(35) Art. 339 (1+2)
(36) As a human right, the right to life means the right in itself 
and its peaceful enjoyment. The Supreme Court of the U.S. has 
held that the expression 'deprived of life' should not be con­
strued to refer only to the extreme case of death; the term 
life as used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti­
tution means something more than mere animal existence. The 
Court extended the prohibition against deprivation to all the 
faculties by which life is to be enjoyed. Hunn v . Illinois 94 
U.S. 133
(37) See Art. 158 (1,2)
(38) Ibid, Para, (3)
(39) Case Ho. 56/53, JBR. (1953), p. 537. See also Case No. 17/53 in
the same volume, p. 313.
(40) King Hussain himself has set an example by his personal parti­
cipation in rescue missions, putting his own life at risk to 
save the lives of individuals, especially in natural disas­
ters.
(41) An interview with a former P.L.O. officer, Amman, January
1985.
(42) Three of the terrorists were killed during the operation and
the other one was convicted by the competent Court of terror­
ist acts, leading to the death of a number of civilians and
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soldiers. See Amnesty International Report < Jordan), A.I.
Publications 1984
<43) For details of the legal and medical controversy over the
question of abortion, see the American Supreme Court in Roe v, 
Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 35 L Ed. 2d 149. Mr. Justice Blackman 
delivered the opinion of the court, He stated:
"Ve forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sen­
sitive and emotional nature of the abortion controv­
ersy, and of the vigorous opposing views, even among 
physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute 
convictions that the subject inspires. One's philos­
ophy and experiences, one's exposure to the raw edge 
of human existence, one's religious training, one's 
attitudes towards life and family, and their values, 
and the moral standards one establishes and seeks tD 
observe are all likely to color one's thinking and 
conclusions about abortion." 
p. 156.
<44) See: The Penal Code of Jordan, <Arts, 321-325), and
Syria, <Arts. 525-532)
<45) The Syrian Court of Cassation in 30 Years. 1949-1980, 5 volumes 
Damascus, 1st ed, , 1981, p,275,
<4-6) See for instance, The Penal Code of Egypt, <Arts, , 260-264) and
Iraq, <Arts., 229-231).
<47) The Criminal Law in the Soviet Union, See Haraeed Al-Sa'idi,
Crimes Against Persons, Baghdad, 1964, p. 276. For more 
details on these divisions see Kamal Assa'eed, "The Crime 
of Abortion: A comparative Study" Derasat Review1, University 
of Jordan, Amman, 1984, pp, 172-173.
Dr. Assa'eed is in favour of the first trend, as he says:
"As a matter of fact, we could not agree with the last
two trends... It is not true that the pregnant woman is
the victim in such a crime, The real victim is the
embryo who cannot be considered a human being because
he has not seen the light of day yet." Ibidp, 173.
<48) U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Roe v. Wadef See above note
43, p. 148.
<49) U.K. The Abortion Act, 1967.
<50) In an amendment to Art, 317 of the French Penal Code, 21st
December 1979, abortion was legalized by adding a new para­
graph to that Article, permitting abortion if performed by a 
physician in a hospital before the 10th week of pregnancy.
<51) The Qur'an says: "Do not kill your children..." 6/151, and:
17/31
<52) See the proposal of Pelgium, Brazil, Salvador, Mexico and 
Morocco, U.U. Doc. A/C.3/L654.
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<53) See Ramcharan, The Right to Life, op. cit, p. 51.
<54) See J, Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bonnes of Liberty,
Princeton, 1980, p.180,
<55) D, Lasok, "The Right of the Unborn", in Fundamental
Rights, a volume of Essays to commemorate the 50th anniversary
J.W, Bridge, D, Lasok and others, with a Foreword by Lard 
Denning, London, 1973, p. 28
<56) R.B. Lillich "Civil Rights" op. cit.t p, 123, See also:
Y. Dinstein, who talks about the right of woman to abortion, 
op, . cit, , p. 122
<57) See Art, 322, para 1
<58) Ibid, para 2.
<59) Case Ho. 143/75, <unreported), Art, 323.
<60) See Art. 325.
<61) See Art. 321-325
<62) This is a further step in protecting the right to life by the 
Jordanian Law. Since the prohibition of abortion is meant to 
protect life in the first place, it would be meaningless if it 
becomes in itself a threat to the life of the pregnant woman.
<63) It seems that the Jordanian legislature had followed the
Islamic Law on the principle (The principle of necessity) and 
the English Law < Abortion Act 1967) on the details and the 
requirements in such circumstances,
<64) See Art, 44.
(65) The Public Health Law lo. 20, 1971,
see Art. 26; compare this provision with Section I. of the UK 
Abortion Act of 1967.
<66) Ibid, para (2)
(67) K. Assa'eed, op, cit,, p, 216
(68) K, Assa'eed, op. cit,, p. 215
(69) On the 'right to abortion', see Roe v. Wade, 410, US 113,
35 L Ed. 2d, above note no,43.
(70) Amnesty International has waged a continuous campaign against 
the death penalty. In 1965, the organization circulated a re­
solution at the U.H. for the suspension, and eventual aboli­
tion of the death sentence for peacetime offences. At the 
Vienna meeting of the Council of Amnesty International in 
1973, it was decided that the death penalty must now be seen 
as a violation of the right not to be subject to torture,
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(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
(75)
(76)
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
(84)
(85)
(86)
(87)
(88) 
(89)
inhuman or degrading treatment. In December 1977, A.I. 
convened in Stockholm an International Conference on the death 
penalty. Delegates from 50 countries issued a declaration 
condemning executions committed by governments. See Amnesty 
International, The Human Rights Story, ed. Power, Oxford,
1981, pp. 32-35; see also Amnesty International Report, The 
Death Penalty.; a ,,S,ur.vey by Country, I. A. Publications, 1984.
See U.H. Doc. Ho. (A/C.3/L.644).
Art. 6(2).
Art. 6(6),
See the Annotation prepared by the Secretary-General, above 
note 16.
Ibid. See also EC0S0C, Official Records, 9th Session, 
supplement Ho. 10 (E/137), Annex 1 and 2.
IMiL_ See also R. Sapienza, "International Legal Standards on 
Capital Punishment", in Ramcharan, The Right to Life op. 
cit. p. 285.
General Comments on Article 6, Report of the HRC, GAQR, 
supplement Ho, 40 (A/37/40) p.94 (1982).
IMd.
See R. Sapienza, op. cit. p.287,.
Art. 328, see also the Supreme Court of Jordan, Cases Hos., 
182/72, JBR (1972), p. 318, 25/78, JBR (1978) p. 95.
See; Art.s 110-113.
See; Art.s 135-139, 142 and 148.
See paragraphs (1&2).
See U.H. Doc. Ho, CCPR/C/SR,362, p.3 (1982).
Ibid. p. 4.
Ikld<
Case lo. 54/76, JBR (1976), p. 1636. See also 
Case Ho. 68/76, JBR (1976), p. 1648.
See U.H. Doc. Ho. CCPR/C/l/Add.24, p.3 (1978).
See the Summary Record of the 103rd meeting, U.H. Doc, Ho. 
CCPR/C/SR.103, (1978).
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(90) Law Ho. 24, 1968. The JOG., Ha. 2089 of 16th April 1968, p.
555.
(91) Ibid. Art. 18(2).
(92) Ibid. Art. 2.
(93) See Art. 17(2) of the Penal Code of Jordan.
(94) Ibid, Art. 357.
(95) Art. 357(1) of the Criminal Procedures Code, (law Ho.9 1961)
JOG Ho,1539 of 16th of March 1961 p.311.
(96) Ibid, (2,3).
(97) King Hussain is well Known for his reluctance to give his
approval for the carrying out of the death sentence. There are 
very rare cases in which the Royal Assent is granted, Most of 
these cases are murder, with one or more aggravating factors 
revealing dangerous criminal conduct.
(98) See: Art. 358.
(99) See: above p. '
(100) See: below p '
(101) See: The HCJ, Case Ho, 59/70, JBR (1971) p. 146.
It is the established practice of the Ministry of the 
Religious and Islamic Affairs to bury any dead person at the 
expense of the Government, when there are no close relatives 
to take the responsibility. It seems that the Jordanian 
practice was influenced by the Islamic view that the burial is 
a human right. See the Islamic DHR, Art. Kb) "Just as in 
life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person's body 
shall be inviolable, It is the obligation of the believers to 
see that a deceased person's body is handled with due 
solemnity."
(102) See: Chapter I. above, p. 13-15.
(103) Arts. 1, 3, See also: The ADRD."Every human being has the
right to... liberty and the security of his person". Art.I."Ho 
person may may be deprived of his liberty except in the cases 
and according to the procedures established by pre-existing 
law..." Art. XXV. The Islamic D.H.R. also provides that: "a) 
Man is born free. Ho inroads shall be made on his right to 
liberty except under the authority and in due process of the 
law." See Art. II.
(104) See those five specified cases in the same Art.
(105) Arts. 5 and 7. See also the AFR, Art. 6.
(106) Arts. 9 and 14.
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(107) See above, p. 65.
(108) R, Lillich, " Civil Rights", op. cit. p. 138. For almost an
identical definition see Dinstein, op. cit.. p. 130.
(109) J.Swarup, op. cit. pp.52-53.
(110) Report of the HRC, GAQR, Supplement No. 40 (A/36/40) p.176
(1981).
(111) Ibid, Supplement No.40 (A/37/40) p.95 (1982).
(112) See: Art. 2.
(113) See: The constitution of Egypt of 1971.
"Individual freedom is a natural right and s?hall not be 
touched,..11 Art, 44.
, The constitution of United Arab Emirates (1971).
"Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to all citizens,,. 
no person may be arrested, searched or detained... except 
in accordance with the provisions of the law..." Art. 26
Kuwait (1962)
"personal liberty is guaranteed" Art. 30.
"No person shall be arrested, detained... except in 
accordance with the provisions of law..." art. 31.
P.D.R. OF Yemen (1978)
"personal freedom shall be ensured.,,arrests are allowed 
only in connection with punishable actions and should be 
based on the law.,." Art. 39.
Algeria (1976)
"No one can be prosecuted, arrested or detained except in 
cases provided by the law and in the manner that it pre­
scribes" Art. 51.
(114) Jordanian Dinars.
(115) See: Art. 179.
(116) See: Art. 180.
(117) See: below, pp. 504-506.
(118) Upon extensive research of the reported and partly unreported 
Jordanian cases since 1952 until the end of 1986, the author 
has failed to find a case where the above provisions have been 
implemented, despite the considerable number of unlawful 
arrest and detention cases decided by the HCJ.
(119) According to the Jordanian Criminal Procedures Code 
•Judicial Police* includes the fallowing persons:
1. Members of the Public Prosecution
2. Judge of the Peace in some districts
3. Provincial Administrative Governors
4. Director of the Public Security
5. The Leader and officers of the county's police force
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<120)
(121)
(122)
(123)
(124)
(125)
(126) 
(127)
<128)
<129)
<130)
<131)
<132)
<133)
<134)
<135)
<136)
6. Criminal detectives
7. The Nokhtars <Village Chiefs)
8. Captains of Jordanian ships and aeroplanes
9. Any officer vested with such function in accordance 
with specific legislation. See Art. 9.
See: Art. 101.
See: Art. Ill,
See: Art. 115.
See: Art. 117
See: Art. 118
It is in such cases that the provisions of Arts. 346 and 178 
of the Penal Code are meant to he invoked. See above p.91,
See: J.O.G. No. 473, 19/3/1935
JOG, No.2010, 5/6/1967. Because of the severe impact of the 
exceptional powers on human rights in general and in Jordan in 
particular, they shall be dealt with separately in Chapter 
VII. below.
See UN Doc. No . CCPR/C/SR.362,p.5 <1982).
See below p.498.
Christie v.Leachlnsky, [19473 I All E.R 567,575.
Equivalent provisions in the EHR is Art. 5<2):
"everyone arrested or detained shall be informed promptly 
in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his 
arrest and of any charge against him".
See Report of the HRC, GAQR, Supplement. No.40 <A/33/40) <1978)
See HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement No. 40<A/38/40) p.192 <1982).
Case No,146/1983, see Report of the HRC, GAQR, Supplement No. 
40<A/40/40) p.187 <1985).
After an exhaustive research into all reported and a large 
number of unreported judgements of the Jordanian courts 
from 1952 until the end of 1986, the present writer has 
failed to find a decision or a case relating to the 
practices of the police in this context.
The legal nature of the alleged offence is of special im­
portance at this stage, because arrest is not allowed for 
same offences no matter under what circumstances <in Jor­
dan, violations and some misdemeanours). In cases of a 
misdemeanour punishable by fine, arrest, as a general 
rule, is not permissible, and therefore the individual is 
under no obligation to submit to the police. Furthermore, 
if the indicated charge, has been proved to be false or 
does not justify arrest, the arrested person would be able
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to claim damages for false imprisonment, even though a latter charge 
has been discovered which would have justified arrest if it were 
introduced at the time of arrest. See Christie v. Leachinsky, p. 57 
above note HO. 130,
<137) See Delcourt v. Belgium, Ho, <2689/65) C, D. 22, 48.
<138) An interview with Police Captain 0, Al-Thara, Madaba,
September 1986.
<139) See the Criminal Procedure Code, Arts. 227-231.
<140) Art. 9 <3)
<141) HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement HO. 40 <A/37/40) p. 95 <1982).
<142) See for instance Case HO. 90/1981 and Case HO. 84/1981, HRC
Report, GAQR, Supplement HO.40 <A/38/40) p.197 <1983).
<143) Case HO. 43/1979, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement HO.40 <A/3g/40)
p. 192 <1983).
<144) See below, Chapter VII.
<145) See Art. 63.
<146) Art. 99.
<147) Art. 112.
<148) Art. 100.
<149) JBR. <1975), p. 962.
<150) Case HO. 54/76,JBR <1976) p.1011; compare this judgement with
Art. 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
"A member of the judicial police shall question the ar­
rested person, if not satisfied; he must bring him before 
the competent public prosecutor within 48 hours, who shall 
interrogate him within 24 hours and release or confine 
him".
<151) See U.H. Doc, Ho.CCPR/C/l/Add.24 <1978); CCPR/C/l/Add.55 
<1981); CCPR/C/l/Add,56 <1982).
<152) UDHR., Art. 5 "Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,"
EHR,, Art. 3. "Ho one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment."
AHR., 5 <2),
"Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived 
Df their liberty shall be treated with respect for the in­
herent dignity of the human person."
AFR., 5
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"...torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments and 
treatment shall be prohibited.”
The Islamic DHR., Art. VII, "Ho person shall be subjected 
to torture in mind, or degraded, or threatened with injury 
either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by 
him, or forcibly made to confess to the commission of a 
crime. ..."
(153) Lillich, Civil Right, op. citp. 153; see also O'Bogle,
"Torture and Emergency Power under the European Convention 
of Human Rights", 71 AJIL 3 687-688, (1977).
(154) G.A. Res.3452, 30 GOAR supplement Ho. 34, Doc.A/10034 (1975).
(155) Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 1984. See ILM. Vol. 23 (1984)
p. 1027
(156) Y. Dinstein, op. cit., p. 123
(157) Y.B. 12 (1969) p. 186
(158) 2 EHRR. 25.
(159) HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40 (A/37/40) p.94-95 (1982).
(160) Communication Ho. R7/28, U.H. Bulletin of Human Rights (30/80);
see also HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40 (A/36/40) p.114 
(1981).
(161) Ibid.
(162) HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40(A/37/40) p.114 (1982).
(163) Ho derogation or any reservation with regard to the pro­
hibition of torture is acceptable,
(164) Ramirez v. Uruguay. (Communication Ho.Rl/4), HRC Report, GAQR, 
Supplement Ho.40 (A/35/40) p.121. (1980).
(165) See: Chapter I.
(166) Ibid.
(167) See for instance: The Constitution of Kuwait (1962) Art. 31
"Ho person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading
treatment,"
The constitution of the Sudan, (1971), Art. 28(3)
"Ho one shall be subjected to physical or mental torture 
or degrading treatment, the law shall designate punish­
ments for those so doing."
The constitution of Egypt, (1971) Art. 42
"Any person arrested, detained... shall be treated in the 
manner concomitant with the preservation of his dignity.
Ho physical or mental harm is to be inflicted upon him.. ,
If confession is proved to have been made by a person
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under any of the above mentioned forms of duress or coer­
cion, it shall be considered invalid and futile."
(168) Para. 2, "If such activities resulted in sickness or injury 
the punishment shall not be less than six months to three 
years, unless a greater punishment is required in accordance 
with the results."
(169) Art. 159 reads as follows: "A confession made by the 
defendant... without the presence of the public prosecutor... 
admissible only if the public prosecution provides evidence of 
the circumstances in which it was given, and the court 
convinced that it was given voluntarily."
(170) Case No. 14/55, JBR (1955), p. 14^. A similar conclusion was 
reached in: Case No, 113/56, JBR (1956), p. 112,
(171) Case No. 22/58, JBR (1958), p. 267, See also:
Case No. 28/58, 33.60, and 41/61.
(172) Case No. 66/73, also Case No, 92/78, In Case No. 66/75:
"... the confession obtained during the questioning of the 
arrested person by the police is admissible evidence since 
there was no violence or compelling measures proved to be 
used.,," See also:
Case No. 93/75, JBR (1975), p. 1112.
(173) Najmuat al-qawaid al~qanonnia (The collection of the Legal
Principles decided by the Court of Cassation), vol. 6,
Case No, 340/44, p. 464. See also Case No. 1594/60, 
10/5/1960, IMiL_p. 512.
(174) JBR (1985), p. 656.
(175) Case No. 86/75, JBR (1976), p. 638.
(176) An unreported case of which the present writer has per­
sonal knowledge. Mr. Nasser was serving his military 
service at the time and while on duty his rifle went off 
by mistake and killed one of his colleagues. In accord­
ance with the Military Penal Code, the commander of the 
military unit had to arrest him and initiate a preliminary 
investigation, the report on which had to be referred with 
the defendant to the military public prosecutor. The of­
ficer beat the defendant all night long demanding a con­
fession that he had intentionally killed his colleague, 
and eventually (and not surprisingly) Mr. Nasser made his 
confession. The confession was recorded in the officers 
report and some aggravating factors were also added.
(177) ' The Greek Case1, Y.B. 12 (1969) p, 196.
(178) Ibid.
(179) UN Doc.NO. CCPR/C/l/Add.55 (1981),
(180) UN Doc,NO. CCPR/C/l/Add,56 (1982),
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(181) See below, p.154.
(182) The Political Covenant Art. 14(3)(a).
(183) See above p.94.
(184) General Comments on Art. 14 of the Political Covenant, see HRC 
Report, GAQR, Supplement Ha.40 (A39/40) p,145 (1984).
(185) See fore instence, Communication HO. R.14/63, HRC 
Report,GAQR. Supplement HO. 40 (A/37/40) p.114 (1982).
(186) One of the main principles of criminal procedure in Islamic 
law is: "Innocence is certain, certainty does not disappear 
upon mere doubt". In the Islamic DHR it says "Ho person shall 
be adjudged guilty of an offence and made liable to punishment 
except after proof of his guilt before an independent judicial 
tribunal." See also:
F. Kilany, The.. Law..„of .Criminal Procedures., Amman, 1981, Vol.
I, p. 116. See also The Islamic DHR., Art. V.,
"Ho person shall be adjudged guilty of an offence and made 
liable to punishment except after proof of his guilt 
before an independent judicial tribunal."
(187) See: F.G. Jacobs, The. Europe an... Con vent ion on .Humn-.Righlg.,
Oxford, 1975, p. 113
(188) See above note HO,184.
(189) F, Kilany, op. cit,, p. 120
(190) In application Ho. 2343/64 before the ECTJM, the applicant
alleged that before he was convicted the police had revealed 
to the press that the accused was a fraudulent person, and 
that remark was published by a newspaper in Vienna. The 
Commission observed that, under certain circumstances, 
information given to the press by officials before the
conviction of a person accused of an offence could prejudice
the presumption of innocence established by the convention, 
Case Ho. 2343/64, Y.B. 10, (1967), p. 182
(191) See the Constitution of Egypt 1971, Art. 67, and the con­
stitution of Syria 1973, Art. 28, "Every accused person is 
innocent until pronounced guilty in a final judgement."
(192) op, cit, , p. 117
(193) UH Doc. HO, CCPR/C/l/Add.24,p.2 (1978).
(194) Case Ho. 17/51, JBR (1953), p, 41
(195) Case Ho. 59/54, JBR (1954), p. 398. Similar judgement was
also rendered in Case Ho. 74/55. JBR. (1955), p, 685
(196) See Case Ho, 89/65, JBR (1966), p. 694.
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(197)
(198)
(199)
(200)
(201)
(202)
(203)
(204)
(205)
(206) 
(207)
See the cases cited above notes 195 and 196.
See Case Nos. 241/77, JBR (1977), p. 217 and 39/81, JBR.
(1981) p. 912.
Case No, 1/76, JBR (1976) 972.
See the seconed supplementary report of Jordan, UN Doc. NO. 
CCPR/C/l/Add.56 (1982).
If the denial of the right to bail involved damaging effects 
on both the interest of the accused and justice, Abuse of the 
discretionary power by the judge or the court, i.e., exagger­
ation in the requirement for the release (excessive amounts of 
bail) may be of even more damaging consequence, as President 
Johnson pointed out at the signing of the US Bail Reform Act 
of 1966, when he remarked, "The defendant with means can af­
ford to pay bail, He can afford to buy his freedom, But the 
poorer defendant cannot pay the price. He languishes in jail. 
He does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed. 
He does not stay in jail because he is any more likely to flee 
before trial. He stays in jail for one reason only, because 
he is poor. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of illus­
trations of how the bail system has inflicted arbitrary cruel­
ty, A man was jailed on a serious charge brought last 
Christmas Eve. He could not afford bail and spent 101 days in 
jail without a hearing, Then the complainant admitted the 
charge was false, A man could not raise $300 bail. He spent 
54 days in jail waiting trial for a traffic offence, for which 
he could have been sentenced to n more than four days. A man 
spent two months in jail before being acquitted. In that 
period he lost his job and his car, and his family was split 
up. He didn't find another job for four months." As quoted 
by Swarup, op. cit., p. 59.
Arts. 121-129
Art. 126(3) "...who decides the bail-out may accept the 
deposition of a sum of money instead of the bail bond",
Art. 123(1).
IMd, (2).
Case No. 101/66, JBR (1966), p. 1092.
See Art. 121(1), para. (2) provides that "If the maximum sen­
tence is less than a year, providing that the accused has a 
known address in the Kingdom, the Public Prosecutor may re­
lease him without bail after five days of interrogation, on 
the condition that this should not include persons previously 
convicted of a felony or imprisoned for more than three 
months."
(208) Case No. 15/55, JBR (1955), p, 138.
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<209) Case Ho. 40/65, JBR (1965), p, 1120
(210) See above note 160.
<211) See below chapter VI.
<212) See Chapter V.
<213) See Harris, "The right to fair trial as a human right",16 ICLQ
<1967) 352, 354} hereinafter referred to as Harris, The right 
to fair trial,
<214) Ibid,
<215) Authorising international organs or institutions to check upon 
the ability of the national judges and their qualifications 
would be too far from being acceptable by states. An amend­
ment to make clear that the adjective does not relate to the
ability of the court was rejected as being unnecessary. The 
amendment was defeated in Third Committee of the General 
Assembly by 32 votes to 22, with 17 abstentions. See Harris, 
The right for fair trial, p. 357.
<216) Chile and Guatemala.
<217) Two votes against eight, with six abstentions, E/CH.4/SR.110,
p. 4
<218) Harris, The right to fair trial, p, 356.
<219) Art. 8<1) reads as follows: "every person has the right to a
hearing... by a competent independent and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law.
<220) Art. 97.
<221) Arts. 102 and 103, For details see below chapter V.
<222) See Judge F. Kilany, The Special Tribunals in Jordan, Beirut
1969; for further details see below Chapter V.
<223) General Comments on Art. 14, HRC Report, GAQR. Supplement 
Ho.40 <A/39/40) p.145 <1984),
<224) Law Ho, 33 of 1976.
<225) See Art. 6, 7, and 10,
<226) Art. 8.
<227) Art. 9.
<228) Art. 10.
<229) The time limit here may be extended upon a reasoned decision
by the court. See Art. 10
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<230) J. Swarup, op, cit.f p, 84
<231) Ibid,
(232) That is on the assumption that judges, lawyers and witnesses 
perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open 
court than in secret proceedings,
(233) See J. Swarup, op. cit,, p. 88,
(234) Lord Denning, Xhs Rm,--Prqcegs of Law> London, 1980, p. 46.
(234a) General Comments on Art. 14, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement
Ho.40 (A/39/40) p.144 (1984).
(235) Ibid.
(236) See HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement HO.40 (A/36/40) p.153 (1981).
(237) The right to freedom to leave the country. Art. 12(1), and 
also the right to freedom of expression, see below pp.163-64.
(238) Criticizing the provision of Art, 6(1) of the EHR which bears 
great resemblance to Art. 14(1) of the covenant, J. Fawcett 
stated that it is doubtful whether the requirement of a public 
hearing under the Convention is likely in practice to yield 
much protection,
J. Fawcett, Application p£ the European. Cqnyentlga. on.iluiBaii
Rights, Oxford, 19$^, p. l6i; See also bel©w,p,j?2*
(239) HRC Report, GAQR. Supplement Ho.40 (A/37/40) p.174 (1982).
(240) See above note HO.236 ,
(240a) Art. 171 of the Criminal Procedures Code.
(241) Law Ho. 24 (1968), see JOG Ho. 2089 of 16/4/1968.
(242) Case Ho. 58/77, see JBR (1977), pp. 826-831.
(243) Ibid., at 830.
(244) The court had used the term al'amtn al-a'am (public security)
as a synonym for al-Ned'aju al-a'am (public order),
(245) Case Ho. 251/77, JBR., (1978) p. 228.
(246) See Art. 14(4), it says that: "in the case of juvenile per­
sons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of 
their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabil­
itation. "
(247) See above p, 109.
(248) Art. 14(3)(a)
245
(249) The AMR uses the word 'means' instead of 'facilities'.
(250) HRC Report GAQRt supplement 10.40 (A/40/40) p.204 (1985).
(251) Case Mo. 87/61, see JBR (1961), p. 617
(252) This measure is mandatory under Art.234, which reads as fol­
lows: "The court may modify the charge to the form it deems
appropriate, providing that such a modification is not based
Dn facts not included in the evidence. If the modification 
shall require a graver punishment, the court must postpone 
hearings for the period it deems necessary for the accused to 
prepare his defence according to the modified charge."
(253) Case Mo, 16/64, JBR (1964), p. 489. See also Case Mo. 119/77,
JBR (1977), p. 1310.
(254) In a number of cases the Supreme Court has reversed the 
judgement of lower courts when they did postpone the hearings 
or gave the defence time to answer the modified charge. See 
for example 58/73, JBR (1973), p. 848. In Case Mo. 11/79, the 
court explicitly stated: "A modified charge which does not 
require a greater punishment, the court should not have post­
poned the hearings upon the request of the defence to prepare 
itself to answer the modified charge, because Art. 234 is not 
applicable in such cases." See JBR (1979), p. 452. In many 
other cases the Supreme Court has upheld the decisions of the 
lower court in which they refused to give the defence any time 
to answer the modified charge. See for instance, 16/64 JBR 
(1964), p. 489, and 15/77 (1977), p. 553,
(255) See the HCJ, Case Mo. 56/73 (1973), p. 1305.
(256) Ibid.
(257) Art. 14 (3)(d).
<258)  3L_ v. The Federal Republic of Germany. Y.B. 5 (1962), 104,
106.
(259) Para. 1.
(260) The Supreme Court has ruled that: "in case of a hurry, because 
of the fear of losing the evidence, the public prosecutor may 
interrogate the suspect without the presence of his lawyer. 
Statements given on that occasion constitute legally obtained 
evidence on which the court could lawfully rely for the 
conviction." See Case Mo, 85/67, JBR (1967), p. 1318,
(261) Case Mo. 95/72, JBR (1972), p. 1078,
(262) Case Ho. 135/79 JBR (1979), p. 85. Also see 72/76 JBR (1976),
p, 1929, 95/72, JBR (1972), p. 1078, and 60/57, JBR (1957) p.
814.
(263) See the JBR (1981), p. 1336.
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<264)
<265)
<266)
<267)
<268)
<269)
<270)
<271)
<272)
<273)
<274)
<275)
<276)
<277)
<278)
<279)
<280)
<281)
<282)
<283)
<284)
<285)
Art. 65 <2, 3).
Art, 66<2), "The prevention should not include the lawyer... 
unless the public prosecutor so decided."
"To be paid from the treasury of the government to the lawyer 
appointed in accordance with the foregoing paragraph an allow- 
ance not exceeding five JD for a hearing plus transportation".
In Case Ho. 18/74, the Supreme Court ruled that since the
prescribed punishment is temporary imprisonment, the accused 
is not eligible for free legal assistance.",JBR, <1974) p.699.
The second supplementary report, U.H. Doc. Ho. CCPR/C/l/Add. 56^,^ 
p. 15.
Summary record of the 362nd meeting, 15 July 1982, U.H, Doc.
No. CCPR/C/SR. 362 p.3(*/^$%) *
Ibid.
Case Ho,158/1983, see above note 2 *
Art. 14 <3)<e).
See Application Ho. 753/60, X, v. Austria, T.B. 3, <1960) 
p, 320. See also Application Ho. 617/59 X> v. Austria, Ibid., 
p. 370.
Art. 69.
Such persons however, are entitled to compensation for 
transport expenses and other damages <Art. 77).
See Art. 153-155.
Art. 165.
See Art. 173<1-3),
Paragraph 3 empowered the court to summon the defence wit­
nesses at the expense of the accused. This may be considered 
as a limitation on his right, but has never been implemented.
Ibid. <4).
Art. 217.
Case Ho. 60/53, JBR <1953), p. 583. See also Ho. 9/53 JBR,, 
p. 375
Case Ho. 81/64 JBR <1964), p. 910.
Case Ho. 67/75 JBR <1975), p. 962. See also 64/82, JBR 
<1982), p. 1017
See (J p-
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(286)
(287)
(288)
(289)
(290)
(291)
(292)
(293)
(294)
(295)
(296)
(297)
(298)
(299)
(300)
(301)
(302)
(303)
(304)
(305)
(306)
(307)
(308)
(309)
See JBR (1957), p. 264.
Art. 14(3)(f)
See Harris, The right to fair trial, p. 368.
Compare the two texts.
Art, 227(2).
Art. 229.
Art, 228,
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Jordan had adopted a similar 
opinion for almost the same reasons ;See Case Ho. 154/80 JBR 
(1980), p. 110.
Case Ho. 15/77, JBR (1977), p. 553; See also 10, 154/80, 
p. Ill,
Art. 14(3)(g). There is no comparable provision in the EHR, 
See above pp.}$2."—
Arts, 7 and 10 of the Covenant.
Ibid,, Art. 14(3)(g).
See Art. 216, paras. 3 and 4.
Art, 216(4)
Art. 175(1),
UH Doc. HO. CCPR/C/l/Add, 56, p. 1 5 , 0 ^ ^  "
The Ottoman Criminal Procedures Code which remained in force 
in Jordan until it was replaced by the present Code in 1961.
Case Ho. 19/53 JBR (1953), p. 318.
Case Ho. 13/54, JBR (1954), p. 274,
Case Ho. 65/75, JBR (1975), p. 1331.
Case Ho. 129/82, JBR (1982), p. 1304.
See above pp. \ M —  especially Case Ho. 173/84 and 
Ho. 86/75f
Art, 14(5). There is no counterpart provision in either the 
AHR or the EHR , However, it is possible, says Harris, to 
interpret the term ’trial’ used in both of them in such a way 
as to include all of the judicial proceedings in which the
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accused’s guilt or sentence is under consideration, The Right to Fair
Trial, op, cit, p. 371.
(310) HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40 (A/37/40) p.168 (1982).
vo
(311) Ibid. p,146.
(312) Communication Ho,R.14/61, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho.40 
(A/37/40) p,161 (1982).
(313) See the Law of the Court of Capital Felonies, Law Ho, 33 of
1976. See particularly Art. 13.
(314) See Art. 256-298
(315) Art. 19 of the Martial Law Instructions of 1967.
(316) See chapters VI. and VII; See also, F. Kilany, op. cit.,
pp. 183-207.
(317) See J, Swarup, op. cit.. p. 64.
(318) See the Fifth Amendment. See also the effect of Christianity
on the philosophy of human rights and human rights dec­
larations in Europe at that time. Chapter I.
(319) Harris, The right to fair trial, op. cit., p. 376.
(320) See Chapter VII.
(321) Case Ho. 74/64 JBR (1964), pp. 14-17.
(322) Case Ho. 12/55 JBR (1955), p. 368.
(323) Case Ho. 81/69 JBR (1969), p. 908.
(324) Case Ho. 83/62, JBR (1962), p. 883.
(324a) See U.H. Doc. No.CCPR/C/l/Add.56 (1982) p.16.
(325) See R. Ash-Sha'ir, Responsibility of the Statewith Regard to
(326) See below p. 428.
(327) See below Chapter VI; see also Case Ho.40/66, JBR. (1966) p.736
(328) See Case Ho. 166/67, JBR (1967), p. 893. Similar views were
also expressed in Case Ho, 248/68, JBR (1968), p. 36.
(329) Case Ho. 77/56, JBR (1956), p. 673.
(329a) See for instance, Communication Ho. R.17/70 and Communication 
Ho. R.6/25, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Ho,40 (A/37/40) p.174 
and 187 (1982) respectively.
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(330)
<331)
<332)
(333)
(334)
(335)
(336)
(337)
(338)
(339)
See the United Nations, G.A. Res. Ho. 59 (UH DUG A/649 1 
(1946); see also J. Humphrey, "Political and Related Rights", 
in Heron, op. cit.. Vol. I., p. 171, 182.
Prof. A. Sarhan, Nami&l. de Droits de 1 'Homme, Cairo, 2nd ed. , 
1984, pp. 212-213.
A situation which has resulted in continuous political 
Instability in that part of the world.
"When Galileo published his discoveries about the phases of 
Venus, etc. he showed that they 'incontestably proved the 
motion of the earth'. But this idea of the motion of the 
earth was declared heretical by an assembly of Cardinals, 
Galileo was hauled before the Inquisition and compelled to 
recant under pain of severe punishment," See J. Swarup, op. 
cit.t p. 218-219.
It is also reported that Plato himself has suggested the 
forcing of science, poetry and religion to function as 
producers of ideologies into service of the state. He also
proposed the suppression of all liberty of thought by
instituting a state monopoly upon ideology in a form of 
dictatorship to which not only the will and activity of man 
submit, but also their opinions and beliefs. See Kelsen,
What is Justice? Beckeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971 p. 96.
That is true, although during the 17th century the English
Bill of Rights in 1688 stated that the freedom of speech and
debate in Parliament was not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of Parliament.
Three years later, the American Bill of Rights, 1791, was
promulgated, In Article I, it proclaims that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press,"
In France itself, Hapoleon was reported to have said to 
Metternich, "I would not undertake to govern for three months 
with the freedom of the press." See J. Humphrey, op. cit.. p. 
181.
See A, Mawdudi, op. cit. , p. 287 lie came to the conclusion 
that "any government which deprives its citizens of this 
right is in conflict with divine injunction. Such a 
government is not in conflict with its people only but also 
with God. It is trying to usurp that right of its people 
which God has conferred not merely as a right but as an 
obligation." p. 29,
For further details and comparative analysis of these con­
ceptual issues, see A. Wandieen, unpublished Thesis, 
op. cit,, pp. 86-88
See‘for instance, S. Mahmassani, Basic Concepts of Human 
Rights, p. 141,
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(340) Among these verses are, 3/104, 9/67, 9/71. The story of Omar, 
the second Caliph is a frequently quoted incident with regard 
to the right to freedom of expression. One day, the Caliph 
was addressing the public in the Mosque, when a woman rose and
expressed total disagreement with him on a key issue. He
argued with her, but eventually he was convinced she was 
right, then he turned to the crowd and said: "the lady was 
right and the Caliph was mistaken." See A. A. Al-Hakeemi,
Qp.i eft.,., p. 125.
(341) I. Annani, op. cit., p. 29.
(342) See Art. 12.
(343) See the EHR., Art. 10(1), AMR. Art. 13. See also AFR. Art. 9,
and the ADRD. Art. 4.
(344) Para. (1) declares that "Everyone shall have the right to
hold opinions without interference,"
(345) General Comments on Art, 19, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Mo. 
40 (A/38/40) p.110 (1983).
(346) Which happens to bear the same number (19). Furthermore, 
there is some similarity between the actual wording of the two 
Articles, thus, the reader may take this in consideration.
(347) (1) and (2)
(348) K.J. Partsch, "Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and
Political Freedoms", in L. Henkin, The InternationalJB-i_l_l_Qf_ 
Eights, p.217.
(349) See the arguments of the UK and France. Un Doc 4/SR 200,
para. 5, and UN Doc 4/SR 320 para 6, respectively.
(350) General Comments on Art. 19, HRC Report GAQR, Supplement No, 40
(A/36/40) p.109 (1981).
(351) See the argument of India and others, UN Doc. A 5000, paras 9,
11, 12 (1961).
(352) See above note 350,
(353) See the discussion of the report of Tanzania (CCPR/C/l/Add.48)
UN Doc. Mbs. CCPR/C/SR.281, 282 and 288 (1981); see the
discussion of the report of Nicaragua (CCPR/C/14/Add.2) UM 
Doc. Mos. CCPR/C/SR.422 and 428 (1983).
(354) See for instance, the discussion of the report of Iceland
(CCPR/C/10/Add.4), UM Doc, Mos. CCPR/C/SR.392 and 395 (1983); 
see also the discussion of the report of Austria 
(CCPR/C/6/Add,7) especially Doc, Mo, CCPR/C/SR.416 (1983).
(355) See the comments made and the information required with regard
to the report of Australia, UM Doc. Mos, CCPR/C/SR.403 and 407 
(1983); see also the information required with regard to the
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report of Mexico (CCPR/C/22/Add,1) especially UM Doc, Mo. 
CCPR/C/SR,397 (1982); and also the questions raised and the 
comments made during the discussion of the report of the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (CCFR/C/32/Add.5) UN Doc, 
Nos. CCPR/C/SR,594-597 (1985).
(356) See e.g, the discussion of the Second Periodic Report of the 
USSR (CCPR/C/28/Add,3) UN Doc. Nos. CCPR/C/SR,564-570 (1984).
(357) See UN Doc, No. CCPR/C/SR. 687 (1986).
(358) UN Doc, No. CCPR/C/SR,103 (1978),
(359) UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/SR.362 (1982).
(360) Case No.61/1979, HRC Report GAQR, Supplement No.40 (A/37/40) 
p. 165 (1982).
(361) K and .Aaspsiaticro ,Z v. United Kingdom, No. 4515/70, C.D.38,
86; I v. Sweden, No. 9297/81, D.R.28, 204,
<362) llhe Handy Side Case1, Judgment of 7 Dec, 1976, Ser.A. 24,23
(363) See above note No. 360.
(364) See above note No. 161; see also Case No. 11/1977 HRC Report, 
GAQR, Supplement No.40 (A/35/40) p.132 (1980); 44/1979 HRC 
Report,GAQR, Supplement No.40 (A/36/40) p.153 (1981),
(365) Case No, 185/1984, HRC Report.GAQR Supplement No. 40 (A/40/40) 
p. 240 (1985),
(266) See 'The Sunday Times Case*, Ser. A. 30, 41.
(367) See M. Bullinger, "Freedom of Expression and Information: an
essential element of democracy", 6 HRLJ, 339, 353 (1985).
(368) X v. Germany No. 8383/78, D.R. 17, 227.
(369) See M. Bullinger, above note No, 367 p,345.
(370) See above note No. 360.
(371) A.C. Kiss, "Permissible Limitations on Rights" in L. Henkin, 
The International__ Bill of Rights, p. 303,
(372) Ibid,
(373) Ibid,
(374) Decision of 27 October 1978, Ser A, Vol. 30, p. 30
(375) See above note No. 350.
(376) UM Doc. No. CCPR/C/37/Add,1 (1986)
(377) Summary records of the 687th meeting, UN Doc. No.
CCPR/C/SR,687 (1986).
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<378) See above note Ho. 360.
(379) Para, <2) See below p. I $$ *
(380) Similar, and sometimes identical, provisions bave been
included in almost all other Arab constitutions; See for
instance:
Egypt, (1971) Art. 47 
Lebanon, (1926) Art, 13 
The Sudan, (1971) Art. 48 
U.A.E., (1971) Art. 30 
Bahrain, (1973) Art. 24 
Tunisia, (1971) Art. 8 
Syria, (1973) Art. 38 
Iraq, (1970) Art, 26 
Kuwait, (1962) Art. 36 and 37
(381) See Chapter VII,
(382) See Art. 107-109 and 110-112
(383) See Art. 114 and the revised para. (2) of Art. 118.
(384) See also Art. 119.
(385) Art. 163, see also the Official Secrets Law Ho. 50/1971,
particularly Art. 17
(386) Arts. 118-125, 195-197, of the Penal Code.
(387) Art. 191, see also Arts, 192, 140-142, 185-186, 200-202,
(388) Art. 152
(389) Ibid,
(390) Art. 188-189.
(391) See also Art. 198,
(392) See the Jordanian Criminal Procedure Code, Arts. 141-145.
(393) See Art. 224
(394) See Art. 225 and also Arts. 222 and 226.
(395) In all Arab countries radio and television stations are state
owned. Only in the Lebanon are privately owned radio and 
television stations allowed.
(396) See the Law of Print and Publication Law Ho. 33/1973, JOG Ho,
2429 of 1/2/1973, p. 8 and the previous law Ho. 16/1955,
(397) See the JOG, Ho. 1131, 17 March 1963, p, 491, See in
particular Arts. 11 and 21.
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(398) See Art. 4 (1) (a) of tlie Defence Law of 1935
(399) See also Regulation No. 4, 1954, and No. 6, 1954, JOG (1193,
p. 626), dated 26 August 1954, which eliminated the Defence
Regulation No.l, 1952. See also Regulation No, 2, 1955, which 
altered Defence Regulations No. 3, 4, 6, 7, of 1964. See JOG, 
No. 1236, 16 May 1955.
(400) Case No. 76/72, the verdict and the reasoning are published in
JBR (1972) pp. 1182-3.
(401) Ibid.
(402) Ibid.
(403) Law No, 16 (1935), see the text of Art. 124 of the
Constitution, below p -
(404) Defence Regulation No. 5 (1948).
(405) It seems that the court had ignored the fact that the Defence 
Law (1935) and the Defence Regulation (1948) preceded the 
Constitution of 1952.
(406) Law No. 33 of 1973, which replaced the previous law.
(407) See particularly Arts. 16 and 23.
(408) See Arts. 16-32, 38-46, 63-67 and 73-76.
(409) Art. 2.
(410) See Art, 61,
(411) See Arts. 63 and 70,
(412) See Arts. 66 and 68.
(413) For a fully documented chronology of the Jordanian Dress, see
O.B. Shrame, The Jordanian Press, between 1922-1983. Amman, 
1984.
(414) See M, Bullinger, above note No. 369.
(415) See Case No. 76/72 above note No. 400
(416) See above note No. 413.,
(417) See I. Bakr, "Human Rights" , , Amman, June 1981, p. 45.
(418) UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/SR. 362, {I ^  '
(419) S. Reshadat, "Freedoms and the Law", JBR^May 1975, p. 769,
(420) UN Doc, No, CCPR/C/1/Add.24, ( j n s j  •
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(421) See Art. 32(a&b)
(422) "... upon a recommendation from the Minister of Information,
the Council of Ministers may cancel its permit or suspend its
publication for a period of not less than a weeh, or a fine
from 150 to 500 JD" .
(423) There is no restriction on the powers of the Council of
Ministers in this regard.
(424) Furthermore, according to para. 3 of the same Article, an
application for a new permit shall not be considered until a 
whole year has passed since the original permit was cancelled.
(425) See I. Bakr, op. cit., p.46.
(426) Case Mo. 101/71, JBR (1971) pp. 1201-3. See also Case no.
61/61, JBR (1961) p. 515.
(427) Judicial review of administrative actions will be treated in 
Chapter VI below.
(428) See U.N Doc. No.CCPR/C/SR.103,^1978^ p.7.
(429) UM Doc. Mo. CCPR/C/l/Add.55, (i W )
(430) See Chapter VII below.
(431) See General Sir John Glubb, My Years with the Arabs. Institute
for Cultural Research, England, 1971, p. 8. (Glubb 'Pasha' was 
the British officer comanding the Arab Legion between 1938 and 
1956, he joined the Arab Legion in 1930.)
(432) Personal interview, Amman, 1985.
(433) I. Bakr, op. cit.f p,45,
(434) See cases cited above notes Mos. 4-00 and 426.
(435) See below Chapter VII.
(436) See John Rees, Equ&ljty, Pall Mall, London, first ed,, 1971, 
pp. 91-101.
(437) Ibid.
(438) The Declaration provides that the law "should be the same for 
all, whether it protects or punishes" and that "all are 
equal in its sight." See P. Sieghart, op. cit., p. 264.
(439) Most of the constitution? of the 19th and 20th centuries 
adopted the principle included under article (7) of the French 
Declaration. See H. Lauterpacht, op. cit.t p. 88-90
(440) Qur’an, 49/13
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(441) op, cit,, p. 22
<442) See A. Mawdudi, op. cit,t p, 21
M. Shaltoot, op. cit., p. 218
I. Annani, op, .cit.,, p. 93
(443) Qur'an, 49/13
(444) See above note 442,
(445) The Islamic taxation system <Zakat) clearly manifests this
philosophy.
<446) Abd Allah Lahud, Human ■Rights. Civil and Rolitical, in
Lebanese Law, Beirut, 1972, pp. 17-36
<447) See Chapter 1, p.i^
(448) See below p.^jQ^and p.9 ^ ^  respectively.
(449) See also The U.N. Charter, Article 1.
(450) Ibid. Under Article 8 of the Charter, the General Assembly is
vested with the power to initiate studies and make 
recommendations and to take measures toward the realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, etc. See also Articles 13, 55,
62, and 76.
<451) The Preamble,
(452) See also Art. 4, 7, 10, 16, 18, 21, 23, and 26,
<453) ICJ Report (1966), In that particular case the court was
evenly divided on the question of admissibility. Because of
the casting vote of the President, the court did not deal with
the substance, Nonetheless, the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Tanaka (the Japanese member) is of special importance in 
clarifying the issue. He had opposed the argument of the 
respondent state and proved the existence of an international 
rule, legally binding on all member states, in accordance with 
the main three sources of international law referred to in 
Article 38 of the statute of the court, i.e. conventions,
customs and general principles of law, See pp. 286-301. See
also Judges Padilla and Mervo, pp.455-6 and 467-9, 
respectively.
(454) The. South Vest, A frican . ..Cas.s ,
(455) ICJ Reports (1970), pp. 3-35
(456) Ibid. p. 32
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<45?) These are "rules that cannot be set aside by international
treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a
subsequent customary rule of contrary effect." See Brownlie, 
The..Principles,, op. cit... p. 513.
(458) ICJ Report, <1970), (second Phase). See also the separate 
opinion of Judge Aramoun in the same report, p. 304
(459) See for instance, ADRD Art. 11: "all persons are equal before
the law and have the rights and duties established in this
declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
colour or any other factor."; APS, Art. 3C1) "every 
individual shall be entitled to protection of the law."
(460) Art. 24 provides that "All persons are equal before the law.
Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to
equal protection from the law."
<461) Art. 14 contains a general prohibition of discrimination with 
regard to the rights guaranteed by the Convention and the 
protocols. It says: "the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion..," On the meaning and scope of this right
under the European Convention see Jacobs, op. cit.. pp. 188-
193; see also the Judgement of the European Court in The 
Belgian linguistic,.Case., Y.B, 11, <1968) pp. 832-50.
<462) See A.2. Drzemczewski, Human Rights: Cases and Material,
London ,1982, Vol.3,, Vol. 3; Brownlie, The Basic Documents. 
op. cit,.
<463) The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 21
December 1965, opened for signature on 7 larch and entered 
into force on 4 January 1969.
Jordan is a signatory to the convention. See U.H. Treaty 
Series, Vol. 660, p. 195.
<464) Art. 2, "State parties condemn racial discrimination and
undertake to pursue by all means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and 
promoting understanding among all races and, to this end... c) 
each state party shall take effective measures to review 
governmental, national and local policies and to amend, 
rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the 
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination 
wherever it exists."
<465) See Art. 14.
<466) See Art. 1.
<467) See for instance, U.H. Document A/C. 3/5R. 1184, para. 7 
<1962); U.H. Document E/CH. 4/528, para. 69 <1951).
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(468)
<469)
(470)
(471) 
<472)
<473)
<474)
<475)
<476)
<477)
<478)
Art. 2<1), provides that: "Each state party to the present
covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present covenant 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour.., or 
any other status."
B.B. Ramcharan, "Equality and Non-Discrimination", in
L. Henkin. _the__Jntematioral Bi 11 of. Rights, p. 256
hereinafter referred to as Ramcharan, Equality.
Critique of Instruments and Processes, Oxford, 1986, p. 120, 
hereinafter referred to as Heron, Human Right Law Making.
Drafters of the EHR have evaded such a difficulty by referring 
to this right in one Art. and explicitly restricted its 
application to the right enumerated in the Convention; see
Art. 14; see also Jacobs, p.p., oft,, and the .Belgian
linguistic case. Y.B. 11, <1968), p. 832.
In Aumeeru ddv-Cz i f f ra et al. v, Kauri tins. <No.R,9/35) the HRC 
had taken the view that there was a violation of Articles 26, 
2<1) and <3) in conjunction with 23<1), where the laws of a 
state party enable the government to restrict access to, and 
remove from, its territory the alien husband of a female 
citizen, but not the alien wife of a male citizen.
In another case <Fictraroia v. Uruguay), <No.44/1979) 
concerning restriction on political rights under Article 25, 
the HRC decided that, although such restrictions may be 
permissible under the said Article, they would violate both 
Articles 2<1) and 26, if they are based upon political 
opinions. See HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement. No.40<A/36/40), 
p. 134 and p, 153 <1981) respectively
Communication No. 178/1984, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement Nd .
40 <A/40/40) p. 226 <1985).
Case No. 182/1984, HRC Report, GAQR, Supplement No.40 
<A/42/40) <1987).
See No, 107/64, JBR <1964), pp. 1056-8; No,15/67, JBR <1967), 
p. 734; No. 67/69, JBR <1969), pp. 137-9.
Art, 5, "All Jordanians shall be equal before the law, 
notwithstanding the difference of race, religion and 
language." In the Constitution of 1946, Article 6 was worded 
as follows: "Jordanians are equal before the law, there shall
be no distinction between them in their rights and duties, 
regardless of the differences in their origin, language or 
religion."
Those Articles are: 9(1), (2); 11; 13; 15; 16(1), (2);
17; 19; 22(1), <2); 23(1); 75; 76; 101 <1) and 102,
Ibid-.
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(479) "The Royal prerogatives shall pass from the holder of the
throne to his eldest son, and to the eldest son of that
son. . .1
(480) See W I clk/ f . TIC-
(481) That survey included inter alia:
The Civil Code (1976); the Labour Code (1961); The Law of 
the Independence of the Judiciary, law No, 19 (1955); The 
Penal Code (1961); The Criminal Procedure Code (1961); The 
Law of the University of Jordan, law No. 36 (1965); The Law 
of the General Election, law No, 24 (1960); The Civil 
Service, law No. 41 (1952); The National Service, law No. 1
(1976); The Social Security, law No. 30 (1978).
(482) See the HCJ Case No. 27 "./55t JBR (195§>, p. 466.
(483) For a full assessment of the effectiveness of this remedy, see
Chapter VI.
(484) Case No. 15/67, JBR (1967), pp. 1056-7.
(485) Two years later.
(486) HCJ Case No. 67/69, (1969), pp. 137-8.
(487) See above Note No. 465.
(488) Case No. 107/64, JBR (1964), p. 1087.
(489) Ibid.
(490) The Law of Civil Pension, law No. 15 of 1976.
(491) Case No. 34/77, JBR (1977) pp. 977-80.
(492) The High Administrative Court's Reports, Cairo, 1947, Case No.
101, p. 975
(493) According to Prof, Atta'ar, the key issue is the right itself, 
not the group to which the person may belong; and since all 
citizens are entitled to the same rights, they all should have 
equal standing in the eyes of the law whether it protects or 
punishes, "The Right to Access to Court", in the Revue des 
Sciences Jurisdiques et Economiques, vol. II, 1959, Cairo, p.
667; see also Abu-Al-Majid, Review of the Const!tut1onality
of,,,Laws in the USA and Egypt, Cairo, 1958, p. 620. He says: 
"... even between members of different categories 
discriminatory treatment violates the principle of equality 
before the law."
(494) F. Kilany, Independence of the Judiciary, 1st ed, Amman, 1977, 
p. 270, hereinafter referred to as F. Kilany, Independence.
(495) Does the Constitution of Jordan allow discrimination on 
grounds other than those listed in Article 6(1)?
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(496) See above pp.221-2X6.
(497) See UN Doc. Nos. CCPR/C/l/Add.24 (1978); CCPR/C/l/Add.55 
(1981) and CCPR/C/l/Add.56 (1982).
(498) Compare with Art, 38 of the Constitution of 1971 of the Sudan.
(499) Art. 34 of the Constitution of the P.D.R. of Yemen of 1978 
provides that "All citizens are equal in their rights and 
duties regardless of their race, origin, religion, language Dr 
degree of their education or their social status." See also 
the Constitutions of:
United Arab Emirates (1971), Art. 25 
Iraq (1970), Art. 19 
Qatar (1970), Art. 9 
Bahrain (1973), Art, 18
(500) Art. 39(2). See also the Constitutions of:
Tunisia (1971), Art. 6;
Syria (1973), Art. 25(3)
Lebanon (1926), Art, 7 
Moroco (1972), Art. 5
(501) Among many other outstanding achievements in this field see: / 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Vomen, 1967;
The. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, 1980;
The Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in 
Emergency and Armed Conflict, 1974;
The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1952;
The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957;
The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 1962;
The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 
and of exploitation of the Prostitution of others;
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 
1956;
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960
(502) The Commission was established by the ECOSOC Resolution No.
(11 (II) of 21 June 1946). It consists of 32 members; and is
charged with the task to prepare recommendations and reports 
to the council on the promotion of women's rights in the 
political, economic, social and educational fields; and to 
bring to the attention of the council any urgent problem 
affecting the right of women, as well as the implementation of 
the principle of equal rights of men and women; and to develop 
proposals to make such recommendations effective,
(503) Resolution No. 2263 (XX II) of 7 November 1967.
(504) The Declaration consists of a preamble and eleven substantive
Articles. It presents a general pronouncement of the U.N.'s 
policy with regard to equality of men and women, and the
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(505)
(506)
(507)
(508)
(509)
(510)
(511)
(512)
(513)
(514)
(515)
(516)
(517)
elimination of discrimination based on sex. It also 
emphasised a number of principles, many of which were embodied 
in earlier international instruments emanating from the U.M. 
and its specialised agencies. See for instance Arts, 1, 2,
3, 7 and 9.
See General Assembly Resolution No. 34/180 (1979).
Art. 1.
Art. 2(a) and (b),
Ibid. paras, (c) to (f).
Attitudes of the Arab countries are indeed confusing. Most of 
them have already accepted the Political Covenant without any 
reservation, yet they seem reluctant to ratify the Convention, 
in spite of the fact that the requirements are the same in 
both cases.
This right is restricted to the male heirs only. This is 
done in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence which prevents 
women from assuming the responsibilities of the ultimate 
leadership of the nation 1 iwawa ussma' , Such a Constitutional 
rule was established in the early days of the Muslim state and 
has been observed for more than fourteen centuries, during the 
Khelafh system as well as in the modern Islamic states.
Compare the Jordanian Article with its counterpart in the 
Constitution of Moroco (Article 20). It is not at all likely 
that this rule would completely disappear from the Islamic 
Constitutions, neither in the present nor in the foreseeable 
future.
Art. 23, paras. (1) and (2d),
Facilities such as separate changing-rooms, ladies rooms, 
fully paid maternity leave; the law also protects them from 
employment after certain hours at night.
See 9
On the encouragement and the facilities provided for the 
Jordanian woman to facilitate her joining the work-force and 
the labour market as an equal competitor with man see Articles 
39 and 41, The farmer says: "...any discrimination based on
sex... must be abolished."
See the Constitution Art. 36 in conjunction with Art. 31. On 
the status of woman in the law of Tunisia see: H. Shugare, A1- 
Arab newspaper, London, 25 April 1985, p. 7»
Art. 2.
Art. 11. See also Arts. 10 and 12.
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(518)
(519)
(520)
(521)
(522)
(523)
(524)
(525)
(526)
(527)
(528)
According to the Egyptian Constitution, Islamic norms 
supersede all ordinary laws. It has been described in the 
Constitution as the principal source of the law of the land. 
See Art., as amended in 1977.
Act No. 16 of 1974, See also the paper presented by Jordan to 
the United Nations Conference on the U.N. Decade for Women, 
Nairobi, Kenya, July 1985.
Since 1970, almost all Cabinets have included at least one 
female Minister (Member of Council of Ministers). Many have 
also reached the rank of Director-General, members of High 
Committees, etc, See also 'Asha'ab Symposium on the status 
and the achievements of the Jordanian Woman', Asha'ab 
newspaper, Amman, 1 August 1985, p. 19.
See the Labour Codes, Law No. 21, 1960
Such things might have happened in practice but certainly 
never been laid before a court of law. This is based upon a 
comprehensive exclusive survey of all published cases decided 
between 1952 and June 1986, as well as various interviews with 
Jordanian lawyers, judges and working women,
See the Year Book 1984/5. However, one must take into account 
the fact that male students seek University education outside 
Jordan more than females do. According to the statistics of 
the Ministry of Education for the same year, the total number 
of Jordanian males who receive University education is much 
higher than that of the females.
"... if there are only female inheritors numbering more than 
two, they will receive two-thirds of the inheritance; if 
there is only one woman heir, she will receive half of it... 
The parents shall have the sixth for each of them if he has a 
child; but if he has no child and his parents are his heirs, 
then his mother shall have a third, and if he has brothers and 
sisters, then his mother shall have a sixth after the payment 
of any bequests he may have bequeathed or of debt..." (Verse 
12: 3-4).
See also Arts, 2 and 26.
See UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/l/Add. 55, ( i W O  > ^  ‘
None of the Muslim or Arab countries including Jordan has 
noticed such a conflict at the time of signing or ratifying 
the Covenant.
The suggested measure is practically and legally passible, and 
would eliminaye such inconsistency. It would also encourage 
the rest of the Arab and Muslim countries to ratify the 
Covenant, This problem is not limited to Jordan, it arises in 
the case of most Arab and Muslim countries and thereore what 
has been said with regard to Jordan is equally true in their 
cases. For those who have ratified the Covenant see for
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(529)
(530)
(531)
(532)
instance, the discussion of the report of Egypt 
(CCPR/C/26/Add.1./Reve,1) UR Doc, Ros. CCPR/C/SR.500-505 
(1984); with regard to the discussion of the report of Morocco 
(CCPR/C/10/Add,2) and the answers given by its representative 
see UR Doc. Ro. CCPR/C/SR.332 (1981).
For instance, Mr. Tarnopolsky, remarked that, the obligation 
under Article 3 of the Covenant to ensure the equal rights of 
men and women went beyond merely ensuring equality before the 
law and necessitated the implementation of positive measures. 
It was gratifying to know that women had entered the armed 
forces and the police services and served as ministers. It was 
a little disquieting, to learn that only 15-18 per.cent of 
those taking the secondery school examination were girls. Sir 
V. Evans, asked whether women had the right to vote or not and
enquired about the role of women in soceity in general. See UR
Doc. Ro, CCPR/C/SR,361 (1982); see also the remarks of Mr.
Bouziri, UR Doc. Ro, CCPR/C/SR.331 (1981),
See Al-Qabas newspaper (International edition), London, 8 July 
1985, p. 1
It is certain that Muslim women were allowed to vote in the 
presence of the Prophet Muhammed himself, and under his 
supervision, in the very early days of Islam fourteen 
centuries ago,
See King Hussain of Jordan, 1 My Career .as a King1, the Arabic 
version, translated to Arabic by G.A. Tocan, Amman, 1978, pp. 
249-65. See also the Jordanian Documents 1984, Ministry of 
Information, Department of Press and Publications, Hereinafter 
referred to as the Jordan Documents. See also 'The Speech of 
the Throne', at the opening of the second ordinary session of 
the 10th Parliament, Jordan Documents (1984).
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CHAPXER X V .
In the previous Chapter, we discussed the international standards of 
civil and political rights embodied in the Political Covenant, against 
which, the laws and practices of Jordan were examined. Likewise, in the 
present Chapter, we shall be dealing with the economic, social and cult­
ural rights, and assessing the relevant laws and practices of Jordan 
against the international standards established under the UR Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights/11
However, before the examination of the substantive provisions of the 
Covenant and its counterpart in the Constitution and laws of Jordan, we 
must explore the scope and the legal dimensions of the obligation of 
states parties to the Covenant. This in itself requires some elaboration 
on the general provisions of the Covenant, especially Article 2, and some 
of the key concepts introduced therein.
THE NATURE AMD LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE OBLIGATION OF STATES 
PARTIES TO THE ECONOMIC COVENANT.
Economic, social and cultural rights (social welfare rights),<s 5 
represent a recent development in the human rights system, or a second 
generation of human rights, They were briefly mentioned in the French 
Declaration of 1789, and in the Constitutions of the nineteenth cent­
ury/35 It is only since the beginning of this century that the 
constitutions and legislators began to put greater emphasis on social 
welfare rights/45 They owe a great deal of their existence and 
development to the socialist philosophy, revolutions and declarations of
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the 20th century, and to the fundamental changes in the role of the state 
in society.
□n the international level, the UDHR, adopted in 1948, contains a 
short list of social welfare rights (Article 22-27). However, their 
distinctive character was a matter of wide controversy,*1® 3 especially in 
the first years of the work of the UU Commission on Human Rights. The 
question was one of whether to draft a single instrument, listing civil 
and political rights, along with social welfare rights, or whether to 
draft a separate instrument for each group of rights.
The General Assembly itself seemed to have been confused by the 
controversy over the issue, especially over the distinction and the 
relationship between the second and first generation of human rights. At 
its fifth session (1950), the General Assembly was of the opinion that 
the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms, and that of social welfare 
rights, "are interconnected and interdependent" and it instructed the 
Commission to include in the draft covenant "a clear expression of 
economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which relates them to 
civil and political freedoms proclaimed by the draft covenant"/7 5 
However, at the sixth session 1951/2, the General Assembly adopted the 
other approach and alternatively instructed the Commission to prepare two 
covenants, one covering the civil and political rights, and the other 
devoted to social welfare rights/®3
Apparently, the principal reason for this important decision, was the 
substantial differences in character between the two groups of rights. 
That is to say, while civil and political rights are enforceable in all 
countries regardless of their wealth or resources, the enforceability of 
social welfare rights must vary according to the prosperity of each 
country. Civil and political rights are rights of the individual 'against'
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the state, or rather, against unlawful and unjust action by the state, 
whereas, social welfare rights are rights which the state must take 
positive action to promote and to ensure. Furthermore, being 'legal' and 
'fixed' rights, civil and political rights are 'absolute' and immediately 
applicable. Social welfare rights are more in the nature of 'relative' and 
'programmatic' rights.
Such a fundamental difference in the nature and character of the two 
groups makes it self-evident that it was impossible to embody a single 
system of implementation for both of them. Differentiation in the 
measure of implementation and instrumental supervision was inevitable. 
Implementing civil and political rights means introducing laws and re­
vising Constitutions, while guaranteeing social welfare rights means 
establishing programmes as w e l l . * It was argued that some rights, for 
example, the right to freedom of expression (Article 16) could be enacted 
immediately into domestic legislation, while social welfare rights, for 
example, the right to health (Article 12) would require programmes of 
action over a period of time before it could be ensured. Thus, a court, 
or a court-like institution could be created on the international level to 
deal with alleged violations of civil and political freedoms, where no 
such thing could be created in the case of social welfare rights.<10>
It is these differences which make some scholars and legal com­
mentators confuse the legal enforceability of rights with the given 
method of implementation, and consequently to misconceive the nature and 
legal dimensions of the obligation of states parties to the Economic Cov­
enant. As it will be soon explained, some of them have understood the 
idea of programmatic or progressive implementation as equal to a legally 
unenforceable obligation. Some have raised the question of whether the 
rights set forth in the Economic Covenant are, technically speaking,
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rights at all, in the sense of being subjective, enforceable and justici­
able rights.
According to a group of legal commentators, the Economic Covenant 
does not impose any obligation on the states parties/115 Prof. A. 
Robertson, for example, believes that it only establishes standards which 
states parties should seek to attain/125 Others have argued that the 
Covenant only imposes 'programmatic' or 'promotional' obligations, not 
legally enforceable obligations. In the words of Prof. Brownlie, "the 
type of obligation tin the Economic Covenant] is programmatic and pro­
motional except in the case of the provisions relating to Trade Unions 
(Article 8)," 0 3  5 In the same direction, the notion of 'programme' or 
'promotional' rights, and 'programmatic* and 'promotional' obligations, has 
been pushed even further by Prof. E. Vierdag. He says that:
"Social rights are often said to be not 'real', not 'legal' 
rights, but 'programmatic' rights, or 'promotional' 
rights. Since every right implies an obligation which 
corresponds to that right, social rights will therefore 
generally entail 'programmatic or promotional obliga­
t i o n s 1AS
Having criticized Prof. Brownlie for not explaining the meaning of
'programmatic' or 'promotional' obligations, he took the initiative
himself, and stated;
"To the extent that social rights are 'programmatic*, i.e. 
lead to the adoption of programmes for the taking of 
measures intended to result in conditions under which 
what the rights promise can be enjoyed, they seem indeed 
not to be enforceable,"0 *5 5
Indeed, it is difficult to agree with any of the above conclusions. 
They seem to be the result of both a misunderstanding of the nature of 
social welfare rights and an inaccurate generalisation, Consequently, 
this has led to the confusion of the idea of progressive realisation with 
the enforceability of these obligations.
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—  It is a misunderstanding of the nature of social welfare rights be­
cause:
a) The separation of the social welfare rights from the traditional 
civil and political rights was not meant to imply that they are not 'real' 
rights at all. On the contrary, the legislative history of the two Cov­
enants, as well as many other UN documents firmly confirm the inter­
dependence and interconnections of the two categories. In Resolution 421 
(V) and 543 (VI), the General Assembly firmly stated that: "the en­
joyment of civil and political freedoms of economic, social and cul­
tural rights are interconnected and interdependent" and that: "when
deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not represent 
the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal for 
the free man/165 In his annotation on the contents of the draft 
Covenants, the Secretary-General of the UKT asserted that all human rights 
must be promoted and protected, Without social welfare rights, civil and 
political rights would be purely nominal; without the former, the latter 
could not be ensured for l o n g / ^ 5
b) It is true that social welfare rights, generally and by their very 
nature, require money to be spent and programmes to be carried out, in 
order to create sufficient conditions for their implementation. But this 
by no means makes them inherently unenforceable rights.
—  It is an inaccurate generalization, because:
a) Not all the rights included in the Economic Covenant are 'program­
matic' rights. Besides the single exception, which Prof. Brownlie has 
admitted, there are many other immediately applicable rights in this 
group. Some illustrative examples may be mentioned: Article 2(2) lays 
down an immediately applicable prohibition on discrimination in the en­
joyment of the social welfare rights. It says: "states parties to the
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present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination..." The same is 
true with regard to the provision of Article 3.c 1135 Another forthwith 
enjoyable right is the right to strike, provided that it is exercised in 
conformity with the laws of the particular country/195 Moreover, by 
virtue of Article 13(3) of the Economic Covenant, states parties pledged 
themselves to have respect for the liberty of parents to choose the 
schools for their children, other than those established by the 
government, providing that they conform to the approved minimum 
educational standards; and to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in accordance with their own convictions/205
b) Not all the rights listed in the Political Covenant are rights of 
immediate application. There are some 'promotional' and 'programmatic' 
rights in this category as well. Among these are the right to self-de­
termination/21 5 and the provision of Article 23(4) which provides that 
states parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights 
and responsibilities of spouses to marriage, during marriage, and at its 
dissolution / 22 5
c) One should not make a general statement saying that the Economic 
Covenant imposes only 'programmatic' obligations in all cases. The na­
tion of 'programmatic' or 'promotional' obligations applies to the 
developing countries only, that is to say, social welfare rights are 
'programmatic', not because they are incapable of immediate application, 
but indeed because special social and economic conditions have to be 
created prior to the full implementation of those rights. Thus, for most 
of the developing countries, where such conditions are lacking, full 
realization of many social welfare rights would be achieved gradually 
over a number of years, maybe decades. By contrast, in the case of
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developed and industrial countries, where the required conditions are 
already present, social welfare rights are immediately applicable. Full 
realization of those rights was due at the time of entry into force of 
the Economic Covenant for those countries. So, the obligations of those 
countries could not be described as 'programmatic', nor as non-binding 
undertakings.
—  It seems that the meaning and the purposes of the principle of 
'progressive realization* has been misunderstood. That is to say, being a 
'programmatic' obligation does not necessarily mean that it is non­
binding; on the contrary, it might indicate the opposite, though this may 
be over a period of time. The principle of 'progressive realization' is a 
common element in several UN Human Rights documents, without them being 
described as non-binding instruments, The International Convention on 
the Elimination of all farms af Racial Discrimination, is an outstanding 
example/2 3 Thus, it could not be held that the Economic Covenant does 
not lay down binding legal obligations, simply because they are 'pro­
grammatic'obligations, which could be realized progressively in effect.
The present writer is of the view that, it is incorrect to insist 
that all the rights enshrined in the Economic Covenant are 'programmatic' 
rights and impose only 'programmatic' and therefore non-binding obliga­
tions. It has to be admitted, that social welfare rights are legally 
enforceable rights and that the Covenant does impose binding legal 
obligations on the states parties, The difficulty however resides in the 
definition of the scope and the legal dimension of these obligations.
Under Article 2, each state party undertakes to take steps, indivi­
dually and through international assistance, especially technical co-oper­
ation, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achiev­
ing progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
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Covenant, by all appropriate means, including particularly, the adoption 
of legislative measures/554-* States parties also pledge themselves to 
guarantee that there shall be no discrimination in the enjoyment of the 
rights referred to in the Economic Covenant/355* However, developing 
countries, with regard to 'economic' rights only, are allowed to differ­
entiate between nationals and aliens/25* Lastly, although discrimination 
on any grounds, including sex, is prohibited under Article 2(2); special 
reference to equality between men and women has also been made under 
Article 3: "the states parties,., undertake to ensure the equal rights of
man and woman to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural 
rights set forth in the present Covenant."
In order to feature the main elements of the actual undertaking of 
states parties to the Economic Covenant, a brief consideration of the 
following concepts appears necessary:
A —  International Economic and Technical Co-operation;
B —  The concept of 'maximum available resources';
C —  The principle of 'progressive realization';
D —  The principle of non-discrimination and equality between sexes;
E —  Developing countries and the differentiation between nationals 
and aliens with regard to economic rights,
A —  International Economic and Technical Co-operation:
Under Article 2 of the Covenant, all states parties undertake to take 
steps, individually and through international economic and technical as­
sistance, aimed at full realization of social welfare rights. Clearly, 
such an undertaking means that inadequate national resources are no 
longer an acceptable reason for failing to promote and realize those 
rights. Developing countries are, therefore, under legal obligation to
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seek international assistance with regard to the full realization of 
social welfare rights, if they do not have sufficient means of their own. 
Yet, is there any corresponding obligation for the rich (developed) coun­
tries to co-operate and furnish such assistance?
Considering the provision of Article 2(1), the purpose and the pro­
visions of the Covenant as a whole, along with the UR Charter, and many 
other documents, the answer would be affirmative, It was made clear from 
the very beginning that the International Bill of Rights was intended to 
be a detailed interpretation of the human rights provision of the UR 
Charter The latter declares, as one of the purposes of the
Organization, the achievement of international co-operation to solve in­
ternational problems of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian char­
acter, as well as the promotion and encouragement of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without discrimination.'52*33 
Furthermore, emphasis on this goal has also been made under Article 55. 
It stresses the necessity for international co-operation for the
promotion of higher standards of living, full employment and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development, and to provide solutions 
for international economic, social, health and related problems.C2S*3
Under Article 56, all member states pledged themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement 
of those purposes,'303 Yet despite the above undertakings, and the fact 
that the provisions of the Economic Covenant are a detailed specification 
of those undertakings, some have argued that the Economic Covenant does 
not impose any obligation on developed countries to co-operate and to 
assist in the efforts to the realization of those undertakings. In the 
words of Prof. D. Trubek,
"The drafters [of the Economic Covenant] wished to leave
the question of assistance from developed countries up
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tD individual states, either through bilateral decisions 
or through future international agreements."*31 *
Considering the provision of Article 56 of the Charter and Article 
2(1) of the Economic Covenant, such a conclusion is untenable. However, 
in support of his argument, Prof. Trubek produced two pieces of evidence, 
neither of which seems sufficient enough. He argued that Article 11 
speaks of "international co-operation based on free consent." According 
to him, the addition of the term 'free consent' suggests an intent to 
encourage aid from rich to poor parties, but not to require it by the 
terms of the Covenant. It might be true that the legislative history 
of the Covenant does not provide a clear answer to this point, but the 
actual provisions of the Covenant, especially Article 2(1), do. That is 
to say, a partial quotation of the last sentence of Article 11(1) could 
not be presented as exclusive evidence of a presumed intention on behalf 
of the drafters, By contrast, Article 11, if taken as a whole, and in 
conjunction with 2(1), would clearly show that developed states parties 
have pledged themselves to co-operate and help, freely or otherwise, under 
the terms of the Covenant, They are legally obliged by virtue of the 
provisions of the latter to participate in the process of the realization 
of social welfare rights. Another presumed intention of the drafters is 
also said to be derived from the provision of Article 23, which suggests 
some examples of the methods to be followed by states parties, in order 
to organize their efforts to achieve the international standards defined 
by the Covenant, According to Prof. Trubek: "the drafters may have
thought that subsequent agreements could be the vehicle to create an aid- 
giving obligation,"<3:E* Such a presumption does not only lack foundation, 
but is also misleading; a) because Article 23 provides us with the 
explicit intention of the drafters, expressed in plain English, which 
hardly needs any interpretation. It declares that:
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"The states parties to the present Covenant agree that 
international action for the achievement of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods 
as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of re­
commendations, the furnishing of technical assistance 
and the holding of regional meetings and technical meet­
ings for the purpose of consultation and study organized 
in conjunction with the government concerned."
It is therefore highly unrealistic for one to rely on what the draft­
ers 'might have thought', whilst putting aside what they have explicitly 
stated; b) What is provided for in Article 23 are suggested means of
executing an already existing obligation, not one that is yet to be cre­
ated.
The other evidence presented in support of Trubek's argument is a
letter by President J. Carter to the U.S.A. Congress. It has been
mentioned that, in his letter of submission of the Economic Covenant to
the US Congress for its advice and consent to ratification:
"President Carter noted that the obligations under
Article 2 do not include any obligation on the part Df 
developed signatories to give economic aid to less de­
veloped states parties."*333
As far as this point is concerned, it has to be noted that the United
States of America is not a party to either of the two Covenants,
Secondly, President Carter's beliefs and interpretation of Article 2 of 
the Economic Covenant, cannot be taken as exclusive evidence. It is 
difficult to accept the argument that the President of any country, even 
the United States could increase, or reduce, by his own judgement, the
obligations of all other states parties as defined under an international 
agreement.
Ho country would, commit itself to an obligation which is beyond its 
ability and resources. The concept of maximum available resources is an 
interesting, flexible qualification on the obligations of the states par­
ties to the Economic Covenant. The need for such a flexibility stems 
from the nature of social welfare rights, and the special requirements 
for their implementation.*3*'1* It helps developing countries to co­
ordinate their performance with their development process without being 
held in breach of their obligations under the Covenant. In accordance 
with the notion of maximum available resources, the scope of the legal 
obligations of individual states parties varies from one country to an­
other, according to degree of development and the availability of 
resources. The scope of the obligation of Jordan or the Sudan, with 
regard to a given right (education or health, for instance) is much less 
than that of the U.K. or Sweden. That is to say, what could be considered 
as a satisfactory performance by one country might not be as such in the 
case of another.
Because of the importance of the principle of maximum available re­
sources, some have raised the question of whether the term 'maximum' 
means an over-riding priority for social welfare programmes, or whether 
it leaves the allocation of resources between social welfare and other 
goals entirely to the individual states; to the extent that state 'X' could 
say: "we have no available resources for social welfare because we have
decided to spend all our budget on defence or industrial development."*3,5 * 
Manifestly, both these interpretations are extreme and neither of them 
could have been intended by the drafters. The word 'maximum' itself is 
qualified by the word 'available'. The latter refers to funds whose allo­
cation to social welfare programmes does not seriously hinder other vital
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national programmes. Consequently, a state party is not required to pour 
all its resources into social welfare at the expense of the other sectors. 
The marriage between the two words suggests that reasonable attention or 
even preference should be given to social welfare programmes, but not 
necessarily an over-riding priority.
Finally, does the phrase 'available resources' include international 
aid, or does it refer exclusively to national resources? In other words, 
in assessing the balance between the performance of a state party in the 
field of social welfare rights, and its available resources, should we 
take into account the international aid to that particular country, or 
only the domestic resources. Since the Covenant says 'its' resources, it 
could be argued that what counts for that purpose is only its own na­
tional resources. Nonetheless, this seems a rather narrow interpretation. 
A complete reading of the whole paragraph would suggest the opposite.C3S 5 
It has already been mentioned that under this very paragraph, developing 
countries are obliged to seek international assistance in cases of limited 
national resources, and that developed countries are also under a legal 
obligation to furnish such assistance.C3V> Thus, when international aid 
is made available to a state party, it becomes part of its available re­
sources, within the maximum of which, it could act with a view to achiev­
ing progressively the full realization of the social welfare rights,
C -  THE PRINCIPLE OF 'PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION'.
Progressive implementation is a technique which has been invoked by 
the United Nations with regard to several human rights' instruments. It 
has been adopted as the most desirable and realistic approach in cases 
where the nature or the subject of an instrument renders immediate 
application too difficult or impossible. In general, it means that states
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parties are obliged to carry Dut a programme of activities including, but 
not limited to the specific measures listed in the instrument, for the 
realization of the rights recognized there in/30 5 So far as the Economic 
Covenant is concerned, we have already mentioned that the adoption of 
this method is not because the social welfare rights are inherently in­
capable of immediate application, but because their implementation re­
quires the creation of some environmental conditions, which might not be 
obtainable in all states parties at the time of entry into force. As M. 
Ganji has put it:
"The Covenant provides the immediate basis for action at 
international and regional levels, as well as for the 
translation of its standards into national reality... Its 
only drawback is that in most of the developing coun­
tries its provision can only be implemented 
progressively, according to their level of development, 
availability of resources and size of population."c335
Article 2<1) of the Covenant therefore requires developing coun­
tries to initiate programmes and plans aimed at the full achievement of 
the recognized rights. Obviously, the time required for the achievement 
of such a goal would vary from one developing country to another, depend­
ing on the above-mentioned factors.
It seems thus, difficult to agree with the view that this principle 
applies to any state that has ratified the Economic Covenant, regardless 
of its resources or economic development/405 Such a generalization
defeats the object of the principle of progressive realization and delays 
the full realization of social welfare rights in countries where it is 
presently possible. The principle, therefore, applies only to those 
countries where full realization of social welfare rights is not yet 
attainable, After ten years of its entry into force, it is still in­
conceivable to expect equivalent performance in the field of social wel­
fare rights in the Sudan and Sweden, for instance, or to argue that the
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scope of these rights is the same in Jordan and the U.K. Even in the 
same country, the contents and the scope of these rights changes from 
time to time, in line with its social and economic prosperity. As we 
shall see in the case of Jordan, the right to education, for example, has 
undergone considerable improvement and wider implementation over the 
last ten years Cafter the entry into force of the Economic Covenant).
Thus, it is not true that all the states parties to the Economic 
Covenant assume equal obligations regardless of their own circumstances. 
They do not only differ from one country to another, but also for the 
same country from time to time within the limits of the available re­
sources.
REGARD TO BCQMQMIC EIGHTS.
Another distinctive feature of the Economic Covenant is the provision
of Article 2(3). It gives yet another advantage to developing countries,
by allowing them to differentiate between aliens and their own nationals
with regard to economic rights. It provides that:
"Developing countries with due regard to human rights 
and their national economy may determine to what extent 
they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present Covenant to non-nationals."*425
Despite the general tendency in the US's human rights work against 
discrimination, this provision constitutes an exception designed to en­
courage developing countries to sign and ratify the Economic Covenant.
Thus, one must bear in mind that discrimination on the basis of 
nationality within the meaning of this paragraph is an exception to the 
general prohibition on discrimination and should always be seen in that
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context, This exception is limited to economic rights and therefore does 
not include social and cultural rights. Furthermore, it applies to de­
veloping countries only, so developed states parties could not benefit 
from it.
In this section we have been trying to throw some light on the legal 
character of the social welfare rights, and to define the central features 
of the obligation of states parties under the Economic Covenant, We have 
stressed the fact that implementing social welfare rights requires some 
conditions different from those we have seen with regard to civil and 
political rights in the previous chapter; and as a result, the under­
takings of states parties under the Economic Covenant are somewhat dif­
ferent from those under the Political Covenant. Under the former, states 
parties undertake to introduce the necessary laws and legislation, and to 
carry out social and economic development planning, and programmes aimed 
at the full realization of the recognized rights. It also allows devel­
oping states parties (countries who da not possess sufficient means for 
full realization) to implement these rights gradually and within the 
limits of their resources. We have also discussed, and defined, the 
meaning and the legal implications of some key concepts in defining the 
obligation of a state party under Article 2, such as 'international co­
operation', 'progressive realization', and 'maximum available resources'.
Having done so, we shall now turn to the substantive rights recog­
nized under the Economic Covenant, for these resemble the international 
standards of social welfare, that each state party should ensure or seek 
to ensure. It is against these international standards that the per­
formance of Jordan, as a state party, shall be examined, in terms of its 
law, practice and social planning. Since the Covenant provides for a 
large number of substantive rights, we shall confine ourselves to some
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examples such as, education, work, freedom of Trade Unions and social 
security.
1 — THE FIGHT TQ ¥QEK.
The right to work was among the first human rights to receive inter­
national attention. Establishment of minimum international standards of 
the right to work and the rights of workers was a practice known even 
before the creation of the United ifations/*35 However, the International 
Bill of Rights was initiated by the proclamation of the UDHR, which re­
fers to the right to work under Article 23:
"Everyone has the right to work, to a free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work, and protection against unemploy­
ment This, and other related rights, have been confirmed again
under the Economic Covenant. With further details, the latter provides 
for the modern international standards of the right to work which states 
parties undertake to implement or to seek their progressive imple­
mentation. Article 6, provides that states parties:
"Recognize the right to work which includes the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work 
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appro­
priate steps to safeguard this right."*4®0
Article 7 stipulates for the rights of workmen to enjoy just and 
favourable conditions of employment, Accordingly, we shall be dealing 
with this right under the following subtitles:
A —  Work as a Human Right,
B —  Freedom from Forced Labour.
C —  The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Employment.
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A -  THE RIGHT TO WORK AS A H O M H  RIGHT ■
It Has to be mentioned at the outset that, recognition of this right 
as a human right does not impose an obligation on the state party to 
provide a job for every individual person, where and when he may wish to 
have one. lor does it entitle one to sue the government in a court of 
law for failure to provide such a right, It is true that the government 
has a general duty to provide jobs and to fight unemployment, but this is 
a political obligation for which it is accountable to public opinion, not 
to the judges. Basically, it means that everyone should be entitled to 
the opportunity to earn his living by a job which he has freely chosen or 
accepted and the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour. It also im­
plies that, once the individual has got a job, it is his right, like all 
other rights, of which he may not be deprived in an arbitrary manner. 
Thus, the law must protect this right, and provide protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of work.
Besides the general obligations of the states parties to the Cov­
enant, and the duty to take legislative measures to safeguard this right, 
Article 6(2) suggests some of the extra measure to be taken by the states 
parties in order to achieve the full realization of this particular right. 
They may include:
"technical and vocational guidance and training pro­
grammes, policies and techniques to achieve steady 
economic, social and cultural development and full and 
productive employment and conditions safeguarding fun­
damental political and economic freedom to the indi­
vidual."CAei
As far as the legislative aspects are concerned, each state party 
must introduce legislative measures intended to guarantee the enjoyment 
of the right to work to everyone subject to its jurisdiction, Rational 
constitutions and domestic laws should first of all recognize the right
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to work as a human right, and provide detailed provisions concerning the 
exercise of the right and the protection of the vital interest of the 
workers. Domestic laws are to regulate inter alia the relationship 
between employers and employees, and to prevent arbitrary practices 
with regard to access to employment, conditions and termination of em­
ployment.
In Jordan, it was not until the proclamation of the present Consti­
tution (1952), that the right to work was first recognized as a human 
right, and protected as such.<A:75 Article 6 of the Constitution of 1952 
provides that: "the Government shall ensure work... within the limits of
its possibilities, and shall ensure a state of tranquillity and equal 
opportunities, to all Jordanians".
Article 23 declares the right of every citizen to work, and lays down 
the constitutional principles upon which such a right is to be based. It 
says:
"(i) It is the right of every citizen to work, and
the State shall provide opportunities for work to 
all citizens by directing the national economy and 
raising its standard.
(ii) The State shall protect labour and enact a
legislation therefore based on the following prin­
ciples:—
(a) Every workman shall receive wages commensurate 
with the quantity and quality of his work.
(b) The number of hours of work per week shall be 
limited. Vorkmen shall be given weekly and annual 
days of rest with wages.
(c) Special compensation shall be given to workmen 
supporting families and on retirement, illness, old- 
age and emergencies arising out of the nature of 
their work,
(d) Special conditions shall be made for the employ­
ment of women and juveniles.
(e) Factories and workshops shall be subject to 
health rules.
(f) Free Trade Unions shall be formed within the 
limits of law,"
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Fine years later, the Labour Code was enacted and came into effect on 
the 21st of June 1961. It contains 117 Articles, divided into sixteen 
chapters dealing with a wide-ranging variety of issues and industrial 
relations, such as individual employment and collective agreements, mini­
mum wages, Trade Unions, settlements of industrial disputes, etc.K435
Having, recognized the right to work as a human right, at the consti­
tutional and the statutory level, the Jordanian legislature has introduced 
several legislative measures for the protection to this right in practice. 
Apart from the prohibition of farced labour and the provisions concerning 
the favourable conditions of employment, several other Articles have been 
devoted to protecting workers against arbitrary deprivation of work.
Except for reasons specified by Article 1 7 <so> -^ he labour code 
forbids the instant termination of employment by the employer.
—  In the case of employment for an unlimited period of time, and after 
the lapse of the probation period/31 * an employer may not terminate the 
employment unless he gives a week’s notice or pay in lieu of notice to 
the worker who is employed on hourly, daily, weekly or piece-work basis, 
or one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice to the worker who is 
employed on a monthly basis, However, the worker is entitled to leave 
work three days earlier in the former case, and seven days earlier in the 
latter,<S2:> Furthermore, if the termination of work is on any ground
other than those mentioned in Article 17, the employer must pay the 
employee a special compensation Cmukafat nehayet al-khedmiti in addition 
to those referred to under Article IQ.*533 The compensation ( mukafah ) 
is to be calculated on the basis provided for in Article 19(2).
These provisions have been constantly applied by the judiciary, in 
all cases involving termination of employment for an unlimited period by 
the employer.
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In Case Ho. 288/70f for instance, the Supreme Court of Jordan ruled 
that:
"Employment of a worker in other projects after the 
completion of the one in which he was originally ap­
pointed, is in fact a new employment for an unlimited 
period. Thus, termination of such an employment because 
Df later redundancies, or because that particular worker 
is no longer needed, qualifies him for the lieu Df notice 
and the compensation referred to in Articles 16 and 17 
of the Labour Code."^**
With direct reference to Article 19(1) of the Labour Code, the court
has defined the circumstances in which employers must pay the special
compensation to the dismissed worker as follows:
1, Termination of employment for any reason outside those specified un­
der Article 17 or an illness that is not included under sub-para­
graphs (a) and (b) of paragraph (1) of Article 19.
2. Termination of employment by the worker for any reason under Article 
18,CSB5 or marriage in the case of a female worker, in accordance 
with sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 19(I)/®63
—  In the case of employment for a limited or a fixed period of time,
greater obligations are imposed upon the employer in order to ensure the
right of the worker to keep his job for the whole Df the agreed period. 
The standing view of the Supreme Court of Jordan may be summarized as 
follows: Should the employer wish to terminate employment before the end
of the fixed or expected time, he would be considered liable to pay all 
supposed wages and payments for the rest of the agreed period. As far 
as labour relations are concerned, two examples may be put forward. In 
Case Wo. 246/72. before the Supreme Court, a worker based his claim for 
compensation on the grounds that the company had dismissed him before 
the end of his contract despite the fact that he was employed for a fixed 
period of time. In its ruling the court noticed that the company was in
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breach of the employment contract, and held it responsible for breach of 
a contractual relation, and awarded compensation in accordance with the 
principle of contractual responsibility. It was decided that: "the worker 
is entitled to damages and all the losses he has suffered because of such 
behaviour 3 The compensation consisted of all wages and payments due 
for the rest of the specified period. In another case, the same court 
ruled that the absence of Mr. 'X' from his work for a period of 17 days 
as a result of detention during the events of public disturbance in Amman 
in September 1970, was an absence for an external reason, over which he 
had no control: "Dismissal from his work for such a reason is arbitrary 
dismissal, for which he is entitled to damages and due compensation for 
arbitrary d i s m i s s a l 5
Finally, it is important to notice the difference in the positions of 
the employers and the employees regarding the unilateral termination of 
employment. The differentiation is based on the idea of work as a human 
right and on the principle that a person could give up his right if he 
does not wish to enjoy it any longer. Thus, while imposing heavy 
obligations and penalties on the employer, in order to protect the right 
of the worker to work and tD keep his job, the Labour Code enables the 
latter to free himself from employment, with no obligation other than 
that of a notice to be given to his employer; sometimes even without any 
notice, if the case is under Article 18. This helps to prevent employment 
from being or becoming unfair, or forced employment which does not 
coincide with the notion of work as a human right nor with the right to 
free choice of work.
The Economic Covenant not only recognizes one's right to work, but 
adds? "...work which he freely chooses Dr accepts..."*5 9 5  The right of 
everyone to a free choice or acceptance of a profession or a job, requires 
first of all, the prohibition of forced or compulsory employment. It is 
therefore for the national constitutions and the legislatures to introduce 
the necessary legal provisions to ensure this. Yet, what are the necessary 
legal provisions, required at the national level? In order to understand 
and appreciate the role of the national constitutions and the legislatures 
in this regard, the term 'forced labour' must be precisely defined.
The Economic Covenant does not offer much help on this point, since 
the term 'forced labour' itself is not mentioned therein. nonetheless, 
Article 8(3) of the Political Covenant explicitly provides for the pro­
hibition of forced labour, and for some exceptions thereto. It says:
"3SFa one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.,KSO:’ 
Sub-paragraph <c), however, stipulates that for the purpose of Article 
8<3), the term 'forced or compulsory labour' may not include:
1. Any work or service not referred to in sub-paragraph <b), normally 
required of a person who is under detention in consequence of a 
lawful order of a court, or a person during conditional release from 
such detention.^
2 Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscien­
tious objection is recognized, any national service required by law of 
conscientious objectors*'
3. Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening 
the life or well-being of the community®
4. Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
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Similar provisions have also been introduced in the EHR and in the 
AMR ,**31 3
Rone of those general instruments contain a clear definition of
’forced labour'. However, Article 2(1) of the ILQ Convention on Forced
Labour of 1930, defines it as follows ;<S3£:>
"For the purposes of this Convention, the term forced 
labour or compulsory labour shall mean all work or ser­
vice which is exacted from any person under the menace 
of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily."**5 3 5
According to this Convention, the term forced labour does not in­
clude:
1. Work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service 
lawse
2. Work or service which forms part of ordinary civic obligations of 
citizens?
3. Work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a 
conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service 
is carried out under the supervision and control of a public author­
ity and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the dis­
posal of private individuals, companies or associations*
4. Work or service exacted in case of emergency or calamity... or in any 
circumstances that would endanger the existence or the well-being of 
the whole or part of the population.
5. Minor community services of a kind which, being performed by the 
members of the community in the direct interest of that community, 
provided that members of the community or their representatives have 
the right to be consulted with regard to the need for the said ser­
vices. 5
The definition of forced labour offered by the ILD Convention 
(Article 2) and the exceptions referred to thereunder, provided a guide
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for human rights legislators, both on the national and international
levels. Nonetheless, it has been admitted that an exclusive definition of
the term forced labour is not an easy task.**5® 5 Some of the technical
difficulties in this regard have been discussed by Fawcett, who argued
that: "The margin between the planned use of labour and the direction of
labour, between free and compulsory employment, can become almost indis-
cernibly narrow,"cse> He also criticised the definition offered by the
ILO and described it as 'incomplete', on the grounds that it does not
mention the 'element of oppress ion' . 5 The concept of forced or
compulsory labour was analysed by four members of the majority of the
ECUM in the Iversen Case. It was concluded that:
"The concept cannot be understood solely in terms of the 
literal meaning of the words, and has in fact come to be 
regarded in international law and practice, as evidenced 
in part by the provisions and application of ILO 
Conventions and Resolutions an forced labour, as having 
certain elements... first, that the work or service is 
performed by a worker against his will and secondly,
that the work or service be performed is unjust or 
oppressive.., or itself involves avoidable hardship. " * ® 435
Obviously, in this case, the ECUM has taken into consideration the
provision of the ILO Convention, in determining the scope and the meaning 
Df the term forced labour, under Article 4 of the EHR.
In another case however, < The Twenty-one Detained Persons v. The 
Federal Republic of Germany ) the ECUM seems to have completely ignored 
a substantial limitation on one of the permissible forms of forced la­
bour, namely that, forbidding the hiring or placement of the prisoner to 
or under the disposal of private individuals, companies or societies. 
This time the applicants complained that part of the work required from 
them during their detention was performed on behalf of private firms
under contracts concluded with the prison administration. 5 It was 
also alleged that the said practice has created a state of slavery for
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the prisoners concerned, The ECUM ignored the requirements of the ILO 
Convention and decided that the practice complained of was justifiable 
under the provisions of the EHR and the practices of the member states 
of the Council of Europe. It was concluded that the form of work against 
which the complaint was made, was permissible and fell within the 
meaning of Article 4(3) (a) of the EHR.<S3b,:>
It is important to notice that both the EHR and the Political 
Covenant have fallen short of the requirements of the ILO Convention and 
therefore they provide less protection in practice. On the one hand, EHR 
and the Covenant have extended the exception to include the compulsory 
employment of detainees, while under the ILO Convention the exception is 
limited to those who have been convicted by a court of law, i.e. under the 
latter, imposition of farced labour upon detained persons, violates the 
prohibition of forced labour, because it falls outside the permissible 
form of compulsory labour. On the other hand, while ILO Convention 
forbids the hiring or placement of the prisoner to or under the disposal 
of private individuals or firms, both EHR and the Covenant remain silent 
on this question. As far as the provision of the EHR is concerned, the 
ECUM has made it clear that the hiring of prisoners or even detainees to 
private firms or maybe private individuals, does not violate the 
prohibition of forced labour under the said Convention.
The departure from the ILO approach seems unjustifiable and difficult 
to understand. When the ILO Convention was drafted and adopted in 1930, 
it was probably hoped that the then recognized exceptions would disappear 
in time, or at least would become even narrower, and consequently forced 
labour would be confined to the narrowest possible form. Unfortunately, 
the contrary seems to have happened. New forms of permissible forced
289
labour have been added and traditional ones have also in turn been 
expanded to include yet new types of practices.
As to the Constitution and laws of Jordan, forced labour was strictly 
prohibited long before the international prohibition. That is to say be­
fore the International Bill of Rights, or even before the ILO Convention 
of 1930, Indeed, it was prohibited at the highest legislative level ( the 
Constitution ) even before the constitutional recognition of the right to 
work as a human right in 1952. Such an early initiative could be attri­
buted to the unpleasant experience which the Jordanians had during the 
Ottoman rule, under what was then known as the SUKHFA<vo:> System. It 
was an established practice that the Government could employ a person in 
any job for any period of time without payment, except for food.*7 ’1 3
Article 8(2) of the first Jordanian Constitution ( The Constitution 
of 1928 ) provided that: "farced labour shall not be inflicted on anyone,
the law however, may impose:"
1. Work or service on any person in a case of war or public emergency 
or natural disasters such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake etc.
2. Work or service in accordance with a final judgement of a court, 
provided that it be performed under direct supervision of an official 
authority and that the person may not be hired to or placed at the 
disposal of private individuals, companies or societies,
The same provision was re-introduced under Article 13 of the Con­
stitution of 1946, which has been transferred under the same number to 
the present Constitution.
Based on the provision of Article 8  of the Constitution of 1928, a 
special law has been enacted. It is known as The Law of the Prohibition 
Df Farced Labour of 1 9 3 4 , 5 Article 2 of this law defines forced 
labour as: "any work or service imposed upon any person with the threat
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□f material or moral damages if lie does not perform it voluntarily," It 
provides for the same exceptions mentioned under Article 8  of the Con- 
stitution of 1928, i.e. work or services imposed in accordance with a 
final judgement of a competent court, on the condition that the perform­
ance of such work or service be carried out under the supervision of a 
public authority and that the convicted person is not to be hired to or 
placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or societies; and 
work or services exacted in special circumstances < emergency ) as spe­
cified in Article 2(b).C73:' Outside these exceptions, the law prohibits 
the imposition of forced labour. "Forced labour shall not be imposed in 
Trans-Jordan" ( Jordan ) ; < 7 A 5  and provides for penal punishment far 
anyone who may violate the said prohibition,'7 3 5  An important 
reservation has been made under Article 4(2).<7e:* It says that nothing 
in the law of the prohibition of forced labour nor in any measure taken 
thereunder may deprive any person from any protection conferred upon his 
rights by any other laws or regulations in effect in Jordan. This 
reservation is meant to enable those who may suffer, as a result of the 
imposition of farced labour, to demand compensation,
As far as the Labour Code is concerned, it is quite evident that the 
legislature has the above principles and the principle of freely chosen 
or accepted profession, (which resembles the other side of the coin when 
it comes to the prohibition of forced labour) in mind when regulating the 
relationship between employer and employees, We have already mentioned 
that, in the case of employment for an unlimited period of time, the 
Labour Code entitles the worker to terminate his employment upon notice 
being given to his employer, if he is no longer willing to perform the 
work/ 7 7 5 The right to freely chosen or accepted work continues during 
the whole term of employment, Article 18(1) guarantees the right of the
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worker to terminate his employment immediately ( without notice ), if the 
employer is to impose upon him work that is substantially different from 
that which he had accepted, or even similar work that would require him 
to change his place of residence, unless it has been provided for in the 
contract, or to transfer him to a lower job or pay/ 7 '*3 3
It may thus be concluded that the Constitution and laws of Jordan 
have prohibited the practice of forced or compulsory labour, long before 
the entry into force of the UU Covenant and that they have guaranteed a 
wider protection than is necessary under international standards (Article 
8  of the Political Covenant) 3 That is to say, the Constitution has 
kept the permissible forms of forced labour in the narrowest possible 
scope and within the limits of Article 2 of the ILO Convention Uo. 29 of 
1930.
C ~  THB RIGHT TO JUST AID MIQURABLB CQIDITIQKS OF WORK.
Recognition of work as a human right requires, besides the right to a 
free choice of work and the prohibition of forced labour, the right to 
just and favourable conditions of work. According to Article 7 of the 
Economic Covenant, this right consists of:
1. Remuneration which provides all workers with fair wages and equal 
remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind-?
2. Safe and healthy working conditions«
3. Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his work to an ap­
propriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those 
of seniority and competence*
4. Rest, leisure and reasonable limitations on working hours, and peri­
odic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.
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It is thus for the national constitutions and domestic laws of the 
states parties to translate these requirements into practical reality. In 
this section however, we shall be focusing on two important aspects of 
the requirements of the favourable conditions of work, and the contents 
of the Constitution and laws of Jordan with regard to those two aspects. 
Those are the right to fair remuneration and the right to rest, limitation 
on the working hours and holidays with pay,
1) The Right to Fair Remuneration and Protection of Wages.
In the law of Jordan, this right has been made one of the principal 
constitutional elements of the right to work. Article 23 <2) <a) of the 
Constitution requires the legislature to safeguard inter alia, the right 
of every worker to "receive wages commensurate with the quantity and 
quality of his work."*7®* The Labour Code uses the term 'wages' in its 
broad meaning or as a synonym of the word 'remuneration'.< e o 5 Article 2 
provides that;
"Wages, means the consideration which the worker
receives from his employer in accordance with an employ­
ment agreement < whether written or verbal ) expressed 
in cash, or kind, share in the profits, a commission or 
on the basis of piece work."cei 5
Several Articles in the Labour Code have been devoted to the 
protection of the right of workers to receive fair wages and to ensure 
regular payment of wages without undue deductions therefrom. The Supreme 
Court in its turn, has ruled that 'wages' are the first and foremost right 
of the worker, A right of which he must not be deprived under any
circumstances whatsoever. It says;
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"...even in cases where the law entitles the employer to 
dismiss the worker without notice or compensation, the 
right of the latter regarding his wages remains un­
affected, and the farmer remains under legal obligation 
to pay all wages due for the previous work. Payment for 
overtime work is just as important as all other wages, 
which could not be withheld even under Article
As far as the Labour Code is concerned, protection of fair wages has 
been manifested in two policies; namely the minimum-wage-fixing policy 
and protection of payment of wages.
For a start, what may be considered as fair wages is a matter that 
has been left to the contracting parties to decide. It is therefore up to 
the free will of the parties to define the amount of remuneration in 
accordance with the conditions of the market and the rule pacta sunt 
servanda. Under the latter, neither of the two parties could alter the 
terms of the contract by a unilateral decision increasing or reducing 
payments or wages. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has upheld 
the above rule and decided that the reduction of wages by a unilateral 
decision of the employer is an arbitrary termination of employment and 
so it awarded compensation for the worker. In Case Wo. 128/64, for in­
stance, the court stated:
"Reduction of wages by the employer is a unilateral 
termination of the contract and consequently an 
arbitrary dismissal of the worker who did not accept the 
reduction
However, in order to protect the weaker party (the worker) in this 
relationship, the legislature has imposed some restrictions on the con­
tractual freedom of the parties, especially with regard to the amount of 
wages, which has been made subject to the 'al-Bad aladna mln al-Ejour1 
(Fixed Minimum Wages Limit). Article 24 of the Labour Code provides for 
the establishment of special machinery for setting up and reviewing the
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fixed minimum payable wages to workers in a given area or industry. It 
says:
"The Council of Minsters may, upon recommendation from 
the Minister of Labour, fix minimum payable wages to 
workers in any particular area, either generally or for 
any trade or section of trade. " * 43* 5
Before fixing the minimum rate of wages, the Minister of Labour is 
required to appoint such temporary committees as he deems necessary to 
study the conditions and the situations of employment in the given area 
or trade, and to report to him on the suggested new or adjusted minimum 
rate which seems appropriate thereafter.*433 * Furthermore, the Minister of 
Labour is also required to appoint an advisory board to consider the work
of the said temporary committees, and to give general advice concerning
the fixing or adjustment of minimum wages.*43435 The advisory board 
consists of six members, two of each being representatives of the govern­
ment, the employers and the employees. Representatives of employers and 
employees are to be appointed in co-ordination with relevant Trade Un­
ions,ce'?r:’ The newly fixed or adjusted minimum wages are to be published 
in the official Gazette, and unless otherwise indicated, become effective 
six weeks after its publication,*43435 Once a notice concerning minimum 
wage rate has been duly issued, the wages which an employer may pay to 
any employee must not be less than the established rate specified in the 
said notice, without any deduction therefrom save those allowed under the
Labour Code. lotwithstanding the provisions of the employment contract,
the employer is liable to a fine of 10 JD for every case of violation of 
the specified rate.
Thus, if the payable wages happened to be less than the fixed mini­
mum rate, the employer would not only be under legal obligation to pay 
the difference, but also liable to penal punishment under Article 24 <b).
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b) Protection of Wages.
Payment of wages is a prime concern of the worker and in most cases 
it is the sole source of income and his only means of livelihood. Pro­
tection of wages is meant to prevent arbitrary methods or abuse of pay­
ment of wages; and to ensure the regular payment of the worker's wages 
in a way which enables him to spend it according to his choices and 
priorities, Several provisions have been devoted to this purpose in the 
Labour Code.
Under Article 25, for instance, the employer and the manager of the 
establishment are jointly responsible for the payment of wages within 
seven days from the date on which they become due, without making any 
deduction therefrom except for those permissible under the Labour 
Code/es> As to the permitted deductions, the same Article entitles the 
employer, with the prior consent of the Director of the Department of 
Labour, to impose a fine on the worker or to suspend him from work with­
out wages if the latter neglects or contravenes the publicized or cir­
culated instructions or orders of the employer, providing that the latter 
has previously warned the worker in writing or in the presence of wit­
nesses, at least once for each contravention, and on the condition that 
the fine does not exceed three times the amount of daily wages, or the 
suspension does not exceed three days/ 9 0 3
Paragraph (3) of the same Article contains a list of lawful de­
ductions which may be imposed for specified reasons/31* Nonetheless, 
the first five JD of the monthly salary, or the first two hundred fils of
the daily wages may not be attached except for alimony or settlement of
the cost of food or clothes for the worker or his dependants, providing
that the amount does not exceed one fourth of his wages. However, any
amounts in excess may be attached in accordance with the law, for the
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settlement of debts, provided that the amounts are due for alimony, and 
debts far food and clothing. Debts for food and clothing are to be given 
precedence over other debts.
In order to ensure the implementation of these provisions, the law 
has established special machinery to enforce the full payment of due 
wages on time; and to deal with any other claim relating to payment of 
wages. Article 26 provides that the Council of Ministers may, on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Labour, appoint a qualified person with 
authority to consider in a specified area, wage cases and claims arising 
out of deductions from, deficiencies or delay in the payment of the wages 
of any worker in that area; and to determine such claims urgently.c92* 
The said authority is not required to follow the procedure and formali­
ties observed by the ordinary courts, but it may exercise the powers 
conferred on the ordinary courts with regard to the following matters:
- The power to compel any person to appear before it and to examine 
him on oath;
- The power to compel any party to introduce any document or paper 
which it may deem necessary in order to determine the case,C 3 3  3
Penal punishment is also imposed on any employer or person respon­
sible for the payment of wages, who violates any of the provisions 
relating to the protection of wages in chapter 8  of the Labour Code. The 
penalty is a fine of 50 JD for each violation.<3A:>
Finally, despite the strict provisions of chapter eight of the Labour 
Cade, a serious gap in the wages protection system under the Law of 
Jordan could easily be discovered. In the event of bankruptcy of the 
employer the law of Jordan does not offer any preference or privilege to 
the worker's wages. Such a privilege would be a crucial guarantee to
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ensure the worker's rights in such circumstances. Dr. H. Hashem has 
sharply criticised the Jordanian legislature for such deficiency and urged 
it to introduce the necessary provisions to give precedents to the payment 
of all due wages over all other d e b t s . T h e  Supreme Court however, 
has remedied the situation by ruling that: "unpaid wages take precedents 
over all other debts owed by the company in the event of bankruptcy."C3e:’
Availability of jobs with fair payment, could be damaging to the 
workers if employers were to overwork their employees and deprive them 
from rest and normal family life/3^* It has thus been realized that the 
law should intervene to impose some restrictions on the freedom of 
contract when it comes to working hours and rest time. This crucial 
element of the right to work had attracted international attention long 
before the establishment of ILO in 1919, The labour legislation of some 
Western industrial countries, particularly England, started to impose 
limitations on working hours during the 19th century especially with 
regard to women and juveniles.<3S* Article 17 of the Islamic DHR, 
provides that: "...He tthe worker] is not only to be paid his earned
wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure." As to 
the modern international standards, Article 7 of the Economic Covenant 
provides that:
"The states parties to the present Covenant recognize 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work which ensures in 
particular..,: d) Rest, Leisure and reasonable
limitations of working hours and periodic holidays with 
pay as well as remuneration for public holidays. " * 3 3  ?
In order to understand the precise meaning of the general terms used 
in Article 7 of the Covenant, such as 'reasonable limitations on the
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working hours', and 'periodic holidays' ,. etc.., a reference to the ILO 
work would he inevitable. The latter has introduced a considerable num­
ber of instruments spelling out in detail the meaning and the contest of 
those terms,
The ILO has carried out a substantial amount of work in the form of 
conventions, decisions and recommendations, concerning limitations on 
working hours. It has initiated its work by convention No.(l) of 1919, 
which lays down the principle of the 'Eight-Hour Day' and the 'Forty- 
eight Hour Week' in Industrial enterprises/ 1 0 0 5  This principle was 
previously adopted in the ILO constitution which was made part of the 
peace-treaty of 1919/1015 In 1935, the ILO adopted the 'Forty-Hour Week' 
Convention, which provides that the application of this principle should 
not cause a reduction in the standards of living/102> With more 
emphasis on the maximum limit of 48 hours a week, Recommendation No. 116 
calls upon member states to pursue a policy of gradual reduction of 
working hours with a view to attaining the forty hour week/103*
In Jordan, the Labour Code has adopted the principle of the 'Eight- 
Hour Day' and the 'Forty-eight Hour Week'. Article 37 provides that, 
subject to the provisions of Articles 41 and 42,c ’  ^ a worker may not be
required to work more than eight hours per day. The same Article how­
ever, exempted the employees of Hotels, Bars, Restaurants, Cafes, Cinema- 
Houses and like establishments from this principle and announced that 
they may be required to work for nine hours a day/ 1 0 ® 5 Moreover, 
Article 38 emphasizes the same principle but with regard to the weekly 
limitation. It says; "Subject to the provisions of Article 41 and 42, a 
worker shall not be required to work for more than 48 hours a week, but, 
a worker who is employed in a Hotel, Bar, Restaurant or similar estab-
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lishments may be required to work 54 hours a week." The inclusion of
this Article in the Labour Code has created some confusion and has given 
rise to the question as to whether to take the daily or weekly limita­
tions as the decisive criterion in considering the number of the legally 
permissible working hours per day. In other words, would it be legally 
possible to employ a worker for more than eight or nine hours a day <as 
the case may be) providing that the weekly total does not exceed 48 or 
54- hours? According to Dr. H. Hashem the answer is negative, he argued 
that the daily limitation is the decisive element, violation of which 
would be a violation of the principle of limited working hours, even if 
we remain within the weekly limitation. He firmly concluded that unless 
otherwise permitted, a worker may not be required to work for more than 
eight hours a day. The weekly total could not, therefore, be used to
undermine the daily limit.'1oe*
This conclusion is based on the established view of the Supreme Court of 
Jordan, The latter has constantly upheld the principle of eight hours a 
day and decided that the law is violated whenever the daily work exceeds 
eight hours regardless of the weekly total. In Case Ho. 141/66, for in­
stance, the court ruled that:
A worker must not be required to work more than 
eight hours per day, whether he works for a regulated 
establishment'107'* or any other employers... rest-time 
and breakfast and lunch breaks are not included in the 
working hours, and therefore no overtime wages are 
required for these hours. " ' 1 0 , 3 5
In another case, the court observed that:
"... The Labour Code forbids the employment of workers 
for more than the specified number of hours prescribed 
in Articles 37 and 38 < 8 or 9 hours). It punishes both 
the worker and the employer if they violate such a 
prohibition. Any agreement to employ the worker 
for more than the daily limit would be considered 'null', 
because it contravenes both the Labour Code and public
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order <al-Nedham al-'am) in accordance with Article 174 
of the Civil Procedure Code, " * 1 0 3 5
However, in some cases, where the daily legal limit has been exceeded,
the court has awarded compensation to the worker for the extra working
hours. This has been justified on the grounds that:
"Although the law forbids the employment of the worker 
for more than eight hours a day, the worker is entitled 
to his wages for the extra hours, and the employer must 
not benefit from violating the law."c 1 1 0 : 1
This is not a departure from the principle of eight hours a day, as 
it may appear. In this case, the court was faced with, on the one hand, a 
worker who had agreed to exceed the legal daily limit of working hours, 
and an the other hand an employer refusing to pay wages for the extra 
work, on the ground that the agreement was void in the first place. When 
the case reached the court, the latter awarded compensation, not as wages 
for legal working hours, but in accordance with the general principle of 
'unjust enrichment'.
However, during the eight-hour day of work, the law also stipulates 
that intervals of rest be given to the workers. According to Article 39, 
a worker may not work for more than five hours continuously without 
being given a rest interval of half an hour, or for more than six hours 
continuously without at least a one-hour rest interval. Pest intervals 
are not to be counted as working hours.< 1 1 1  ? Finally, in order to ensure 
the purposes of the limitation Dn working hours, and to prevent employers 
from holding the employees on the premises longer than would be reason­
able. Article 40 provides that: "the total of working hours and rest
intervals shall be so arranged as not to exceed eleven hours per day."
Nevertheless, there are some cases where the limit of eight or nine 
hours prescribed by Articles 37 and 38 could be legally exceeded. As far 
as these exceptions are concerned, a distinction may be drawn between
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those directly prescribed by the law on the one hand, and those dependent 
on the consent or approval of the Minister of Labour on the other.
Within the first category there are some temporary exceptions and 
permanent ones. Under Article 42, the provisions of Articles 37, 38, 39,
40, and 4 1 * 1  is>> do not apply in cases of national emergency, natural
disaster, urgent work which must be carried out to repair machinery, 
equipments or buildings, and in the case of force majeure*1 1 3 * The 
permanent exception from the limits of Articles 37 and 38 applies to the 
supervisory and managerial personnel in regulated establishments, persons 
employed in a confidential capacity and those whose duties involve travel 
and occasional work outside the premises of the establishment,
As to the second category of exceptions, i.e. those dependent on the 
consent or the approval of the Minister of Labour; the Minister has been 
granted a wide discretion under the present Labour Code in ad hoc
exceptions from the standard limits. Under Article 43, the Minister is 
empowered to:c 1 1 4  *
1 . Permit the employment of port and rail transport workers or any
other categories of workers, for a maximum of ten hours per day or 
60 hours per week in the following cases -
a) If he is of the opinion that such work is necessary for off" 
loading or loading goods from or on a ship, the clearing of such 
goods, and the transport of passengers.
b) If he is satisfied that the yearly average of working hours of 
such workers will not exceed 48 hours per week.c 1 1 s *
2. By a special order, increase the number of working hours prescribed 
by Articles 37 and 38, in the case of shift-work, which for technical 
reasons require uninterrupted work despite the changing of workers in
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each shift; provided that the worker *s right to the weekly day of 
rest is observed.e 1 1 e *
3. After consultation with the relevant Trade Union of the employers and 
workers, the Minister of Labour may sanction:
a) Permanent exceptions to the provisions of Articles37 and 38, in 
the case of a preparatory or complementary operation; or for 
special categories of workers whose work is not continuous.
b) Temporary exceptions when necessary to prevent damage to perish­
able goods, or risk in technical work or other reasons including 
enabling an establishment to carry out certain work in an emer­
gency arising out of pressure of work/1 *
4. Increase the number of working hours prescribed for the basic work­
ing day and working week, if he is satisfied that there is a shortage 
of skilled or unskilled workers.c 1 1 s*
Obviously, the discretion of the Minister of Labour is too wide to be 
brought under control because of the terminology used in Article 43.
Such generous exceptions are undoubtedly capable of rendering the limi­
tation on working hours virtually nominal. Thus, the position as it 
stands under the law of Jordan is that the law does provide for limita­
tions on the working hours in accordance with the international stand­
ards, but it empowers the administration to waive those limitations via 
administrative decisions. Exceptions from the standard limitation are 
acceptable or even desirable in some cases, but if they are to be pro­
vided for in the same way as in the law of Jordan, they will not only 
violate the established standard of the 'eight-hour-day', but make the 
right to limited working hours meaningless. So, it seems legitimate to 
suggest that the Jordanian legislature should review the above exceptions
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and reduce them to the narrowest possible margin, and impose some 
restrictions Dn the administrative discretion in order to ensure the 
right of the worker to limited working hours.
The Labour Cade provides for Friday to be observed as the weekly day 
of rest, with the possibility that the manager of the establishment may, 
by prior notice to the Labour Inspector, substitute any other day as a 
regular weekly day of rest,°1£>> This provision is well respected in 
practice. Muslims C who constitute nearly 95% of the entire papulation ) 
have observed Friday as the weekly day of rest long before the intro­
duction of modern labour laws. Friday, however, is not a mandatory holi­
day under Islamic law. All that is required is that only a few hours be 
set aside for the JujsaJi ( Friday prayers ), For Christians, Sunday is 
the usual day of rest. Some foreign enterprises, which apply the 'five- 
day working week' system, usually give Friday and Sunday as a weekend 
rest.0 2 0 *
Except for the categories who are completely excluded from the pro­
tection of the Labour Code, the weekly day of rest applies equally to all 
workers, whether in regulated or nan-regulated establishments. The main 
difference is that it is a paid holiday only in the case of those who 
work for regulated establishments. However, in 1965, Article 5(1) was 
amended to extend the privilege of a paid weekly day of rest to workers 
employed in "road-works, railway, land and air transport including 
workers engaged in the loading and unloading of goods at ports" . 2 1  *
According to Article 42(2), a worker who has worked in a regulated 
establishment for six consecutive days prior to the weekly day of rest,
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is entitled to wages for that day at a rate equal to his average daily 
wage ( excluding wages for overtime work ) during the six days which he 
had worked/122*
Thus, the Labour Code of Jordan recognises the right to a weekly day 
of rest for all workers subject to its provisions, but it restricts the 
pay for such a day of rest to those who are employed by regulated estab­
lishments and a few others,c 123* but nonetheless many are still excluded 
from the right to a paid weekly day of rest. Undoubtedly, this is in 
consistent with either the ILO Convention,0 2 ** or the UU Economic 
Covenant/123*
The legislature should thus, remedy such an unjust position and en­
sure the right of all workers to a paid weekly day of rest without any 
distinction whatsoever,
—  Public Holidays.
So far as the public holidays are concerned, the present Labour Code 
does not contain any provision guaranteeing such holidays nor any re­
muneration if the worker has actually been compelled to work on a public 
holiday. The only reference to the public holidays, 'official holidays', 
is the above quoted0 2 6 * part of Article 41(2) with regard to a weekly 
day of rest. It refers however to the case where the establishment it­
self is closed on an official holiday, that day is to be considered as a 
working day in respect of which the worker is entitled to wages/127*
The term public holiday, as used here, means official and religious 
holidays, However, neither the Labour Code nor the Supreme Court has 
defined what may be regarded as an official or religious holiday. Conse­
quently, upon a request from the Prime Minister, the Special Tribunal 
(Diwan Kha'as) has defined it as follows:
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"... Hence the Labour Code has not defined the meaning of 
the official and religious holidays, it should therefore 
be defined in the light of the relevant laws.
According to Article 4 (d) of the Civil Service 
Regulations, an official holiday is any regular or occa­
sional holiday, considered as such by a special an­
nouncement issued by the Council of Ministers. Religious 
holidays are all days specified for special practice of a 
recognized religion in the Kingdom of Jordan in
accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution,C12e>
which guarantees the freedom of religion and religious 
practice, It is thus a factual matter to be decided by 
the competent authority upon consultation with the 
relevant sect, * 1 2 5 0
If that is the position one may wonder, could a worker be obliged to 
work an an official or religious holiday (public holiday) and if not is it 
a paid holiday? Also, if a worker does work on a public holiday would he 
receiving the normal pay or the higher rate set for work outside the
normal working hours or days? Neither the Labour Code nor the Special 
Tribunal offers any explicit answer to any of these questions. All these 
issues were laid down before the Supreme Court in 1964. In Case No. 
169/64, a worker was dismissed without proper notice or compensation on 
the grounds that he had refused to work on two official holidays and
disobeyed the written instructions of his employer in this regard. The 
court ruled that: "It is the right of the worker to refuse to work on
official holidays. Such a refusal does not constitute a violation of the 
instructions or of the conditions of employment, which justifies the 
application of Article 17 <e) .',c 13CO Although it did not say so, it seems
• . o f -
that the court had taken into consideration the previSi°P>/Article 45, 
which excludes official and religious holidays from the working days to 
be counted as the annual leave. * 1 3 1 5 However, Dr, H. Hashem has 
criticised the judgement of the court and stated: "we cannot agree with
the court's conclusion." In his view, the distinction should be made 
between a religious holiday on which there is no obligation to work, and
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an official holiday for which the law does not guarantee leave, and 
therefore the worker is under an obligation to perform the work unless 
the employer voluntarily observes such holidays/ 1 3 2 : 5
If one is to choose between the two opinions, the Supreme Court's 
view would seem more desirable and indeed brings the law of Jordan yet a 
few steps further towards the International Standards. On the contrary, 
the opposing point of view seems to lack legal foundation and would 
aggravate the gap between the laws of Jordan and International standards.
In a more recent case, the court has re-confirmed its previous opin­
ion and stated:
"In accordance with the provisions of Articles 5, 41, and 
45 of the Labour Code, it can be ascertained that the
weekly, religious and official holidays are guaranteed
to all categories of workers to whom the Labour Code is
applicable, " * 1 3 3 1
As to the question of payment, the position was not clear and be­
came even more complicated after the first judgement of the Supreme Court 
(Case No. 169/64) in which the court had confirmed the right of workers 
to be an leave on official and on religious holidays, but without deciding 
whether it was a paid holiday or not, Thus, the question has been raised 
again before the court in the second case. In the latter the court had to 
deal with the question of payment, and pronounced that:
"...all categories of workers to whom the Labour Code is 
applicable are entitled to... official and religious holi­
days, but it is unpaid except in the case of those em­
ployed by regulated establishments and road, railway and 
transport workers, i.e. other categories are entitled tD 
those holidays but without pay, however, if they do work 
on such days they are entitled to normal wages
only."c,3A>
Thus, although the Labour Code of Jordan does not explicitly recog­
nize the right to public holidays, the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court,
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has guaranteed this right, but as an unpaid holiday, for the majority of 
workers in Jordan.
Obviously, this is another gap between the law of Jordan and the 
established international standards under the ILO Convention and under 
Article 7 (d) of the Economic Covenant which stipulates for "periodic 
holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays."
The above mentioned judgement was issued only a few months after the 
entry into force of the Covenant in 1976. Nonetheless, the court seems 
to have failed to take notice of this factor and the fact that Jordan is 
a party to the said Covenant.
—  Annual_Leay.e.
Annual and other paid leaves are explicitly provided for in the 
Labour Code of Jordan. It stipulates that every worker in a regulated 
establishment is eligible for a Two-Week paid leave. Such a leave be­
comes due upon the completion of at least 240 days during a period of 12
months.*13E:” The payable wages for the period of the leave are the 
normal rates payable for working days.cl3S> It is always the duty of the 
employer to notify the worker of the date on which he becomes entitled to 
the leave each year. Annual leaves may not be accumulated over a period 
of more than two years. The worker's right to the leave, due for the
first year, is obsolete at the end of the third year.*137’*
Some other occasional paid leaves are also provided for in the same 
Article it says, any worker in a regulated establishment is entitled to a 
two-week 'paid illness leave in any Dne year',*1 3 3 3  provided that he has 
completed six months of service in that establishment. Such an entitle­
ment is subject to the production of a medical report by a General Prac­
titioner specified by the establishment.
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Finally, training and education leaves are guaranteed to any worker 
in a regulated establishment when participating in a training or edu­
cation course. According to Article 45(7), "every worker in a regulated 
establishment who participates in an educational course for workers shall 
be entitled to ten days paid leave."
Here again, we find that the Jordanian legislature has restricted 
those privileges to the workers of the regulated establishments, roads, 
railways, land transport and those engaged in the loading and unloading 
of goods at ports,0 3 9 * and excluded a great number of the work force, 
contrary to the established international standards.
However, it has to be mentioned that the provisions regulating the 
weekly day of rest, annual and all other paid leaves, apply equally to 
workers of bath sexes. Some additional privileges have also been granted 
to female workers, and these are mentioned elsewhere in this thesis.c 1AO*
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2 —  THE .RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF TRADE OTIQHS,
Freedom of trade unions has become an increasingly important right. 
It is a right whose implementation is not an end in itself but rather a 
means to protect the enjoyment of other fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Freedom of trade unions seems to occupy an intermediate position between 
economic and political rights. It contains an element of both, and this 
may justify its position, as an area of elaboration between the two 
Covenants (Article 22 of the Political Covenant and Article 8  of the 
Economic Covenant). Some international instruments have regarded it as a 
political right, * 1 31 others as an economic right, * 1 4Si:> while others see 
it as having an element of both economic and political rights. * 1 4 3  *
This mixed character may explain the suspicious attitude of many 
Third World governments towards this right. That is to say, many of 
them tolerate and implement some economic and political rights, but they 
always seem to be suspicious of trade union activities, and tend to im­
pose various restrictions on them. The ILO supervisory bodies and the 
International Labour Conference have repeatedly recognized the close re­
lationship between the freedom of trade unions, and the effective enjoy­
ment of civil and political rights.c 144*
In a resolution adopted in 1970, for instance, the International 
Labour Conference firmly stated that the absence of the civil liberties 
enunciated in the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Fights, renders the concept of trade union rights meaning­
less. <14-& 5
As far as the Economic Covenant is concerned, the right to freedom 
of Trade Unions has been provided for under Article 8 , in accordance with 
which state parties undertake to ensure:
Ma) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join 
the trade union of his choice...;
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b) The right of trade unions to establish national fe­
derations or confederations, and the right of the
latter to form or join international trade union or­
ganizations.,.;
c) The right of trade unions to function freely. " * 1 4 ® 1
The same Article however, provides that the right to form and to join 
trade unions and the right of trade unions to function freely may be made
subject to: "Such limitations as are prescribed by the law and are ne­
cessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
public order, or for the protection of rights and freedoms of
others. " * 1 '4 7 1  It also allows States parties to impose special 
restrictions on the exercise of this right by members of the armed 
forces, the police and the administration of the state, * 1 4 4 3 1
It is against these provisions and limitations that we shall be
judging the relevant laws of Jordan and the restrictions introduced 
thereunder. Accordingly, the subject may be dealt with under the fol­
lowing sub-titles:
A The Right of Everyone to Form and to Join a Trade Union of his 
Choice.
B. The Right Df Trade Unions to Function Freely.
C, The Right of Trade Unions to Form Rational Federations and to
Affiliate with International Trade Union Organizations.
A ~  THE RIGHT OF BVBRYQRE TO FORM ARP TO JQIK A. TRADE ...MIPS OF HIS 
Choice. * 1 4 3 1
Before 1948, there were no trade unions in Jordan. * 1 ® 0 1  A number of 
factors had militated against the establishment of a powerful trade 
union ' movement. The major obstacles were the prevalence of government 
supervision, the political and social structure which made individual
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workers look first to their families and tribes rather than the trade 
unions to protect their interests, and above all, the small number and 
size of the industrial establishments. The annexation of the West Bank, 
after the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the influx of refugees, brought 
into the country many workers with previous experience in union 
movements.6 1 *51 *
Sir John Glubb reported that during the period of Mandate in 
Palestine, the British Government gave orders that trade unions must be 
established.6132* When the British left Palestine, there were two major 
federations of trade unions: the 'Arab Workers Society' with 30 member 
unions and an aggregate membership of about 2 0 , 0 0 0  workers, and the left- 
wing 'Federation of Palestine Workers', with about 8,000 members,6 1 3 3  *
In 1951, the Arab Workers Society moved its headquarters to Amman, 
but kept its branches in the major cities of the West Bank in an attempt 
to earn the support of the labour force in both Banks. In the following 
year however, the Jordanian Government, suspecting communist tendencies, 
banned all labour unions,6 1 3 4 5  Such a decision caused a great deal of 
public displeasure among the workers and provoked strong political 
opposition. Consequently, the Government introduced the Trade Unions Law 
(Law Mo. 35 of 1953) which for the first time permitted the formation of 
trade unions and regulated their functions.6 1 3 3 3  More than ten labour 
unions were formed during the same year, and in 1954, the General Feder­
ation of Trade Unions was established <GFTU) and officially registered. 
By 1956, there were 27 registered trade unions in Jordan, 25 of them 
being members of the GFTU. They were classified into four major groups 
(vocational, industrial, public offices and agricultural workers' trade 
unions).
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According to Miss S. At'tal,6136* the unstable political situation 
during the second half of the fifties had badly affected the freedom of 
trade unions, In an attempt to reduce the number of those who were 
eligible to form or to join trade unions, a great controversy was created 
around the definition of the terra 'worker', referred to in the law of 
1953. The question was therefore referred to the al-Diwan al-Khass 
(Special Tribunal), which pronounced that the word 'worker', used in the 
Law of Trade Unions Mo. 35 of 1953, does not Include government officers. 
Subsequently, the Government dissolved all government officers' trade 
unions,6137* who remain to this day deprived of this right. Moreover, 
the Government also banned all political parties and imprisoned leading 
members, and dissolved all trade unions except 9 strictly industrial 
workers' trade unions,6 1 3 6 0
A new era has been marked by the introduction of the present Labour 
Code, which recognises the rights of trade unions and regulates their 
formation and administration.6 1 3 3  * It defines a trade union as a group
of workers organised into a corporate body in accordance with the pro­
visions of the law, for the purpose of safeguarding their interests with 
regard to wages, collective bargaining and other matters which would 
improve their financial, cultural and social standards,616,0*
With the exception of government and municipal employees and 
labourers, Article 69, entitles all workers engaged in the same profes­
sion, trades or crafts, to form a trade union for themselves.6 1 6 1  * Thirty 
such workers or more, may form a trade union and, after drafting the 
internal regulations, they must apply for registration.6162* A workers' 
body may not be recognized as a trade union, unless it has been re­
gistered in accordance with Article 89. It states that: "Mo organization
shall be deemed to be a trade union within the meaning of this law
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[the Labour Cade], unless it has complied with its provisions regarding 
registration ." * 1 ® 3  5
Thus, the legal character of the trade union is entirely dependent 
upon its registration with the Ministry of Labour. In order to register 
as a trade union under Jordanian law, it is necessary to comply with a 
series of highly complicated formalities and procedures. A written 
application is required and must include the fallowing particulars: 
names, occupations and addresses of all members and union officers, * 1 ® 4 3  
the address of the union's headquarters and the names, ages and addres­
ses, and occupations of the members of the Executive Committee. * 1 ® ® 3 The 
application must be supplemented by a copy of previously adopted Internal 
Regulations, which provide, inter alia, for the following: * 1 ® ® 3
—  A prohibition against engaging in any political or religious issues
or any competitive trade or financial dealings.*13,7*
—  The method of election and term of office of the unions' Executive 
Committee, * 1 ® ® 3
—  The safe handling and custody of the union's funds and annual 
auditing of the union's accounts, and free access to them by the 
members. * 1 ® 3 3
—  The time and manner of convening general meetings and the method
of voting and the powers of the Executive Committee. * 1 '7'0 3
Furthermore, the Registrar may require any additional details, as he may 
deem necessary in order to satisfy himself that the application conforms 
with the provisions of the law, and may suspend registration until such 
information is supplied. * 1 '7 1 3
Having received the application and the internal regulations, ex­
amined their contents and found that they complied with the requirements 
of Articles 69 and 70 of the Labour Code, the Registrar must enter the
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name and the particulars of the trade unions in his register, and accord­
ingly, issue a certificate of registration/ 1 7 : 2 5 In the case of a refusal, 
any person(s) aggrieved by such decision may submit an appeal against it
to the HCJ within 30 days from the date of the said refusal, The court
may dismiss the appeal, or accept it and order the registration of the 
trade union. Two appeals have been filed with the HCJ so far. The first
was Ho. 27/61, with regard to which the court stated that:
"...CD Labour Code, Mo.21 of 1960 which regulates the 
affairs of the workers, imposes a duty upon the Regis­
trar of trade unions to register the trade union and to
issue a certificate of registration, if the requirements 
of Article 69-71 of the said law have been fulfilled.
<2) the Registrar is unjustified in rejecting an appli­
cation to register the union, because of the opposition 
to formation of trade unions in general, since the law 
itself has permitted it."< 1 7 3 5
The second case was concerning the registration of ilTiqabat Saiqi
Sayyarat al-Shahin al-Khareji (Lorry drivers who operate between Jordan
and other countries) When the latter applied for registration as a trade
union in Jordan in accordance with Article 69 and 70 of the Labour Code,
the Registrar wrote to the Minister of the Interior seeking his opinion
in this regard. The Minister recommended non-registration of the said
union and the Registrar therefore rejected the application. Consequently,
an appeal was brought before the HCJ against the refusal. The court
(unanimously) overruled the decision and ordered the registration of the
Nigabah as a trade union/ 1 7 4 5  It was stated that:
"Article 72 of the Labour Code stipulates that if a trade 
union has complied with the provision of Article 69, 70 
and 71 with regard to registration, the Registrar must 
enlist the name and the required particulars in his 
register and issue a registration certificate...
Hone of the above provisions requires the Registrar 
to seek the opinion of the Minister of the Interior on
the admissibility of an application, A negative recom­
mendation therefore, must not lead to the rejection of a 
duly submitted application. In view of the fact that the 
application was rejected solely on the basis of the 
Minister's statement that the formation of the said
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union was prejudicial to public security, and not because 
of failure to comply with the conditions required by the 
law, ...hereby we declare the Registrar's decision null, 
and order the registration of the ffiqabah as a lawful 
union in accordance with Article 74(2) of the Labour 
Code."*17'®*
However, it is important to point out that under the law of Jordan, 
the right to form and join trade unions is not confined to the workers. 
Indeed, it has been extended to the employers as well. That is to say, 
subject to the prescribed conditions and procedures concerning the form­
ation of the worker’s trade unions, employers engaged in the same or 
inter-related professions, crafts, or industries, may also form a union 
among themselves.c 1 *
Over the last few years, an increasing number of employers' organiza­
tions have been registering themselves as trade unions within the meaning 
of this term under Article 69 of the Labour Code, especially in the Vest 
Bank/1775
In order to preserve the right of the workers to form or join a trade 
union of their choice, an important guarantee has been introduced under 
Article 79, preventing interference by employers in the freedom of 
employees in this regard. It says, that an employer may not make the 
employment of any worker contingent upon not joining a trade union or 
renouncing his membership thereto. He also may not dismiss a worker or 
otherwise prejudice his rights on the account of his being a member of a 
trade union or of his participation in the activities of a trade union 
outside working hours.c 1 >
Yet, it has to be admitted that despite these legal provisions and 
guarantees, the freedom to form and to join trade unions, under the 
present laws of Jordan, is still far from being secured or fully im­
plemented. It is not fully implemented because, in spite of the language
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of Article 69 of the Labour Code, a large number of workers are still 
suffering from deprivation of this right. That is so because some of 
them are excluded from the protection of the Labour Code in general and 
others are deprived of - this right in particular.
As has already been mentioned, government and municipal employees, 
persons employed in agricultural work, house servants, gardeners, cooks, 
and all those engaged in such occupations are excluded from the protec­
tion of the Labour Code, and deprived of the rights provided there­
by,4 1-79:1 Even for those who are entitled to the protection of the Labour 
Code, and supposedly to the enjoyment of the rights provided thereunder, 
the Minister of Labour is specifically empowered to impose restrictions 
on their freedom to form or join trade unions. Under Article 84(a), the 
Minister may issue a decision classifying exclusively those professions, 
trades and industries whose workers are allowed to form trade unions. He 
may also define groups of professions, trades or industries whose workers 
are not allowed to form more than one trade union. Furthermore, he may 
order that such a decision be applied to existing trade unions.41905 In 
other words, the Minister, by an executive order, may abolish existing 
trade unions simply because he thinks that there are too many of them, or 
because it appears to him that there are several trade unions relating to 
a group of inter-related industries or professions. Such discretionary 
powers constitute a serious threat to the freedom to form or join a trade 
union of one's choice. In fact, they are capable of rendering this 
freedom virtually nominal at any time, The Minister has used the above 
powers in his decision dated 10/2/1976, whereby he has drawn up an ex­
clusive list of some 17 trades, industries and professions allowing only 
these to form trade unions.41®1 * Any worker who is interested in trade
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unions must join with the relevant trade union, obviously without a free 
choice.
Needless to say, such laws and practices do not comply with the role 
designated for domestic legislation under the Covenants regarding the 
acceptable standards of this right; they also violate the ILO Convention 
No 87, to which Jordan is a party.*1351 *
B ™  THE RIGHT OF TEAl)B__m_IQlS.TQ FUNCTION FREELY.
As to the recognized trade unions or those which are lawfully oper­
ating in Jordan, the law has granted them a certain degree of autonomy 
with regard to the drafting of their Internal Regulations and admini­
stration, but indeed has tept them under tight governmental supervision.
It has already been mentioned that the Constitution requires the 
legislature to enact a law ensuring the formation of trade unions within 
the limits of the law. It says: "Free trade unions shall be formed
within the limits of the law."*133:1 However, it seems that the last 
phrase of this paragraph has been abused (within the limits of the law); 
as will soon be explained, these limits have exceeded the usual or the 
acceptable limitations or restrictions on the freedom of trade unions, and 
indeed have put the laws of Jordan well below the minimum international 
standards.
Theoretically, the formation of trade unions in Jordan is free and 
does not require previous authorization by the Government. In practice, 
nonetheless, the legislature has undermined this guarantee by conferring 
uncontrollable discretionary power upon the Minister of Labour, allow­
ing him to specify the professions, trades and industries which may or 
may not form trade unions.* 1 *
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The Labour Code guarantees the right of trade unions to draft their 
own internal regulations and to elect their executive committees 'without 
interference'. This remains true, although the law stipulates that certain 
particulars are to be included within the Internal Regulations,*1003 and 
that a member of the Executive Committee should be a workman or a full­
time employee of the trade union, who has not been convicted of a felony 
or misdemeanour involving morals.*100 3 The law also recognizes the legal 
personality of all registered trade unions. Under Article 76, and from 
the moment of registration, "every trade union becomes a corporate body 
known by its registered name, having legal existence and an official 
seal."
In this capacity, a trade union may acquire and possess movable 
and real property, conclude contracts, sue and be sued in any competent 
court.*1073 In order to enable trade unions to carry out their lawful 
functions the law provides that no legal action or proceedings may be 
taken against an employee or a member of a labour union as a result of 
an agreement among its members to carry out any legal purpose of the 
union, provided that such an agreement does not violate any laws or re­
gulations in force.*1003 Furthermore, Article 81 stipulates that "A 
labour union shall not be considered an illegal body on the sole grounds 
that any of its activities is alleged to be in restraint of trade."*1003
The law also allows trade unions to open branches in any part of the 
country and to form federations amongst themselves in accordance with 
their internal regulations,*1003
Finally, with the approval of a two-thirds majority of its registered 
members, a trade union may voluntarily dissolve itself, and liquidate its 
funds by a resolution of its General Assembly.
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In such cases the Minister of Labour must be notified within 15 days of 
the dissolution.031 *
However, the law requires trade unions to have known addresses to 
which all correspondence and notices are to be addressed, and that any 
change of address must be notified to the Registrar, who records such 
changes in his registers.'13:25
Every trade union is also required to maintain such registers and 
books as may be required by the circumstances and by the conditions im­
posed by the Minister of Labour.'1333 Any employee or member of the 
trade union is permitted by the law to inspect the books of accounts and 
other books or registers maintained by the trade union, as well as the 
list of members, during the hours fixed in its regulations, A Labour 
Inspector may inspect these records at any time at the union's offices 
without removing them.'134-*
Several provisions have been devoted to the handling of the union's
funds, Although these provisions are meant to ensure the safe custody
and administration of the union's funds, they could be used as a means of 
governmental interference in and control of the union's finance. Article 
88(1), for instance, provides that:
"Every trade union shall before the first day of April
of each year send to the Registrar a copy of its balance
sheet in the form prescribed in the regulations, duly 
audited, and showing its income and expenditure and its 
assets and liabilities in respect of the last preceding 
year."'13®*
Article 77, provides some examples of the purposes for which the 
union's funds may be spent."'13e>
The most restrictive provision in the Labour Code with regard to the 
freedom of trade unions to function freely, is the provision of Article 
86, under which the Minister of Labour may apply to the Court of First
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Instance, to order the dissolution of any trade union in any of the fol­
lowing cases:'137 *
"1. Where a trade union has violated any provisions of 
the Labour Code, and failed to remove the cause of 
the violation within one month from its being noti­
fied in writing to do so.
2. Where the trade union has adopted a resolution or
performed an act which may result in committing any
of the following offences or crimes:
a) Incitement to the 'overthrow or promotion of
detestation or contempt of the regime', or the 
approval or advocacy of subversive doctrines
designed to alter the principles of the Con­
stitution or the fundamental system of the so­
ciety in the Kingdom;
b) Abandonment of or abstention from work, with
intention of going on strike or occupation of
premises or demonstrating or incitement to com­
mit such acts;
c) Use or incitement to use of force, violence,
terrorism, threats or illicit measures for en­
croachment on the rights of others to;
—  work;
—  employ workers;
—  abstain from employing any person;
—  join any association or union."
Such restrictions are undoubtedly capable of reducing the free func­
tion of trade unions to a limited scope or to merely administrative 
matters. Sub-paragraph <b) could seriously hinder the ability of the 
trade unions to defend the interests of their members, and therefore 
defeats the main object of the formation of trade unions.'13'7®* It is also 
incompatible with the provision of Article 103 of the Labour Code which 
guarantees the right to strike, With direct reference to this Article 
<103), the Jordanian Government has reported to the ECOSOC, that the law 
of Jordan guarantees "the right to strike provided that they [the 
workers] give their employer prior notification ... ".<,97b5 What may 
mitigate the effects of these restrictions is the fact that their
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application is made subject to a court order. Thus, it is the court, not 
the administration which orders the dissolution of the trade union when 
it violates the law or abuses the freedom guaranteed thereby. Before 
ordering the dissolution of the trade union, the court would objectively 
examine the behaviour of the trade union and interpret the terms of 
Article 86(1 and 2), Another mitigating factor is the provision of 
Article 87(a), which entitles the trade union concerned to appeal against 
the decision of the Court of First Instance.<19e:'
Thus, despite the ambiguity of the above restrictions, availability of 
a judicial remedy may prevent the misuse or unfair application of those 
provisions. What may seem rather unfair and an arbitrary restriction on 
the freedom of trade unions to function, is the provision of paragraph 
three of the same Article. *199 > The said paragraph entitles the Council 
of Ministers to dissolve any trade union when it deems it necessary in 
the interest of national security or public safety. However, as to what
may be regarded as a matter of security or public safety, that is left to
the discretion of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the same para­
graph protects the decision of the Council of Ministers from being 
examined by any court of law. It provides that:
"The Council of Ministers may, upon the Minister of La­
bour's recommendation, dissolve any trade union for
reasons of security or public safety, and its decision in 
this matter shall be final and uncontestable."
With such powers at its disposal, one can hardly imagine the
Government using the other technique (Court Order), If widely interpreted, 
the terms 'security and public safety', could absorb any reasons for which 
the administration is required to obtain an order from the court. 
Consequently, while the administrative dissolution has been used several 
times, the judicial order has never been sought. Indeed, the provision of
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Article 86(3) does not only violate the Economic Covenant*2003 and the 
ILO Convention/201 3 hut also the concept of 'free trade unions' provided 
for in the Jordanian Constitution as well/2023 Such a provision must be 
abolished if the law and practice of Jordan are to be brought into line 
with the minimum international standards in this field.
This is a right where the provisions of the Economic Covenant have 
fallen short of the ILO standards, While the Covenant has limited the 
right to affiliate with international labour unions to the national feder­
ations of trade unions, the ILO Convention ETo 87 has granted this right 
to individual trade unions as well. The Covenant provides for:
"the right of trade unions to establish national federations or confeder­
ations, and the right of the latter to form or join international trade 
unions organizations."*2033
The ILO Convention explicitly stipulates for the right of national 
trade unions to join international organisations in their individual
capacity. It says: "workers' and employers' organizations shall have the
right to establish and join federations and confederations and any such 
organizations, federation or confederation shall have the right to 
affiliate with international organizations..."/2043
In Jordan, subject to the same procedures and conditions discussed 
above with regard to the formation of trade unions, groups of trade
unions may apply to the Registrar to be registered as a national feder­
ation or union, having one corporate legal personality, A federation of
trade unions enjoys all the rights and is subject to all restrictions
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conferred or imposed on individual trade unions.csoe* Until 1972, all 
that was required for a trade union to join a federation, was to obtain 
the consent of the ordinary majority of its General Assembly, and to 
notify the Registrar thereof. In 1972, Article 78 was amended/2065 
whereby two new paragraphs were added, namely paragraphs <b) and (c), 
Paragraph Cb) imposes administrative control on the right of trade unions 
to establish national federations. It says: "A federation may not be
established without a decision by the Council of Ministers acting upon 
the recommendation of the Minister concerned/2075 and the approval by 
the Council of Ministers of the internal regulations of such a feder­
ation.*' Paragraph <c) entitles the Council of Ministers to dissolve any 
such federation or national union, for reasons of security or public 
safety. Here again, what might be regarded as a matter of security or 
public safety lies entirely with the Council of Ministers' discretion.
It is needless to repeat the same criticism that we raised earlier 
with regard to the provision of Article 86(3), concerning the dissolution 
of trade unions by administrative decisions/2065 However, Article 78 
provides that: "labour federations which are duly registered, shall have
the right to affiliate with legally recognized international labour 
organizations." Accordingly, the right to join international organizations 
of trade unions, under the law of Jordan, is recognized for the national 
unions and federations only, and not for individual trade unions. Such 
limitation is a violation of the ILO Convention Mo. 87, and therefore it 
is not permissible under the Economic Covenant despite the provision of 
Article 8(1) (b), which suggests the opposite. That is so, because 
paragraph <3) of the same Article stipulates that nothing in that Article 
may authorize states parties to the ILO Convention "to take legislative
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measures, which would prejudice or apply the law in such a manner as 
would prejudice the guarantees provided for in that Convention."4203>
If one is to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the Jordanian 
trade union movement in general, and the role of the law of Jordan in 
protecting the freedom of trade unions, certain facts must he home in 
mind. First and foremost, one should bear in mind the short history 
of the said movement, the political situation and the social structure of 
Jordan. Indeed, individual trade unions do vary in size and 
effectiveness, ranging from relatively large national unions of workers in 
trades and industries, with several branches throughout the country, in 
addition to their headquarters in Amman, to some small or almost unheard 
of organizations.
The small size, financial and organizational problems, shortage of 
trained full-time organizers, and the absence of the concept of the 
'closed shop' all contribute to the weakness of trade unions and tend to 
keep them powerless, They hardly have any influence on social and polit­
ical issues. A growing influence may be noticed over some matters such 
as the government wage-fixing policy, production methods, vocational 
training, use of foreign labour, entry of additional manpower into some 
occupations, and occupational qualifications.
It seems however, safe to say, that over the last 26 years, the trade 
union movement has grown in size and gradually strengthened its influ­
ence, sometimes supported by sympathetic Government policies,<s 10* and 
sometimes by compelling political conditions.^1131 Reasonable funds are 
being allocated in the successive annual national budgets, in the form of 
Government grants and support for trade unions in their lawful activi­
ties.
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Finally, some may argue that restrictive provisions in the Labour 
Code of Jordan and administrative practices are not designated to oppress 
or abolish the freedom of the trade unions, but indeed to prevent the 
abuse of this freedom. They also enable the government to supervise and 
direct the activities of such a young movement, and to exclude trade 
unions from interfering in purely political issues. This might be true 
and understandable, but nonetheless it is quite clear that these 
provisions are incompatible with the minimum international standards of 
this right; and therefore the Jordanian legislature should take this into 
consideration,
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3 ™  THE RIGHT TQ SOCIAL SECURITY.
This is a relatively recent right even among social welfare rights. 
It has been mentioned in two Articles in the UDHR: namely Article 22 and 
25. It says that: "everyone, as a member of society has a right to
social security",52125 especially in the event of "unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old-age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control."52133
lone of these particular grounds, however, has been mentioned in the 
Economic Covenant; instead, a general provision has been introduced under 
Article 9, which states that, n ~The states parties to the present Cov­
enant recognize the right of everyone to social security and social in­
surance."521,45
In the case of a developing state party, such as Jordan, this pro­
vision implies an obligation to recognize the right of everyone to social 
security and to take appropriate administrative and legal measures to en­
sure its progressive implementation with a view to full realization in 
accordance with established programmes,521* 5
Before 1976, the right to social security was not recognized as a 
human right under the law of Jordan. That is to say, apart from the few 
provisions in the Labour Code regarding the compensation for workers in 
an industrial accident or occupational disease,5-1 s 5 there was not any 
legal provision in the law of Jordan providing for the right to social 
security.52175 Immediately after the entry into force of the Economic
Covenant in 1976, the Jordanian Government began an intensive effort to 
draft and implement a special law recognizing the right to social 
security as a human right.5217**5
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In 1978, the law was promulgated and known as the Social Security 
Law Bo. 23 of 1978. A special body has been created under the said law 
(The General Institution of Social Security) and charged with the task of 
speedy and effective implementation of the right to social security. This 
is a public institution with total financial and administrative inde­
pendence and it is run by its executive board which represents the tra­
ditional triunal formation (Government, employers and employees all have 
equal representation).
In the long run, the law intended to establish a national system of 
social security and to build the so-called 'national umbrella of social 
insurance' to cover every workman and all members of his family residing 
in Jordan, regardless of nationality or of any factor other than that of 
being a working person,52105 Six types of social insurance have thus 
been provided for by the Law of Social Security of 1978.52195 Those are;
1) Insurance against industrial accidents and occupational disease;
2) Insurance against old-age, disability and death;
3) Insurance against temporary disability due to illness and 
maternity;
4) Health insurance for the workman and his family;
5) Family allowance and benefits;
6) Insurance against unemployment.
Due to the inadequate economic resources of Jordan, immediate imple­
mentation of the whole scheme was impossible.52:205 Thus, the Jordanian 
government has applied and benefitted from the principle of progressive 
implementation. Accordingly, the Law of Social Security provides that it
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should he implemented in several stages and in accordance with estab­
lished programmes in line with Economic and social Development Plan­
ning/221 5
The first stage, however, started on 1st January 1980. It provided 
every workman with a full cover insurance with regard to the first two 
types of social security, namely, insurance against industrial accidents 
and occupational disease; also, old age, disability and bereavement 
pension/2225
However, a brief examination of the programmes of the first stage 
may help to throw light on, or explain the manner in which the principle 
of progressive implementation has actually been applied in Jordan. 
A plan of ten consecutive programmes has been designated for the first 
stage, over a period of six years/2235
The first programme commenced on 1st January 1980, and covered 19 
private companies and public establishments by name, employing a total of 
seven thousand people.
The second programme commenced on 1st Hay of the same year and cov­
ered all companies and private firms employing more than 50 persons, 
with an aggregate reaching 30 thousand people.
The third programme commenced on 1st January 1981 and include all 
companies and enterprises employing 20 workers or mare, covering a total 
of 30 thousand workers,
The fourth programme commenced on 1st November of the same year and 
included 22 companies by name, all classified civil servants and those 
employed in accordance with individual employment contracts by any pu­
blic or governmental establishment or department, as well as those em­
ployed on a daily basis. Employees of all public establishments and 
authorities of administrative and financial independence are also included
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in this programme, It covers approximately 65 thousand persons from 
both private and public sectors,
The fifth programme commenced on 1st January 1982. It covers all 
the employees of Jordanian Universities, Municipalities, the Municipality 
of the capital, and Town Councils in all parts of the Kingdom. The 
number of beneficiaries of this programme is well above 20 thousand 
people.
The sixth programme commenced on 1st January 1984. It includes all 
civilians employed by the Royal Armed Forces, General Security, General 
Intelligence Agency, Civil Defence and the Royal Scientific Association.
The seventh programme commenced on first July 1984 and covers the 
employees of all firms employing more than 10 persons.
The eighth programme commenced on 1st January 1986. It covers the 
employees of all firms employing 5 workers or more,42245
So far as the first stage is concerned, the Social Security Law, Ho. 
23 of 1978, provides those covered by it with, inter alia, the following 
benefits: an insurance against all kinds of occupational diseases and 
industrial accidents Howadtb al~ amal wa al-amrahd al-jneba nib, which 
includes complete medical cover and daily allowances of not less than 75% 
of the normal wages for the whole period of medical treatment; permanent 
income in the case of permanent disability and funeral allowances of 150 
JD in the case of death, with a monthly salary of not less than 68% of 
the normal pay of the month prior to death; insurance against old age, 
natural death or permanent disability, which may consist of a pension, 
disability allowance, or what has been called natural bereavement pension 
salary. > The latest available information indicates that nearly half 
a million people have been covered by the programmes of the first 
stage.422®1*
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4 -  XHB RIQHT TQ-EPmATIDM.
a - amicAi,iQi-.Aa,..i h e m l k i s h i .
We have already seen that some have expressed their doubts about 
the existence of such a right in the contemporary international law of 
human rights. It has been argued that the Economic Covenant does not 
contain any legally enforceable rights and that what is included 
therein is a number of merely social programmes which are intended to 
be implemented over a period of t i m e . H o w e v e r  as far as the 
right to education in particular is concerned, Article 13(1) of the 
Economic Covenant provides that, "The states parties to the present 
Covenant recognise the right of everyone to education." Under this 
very paragraph, states parties undertake to recognize a "right" not a 
"social programme". It is the right of every human being to be educa­
ted. The legal background of this provision is the provision of Art­
icle 26(1) of the UDHR, which also speaks of a "right" of every human 
person to be educated. "Everyone has the right to education."
So, the general entitlement to education was first declared by the 
UDHR and then transformed into a legal obligation by the Economic Cov­
enant. The latter imposes a legal obligation on all states parties 
thereto, to recognize the right to education as a human right. It 
might be true that it is not an absolute and immediately applicable 
right, but the idea of progressive realization also must not lead us 
to denounce its character as a human right. Indeed, the proclamation 
of a human right is one thing, its enforceability or methods of en­
forcement is something else,
Applying another human rights instrument, the ECUT has confirmed 
the nature of the right to education as a human right. Article 2 of 
the First Protocol to the EH3R, provides that: "Ho person shall be
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denied the right to education...." In the Belgian Linguistic Case,
the ECUT stated:
"In spite of its negative formation, this provision42235 
uses the term 'right' and speaks of a right to education.
Likewise, the preamble of the protocol specifies that the 
object Df the protocol4230> lies in the collective 
enforcement of rights and freedoms. There is, therefore, 
no doubt that Article 2 enshrines a right,... as a right 
does exist, it is secured by virtue of Article 1 of the 
Convention to everyone within the jurisdiction of a 
contracting state."4231 s
The text of Article 13, of the Economic Covenant leaves no
doubt that each state party is under a legal obligation to recognize
the right to education (as a human right) of everyone within its jur­
isdiction. The difficulty however, is in defining the scope and the 
limits of such an undertaking. Does the recognition of this right re­
quire, for instance, the state party tD establish a new educational 
system different from the one it already has, or simply to enlarge the 
capacities or multiply the number of the existing educational institu­
tions? Does it compel the state party to provide any kind of edu­
cation one may desire, or to admit a person to a particular school?
In the above mentioned case, (the Belgian Linguistic Case) the ECUT 
marked the border line of the right to education as a human right. It 
says:
"...to determine the scope of the 'right to education'
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 2 of 
the protocol, the court must bear in mind the aim of 
this provision. It notes in this context that all mem­
ber states of the Council of Europe possessed, at the
time of the opening of the protocol to their signature, 
and still do possess, a general and official educational 
system. There neither was, nor is now, therefore any 
question of requiring each state to establish such a 
system, but merely guaranteeing to persons subject to 
the jurisdiction of the contracting parties the right in 
principle to avail themselves of the means of in­
struction existing at a given time."42333
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According to the ECUT what is guaranteed under the first sentence 
of Article 2 of the Protocol is the right of access to existing educa­
tional institutions, but such access "constitutes only a part of the 
right to education," In order to be sufficient the latter requires 
official recognition of some other elements, e.g. "The right to ob­
tain in conformity with the rules in force in each state, and in one 
form or another, official recognition of the studies which he has com­
pleted. " c 234 "
The findings and the conclusion of the ECUT seem to be valid also 
in the case of the Economic Covenant. It may thus be stated that, 
within the limits of the available resources, states parties, to the 
Covenant, are under legal obligation to provide general educational 
systems with sufficient facilities and an adequate number of educa­
tional institutions, The latter must be made available and accessible 
to anyone who seeks admission; and who is qualified in accordance with 
pre-established rules, As it stands, the provision of Article 13
of the Economic Covenant, neither compels the government of a state 
party to establish a particular kind of school nor to admit a bene­
ficiary to a specific school.
Article XXI of the Islamic D.H.R., stipulates that: "Every person
is entitled to receive education in accordance with his natural 
capabilities."
In Jordan, the right to education, was first recognized as a human 
right, by the Constitution in 1952.c&sr* provides that: "The
Government shall ensure,.. education, within the limits of its capa­
city, and shall ensure a state of tranquility and equal opportunity to 
all Jordanians," ^ 233? The qanun of al-Tarbiyah wat-Talim of 1964, 
(The Law of Education)C239), also provides for the right of every
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Jordanian to receive education, as a constitutional right and a na- 
tional duty to eliminate illiteracy. It regulates the practice of 
this right and outlines the policy to be fallowed by the Ministry of 
Education, in order to ensure the enjoyment of this right. <i£AO:)
B - EDUCATIONAL POLICY AID THE EDUCATIONAL.SYSTEM,
The obligation of states parties to the Economic Covenant goes 
beyond mere recognition of the right to education in principle. They 
undertake to enact laws and to employ practical policies and to main­
tain constructive educational systems. In the Covenant it says, that 
they (states parties) agree that education be directed for the devel­
opment of the human personality and to uphold its sense of dignity, 
and for the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. They also agreed that education should seek to enable all 
persons to participate effectively in a free society; and encourage 
tolerance and understanding among all nations and racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, in support of the United Nations activities for the 
maintenance of peace. >
As to the educational systems, Article 13(2) stipulates that each 
party to the Economic Covenant undertakes to ensure that:
"a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available 
free to all;
b) Secondary education in its different forms, including 
technical and vocational secondary education, shall 
be made generally available and accessible to all, by 
every appropriate means and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education;
c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to 
all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by the progressive intro­
duction of free education;
d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or in­
tensified as far as possible for the persons who 
have not received or completed the whole period of 
their primary education."
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It is therefore against these provisions and requirements that we 
shall assess the educational system and policy of Jordan.
Chapter two of the Law of Education of 1964, defines the prin­
ciples and the purposes of the educational system of Jordan.
Article 3 enumerates the principles upon which the philosophy of 
the educational system is based, It provides that the philosophy of 
education in Jordan stems from the Jordanian Constitution and is based 
on the following principles:
1 - Encouragement of the physical, intellectual, social and emo­
tional development of the student to enable him to become a
responsible and useful member of society.
2 - Social justice, and equal educational opportunities for all
Jordanian males and females, within the limits of their per­
sonal abilities.
3 - Respect for the dignity and freedom of the individual and the
public interest of the society.
4 - Importance of education for the development of Jordanian so­
ciety in a Pan-Arab perspective.
5 - Respect for the democratic system which enables citizens to
govern themselves and to handle their own affairs with know­
ledge and for their common interests.
6 - International co-operation based on justice, equality and
freedom.
7 - Positive participation in international culture, art and lit­
erature.
In the light of the principle of education for all, declared by 
the Constitution, the legislature has defined the following objectives 
as the general aims of the education system of Jordan.
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1 - The provision of education for every individual in the so­
ciety, according to equal educational opportunities,
2 - Creation of a citizen who "believes in the following ideals:
a) The ideals of the national philosophy of education.
b) Citizenship rights and duties.
c) Realization of moral ideals through individual and social 
conduct.
d) Democracy in social relations.
3 - Better understanding of the social and cultural environment
from the family to the school, the village, the city, the pro­
vince, Jordan, the Arab World and to the Human Community, as 
a whole,
4 - Improvement of living standards and to increase the national
income, by varying the specialisation and expansion of pro­
grammes to include evening and part-time studies and pro­
grammes for the elimination of illiteracy and other programmes 
in line with development planning.
In view of the above principles and goals, Jordan has maintained a 
steady educational policy aimed at the realization of the principle of 
'education for all'. It consists of a free and 'compulsory* primary 
education, a free secondary education, and a higher education which is 
available to all.
1. Primary Education.
All states parties to the Economic Covenant have pledged them­
selves to introduce a free and compulsory primary education system. 
Article 13(2) (a), stipulates that: "primary education shall be com­
pulsory and available to all," It has to be noted thus that this
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is an immediately applicable right, to which the principle of 'pro­
gressive implementation' does not apply, even in the case of a devel­
oping country such as Jordan. In the case of the latter however, this 
right has been declared under Article 20 of the present Constitution 
since 1952. It says: "Elementary education shall be compulsory for
Jordanians and free of charge in the governmental schools."*2/155 
Nonetheless, it was not until 1964 that this right was first imple­
mented as a constitutional right in Jordan. A complete chapter in the 
Law of Education <1964) has been devoted to the right to free and com­
pulsory primary education. Article 12 of the said law provides that: 
"free and compulsory primary education shall be implemented in govern­
mental schools upon the entry into force of this law, in accordance 
with Article 20 of the Constitution," Article 9, refers to primary 
education as the most important stage, "a foundation upon which all 
subsequent education is based." It should thus aim at the physical 
and emotional development of the pupil and the production of an en­
lightened and useful member of society.
According to Articles 10 and 13, compulsory education starts at 
the age of six and continues until the age of sixteen. 
Nonetheless, Article 10 has cast some doubts on the scope of this con­
stitutional right and the obligation of the government in this regard. 
It stipulates that: "A student shall be admitted to the compulsory
stage, if he has attained six years of age by the beginning of the 
academic year, within the limits of the possibilities (Fi Hudaod al~ 
emkaniat' ) T h e  last sentence of this Article, i.e., the limits 
Df the possibilities seems to present a rather vague limitation on the 
scope of this right under the law of Jordan. Indeed, it is not clear
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at all, whether the legislature is referring to the financial possi­
bilities or other factors such as classrooms, teachers.etc.
Whatever the case may be, one may argue that this is an unconsti­
tutional limitation, imposed on an absolute right guaranteed by the 
Constitution. It has already been mentioned that Article 20<3)<SAe:> 
of the Constitution declares an absolute right without any limitation 
whatsoever. Even in the law of education Itself, it says that compul­
sory education shall be free in the governmental schools and shall be 
implemented in accordance with Article 20 of the Constitution.
Obviously, this right is of special importance in the case of 
Jordan. It also constitutes a heavy financial burden imposed on the 
Jordanian Government. This is due to the fact that over 51% of the 
population of Jordan is under 14 years of age; i.e. almost one third 
of the nation must be provided for because they are of the age requir­
ing free and compulsory education <6-14 years).
In practice however, this stage is divided into two compulsory cy­
cles of free education;
a) The elementary cycle which covers a period of six years, from 
the age of 6 - 11 years. As it was mentioned above the aim of 
this cycle is to introduce the pupils to academic life and to 
prepare them for subsequent stages, On average the rate of 
enrolment in this stage is 80% of the population in this 
specified group.
b) The preparatory cycle which covers a period of three years 
from the age of 11 - 14 years. According to the Ministry of 
Education the rate of enrolment in this cycle is 91% of the 
population of the prescribed age group. At this stage stu­
dents receive thirty lessons per week, >
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By the end of their primary education (compulsory education), stu­
dents are required to sit for a general examination for admission to 
secondary education which is free of charge but not compulsory.
2, Secondary Education.
The Covenant requires that secondary education in its different 
forms, including technical and vocational secondary education be made 
generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, 
and in particular by the progressive introduction of free educa­
tion. Contrary to the right to primary education which is an
immediately applicable and absolute right, the right to secondary edu­
cation has been made a relative and progressive right, All that is 
required in this regard therefore, is that secondary education be made 
available and accessible but not necessarily free, The introduction 
of free education is one of the recommended means by which to make 
secondary education accessible to all.
In Jordan however, secondary education is free of charge; and has 
been made available to all,*2*535 by the continuous enlargement of the 
capacity of secondary schools and the numbers of teachers. Over the 
last thirty years, the number of students enrolled in this stage, has 
multiplied by more than twenty times, from 6,424 in 1954 to 125,338 
students in 1984.
According to the Ministry of Education, 68.2% of the population 
between 15 - 17 years of age were enrolled in secondary education in 
1984. *****■'> Improvement of secondary education is a standing section 
in the successive development plans. The aim is to make it available 
to all citizens in their own residential areas and with the least ef­
forts,
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In order to prepare and qualify the student for higher studies or 
training, secondary education has heen made available in various forms 
and fields. That is to say, after the compulsory stage, there are 
several types of secondary education from which the student may 
choose. in most cases his choice defines the type of higher edu­
cation or training that he is likely to receive. That remains true, 
although the choice may be limited by the student's performance in 
primary education. Basically, there are two types of secondary 
education at this stage, academic and vocational (al-Ta'leem al- 
Nehani) education. If the student is admitted to academic education, 
he could choose one of the two available sections, Arts or Sciences. 
Here again the choice is not always free, it is entirely dependent on 
the performance of the student in the first year of his secondary 
e d u c a t i o n . i n  the case of vocational education, whether freely 
chosen or otherwise, the student could choose more freely between the 
various types of vocational secondary education, which includes, inter 
alia, industrial, commercial, agricultural, nursing train­
ing. , . etc.C266a:i
Vocational education has become an integral part of secondary 
education in J o r d a n . I n c r e a s i n g  funds have been allocated to 
this type of education in the last two development plans, <1981 -1985) 
and <1985 - 1989>.<as® a
3 - Higher Education.
Higher education has been recognized as a right of every Jordan­
ian, and is subsidized by the Government, but it is not yet totally 
free and available to all.<S59> Before 1966, there was hardly any 
higher education available in Jordan. czeo;>
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So far, there have been five universities, in addition to numerous 
other higher educational institutions, such as polytechnics, and com­
munity colleges. The latter have become an increasingly effective 
factor in the higher educational system of Jordan. Statistics of 1985 
indicate that there are 46 public and private community colleges in 
the country, with a capacity to admit 23 thousand students a year or 
about 40% of the ' Tawjehy’*^'1* graduates.
The universities and the colleges of higher education meet about 
75% of the national demand far higher education in Jordan. As regards 
the remaining 25%, they have to seek higher education in neighbouring 
Arab countries and throughout the world,
However, enlargement of the capacity of the existing institutions 
and creation of new ones, has been made one of the principal object­
ives of the current development plans <1986 - 1990). It is for this 
task, that the Ministry of Higher Education has been created for the 
first time in Jordan, and the Minister included in the present cab­
inet. Reading the manifesto of his cabinet in the parliament, the 
Prime Minister stated that it is about time that special attention be 
given to higher education. He also expressed the need for a clear and 
complete policy, in order to achieve substantial improvements in terms 
of quality and quantity. Such a policy, must take into consideration 
the ideals of higher education and the means of its realization, and 
make higher education correspond to the needs of society, social and 
economic programmes and national development planning, The manifesto 
adds that:
"....the government shall review the previous attitudes 
towards the foundation of private universities, in the 
light of a new policy, the aim of which is to provide 
higher education to all qualified persons and to reduce
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the number of students who seek higher education 
abroad."C2e3>
4 - Special Programmes.
The Covenant requires states parties to encourage or intensify —  
as far as possible —  fundamental education "for those persons who 
have not received or completed the whole period of their primary edu­
cation. " C£e'* 5 It has to be noticed therefore, that on the one hand, 
the obligation of the state party under this paragraph is restricted 
to primary education only, and does not Include the subsequent stages 
(secondary and higher education). On the other hand, the phrase 'as 
far as possible' implies that no specific actions or programmes are 
required in this regard, and that general encouragement or intensi­
fication would be sufficient,
However, as far as Jordan is concerned, there is a wide variety of 
these programmes, ranging from the programmes of the elimination of 
illiteracy to evening and private studies for higher education,
a) Illiteracy elimination programmes,
This is a special scheme designated to provide extra educational 
opportunities for persons who are over ten years of age, and did not 
avail themselves of the educational system at the prescribed age.
The Ministry of Education has implemented this scheme since 1960, with 
specific plans for the total elimination of illiteracy by the year 
2000. In its fifth report to the U.M. Commission on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, for instance, the Government of 
Jordan has reported that it opens a free centre for the elimination of 
illiteracy for "every fifteen students in any part of the country, 
and provides books and stationary free of charge, "c =ses? According to
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the data of the Ministry of Education, illiteracy in Jordanian society 
was as high as the rate of 68% in 1960, hut was reduced to 28% by 
1984. It is expected to be reduced to 20% by the end of the present 
development plan <1986 - 1990) and to be entirely eliminated by the 
turn of the century.
b) Evening and part-time education.
Such programmes are intended to enable those who are far social, 
economic or any other reasons, unable to pursue regular programmes of 
higher education. The Yarmuk University has taken the initiative in 
this direction, by establishing what is called the 'Evening Univers­
ity' in 1980. The latter admits an average Df 600 - 700 hundred stu­
dents every year in various subjects such as economics, literature, 
public administration...etc.
c) Private studies.
In these programmes students are allowed to stay at home and study 
in their free time. Nonetheless, they are required to study all the 
subjects required from regular students, and to sit side by side with 
them for final examination.
The grading system is the same for both private and regular stu­
dents, c2693 The programme however, seems to provide crucial 
educational opportunities for Jordanian women especially those who 
have been deprived of education either as a result of an early mar­
riage or because of social or religious disapproval of participation 
in the modern educational system outside of the home,
C - AN ASSESSMENT.
Admittedly, it is not an easy task to assess the performance of 
any third World Country in the field of social welfare rights, mainly 
because of the lack of data and credible figures.
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Nonetheless, an attempt will be made to highlight some of the gaps 
in the educational system in Jordan, and to assess some of the 
achievements and the progress made towards the full realization of the 
right to education.
Having regard to the scope and the legal dimensions of the right 
to education as a human right as embodied under Article 13 of the Cov­
enant, one has to bear in mind that, except for the right to free and 
compulsory primary education, the right to education is a 'pro­
grammatic right’ at least in the case of developing states parties. 
In other words, a developing state party such as Jordan, is not re­
quired to ensure its full realisation immediately. The only immediate­
ly applicable aspect of this right is the right to free and compulsory 
primary education, in regard to which, Jordan seems to be in breach of 
Article 13(2) of the Economic Covenant. That is to say, both the le­
gislation and the practice of Jordan seem to fall short of the minimum 
international standards in this regard. As we have already mentioned 
the inclusion of the qualifying phrase 'within the limits of the pos­
sibilities' in Article 10 of the Law of Education, is intended to en­
able the Ministry of Education to turn down any number of applications 
on the ground that their admission is beyond the 'possibilities' and 
therefore it is unable to provide free primary education for 
them. ?
In practice, the Government does not seem to take the word 'com­
pulsory' in the absolute sense, which requires parents to enrol their 
children in primary education, under penalty of law. It is therefore 
up to the parents to bring their children to school. This was said to 
be a serious cause of illiteracy among the younger generations, and 
allowed many parents, especially in rural parts and remote areas, to
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bar particularly their female children from educational opportuni­
ties. Apart from that, Jordan seems to take the right to
education seriously. Taking into consideration the limited economic 
resources and the demographic e x p l o s i o n , J o r d a n  has achieved 
encouraging progress towards the full realization of the right to edu­
cation as a human right.
That is to say, since the recognition of this right, under the present 
Constitution (1952), increasing attention has been focused on its 
realization. Despite the above-mentioned drawbacks, there has been
considerable enlargement of the educational institutions and constant 
improvement of the educational standards, The number of schools and 
teachers has multiplied several times over the last few decades, in 
line with the increasing number of students, it is important to
know that the number of students has been doubling approximately every 
ten years. From 140,000 in 1951 for instance, to 249,115 in 1955, to 
426,000 in 1973 to almost a million in 1986.
The educational policy of Jordan has been orientated around the 
'principle of education for all' and pledged itself to make education 
available and accessible to everyone in any part of the country. Am­
bitious plans and programmes have been carried out for this pur­
pose. Modernization of the educational standards is indeed an
eminent feature of the successive development plans. In his address 
to the working group on the five-year (1986 - 1990) development plan 
in the educational sector, H.R.H. the Crown Prince, > emphasized 
the desire for yet more attention to be focused on the principal el­
ements of the educational system, namely, the students, the teachers, 
the syllabuses, school planning and administration, He also pointed 
out that Jordan is undergoing rapid developmental, social and economic
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changes, which require a parallel review and improvement of the 
schools' system and variation of specializations in order to meet the 
new needs brought about by such t r a n s i t i o n . S o  far as 
governmental policies are concerned, education has been treated as a 
top priority by all successive governments, CS7rso
In the ' Bayan-wizari' (ministerial manifesto) upon which the 
Government has obtained the confidence of the House of Represent­
atives, the present Government (al-Refa cabinet), has placed special 
emphasis on the right to education and on the improvement of the edu­
cational system. The importance of this document stems from the fact
that it explains the Government's policy in the field of education. 
It re-confirms the Government's belief in the principle of education 
for all, and refers to the promotion of educational standards as one 
of its top priorities. It also reveals clear intention to bring into 
effect a wider spectrum of programmes for greater variety in secondary 
and higher education.
The Bayan states that:
"... it is the intention of the Government to carry out a 
comprehensive review of the existing educational poli­
cies, regulations and programmes. It is also the Govern­
ment's duty to review rules for the admission exam­
ination for secondary education in order to maintain a 
just balance between the individual and the national 
interests. This is to ensure the freedom of the indi­
vidual, to choose the type of education that he wishes, 
and the requirements of the development plans as well as 
the needs of the society for professional and technical 
training in all working s e c t o r s . " 3
It may thus be concluded that Jordan has taken the implementation 
of the right to education seriously and has expressed genuine inten­
tions towards its full realization as a human right.
Despite the consistent planning and the relentless effort that has 
been made, Jordan is still far from achieving this goal, This may be
346
ascribed in the first place to the financial deficiency caused by 
meagre economic resources. Such a case raises the question of inter­
national aid, and an international effort to help developing countries 
of such circumstances in order to enable them to achieve the full re­
alization of social welfare rights in general or any right in parti­
cular. C;2eil 3
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Chapter IV. BOTES.
< 1) Hereinafter referred to as the Economic Covenant
< 2) Hereinafter referred to as the Social Welfare Eights,
< 3) See Chapter 1,
< 4) See for instance the Constitution of Mexico of 1917, the De­
claration of Rights of the Wording and Exploited Peoples of 
16th January 1918, which was incorporated in the Constitution 
of the USSR in 1918; the Weimar Constitution of Germany of 
1919; the Constitution of Egypt of 1923; the Constitution of 
the Republic of Spain of 1931; the USSR Constitution of 1937,
and the Constitution of Ireland of 1937,
( 5) In 1969, the UR Commission on Human Rights noted "The signi­
ficant political and theoretical contribution of Lenin to the 
development and realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights,,. and the historical influence of his humanistic ideas 
and activity", in this field (Res, 16 (XXV)); See:
V. Kartashkin, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", in The
Vol0ri^ ^ an^ 1>'Dlmensi0nS 0f Hu3nan right y
(6) Sometimes they were looked at as a by-product of the develop­
ment of civil and political rights.
( 7) Res, 421 (V), December 1950. The question was decided by the
Third Committee by 23 votes to 17, with 10 abstentions.
Official records, 5th Session, Report of the Third Committee 
A/1559, para. 51.
< 8) General Assembly Resolution 543 (VI), February 5th 1952. The
issue was decided by the Third Committee by 30 votes to 24, 
with 4 abstentions. See GAQR, 6th Session, Agenda Item 29, 
Annexes, Report of the Third Committee (A/ 2112, para. 50).
The decision was confirmed by the General Assembly in plenary
session by 29 votes to 25, with 4 abstentions (A/p.V 375,
February 5th 1952),
( 9) See David Trubek, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
the Third World", in Human Rights in International Law, ed. 
by T, Meron, Vol. I, p. 211: hereinafter referred to as D.
Trubek,
(10) Ibid. See also GAQR Doc, Ro. A/C3/565 (1952).
(11) A. P. Mavchan, 1 International Protection of Human Rights', 
Moscow, 1958, p. 91. Cited in Kartashkin, op. cit.. p. 142
(12) A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World, Manchester, 1972, 
p. 35.
(13) I, Brownlie, The Principles, op, cit.. p. 572
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(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(1©)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
E.W. Vierdag, "The Legal Mature of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights", IX Netherlands. Y.B.Int.L.. 1978, p. 83.
Ibid.
Res. 421(V) Dec. 4th 1950, See: GAOR, 5th Session, Doc.
(A/p. V, 317) and Res. 543 (V), Feb, 5th 1952; See also: GAOR, 
6th Session Doc. (A/p.V, 375).
UN Doc, A/2929 (1955), Chapter 2.
'The states parties to the present covenant undertake to en­
sure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
covenant'.
Art. 8(1)(d)
See Art. 13(3), The provision of Article 15(3) is also 
another example "the states parties undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative 
activity." Also Article 10(1) concerning the rule that mar­
riage must be entered into with the free consent of the in­
tending spouses.
Art, 1(3) "The states parties to the present covenant, in­
cluding those having responsibility for administration of non­
self-governing and trust territories shall promote the reali­
zation of the right to self-determination, and shall respect 
that right."
See also Art. 24(1)
Another example is the Convention against Discrimination in 
Education (1960); see also E. Schwelb, ' v
... International
Conventions on Human Rights", 9 ICLQ (1960), pp.^5^-
Art. 2(1), "States parties to the present covenant undertake 
to take steps, individually and through international assist­
ance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights re­
cognized in the present covenant by all appropriate measures."
Ibid. Para. (2): "The states parties to the present covenant 
undertake to guarantee that the rights enumerated in the 
present covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, polit­
ical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other statutes."
Ibid. Para. (3): "Developing countries, with due regard to
human rights and their national economy, may determine to what
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extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present covenant to non-nationals. "
(2?) See ECOSQC, Res. No, 5(1) of 16 February 1946 and Res, No,
9(11) of June 1946,
(28) Art. 1 (3).
(29) It reads as follows: "With a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a) higher standards of living, full employment and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development;
b) solutions of international economic, social, health and 
related problems; and international cultural and educa­
tional co-operation; and
c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex..,”
(30) Art. 56: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the organization for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
Compare the two Articles (55,56) with the provision of Art, 
2 (1).
(31) Trubek, op. cit.t p. 216,
(32) Trubek, op. cit.. p. 216
(33) Ibid.
(34) See above p, M S *
(35) See Trubek, op, cit., pp. 214-215,
(36) Art, 2(1), quoted above, see p.X"?^'
The legislative history of the Covenant also indicates that
international aid should be taken into account. See the Com­
mission on Human Rights (275th mtg), UN Doc. E/CN. 4/5R.275 
(1952).
(37) See above p
(38) See Trubek, op. cit.. p, 217
(39) M. Ganji, ' Ih^Rea_ll.zation of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; Problems. Policies. Progress', (UN Sales No. E 75 XIV. 
2)
(40) See Trubek, op, cit,, p. 217.
(41) See above pP-Q.03 j —  2/2 T- *
350
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48) 
(48a)
(49)
(50)
Para. (3)
While most of the modern international standards of human 
rights have been created after the second World War and under 
the auspices of the United Sations, establishment of inter­
national standards of the right to work goes back at least to 
the era of the League of Nations. In 1919, the ILO was 
created and its Constitution was adopted as part of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, The ILO has brought about 
hundreds of international recommendations, decisions and con­
ventions regarding the international standards of the right to 
work. However, since our study is limited to the UN Covenants 
on human rights, it is not our intention to study the struc­
ture and the work of the ILO in this area, but nonetheless, we 
shall be referring to the ILO conventions and documents 
whenever it is necessary and by way of comparison only.
Art. 23(1), See also paras. (2, 3 and 4) and Art. 22, 24.
Art. 6(1).
See Art. 6(2).
Although the previous Constitutions prohibited forced labour, 
they lacked any provision recognizing the right to work as a 
human right.
Art. 6(2).
See the Initial report of Jordan under Art. 17 of the Economic 
Covenant, UN Doc. No. E/1984/6/Add. 15.
(Arts.)
Chapter One - Applicability of the Law and
Definition of Terms, 1- 7
Chapter Two - Administration. 8-12
Chapter Three - Matters Relating to Service
and Employment. 13
Chapter Four - Apprenticeship. 14
Chapter Five - Individual Contracts of
Employment. 15-20
Chapter Six - Collective agreements 21-23
Chapter Seven - Minimum Wages. 24
Chapter Eight - Protection of Wages. 25-28
Chapter Nine - Health, Safety and Welfare. 29-36
Chapter Ten - Working Hours, Holidays and
Annual Leave. 37-45
Chapter Eleven - Employment of Women and Children. 46-53
Chapter Twelve - Workmen's Compensation. 54-67
Chapter Thirteen - Labour Unions, 68-89
Chapter Fourteen - Settlement of Labour Disputes. 90-109
Chapter Fifteen - Supplementary Provisions. 110-115
Chapter Sixteen - Repeals, 116-117
It provides for cases of instant termination of employment 
without a notice or payment of Mokafah. (compensation).
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(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
Three months; See Art. 16, para. 1(a)
Ibid. (b), "payments due under this Article shall be 
calculated on the basis of the last monthly salary received by 
the worker at the time of termination of his employment to­
gether with all allowances paid, but excluding wages for any 
overtime work. . . "
Ibid. (c).
Case flo. 288/70, JBR (1971), p.155.
"1. The following acts shall be deemed as justifiable grounds 
for the termination of employment by the worker without 
notice:
a) Employment of the worker in work the nature of which dif­
fers distinctly from the work for which he was employed 
under the employment contract.
b) Employment under such conditions as would require a change 
of the worker's residence, if such change is not provided 
for in the contract.
c) Transfer of the worker to work of a lower grade.
d) Beating or humiliating the worker, or committing a moral 
offence against him or against a member of his family by 
the employer or by the manager of the establishment.
e) Failure on the part of the employer to carry out the pro­
visions of any section of this law, or of any regulation, 
or any order issued under Article 4 of this law, after re­
ceiving notice to do so from the Director of the Depart­
ment of Labour or from the Labour Inspector, provided that 
such notice concerns the workman concerned exclusively."
Case lo. 409/75, JBR (1976), p. 1433.
See also case Ko. 367/77, JBR (1978), p. 189, where it was 
stated that:
"...it is the established opinion of the Supreme Court 
that termination of employment by the worker because of
reduction in his pay entitles him to the payment in lieu
of notice and the compensation."
Obviously, the court has understood the reduction in pay as an 
indirect instant termination of employment by the employer, 
for which the court has always asserted that payment in lieu 
of notice is required.
Case No. 246/72, JBR (1972), p. 1278.
Case lo. 379/72, JBR (1973), p. 104.
In case lo. 186/72, the court explicitly stated that: 
"unilateral termination of employment for a limited period by 
the employer, before the fixed time, entitles the worker to a
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(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(69a)
(70)
(71)
full payment of his wages for the rest of the agreed period." 
JBR (1974), p. 1401.
Art. 6(1)
Sub-paragraph Cb), provides that the provision of sub-para­
graph (a) "shall not be held to preclude, in countries where 
imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment 
for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a 
sentence to such punishment by a competent court."
See Art. 4 and 6 respectively.
Convention la, 29. For the full text of the Convention, see 
the UN Treaty series, Vol. 39, p. 55, Cf, the ILO Convention 
for the Abolition of Forced Labour of 1957.
Art. 2(1).
Art. 2(2).
See Brownlie, Basic Documents, op. cit.. p. 176.
J. Fawcett, 'The Application of European Convention on Human 
Rights. Oxford, 1969, p. 48.
IMd. p. 47,
The applicant was a Norwegian dentist, who was directed to 
Moskenes district in northern Norway under the Act of 1956, 
which provided that dentists might be required for a period of 
up to two years to take a position in public service. 
Accordingly he was convicted and sentenced under the said Act, 
and his appeal to the Supreme Court failed. Thus he chall­
enged the Act and the decision of his assignment as being con­
trary to Art. 4 of the EHR. Although the application was 
declared inadmissible by a majority of six to four, it is in­
teresting to note, as far as the definition of the term 
'forced labour’ is concerned, that the majority were divided 
among themselves. Four of them followed the above-quoted ana­
lysis and concluded that the service of Iversen in that dis­
trict was not forced labour. The other two were of the opin­
ion that it was forced labour, But it was justifiable under 
Art, 4(3) in view of the emergency threatening the well-being 
of the community. Y.B, 6, (1963) p. 328.
This is a plain violation of the provision of the ILO Conven­
tion - see Art. 2.
Y.B. 11 (1968) 528, 558.
Exacted work or service without payment,
This however, seems to have been a common practice in the pre- 
Vorld ¥ar I era, The British were reported to have applied a
similar system in Egypt. Bee al-Madi and S. Musa, A History
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of Jordan in the Twentieth Century, Amman, 1959, p. 77,
hereinafter referred to as Madi and Musa} on the history of 
farced labour and involuntary servitude, see A. Avins, 
"Involuntary Servitude in British Commonwealth Law", 16 ICLQ 
(1967), pp. 29-55.
(72) The Law of the Prohibition of Forced Labour of 1934, published 
in the (461) JOG on the 8/12/1934, Art. 1, provides that:
"this law shall be known as the law of the prohibition of en­
forced labour of 1934 and shall be effective from the date of 
its publication in the Official Gazette."
(73) Art. 2(c) added another exception in regard of "work or ser­
vices exacted in accordance with the law of 'Locusts fighting 
of 1929' or the law of ' In lieu of the road tax' in places 
where this law is still in force." Hence, both of these laws 
have been abolished, this exception has no practical effect in 
the present.
(74) Art. 3.
(75) See Art. 4(1).
(76) Art. 4. : "Anyone who commits an offence against the pro­
visions of this law shall be sentenced for a term of imprison­
ment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding 50 JD, 
or both."
(77) See Art. 16(2), as amended by law Mo, 2 of 1965, and published 
in JOG Mo. 1818, p. 52, on the 18/1/1965.
(78) Art. 18(1), see sub-paragraph (a, b, c).
(78a) See the second supplementary report of Jordan under Art. 40 of
the Political Covenant, UN Doc. No. CCPR/C/l/Add. 56,
(79) Sub-paragraph (a).
(80) See H.R, Hashem, Interpretation of the Labour Law of Jordan,
Amman, 1st ed,, 1973, p. 156.
(81) Para, (8).
(82) Case Mo. 69/71, JBR (1971), p. 648.
(83) Case Mo, 128/64, JBR (1964), p. 637. Almost identical
conclusions have been reached in the following Cases:
346/<d&, JBR (196^), P- I08?! 221/63, JBR (1963), p. 329;
114/63, JBR (1963), p. 192; 173/72, JBR (1972), p.1047.
(84) Art. 24(1).
(85) Ibid. (3).
(86) Ibid. (4).
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<87)
(88)
(89)
<90)
<91)
<92)
<93)
<94)
<95)
<96)
<97)
<98)
<99)
IfcM.
IMd, (5),
Art. 25<1)
In all cases "The fine may not be imposed after the lapse 
of thirty days from the date on which the violation was 
committed. Fines shall be recorded in a special register, and 
shall be added to the credit of a common fund for the benefit 
of the worker." See Art. 25<2),
These are:
a) deductions for the recovery of advances or the adjustment 
of overpayment;
b) deductions of income tax or social security fees payable 
by the worker;
c) deductions ordered by a competent court of law or other 
competent authorities, subject to the provisions of para. 
<4);
d) deductions of contributions to any provident fund, or for 
the repayment of any loans taken from such a fund;
e) deductions far housing or other facilities or services 
provided by the employer at such rates and percentage of 
wages as may be authorised by the Minister of Labour.
See para. <3)
Art. 26<1).
Art. 26<2)
See Art. 28,
See H.R. Hashem, op. cit., p, 171.
It is also noteworthy that Art, 209 <a,b,c> of the Companies 
Law <Law Mo. 12 of 1964) does not give any precedent to wages 
in the case of bankruptcy.
See Case Mo. 285/65, JBR <1966), p. 1529.
Human beings by their very nature need rest intervals from 
work. Over-worked employees are more prone to accidents at 
work as a result of exhaustion. See H.R. Hashem, op. cit.t p. 
187
See ¥. M, Cooper, Outlines of Industrial Law, 7th Ed., <ed. ) 
J.C. Wood, 1962, London, p. 172 et seq.
See also UMHR, Art. 24, ADRD, Art. 15, ESC, Art. 2.
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<100) The International Labour Office, Conventions and Recom­
mendations, 1919-1981. Geneva, 1982, hereinafter referred to 
as ILO Conventions and Recommendations, 1919-1981.
(101) See Art. 427
<102) Convention Ho. 47,
<103) Reduction of Working Hours Recommendation la. 116, of 1962,
<104) These Arts, provide for the right to the weekly day of rest,
and for some exceptions to the principle of the eight-hour 
day, in some exceptional circumstances.
<105) Art. 37.
<106) op. cit. . p. 157
<107) According to Art. 2 of the Labour Code, Regulated Establish­
ment means: "an establishment which employs not less than
five workers, or which has employed an average of five workers 
during the period of the last preceding twelve months; and it 
includes building workers."
<108) Case Ho. 141/66, JBR <1966), p. 850; similar decisions have
also been reached in Cases Ho. 116/73, JBR <1973), p, 804; 
287/73, JBR <1974), p, 162
<109) See Case Ho. 410/72, JBR <1972), p. 192.
<110) Case Ho. 47/82, JBR <1982), p. 403,
<111) See Art. 39.
<112) Arts. 37, 38, 39, and 40 all deal with the limitation of the
daily working hours. Art, 41 stipulates for the weekly 
holiday.
<113) For the lawful application of the exception in any of the
above cases, the manager of the establishment is required to 
notify the Department of Labour <Dairat al-Awal) of the 
occurrence of such an event, and to compensate the workers far
the extra work or any holiday which they did not receive.
<114) Art. 43<2).
<115) Ibid, Sub-p
<116) Ibid. <3)
<117) Ibid,. <4)
<118) Ibid. <5)
<119) Art, 41. <1)
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<120) Some others give 'Saturday' and 'Sunday',
(121) It was amended by law Ho. 2 of 1965, Before the amendment the
Supreme Court had constantly denied the right to a paid weekly
day of rest to anyone who was not employed by a regulated 
establishment, In case Ho, 390/65 (only months before the 
amendment) the court ruled that: "paid weekly day of rest ap­
plies only to those employed by regulated establishments."
See JBR (1966) p, 88.
Since 1965, the court has modified the previous approach and 
stated that "Art. 41 (paid weekly day of rest) applies to the 
workers of land.,. transportation, even though they are not 
employed by regulated establishments," See Case Ho. 47/72, 
JBR (1972), p. 395
(122) See Art, 41(2): "...annual leave days which are provided for
in Art. 43, and official holidays on which the establishment
is closed, shall be considered as working days in respect of
which a worker is entitled to wages."
(123) See Art, 5(1) as amended by Law Ho, 2 of 1965, mentioned 
above,
(124) The ILO has adopted a number of conventions on the weekly day 
Df rest and annual leaves, such as the weekly day of rest in 
Industrial Enterprises Convention Ho. 14 of 1921, and the 
weekly day of rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention Ho. 106 
of 1957.
(125) Art. 7(d)
(126) Hote 122 above <,
(127) Ibid.
(128) It says: "The state shall safeguard the free exercise of war­
ship and religious rites in accordance with the customs ob­
served in the Kingdom unless such exercise is inconsistent 
with public order or decorum."
(129) Diwan Khasst Decision Ho. 14 of 1972, published in JOG Ho. 
2383 of 1/10/1972, p, 1856,
(130) Case Ho. 169/64, JBR (1964) p. 686.
(131) Art, 45, provides that: "Every worker employed in a regulated
establishment. . , shall be entitled to leave with pay in pro­
portion to the period of his employment less the number of 
public holidays with pay which he was granted during that 
period."
(132) op. cit.f p. 260.
(133) Case Ho. 463/75, JBR (1976), p. 1478,
(134) Ibid,
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(135) Art, 45(1); see also the report of Jordan under Art. 17 of the 
Economic Covenant, UN Doc, No. E/1984/6/Add. 15j.(jq .
<136) Ibid. (3).
<137) Ibid, <5,6).
(138) Ibid, <4).
<139) Art. 5<1) as amended in 1965.
<140) See above pp.
<141) See EHR, Art. aa<l) "everyone has the right to freedom of
association, , , including the right to form and to join trade
unions..." See also Art. 22<1) of the Political Covenant.
<142) See ESC II, <5) and Art. 8 of the Economic Covenant
<143) See UDHR Art. 23
<144) Especially rights such as, personal liberty, freedom of opin­
ion, expression, assembly, and the right to fair trial.
<145) Trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties,
International Labour Conference, 54th Session <1970). report 
la,-1H I,
<146) Art. 8 <1) <D)
<147) These are traditional limitations which have been maintained
with regard to several rights throughout the two Covenants - 
we have already discussed some of the legal and technical 
difficulties that may be caused by such undefinable 
limitations, see above pp.
<148) Art. 8 <2),
<149) Art. 8 <1) (a).
<150) See General Sir John Glubb, op. cit.t p. 8.
<151) Miss S. At'tal, An Introduction to the Problem of Woman and
the Women's Movement in Jordan, Amman, 1985, p. 82.
<152) Sir John Glubb, op. cit., p. 8
<153) Miss S, At'tal, op. cit,, p. 88
<154) See Ali Khrase and S. A. Sufadi, The Trade Unions Movements in
Jordan, Amman, 1979, p. 25j hereinafter referred to as Khrase
and Sufadi.
<155) Law No. 35 of 1953, published in JOG No. 1134 of 16/2/1953, p.
543.
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<156) op. cit.. p. 89
<15?) Total of Nine Trade Unions.
(158) Miss S.At'tal, op. cit. . p. 89. See also Khrase and Sufadi,
op. cit.. p. 45
<159) Chapter 13, (Arts. 68-89)
<160) See Art. 68(1).
(161) Art. 69(2)(a).
<162) Ibid. <b)
(163) Art. 69 (1),
<164) Art. 69 <2).
(165) Art. 70, "No organization shall have the right to register
itself as a labour union under this chapter unless its 
executive committee has been formed in accordance with its
provisions..."
<166) Art. 70.
<167) Ibid. <g)
<168) Ibid. (i).
<169) Ibid. <j).
<170) Ibid. (k,1)
<171) See Art, 71<i).
<172) Art, 72.
(173) Case No. 27/61, JBR <1961), p. 261.
<174) Case No. 37/64, JBR <1964), p. 937.
<175)Ibid.
(176) See Art. 69(2)(d); compare with the provision of Art. 2 of the
ILO Convention No. 87 of 1948, concerning (Freedom of Asso­
ciation and Protection of the Right to Organize), UN Treaty 
Series, Vol. 68 p. 17. Hereinafter referred to as ILO Con­
vention No 87 of 1948. It says: " Workers and employers
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to 
establish and ,.,to join organizations of their own choosing 
without previous authorization." However, it should be noted 
that the Jordanian legislature uses the term ' Hfegah' (Trade 
Union) in both cases,
(177) The Ministry of Labour, 23 The Labour Review, Amman, 1983.
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(178) See Art. 79.
(179) See Art. 1(2).
(180) Art. 8(a): "...the Minister may order that such a decision
shall apply to any existing labour unions."
(181) See the JOG Mo. 2606 of 19/2/1976, p. 242, This decision re­
placed the decision of 10/1/1971, published in the JOG Mo.2272 
of 10/1/1971, p. 23.
(182) Art. 2: "Workers and employers, without distinction
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject 
only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous author­
ization, "
Art. 3(2) provides that: "the public authorities shall re­
frain from any interference which would restrict this right or 
impede the lawful exercise thereof."
(183) Art, 23(f).
(184) See above p 3 1b, and see also Art. 84(a) of the Labour Code.
(185) See above p.
<186) See Art. 83.
(187) Art, 76: "Every trade union shall be a corporate body known
by its registered name, having perpetual existence and a 
common official seal. The trade union shall have the right to 
own and possess movable and immovable property in accordance 
with the provisions of the 'Law of Disposal of Immovable 
Property by Corporate Bodies', to conclude contracts and to 
institute or defend legal actions in its corporate name."
(188) Art. 81.
(189) Art. 81
(190) Art. 84(c)
(191) Art. 85, as amended in 1972, Law Mo. 25 of 1972 see the QGJ
Mo. 2357 of 6/5/1972, p. 868.
(192) Art. 75.
(193) Art. 82(1).
(194) Art. 82(2).
(195) See also paragraphs (2,3,4) and Art. 70 (f,g,m, ).
(196) See Art. 77.
(197) See Art. 86(1&2)
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(197a) See the individual opinion of Professor Higgins and other
members of the HRC, in Case Ho. 118/1982,HRC Report, £A0E, 
Supplement Ho. 40CA/41/40) p. 151 (1986).
(197b) See the report of Jordan under Art. 17 of the Economic
Covenant UH Doc. Ho. E/1984/6/Add. 15 (1986).
(198) Paragraph (a) "an appeal against the judgement of the Court 
of Pirst Instance may be submitted within thirty days from the 
date on which it is issued if rendered in the presence of the 
parties, otherwise from the date of service thereof. The de­
cision of the court of Appeal shall be final."
(199) Art. 86(3).
(200) Art. 8(c)
(201) Art. 4: "Workers and employers organisations shall not be
liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative author­
ity, "
(202) Art. 23(f).
(203) Art. 8(1)(b).
(204) Art. 5.
(205) Art. 78(1&2) "Applications shall be submitted to the
Registrar in the manner prescribed in Section 69, sub-section 
2, and the regulations of such federations shall include the 
provisions prescribed in Section 70 of this law,"
(206) Law Ho. 25 of 1972, see the JOG Ho, 2357 of 6/5/1972, p. 868.
(207) The Sinister concerned, could be the Minister of the Interior 
or Health or Industry or any Minister as the case may be.
(208) See above p. 321.
(209) See Art. 8(3)
(210) See for instance, King Hussein's public address on the ' Eed
 (May Day) on the 1st May 1984. See also Dr, T, Abd
al-Jaber, the Minister of Labour, a speech on the same occa­
sion, The Ministry of Labour, 25 Labour Review, Amman, 1984, 
pp. 2-5.
(211) The political situation in the West Bank and the increasing 
number of trade unions, especially in the last four years (82- 
86).
(212) Art. 22.
(213) Art. 25(1).
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(214)
(215)
(216)
(217)
(217a)
(218)
(219)
(220) 
(221) 
(222)
(223)
(224)
(225)
(226)
(227)
(228)
However, a substantial body of international rules concerning 
the right to social security has been introduced by the ILO in 
the form of International Conventions, Declarations and 
Recommendations. See for example!
—  Convention Ho. 17 of 1925
■—  Convention Ho. 24 of 1927
—  Convention Ho. 35 of 1933
—  Convention Ho. 36 of 1933
—  Convention Ho. 67 of 1944
—  Convention Ho, 102 of 1952
—  Convention Ho, 118 of 1962
—  Convention Ho, 131 of 1967;
All published in the 'International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 1919-1981' by the International Labour Office, 
Geneva, pp. 515-685.
On the implications of the concept of progressive realization 
see above p,2i/7.Sf-
Art. 54-67
According to Mr, Ali Isa, the Director of Information and 
Publications of the General Institution of Social Security, 
Jordan was ready to establish a social security system in the 
late 60's, if it were not for the social and economic conse­
quences of the war of 1967. See 6 The Labour Review. Amman, 
1983, p. 33; hereinafter referred to as Ali Isa.
See the report of Jordan under Art. 17 of the Economic 
Covenant, UH Doc. Ho. E/1984/6/Add, 1 5 ^ ( m 6 >
See Ali Isa, op. cit., p. 3.
See Art. 3(a)
See H.M, King Hussein (May Day speech), op. cit.. p. 3 
Arts. 3(b) and 6.
See Art. 3(b)
See Ali Isa, op. cit., p. 34
Ho available data or information has been published with re­
gard to the last two programmes yet.
See Ali Isa, 'A Hote of the Social Security System', in Labour 
Review, Amman, Vol.8 (1985) Ho. 29-30, p. 78.
See Dr. M. al-Farhan, "Social Security in Jordan", a lecture 
delivered at the Yarmuk University, Irbid, 17th of March 1987.
See above pp. 2.^ £6 ■
For the argument concerning the character of the social wel­
fare rights in general and in the legal dimensions of the
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<229)
(230)
(231)
(232)
(233)
<234)
<235)
<236)
<237)
<238)
<239)
obligation of states parties to the Economic Covenant see 
above  . C-T- •
Art. 2 of the First Protocol,
The First Protocol.
Judgement of 23 of July 1968: 1 EHRR, p. 252, see particularly 
pp. 280-281. See also: Y.B. 11 <1968) p. 832.
Art. 13 <1+2)
The court added that: "the convention lays down no specific 
applications concerning the extent of these means and the man­
ner of their organization or subsidization..."
1  f> • '3-S’t •
Ibid,
nonetheless, failure to admit all the qualified applicants to 
a medical school or a training institution, does not 
constitute a denial of the right to education for those who 
have not been admitted. This was the conclusion reached by 
the German Constitutional Court in 1972. "On the basis of 
Art. 12<1) of the German Constitution, would-be medical 
students complained about being excluded from the Hamburg and 
Munich faculties of medicine on the basis of existing numerus 
clausus regulation,,, the court noted that in the cases were 
individuals are entitled to a share Df some facility provided 
by the government, but finances are not sufficient, it is 
possible to reduce everybody’s share proportionally, This is 
not so with restrictions in admission to education: some are 
completely admitted, some must be completely excluded... the 
court reasoned that the crux of the matter was not done 
justice by either of two views: (i) that the right to
education is nothing more than a right to the education that 
is available; <il) that the right implies the duty of the 
authorities to expand facilities to the point where every 
qualified person can have whatever education he may desire,., 
the court tried to chart a middle-course The essence of its 
reasoning seems to be its statement that, although the right 
to a share in the educational facilities is not fundamentally 
limited to those that are available at a given moment, the 
right is nevertheless, subject to the "restriction of the pas­
sible", that is: what the individual can reasonably require
from the society he lives in." Judgement of 18 July 1972. 
Cited in Vierdag, op. cit.. p. 90
See para, (a)
Mane of the previous constitutions had mentioned the right to 
education.
Art. 6(1)
Law Mo. 16 (1964), see JOG, Mo. 176; 26/5/1964, p. 730.
Hereinafter referred to as the Law of Education of 1964.
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<240) See Arts. 2 - 8.
<241) Art. 13 <1)
<242) Arts. 3 - 4 .
<243) Paras, <5 - 11).
<244) Similar provision is also introduced under the UDHR.
"...education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stages". See Art. 26 <1), This was the legal
background of the provision of Art. 20 of the constitution of
Jordan, whilst the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Law of 
Education <1964) were based on the provisions of the then
draft covenant and Art. 20 of the constitution.
<245) See Art. 20.
<246) See paras, 1 - 11,
<247) It says: "No student may be discharged from school before the
age of sixteen, except for some special health conditions."
<248) See above p, 3} £ e
<249) See the Ministry of Education report of 1984-1985 <education
in figures),
<250) Ibid. In the year 1983-4 for instance the rate of enrolment
was 89.3% of all Jordanians between 6 - 1 1  years of age. See 
the Ministry of Education annual report 1983/4.
<251) Ibid. See also the Annual Report of 1984/5
<252) Art, 13 <2)<b),
<253) That is true, although students from some villages have to
travel every day to the nearest town for their secondary
education.
<254) The Ministry of Education, "The Educational System of Jordan",
a report submitted to the ordinary meeting of the Arab 
Ministers of Education, Amman, 1985, Hereinafter referred to 
as <The Educational Systems Report).
<255) Ibid.
<256) Ibid. para. 8.
<256a) See the report of Jordan under Art. 17 of the Economic
Covenant, UN Doc, No. E/1984/6/Add. 15^ (lq£&y •
<257) See the annual report of the Ministry of Education Amman 1985.
According to the statistics of 1983/84 for instance, the num­
ber of the students in this section of secondary education was
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(25,310) i.e. well above 25% of the total number of students 
in secondary education in general.
(258) See Muhammad A. Tigani, Social and Economic Development Plan
of Jordan (1981-85). Amman, 1981.
(259) According to Prof. A. Bedran the annual cost of each student
in Jordanian universities is 850 JD. The student pays only
350 JD and the government pays the rest, Prof. A. Bedran, al- 
Dustur symposium "Higher Education between the Public and 
Private Sectors", see al-Dustur (newspaper) Amman 3/8/85. p. 
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LEGAL SAFEGUARDS.
Under the Covenants, States parties undertake to take legislative 
measures to ensure the practical implementation of the declared rights 
and freedoms at the domestic levels15 Such an undertaking means that 
a specific role has been assigned to the constitution and municipal 
laws of each state party to play in the process of the implementation 
of the declared rights and freedoms at the national level.*25 Since 
the purpose of the Covenants is to secure the actual implementation of 
those rights, mere introduction of abstract legal provisions declaring 
equivalent standards at the domestic level will not suffice.
If the constitution and domestic laws are to play their role in 
full, they must include some legal guarantees to ensure the implement­
ation of those provisions in practice. The question which arises here 
therefore is: what are these legal safeguards that the national le­
gislator must introduce in order to achieve this purpose? Considering 
that these legal safeguards are intended for the implementation of 
some legal provisions, one would firstly look for an independent 
court, by whom those provisions are to be interpreted and applied, An 
independent judiciary is a valuable guarantee for the rights and free­
doms of the individual. If rendered independent, the judiciary would 
be able to protect the declared rights from being violated by the gov­
ernment or anybody else. Evidently, the judiciary is the 'weakest' 
amongst the three branches of government. For it does not possess in­
fluence over the sword nor the purse, <35 Its independence and 
consequently its ability to protect human rights itself needs to be 
protected. It is thus the duty of national legislators to provide 
such protection, through the constitution and domestic legislation.
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This is a central point in the role of the constitution and domestic 
law in the implementation of the international standards of human 
rights at the national level,
However, the judicial independence would lose its significance if 
the legislature or the executive were free to bar access to the in­
dependent courts, The national legislature must guarantee the right 
of access to court for everyone whose declared rights have been vio­
lated by anybody. Special protection is needed against violations by 
the administration or by individuals acting in their official capa­
city, Judicial review of administrative action is therefore the 
second legal safeguard which the constitution and domestic law should 
seek to establish as a fundamental constitutional right, which cannot 
be forfeited or abrogated by legislative or executive action.
Thirdly, another important area to be considered in the field of 
domestic implementation of the international standards of human rights 
are the emergency powers. Experience tells us that unbridled emergen­
cy powers constitute a serious threat to the rights and freedoms of 
the individual. They are a formidable weapon placed in the hands of 
the government, who usually tend to abuse them to the furthest pos­
sible extent. It is thus a crucial part of the role of the consti­
tution and domestic laws to impose reasonable limits on the extent of 
and exercise of the emergency powers and to restrict their application 
to the utmost demanding circumstances, and in the narrowest possible 
manner.
In this part, we shall be discussing the meaning and the import­
ance of the suggested legal safeguards in the context of the Constitu­
tion and the laws of Jordan, in order to assess the value of those 
safeguards and the role they play in the actual implementation of the
Modern International Standards of Human Rights in that country.
1. The independence of the judiciary;
2. Judicial review of administrative action;
3. Restricted emergency powers.
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CHAPTEK V .
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
"I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, 
that the greatest scourge an angry heaven ever inflicted
upon an ungrateful and a sinning people is an ignorant,
a corrupt or a dependent Judiciary,"*45
1. THE JUDICIARY AS THE VINDICATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Traditionally, the functions of government are divided into three 
major divisions. These are namely, legislative, executive and adjudi­
cative. The legislature should make the laws and the executive should
execute them and the judiciary should interpret and apply these laws
to individual cases. Long ago, Montesquieu had warned against the 
concentration of these powers in the hands of one man or a group of 
men. He argued that if the three functions were to be exercised by 
the same authority, it would became an absolute and consequently 
oppressive body.*e 5
When it comes to the protection of the rights and freedoms of the 
individual, we have already maintained that the national constitution 
should contain provisions recognizing those rights and defining the 
legitimate restrictions which may be imposed thereon. These consti­
tutional rights undoubtedly form a bind on the powers of both the 
legislature and the executive. Neither of them may lawfully infringe 
or disregard the provisions of the constitution, It is always pos­
sible that while regulating the practice of those rights, the legis­
lature may penetrate the protective constitutional shield by imposing 
additional limitations on any of those rights, it is equally possible 
and even more likely that the executive may also undermine the rights
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of the individual especially in cases of conflict between them and the 
general policies or programmes of the government of the day,
It is thus, the judiciary who may be entrusted with the task of 
protecting the individual's rights. As a guardian of the constitu­
tional rights, the judiciary itself needs to be protected from outside 
influences particularly from the influence and pressure exerted by the 
other two branches (the legislature and the executive). If rendered 
an independent and co-equal branch of government, the judiciary would 
certainly be capable of being a trustworthy vindicator of human 
rights. Accordingly, a substantial part of the role of the national 
constitutions and domestic laws in the implementation of the inter­
national standards of human rights, is to secure the independence of 
the judiciary vis a vis the other arms of the government. Without 
this, the aforementioned role could hardly be fulfilled.
In the case of Jordan, the Constitution has designated the judi­
ciary as an independent branch of the Government and has devoted 
several provisions for the preservation of such independence. ce:* The 
third chapter deals with the distribution of powers between the three 
branches of Government,<7r> In addition to an Article declaring the 
nation as the source of all powers, and that the nation shall exercise 
its powers in the manner prescribed by the Constitution,ce;> the 
latter contains three separate Articles, each instituting a different 
branch of Government. Whilst Article 25 provides that the 
legislative power shall be vested in the National Assembly, and the 
King, cso Article 26 vests the executive power in the King who 
exercises it through his Ministers in accordance with the provision of 
the Constitution.
372
Article 26 stipulates that: "the judicial power shall be exercised 
by the various courts of law, and all judgements shall be given in ac­
cordance with the law and pronounced in the name of the King."
Having instituted the judiciary as a separate and co-equal branch 
of government, the constitutional legislator devoted chapter six to 
the regulation of the judicial function of the state. It contains the 
basis of the judicial system and enshrines some constitutional guar­
antees for the independence of the judiciary,
According to Article 97, judges enjoy full independence "and in 
the exercise of their judicial function, they are subject to no au­
thority other than that of the law."
Article 101(1) stipulates that: "The courts shall be open to all
and are free from any interference in their affairs." It is under 
these constitutional provisions that the relevant laws relating to the 
independence of the judiciary have been enacted. Namely, qanoon 
tashkeel al-imhakem al-nedhamia (The Law of the Formation of Regular 
Courts), Law No. 26 of 1952 and qanoon esteqlal al-qadha No. 49 of 
1972, (The Law of the Independence of the Judiciary)c105
There are several aspects to the independence of the judiciary, 
such as the independent administration of justice and the exclusion of 
interference or pressure, especially from the other arms of the gov­
ernment. However before discussing any of these aspects, it may be 
helpful to cast some light on the judicial system in Jordan in general 
and on the hierarchy of courts thereunder, No reference tD the 
judicial system and the hierarchy of courts in Jordan has been made in 
any of the Jordanian reports to the HRC so far, though information on 
this point was required since the initial report in 1978. During the 
consideration of the latter Sir Vincent Evans (a member of the HRC)
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remarked that} with respect to the remedies available within the 
Jordanian legal system to secure the rights referred to under the 
Covenant^ a general description of the judicial system was required. 
He wanted to know the types of courts and their jurisdiction, and 
specifically asked whether there were military courts which might try 
civilians during the state of emergency.c1 3
2. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
As part of the Islamic Empire, Jordan adhered to the traditional 
Islamic Judicial system. Under this system, the judiciary was never 
an independent branch of government. The principle of separation of 
powers as we understand it today does not seem to have received much 
attention in early Islamic political thought. In the Islamic Judicial 
System, the judge is considered to be the agent of the Sultan (the 
Sovereign), who appoints the judge, and delegates jurisdiction at his 
own discretion. Judges can also be removed from office at the Sover­
eign's pleasure.*11 *
This tradition had influenced the degree of independence of the 
judiciary in Jordan, throughout the Ottoman era, and during the 
earlier years of modern Jordan until the proclamation of the present 
Constitution in 1952, The latter has established the judiciary as
a co-equal branch of government and rendered judges subject to no 
authority other than that of the law,C13> It provides that: "Judges
are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions, they 
are subject to no authority other than that of the law. C1A:> There 
is no equivalent provision in any of the previous constitutions <1928 
and 1946). Instead, Article 55 of the Constitution of 1946 provided 
that:
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"Judges of the civil and sharia courts shall be appointed 
by Royal Decrees, and may not be dismissed except in 
accordance with ordinances issued by the Council of 
Ministers and assented to by the King,"
In other words, the powers of appointment to and removal from judi­
cial offices were vested exclusively in the executive. As regards the 
present judicial system, the distinction has been made between three 
categories of courts.'155
In this category, there are two types of religious courts:-
1> The Sharia Courts.
These are traditional Islamic courts, consisting of Muslim lawyers 
(.qudha Sharieen')cie:> and scattered in the major towns, with a sharia 
court of appeal located in Amman. According to Article 105 of the 
Constitution, their jurisdiction is limited to the matters of personal 
status of Muslims, to awqaf (Islamic trustees) and blood money 
idiyeh), when the parties are Muslims, or when one of the parties is 
not a Muslim, but all parties agreed upon the jurisdiction of the
Sharia court. For the administration of the Sharia courts, Article 3
Df the law of the formation of the Sharia courts provides for the
establishment of the Jfajlis al-Qadha al Shari (the Sharia Judicial 
Council). It consists of the Nudeer al-Sharia (a government official) 
and two other sharia judges to be appointed by qadhi al-qudha (the
Sharia Chief Justice) who himself is appointed by the King. The Coun­
cil is the competent body governing the appointment, promotion, trans­
fer, discipline and dismissal of the Sharia Judges. Its decisions 
however, are to be submitted by the qadhi al-qudha to the King and
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they are not executable unless they are assented to and signed by the 
Ki ng.
2) The Ion-Muslim Religious Tribunals,
These courts were first established under Ottoman rule and still
remain operative in modern Jordan. According to the Hanafi
School,*175 non-Muslim religious communities must not be subjected to
Islamic laws, at least with regard to their personal status matter
which should be left to their own churches and religious leaders to
regulate and deal with in accordance with their religious convictions.
In the Constitution, it says:
"The tribunals of religious communities are the tribunals 
of the non-Muslim religious communities which were or 
will be recognized by the Government as being esta­
blished in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.,,cie>
It also adds that these tribunals are to be established in accord­
ance with a special law to be enacted concerning them.
Such a law is to define their jurisdiction in matters of personal 
status and trusts constituted for the benefit of the community con­
cerned. Matters of personal status of such communities are the same 
matters as apply in the case of Muslims, i.e. those within the juris­
diction of the (Sharia courts.
Same Jordanian lawyers have criticized the system of the religious 
courts and have urged the legislature to abolish them. According to 
Mr. Al-Halasa52105 the historical reasons which justified the 
existence of such courts have now disappeared. It is thus high time 
that the legislature should unify the judicial system by transferring 
the jurisdiction of the religious courts to the regular courts. He
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also adds that Egypt had the same system until 1955, when the re­
ligious courts were abolished by law lo. 642 of 1955. <:215
B -  IHB-SEE£IAL-JQCffim.
The relevant two Articles of the Constitution are 102 and 110.
The latter provides that: "Special courts shall exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions of the law constituting them." The
significance of these courts can better be appreciated when the above
provision is read in conjunction with Article 102, as amended in
1958.CSS3 It says:
"Regular courts of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall 
have jurisdiction over all persons in all matters.., 
except in matters which, by the provisions of the 
Constitution, or of any law for the time being in force, 
fall within the jurisdiction of the religious courts or 
special courts."
This Article authorises the legislature to take any matter under 
the jurisdiction of the regular courts and transfer it to a special 
court<s), which in most cases lacks the independence and the ex­
perience of the regular courts. Within this category, the 
distinction however may be made between two types of special courts.
1> Special Courts connected with the Ministry of Justice, and are
These include the Income Tax Court of Appeal, the Court of the
Property of the State, the Court of Land and Water Settlement, 
Customs Courts, (first instance and appeal), and the Courts of the 
Municipalities, These courts are special in the sense that they have 
limited jurisdiction to adjudicate in specific types of disputes ra­
ther than general jurisdiction similar to that of regular courts,
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Apart from that, they are composed of 'independent1 judges who are 
subject to no authority other than that of the law. They could be 
described as specialized rather than special courts. Establishment of 
such courts therefore, does not seem to pose a great threat to the in­
dependence of the judiciary,
2) Special Courts, outside the Judicial Organization.
These courts are being established by the executive in accordance 
with special laws enacted for that purpose. They are manned by or­
dinary administrative or military officers who are subject to their 
respective superiors, and lack the independence necessary to decide 
upon disputes themselves. In most cases, there is no appeal against 
their judgements, and in all cases, their decisions are to be ratified 
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, or the Minister of the 
Interior, the Prime Minister or the King, as the case may be.
Among this group come the Military Courts, the Police Courts, the 
Court of the Security of the State, Martial-Law Courts, and the Ad­
ministrative Governor's Courts. We have already mentioned that 
Article 102 of the Constitution as amended in 1958, authorizes the 
legislature to establish as many of these special courts as it deems 
necessary. In practice, many issues relating to the constitutional 
rights are involved within the jurisdiction of these courts, espe­
cially civil and political rights such as the right to personal liber­
ty, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of Assembly and Asso­
ciation.
Considering the fact that these courts are formed and controlled 
by the administration, they cannot be regarded as protectors of the 
individual's rights against the state.
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The most important example in this category is the Martial-Law 
Court which has been created since 1967 and has vast jurisdiction and 
powers to try civilians. As will be explained later, the court is 
composed of military officers and is not required to observe the 
procedural guarantees provided for under the Criminal Procedure 
Code.
C -  THE REGULAR ..COURTS.
The Constitution uses the term ' Nedhmyh' (regular) to distinguish 
this category from the religious and special courts. C2S5 These are 
the courts of General Jurisdiction in Jordan. According to Article 
102 of the Constitution the regular courts of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan:
"have jurisdiction over all persons in all matters, civil 
and criminal, including cases brought by, and against, 
the government, except in matters which, by the pro­
vision of the constitution, or of any law for the time 
being in force, fall within the jurisdiction of a reli­
gious or a special court,"
One of the most fundamental principles of the judicial system of
Jordan is that the Muhakamat (litigations) are to be conducted in two
stages. Consequently, the Law of Formation of the Regular Courts,C2e>
has divided the pyramid of the courts into two levels,
1) The Lower Courts:
a) Mahakem al-suleh (Courts of the Peace).
These are small courts which may be found in all major towns; they 
consist of one judge Known as qadhi alsuleh (the judge of the 
peace).c 3 Basically, they have jurisdiction in all civil cases 
where the value of the claim does not exceed 250 JD's (£500). csss:*
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Their criminal jurisdiction has been extended to include all crim­
inal offences when the maximum punishment does not exceed two 
years imprisonment with or without a fine, except those which by 
virtue of special legal provision, have been transferred to an­
other court other than the court of the peace.
The Judge of the Peace acts upon complaints from private citi­
zens or a report from the Dhabdha Adliah (Judicial Police). He is 
also bound by the Criminal Procedure Cade and exercises the powers 
of the public prosecutor with regard to detention and release on 
bail, According to Article 136 of the Criminal Procedures Code, 
the Judge of the Peace may grant or refuse to grant release on 
bail, when applied for. Yet, in either case, he is always at lib­
erty to revoke or revise his decision if he thinks it is necessary 
at any time. Such decisions may be appealed against in the Court 
of Appeal within three days for the public prosecution from the 
date of the returning of the papers to it, and from the date of 
notification for the defendant. <3C’;>
However, all the decisions of the Judge of the Peace are ap­
pealable to the competent court, the variation is only with regard 
to the latter. The Court of First Instance is the competent court 
in any of the following:
1) criminal cases where the imposed punishment does not ex­
ceed a fine of 5 JD,
2) civil cases when the value of the claim does not exceed 10 
JD. All other decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeal.
b) Mahakem al-Bedaih (The Courts of JF.ir.st Instance),
In Jordan, the Court of First Instance is a court of general 
jurisdiction, i.e. it is the competent court for any claim that
380
has not been specifically assigned to the jurisdiction of any 
other court,C31> by virtue of a specific piece of legislation, A 
court of first instance is usually located in the capital of each 
province or governorate. It consists of a president and a number 
of judges as may be necessary,<335
A session of the Court of First Instance may be composed of 
one, two or three judges, depending upon the magnitude of the case 
as follows:
1) It sits as a court with solely one judge in civil cases, 
where the value of the claim does not exceed 500 JD, and coun­
ter claims regardless of the value. Any claim resulting from 
the original one such as those relating to interest, damages, 
legal fees, regardless of the value. C33:>
- all misdemeanours which fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Judge of the Peace. C345
2) Two Judges Session:
- all other civil cases and when it sits as a Court of Appeal 
from the decisions of the Judge of the Peace in civil cases.
- all criminal cases where the prescribed punishment is 
imprisonment or hard labour for less than fifteen years, and 
when it sits as a Court of Appeal for the decisions of the 
Judge of the Peace in criminal cases.
-Me
In cases of disagreement between/two judges, whether during the 
session or on the final decision, the President of the court must ap­
point a third judge to take part in the procedures from that stage, 
providing that all previous procedures are explained and made avail­
able to him. C3S:>
c) Three Judge Session.
381
A bench, of three judges is to be farmed in the mast serious of 
criminal cases, where the prescribed punishment ranges from death 
to more than fifteen years imprisonment or hard labour.
The Upper Courts:
a) Mahakem al-Estauaf (The Courts of Appeal).
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, there are two Courts of 
Appeal, one in Amman and the other in Jerusalem, each of them con­
sists of a president and a number of judges. A Court of Appeal 
sits in benches of three judges, and in cases of disagreement 
among judges, majority vote is required.<3e> When its jurisdic­
tion is being invoked, Amman's Court of Appeal may review any 
judgement issued by any court of first instance or court of the 
peace in the East Bank of Jordan, and the same is true of 
Jerusalem’s Court, with regard to the West Bank.c3-7*
The Supreme Court is located in Amman and represents the high­
est court of law in Jordan. The court consists of two presidents 
and a number of judges as may be necessary, It functions as a 
Court of Cassation (Cour de Cassation), in civil and criminal 
cases and as a High Court of Justice (HCJ), or Mahkmat Adel Ullia 
in administrative cases. In either case, the bench must consist 
of a president and four justices, except when reviewing a decision 
of a court of the peace, C3S:> A panel session is required when the 
Court of Appeal insists on its previous decision after being de­
clared void by the Supreme Court. <33:> However, all decisions are 
to be taken by a majority vote.
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As a Court of Cassation, it may review the decision of the Courts 
of Appeal in all criminal cases and in all civil cases where the value 
of the claim exceeds 100 JD. In this capacity its jurisdiction may be 
invoked upon a point of law only. As a High Court of Justice,
its jurisdiction is limited to administrative cases.
Before concluding this section on the hierarchy of courts in 
Jordan, it is important to mention the public prosecution, especially 
with regard to its structure and function. Article 13 of the law of 
the Formation of the Regular Courts requires that:
1. A tfuwazaf (Government Official)
known as the Faies al~Neabh al-Ammh (Chief of the Public 
Prosecution), be appointed in the Supreme Court.CA15 The Chief of 
the Public Prosecution enjoys the same treatment as the justice of 
the Supreme Court, with regard to his salary, promotions and offi­
cial status. All members of the Public Prosecution are his sub­
ordinates, including his deputy who has the same privileges as de­
fined by the law,
2. In each Court of Appeal, a Muwazaf known as al-naib al-A'am
(The Attorney-General) must be appointed. Attorney-Generals and 
their deputies exercise all the jurisdictions and powers delegated 
to him under the Criminal Procedure Code and all other laws.
3. "In each Court of First Instance, there shall be one official or 
more, known as al-Mudai al~A‘ajB*'c*3) (the Public Prosecutor). A 
public prosecutor m y  also be appointed in any court of the peace, 
All members of the public prosecution are subject to the admin­
istrative superiority rule. Those of the appeal, first instance
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courts and the courts of the peace, are directly connected with the 
Attorney-General and they are bound by his instructions and orders, 
with regard to the administrative affairs and the initiation of 
criminal procedures.
They all are supervised by the Chief of the Public Prosecution and 
directly connected with the Minister of Justice in accordance with the 
administrative hierarchy,
The Public Prosecution performs many functions as provided for in 
the various laws. The most important one is the initiation of crim­
inal proceedings on behalf of the community (Dawa al-Haq al~A'am) in 
criminal cases. As far as the preliminary examination of criminal 
cases is concerned the public prosecutor performs similar function as 
that of a Magistrate in the English legal system, In civil cases, 
brought by the Government against individuals, where the law does not 
allow direct execution, the Attorney-General represents the Government 
as plaintiff, All claims brought by private individuals against the 
Government are to be instituted against the Attorney-General. The 
Chief of Public Prosecution represents the administration before the 
HCJ in all the cases brought by individuals challenging the legality 
of administrative actions.
In Jordan, the public prosecution exercises both the power to in­
vestigate and the power to prosecute. According to a former Deputy 
Attorney-General, the latter has managed to perform the two tasks with 
honesty and impartiality and maintained a just balance between the 
individual's freedom and public interest. 5
With regard to their judicial functions, members of the public 
prosecution enjoy similar privileges and immunities equivalent to 
those of the judges.
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3 -  lUDEPETOBFT ADMINISTRATION OF J U S T I C E .
It is doubtful that the independence of the judiciary can be en­
sured for long if the administration of the judicial organization is 
left to any authority other than that of the judiciary itself,
A - THE PRIICIPLES UPON WHICH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF JORDAN LS BASED.
a) Komina 1 fees....payable by the P1 aintiff;
In modern Jordan, judges do not receive their salary from the 
litigants. CAe:> They are public officials, and their salaries are 
paid by the public treasury of the state. However, in order not 
to waste the court's time, for claims that are neither serious nor 
well-founded, the law requires payment of some nominal fees to be 
paid by the person who brings a claim to the court of law. The 
final burden of this payment is to be placed on the defeated party 
at the end of the proceedings. Since it was not intended to pre­
vent people from seeking justice and protection by the courts, the 
law allows the president of the court or the Judge of the Peace to 
postpone such payment in a case of a poor person, if the former is 
satisfied that the latter has reasonable grounds for his allega­
tion.
b) Two Stages of Litigation.
In regular and religious courts, almost all cases may be in­
vestigated on two levels. Firstly, cases are to be decided by a 
lower court, usually the court of the peace or the court of first 
instance. If either party is not satisfied with the decision of 
that court, the law permits him to appeal to a higher court which 
re-examines the facts of the whole case and either upholds the
385
decision of the lower court or reverses it and issues a new judge­
ment.
c) Single and mu 11 i-Ju dge Hearingsi
The Jordanian legislature did not choose to apply any of those 
two systems on its own, but indeed combined them together. The 
Lower Courts, the Courts of Peace and sometimes the Court of First 
Instance are single-judge courts. Higher courts are always multi­
judge courts, cso:*
This is an important principle which has been declared and 
protected by Article 101(2) of the constitution. In accordance 
with the latter and as a general rule, the sessions of the courts 
should be open to all, "unless the court considers that it should 
sit in camera" for the sake of public order and d e c o r u m . 31 
e) Independence of Judges:
We have already mentioned that it is a basic requirement for 
justice to be dispensed even-handedly, This cannot be achieved if 
the judges are not independent or are subject to any authority 
other than that of the law. During the consideration of the 
supplementary report of Jordan in 1981, members of the HRC 
enquired about the degree of independence enjoyed by the judiciary 
in Jordan, and wanted to know the system of appointment and 
dismissal of judges and the role that the executive plays in these 
processes. Further information on this matter was also asked for 
by members of the H R C . n o n e t h e l e s s ,  no reference was made to 
such matters in the second supplementary report.<eit>5
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However, the Jordanian Constitution declares that; "Judges are 
independent and in the exercise Df their judicial function, they are 
subject to no authority other than that of the law. "ce:a;> Furthermore, 
Article 101 protects the courts from any outside intervention, in 
their function. It says: "The courts shall be open to all and are
free from any interference in their affairs. "<B3:>
Obviously, neither the judges nor the courts would be independent 
or free from intervention and outside influence, if the appointment of 
judges and the tenure of judicial offices are left in the hands of 
anybody other than the judges themselves. It was in accordance with 
the above constitutional provisions, that the law of the Independence 
of the Judiciary was e n a c t e d . T h e  latter provides for the 
establishment of al-Majlis al-qada'i (the Judicial Council) as an 
independent body which consists of senior judges, and is charged with 
the task of supervising and preserving the independence of the judi­
ciary.
B —  THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Under Article 4 of the law of the Independence of the Judiciary, 
of 1972, *66:1 the Council consists of;
1) The First President of the Supreme Court, as a president.
2) The Second President of the Supreme Court,
3) The Chief of the Public Prosecution.
4) Waqeel Vazirat al~Adeil (The Under-Secretary of State for Justice),
5) Presidents of the two Courts of Appeal.
6) An Inspector to be appointed by the Minister of Justice for one
year.CBe>
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The Council is the principal body of the Judicial Organization, 
and is responsible for the administration of justice and judicial af­
fairs, Its function includes particularly the following:
1) Appointment of Judges.
The Jordanian legislature did not choose the method Df elec­
tion for judicial offices, nor that of direct appointment by the 
Executive. Instead, Article 13(1) of the LIJ provides that:
"appointment to judicial offices shall ensue from a recommendation 
from the Minister of Justice, and a decision by the Judicial 
Council and a Royal Decree," Although the same Article stipulates 
that the Minister must nominate more than one person to the post, 
and the fact that the decision is to be taken by the Judicial 
Council and not the Minister, some judges have considered the
present provision to be an unwelcome development, Under the 
previous law, (Law Mo.19 of 1955) appointments take place after a 
decision from the Judicial Council and a Royal Decree, without any 
intervention by the executive, Comparing the two provisions, 
Judge F, Kilany argued that the present law provides less pro­
tection for judges by allowing the Minister of Justice to inter­
fere in the process of their appointment.
Less than two years later, Judge Kilany*s argument was proved 
to be correct. Four vacancies were needed to be filled by the 
Judicial Council from a list of candidates, submitted by the 
Minister of Justice in accordance with Article 13(1) of the LIJ. 
In Case Mo, 77/74, before the HCJ. Mr. A, A. Labeeb and Mr.
M,D. Abdulqadir, complained to the Court that they were illegally
excluded from nominations by the Minister of Justice to be ap­
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pointed as judges, In the complaint, they stated the following 
facts:
1. They have been working in the Ministry of Justice since 1962, 
and they are currently on the fifth grade and that their annual 
reports are constantly of good or very good calibre.
2. Both of them have held their LLB degrees since 1966.
3. Because of the Minister's nomination, the vacancies have been 
filled by other colleagues who received their degrees in 1966, 
1967, 1968 and 1969.
4. The Minister has excluded them from this and all previous 
nominations despite the fact that they are from among the senior 
officials in the Ministry of Justice, with regard to their ser­
vice, ranks and the date of their law degrees, and thus, they de­
serve to be nominated and appointed before those who actually have 
been nominated and appointed.
They challenged the decision on the following grounds:
a) It constitutes an abuse of the power vested in the Minister,
b) It violates the doctrine of equality before the law.
In a highly questionable reasoning, the HCJ mentioned that:
"...in accordance with Article 13, appointments depend 
upon a decision from the Judicial Council and a Royal 
Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Jus­
tice, In the case of trainee judges, the law does not 
specify any further procedure as is the case with regard 
to those who are of the fourth or higher rank, who are 
required to sit for the competition examination. As far 
as trainee judges are concerned, all that is required for 
nomination is the first law degree (LLB) and three years 
of service in the Ministry of Justice. Providing that 
these two conditions are fulfilled, the Minister of 
Justice has an absolute discretion as to who may be 
nominated, notwithstanding that there may be some other 
eligible person who may have served longer periods and 
graduated earlier. So long as those who have actually 
been nominated are legally qualified, the choice between
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them and other qualified officials is a discretionary
matter, ultimately resting with the Minister of
Justice."
It is important however, to notice that the court did not address 
any of the crucial grounds mentioned by the complainants. Instead, the 
court explained the law as it stands and the requirements for appoint­
ments for judicial offices and some other simple and undisputed facts, 
such as;
"...it is the right of the Judicial Council to choose the 
required number from among those nominated by the
Minister, and hence the Minister has nominated eight
qualified officials after using his discretion, and that 
the Council has chosen four from among them... and that 
the Judicial Council has rightfully used its right to
choose... thereupon we decided to dismiss the com­
plaint. "<SQ>
Obviously, the key issue in this case was not the validity of the 
Judicial Council*s decision, nor its right to choose the required num­
ber from amongst the nominees. It was indeed the decision of the Min­
ister of Justice not to include the complainants on the list of nomi­
nees, which, in their opinion amounts to abuse of his discretionary 
power and violates the doctrine of equality before the law. It is
difficult to see why the court ignored the submissions of the ap­
plicants, and focused instead on some undisputed procedural aspects.
As far as the substantive conditions for appointments to judicial 
offices are concerned they are the same as those required for appoint­
ment in any other government department,CS1* in addition to:
1 - A Jordanian nationality.
2 - A Law Degree from a recognised university or institution.
3 - A minimum age of twenty-five years,
It is important however to note that the Jordanian legislature has 
disregarded the controversy in Islamic law regarding the appointment
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of women to judicial offices, ,::se:, Legally speaking, these conditions 
apply to all Jordanians, men and women equally. Nonetheless, there 
has not been a woman judge so far in Jordan, although there are a num­
ber of female lawyers practising in the country, Available records do 
not indicate any rejected applicants.
Apart from the above substantive and procedural requirements all 
Jordanian judges are required to sit for the competition examination. 
In order to qualify for this examination one should have a Ph.D. de­
gree in law or a Masters degree with one years service as a trainee 
judge. Holders of a diploma or first degree should either join the 
Bar for five years or the service of the Ministry of Justice far three 
years and serve two years as a trainee judge, Once one has been ap­
pointed as a judge, one's initial status and rank are to be defined in 
accordance with one’s qualifications and experience. Following 
promotions are subject to the normal rules of promotion.
2) Promotions.
Promotion of judges could be abused and therefore provide a 
wide channel for intervention by the executive to impair the in­
dependence of the judiciary. The law thus must provide the neces­
sary guarantees to exclude such a possibility, and they may in­
clude the exclusion of intervention by the executive and the 
introduction of objective basis for promotion,
a) Non-interference by the executive.
The promotion of judges is placed in the hands of the Judicial 
Council. If all were controlled by the executive then promotion 
would be granted only to the most obedient of judges and the rest 
would be ignored, Such a situation could render the judiciary as
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a whole merely obedient puppet, whose strings are pulled by the 
executive. However, placement of the promotion of judges solely 
in the hands of the Judicial Council, is not enough in itself. The 
executive still could block the promotion of any undesirable judge 
by not providing the required funds in the budget or by excluding 
the higher post itself. As long as the budget of the judiciary 
forms a part of the national budget, the executive will always be 
able to control its funds by giving or holding back, as it 
pleases. Independence of the Judiciary thus, requires a separate 
budget for the judiciary to be planned and distributed by the 
Judicial Council free from the control of the executive.
b) Introduction of Objective Rules for Promotion:
Previously adopted objective rules would ensure the judge's right 
to promotion, regardless of any personal considerations.
—  £hg_Rule of. g.eniprjty;
Some of the Arab countries have adapted the Rule of Seniority.c*575 
According to this rule promotion to the post above takes place 
every certain number of years, automatically regardless of any 
other factors. Although it employs a considerable degree of ob­
jectivity and eliminates personal considerations, automatic pro­
motions may and usually do result in carelessness and a lack of 
concern on the part of the judges, since their personal perform­
ance, qualifications and conduct do not count.
—  IheJKule of Efficiency and. Competence.
As a basis for promotion to higher judicial offices the doctrine 
of efficiency encourages the judges to improve their personal per­
formance, by means of legal research accuracy and creativity which 
are indispensable to successful judgeship.
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In the LIJ the Jordanian legislature adopted this rule but with­
out ignoring the element of seniority. Article 19 of the said law 
provides that:
’Promotion of judges shall occur upon a decision by the 
Judicial Council and a Royal Decree on the basis of 
efficiency and competence derived from the reports about 
them and the disciplinary actions imposed upon them and 
their personal performance within the same rank. In the 
case of equal performance, the senior shall be chosen.”
Efficiency is thus a crucial requirement for the promotion of 
judges. Efficiency is to be judged on the basis of reports received 
on the judge concerned. Yet the term 'reports' is used in its general 
sense, and without limiting it to the reports of the Judicial In­
spection Commission. These could be the reports of any outside body, 
especially the executive and its agents. The impact of the fear of 
such reports could influence the independence of judges who are, ac­
cording to the Constitution, "subject to no authority other than that 
of the law." If the independence of judges is to be preserved, the 
law should protect them against reports from outsiders and should rely 
only 011 the report of the Judicial Inspection Commission.
3) Transfer and Assignment of Judges.
Stability and peace of mind is a prime requirement for the inde­
pendence of the judges. However, that is not to say that a judge 
should serve in the same court throughout the course of his whole 
career. Proper administration of justice might necessitate the 
redistribution and transfer of judges from one place to another. This 
is a two-edged weapon which may considerably affect the independence 
of the judge, if he is constantly confronted with the threat of being 
transferred to another place, each time he gets established in a city,
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□r even to another department outside the judicial organization, Such 
an important aspect of the administration of justice must not be 
placed in the hands of the executive but rather in those of the Judi­
cial Council and should be strictly regulated by law.
In some Arab countries, for instance, judges of certain ranks have 
the right to object to the transfer, and others even require their 
written consent. CSQ> According to Article 91 of the law of the 
Judicial Authority, in Syria, judges are not transferable as a general 
rule. Exceptionally, Article 93 stipulates that in cases of extreme 
necessity, a judge may be transferred providing that he has served for 
at least three years in the same court.
In Jordan, transfer of judges is within the prerogatives of the 
Judicial Council, without any intervention by the executive. Article 
21 of the LIJ as amended in 1977, provides that judges may be trans­
ferred from one post to another impending a decision from the 'Judicial 
Council and a Royal Decree, with no further restrictions, Before 
1977, the same Article required that judges of certain ranks should be 
transferred after three years in the same post. Paragraph Cb) 
provided that no public prosecutor, judge of the peace, member of the 
Court of First Instance or a deputy of the Attorney-General, may serve 
for more than three consecutive years in the same job, and in the case 
of transfer to another post, within the same court, the period may not 
exceed five years 'altogether'. According to paragraph (c) of the 
same Article, no judge or any of the above persons may be re-trans­
ferred to his previous job, before the lapse of a two-year period, 
except in cases of special circumstances to be mentioned in the same 
decision.
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The law also protects judges from transfer or assignment to non­
judicial posts or to any job outside the judicature without the ap­
proval of the Judicial Council. Article 24, provides that:
"No judge may be transferred from the judicature or be assigned to ex­
tra work or any job unless approved by the Judicial Council."
However, FI Halei al-Darorh <in the case of necessity), Article 23 
permits the Minister of Justice to assign a judge to a regular or spe­
cial court or to exercise any of the duties of the public prosecution, 
or to the post of the under-Secretary of State for Justice or the 
Judicial Inspector for a period of up to three months a year,C71J 
Such a period may be extended upon the approval of the Judicial 
Council. Yet, under no circumstances may the assignment be to a 
lower job, or to a post of lower rank than that held by the assigned 
judge.
4) Discipline of Judges.
As all human beings, judges do have weaknesses and faults, and as 
public officers, they also may commit offences and make gross pro­
fessional errors which may justify disciplinary action. Due to the 
status of judges, and the nature of their task, as well as the con­
sequences of the imposition of disciplinary action on them, the law 
usually provides them with special guarantees in the event of such 
actions.
Article 28 of the LIJ provides that:
"Unless caught in the act, a judge may not be arrested 
or seized without the permission of the Judicial Council.
In such a case, the Attorney-General must notify the 
Council within twenty-four hours of the arrest. After 
having heard what the judge has to say for himself, the 
Council may release him whether or not on bail or may 
decide to remand him in custody for any period."
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In the case of a criminal offence, the Council may suspend the 
suspected judge pending trial, and may also order the detachment of 
not more than half of his salary, t7** A disciplinary action is to be 
brought before the Judicial Council by the Attorney-General upon the 
request of the Minister of Justice, who should also notify the Council 
of such a r e q u e s t . T h e  application must indicate the alleged 
misbehaviour and the supporting evidence and be submitted to the 
Council which in turn must summon the judge concerned and initiate the 
proceedings within 15 days. The latter may authorize any relevant
enquiry and may delegate one of its members to investigate the alle­
gations. The Council and the delegated member exercise the privileges 
of regular courts with regard to summoning witnesses. Upon
conclusion of the enquiry, if the Council has decided to continue with 
the proceedings, it should order the judge to appear before the Coun­
cil within a period of not less than a week. The said order must 
indicate in detail the allegation and the evidence. The judge may
appear in person or be represented by a lawyer.
Disciplinary hearings are to be held in camera unless made public upon 
the request of the accused judge, who should be the last to speak. C7S>:> 
A wide range of disciplinary measures are made available to the 
Council, by the law, and may include:
1. Warning
2. Attachment of Salary.
3. Demotion.
4. Dismissal,
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Under the previous law <1955) the decision of the Council were 
final and irreversible by any court, The present LIJ (1972) allows 
judges to appeal against disciplinary decisions to the HCJ.
5. Removal from Office and Retirement of Judges.
Irrevocability of the status of judges is an important guarantee 
of the independence of the judiciary. A judge can only enjoy inde­
pendence if his tenure and livelihood is not dependent upon the whims 
and pleasure of the Executive or the Sovereign. Legal history tells 
us that in the traditional Islamic State, and in the classical 
Western monarchies, judges used to hold their offices as long as they 
continued to evoke the pleasure of the Caliphs and Kings, a situation 
which led to the total subjugation of the judges to the tyrannical 
wishes and desires of the rulers, A major rift was brought about by 
the Act of Settlement of 1700 in England, <eo:> and by the French 
Constitution of 1790 following the French Revolution.<eiJ In modern 
Western democracies, and in most of the Arab countries, judges hold 
their offices during 'good behaviour'. Irrevocability of the 
status of judges, however, does not imply that a judge may not be dis­
missed when there is a lawful ground for it. It only requires that 
such a fundamental guarantee must not be dependent upon the desires 
and inclinations of the executive, but to be entrusted to an inde­
pendent judicial body (the Judiciary Council), for instance, which may 
judge the behaviour of the judge and then revoke his status as a judge 
if deemed appropriate. Two conditions thus may be put forward for the 
lawful dismissal of judges.
Firstly, sufficient grounds, previously prescribed by the law. 
Secondly, such punishment must be imposed by a judicial body independ­
ent from any other branch of government.
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As far as Jordan is concerned, judges are appointed to serve dur­
ing good behaviour. Unless otherwise decided by the Judicial Council, 
they hold their offices until the age of sixty-five. Article 98 of 
the Constitution stipulates that; "judges of the regular and sharia 
courts shall be appointed and dismissed by a Royal Decree in accord­
ance with the provisions of the law." The relevant law is the LIJ and 
precisely the provision of Article 25 thereof which provides that: "a
judge may not be dismissed, lose his job, or be demoted except by a 
decision from the Judicial Council, and a Royal Decree."
Accordingly, a Jordanian judge may not be lawfully dismissed by 
the Council of Ministers or even by the King. That is true, because 
Article 98 of the Constitution provides that: "judges shall be
...dismissed by a Royal Decree in accordance with the provisions of 
the law." The latter requires both a decision by the Judicial Council 
and a subsequent Royal Decree too. Dismissal of judges perpetrated in 
any other manner could thus be regarded as an arbitrary and an unlaw­
ful dismissal.
However, what seems to constitute a threat to the Jordanian judges 
in this context, is the powers conferred upon the Martial Law Gov­
ernor-General by the Emergency Law. In practice, when the Government 
desires the removal of a judge from office, it avoids the provisions 
of the LIJ and the Judicial Council, by resorting to the powers of the 
Martial Law Governor-General, who dismisses judges by irreversible 
administrative decision.
The following case may illustrate this practice. On the second of 
May 1974, the then judge of the Court of the Municipality of the Cap­
ital (Amman), Judge K, Abu-Qurh, sent a telegram of support to Presi­
dent Gaddafi, stating the following:
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"To President Gaddafi and his comrades, members of the 
Revolutionary Council, Tripoli, Libya.
On the occasion of the false allegations made by 
those corrupted amongst the Arab leaders, I would like 
to express my support for your endeavour towards es­
tablishing Islam as a religion and a system of gov­
ernment, and to spreading its banner throughout the 
whale world. Muslims shall support you wherever they 
are, and you should not be intimidated by those cowards 
who fear to voice the calling of God, and you will be 
the victorious. I declare myself a soldier and offer all 
I possess to the service of goals most noble for which 
you too have devoted yourselves. I am under your 
command at any time."c03*
Consequently, Judge Abu-Qurah was dismissed by the Prime Minister 
acting as the Martial Law Governor-General in accordance with Article 
3 of the instructions of the Martial Law Administration for the Gov­
ernment Officials of 1970. When the said judge appealed to the HCJ, 
the latter rejected the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction, on the 
grounds that Article 5 of the Instructions of Martial Administration 
of 1967 prohibits the Court from examining the decisions of Martial 
Law authorities.
4 —  i m BRYBNTIOM WITH. THE JUDICIAL PUWCTIQU,
The principle of non-intervention in the judicial function is an 
essential element of the independence of the judiciary. The role of 
the independent judiciary would be diminished if the judicial function 
itself were not protected against invasion from other branches of 
governzment. Indeed, independence of the judges is not an end, re­
quired for itself, but rather a guarantee necessitated by the nature
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of the judicial function, and the role judges are to play in the com­
munity, Members of both the executive and the legislature lack such a 
necessary guarantee and therefore they must not be allowed to perform 
a judicial function.
In this section, we shall briefly discuss some form of interven­
tion in the judicial function by the executive and the legislature in 
Jordan.
There are numerous forms and methods by which the administration 
can interfere with the judicial function. It may attempt to interfere 
in the judicial proceedings, or to influence the judges or the parties 
personally.
1> Interference with Judicial Proceeding,
- Criminal Cases:
It has already been mentioned that the power to investigate crimi­
nal cases is vested in the public prosecution. ces;> We have also 
mentioned that members of the latter are subject to the adminis­
trative supervision of the Minister of Justice, cee:> That is true 
with regard to the administrative affairs and the power to prose­
cute (.sultat al-etteihairi), but certainly not the power to 
investigate (.sultat al-Tahqeeq), which is a judicial power derived 
directly from the law. c&7:> When performing this function, 
members of the public prosecution form a part of the judiciary, to 
whom the administration may not issue orders or instructions with 
regard to their judicial duties, nonetheless, the executive seems 
very keen to interfere at this stage. As an example, one may re-
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fer to Case Mo, 1047/73, on the 15th August 1973, the public pro­
secutor of Amman arrested Mr, X on the charge of defalcation (.E-
Khtelass'), contrary to the provision of Article 173(2) of the 
Criminal Code and Article 202 of the Company Law of 1964, The 
Court of First Instance refused to release him on bail, when it 
was applied for on the same day. On the next day (16,8.1973), the 
Mudeer al-Am'n al-A'am (Police Commissioner) ordered his release 
and let him free, According to Judge Kilany, that was the first 
time in the legal history of Jordan, that a judicially arrested 
person was set free by the administration, regardless of all judi­
cial proceedings.
Another form of intervention involving criminal proceedings in 
Jordan is that when the administration is not satisfied with the 
findings of the court, the farmer disregards the judicial deci­
sions and takes the initiative itself by trying the person again. 
In most cases, this has led to double jeopardy, and resulted in
persons being tried twice for the same offence. As examples, we
have already mentioned Case Mo. 74/64, where Mrs. X. was acquitted 
by the court of Jerusalem, from the alleged charge, but re-tried 
and convicted by the Administrative Governor, ct3£>;i
- Civil Cases,
In civil cases also, the executive may attempt to influence 
the court during the proceedings, or by partial or non-execution 
of the court's decision. Despite the explicit constitutional and 
other provisions forbidding the administration from interfering 
with the judicial function, the Ministers of Justice in most Arab
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countries always tend to interfere in the judicial proceedings of 
some cases.
As far as Jordan is concerned, the case of Mr. S. Masadeh is an 
outstanding example of such practices, As a Minister of Justice, 
Mr, Masadeh wrote to the president of the Court of First Instance 
of Amman, requesting him to send the file of Case Mo. 807/73, 
which was a civil case pending before the court, to him for
inspection. The president rejected the request and in his letter 
to the Minister he explained the seriousness of such practices and 
the threat it poses to the independence of the judiciary. The
letter stated:
"...inspection of pending cases entails subjection of 
judicial proceedings and decisions to the supervision of 
the administration, a situation which cannot be tolerated 
under any circumstances. Independence of the judiciary
is a sacred principle, protected by the Constitution and
the LIJ itself. One of the fundamental elements of the 
principle of the independence of the judiciary is the 
non-intervention with the judicial proceedings and 
decisions pending trial, by anybody whatsoever."*305
Another example, of such practice is, the letter of the Jordanian
Minister of Justice to the president of the Court Df Appeal in Amman,
requesting the acceptance of some enclosed documents, as evidence for
the benefit of one of the parties in an appeal pending before the
court.*315
The court, however, blocked the intervention and rejected the Min­
ister's request.<3S:5 It is needless to say that the above practices 
do not only violate the Constitution but also the LIJ and the law of 
the inspection of the regular courts which stipulates that:
"The Inspector (the Judicial Inspector) may scrutinize 
the decided cases to examine the manner in which the 
provisions of the laws are being applied thereto; 
especially the Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes and 
specifically the provisions of Article 237 of the former
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and 186 of the latter which regulate the conditions, and 
the contents and reasonings of judicial decisions.nc9S 3
Obviously, the power to inspect the courts is vested in the Judi­
cial Inspector alone, and not in the Minister or anybody else. It 
applies to the decided cases only and for specified purposes, Pending 
cases, therefore, must not be inspected, scrutinized or interfered 
with in any form,
Administrative Cases,
The area of administrative cases is a fertile field for inter­
ference from the executive and is an area where the individual comes 
to the court to challenge an administrative action which has unlaw­
fully and detrimentally affected his rights and freedoms. In some 
Third World countries, and in Arab countries in particular, the ad­
ministration has proved to be highly sensitive to this type of judi­
cial proceedings. For it has not yet been used to witness the re­
versal of its decision by an impartial body, It is not surprising 
thus to observe the administration seeking every possible way to 
influence the administrative courts or to intervene in their pro­
ceedings.
Besides, intervention in the proceedings before administrative 
courts, the administration has shown some reluctance in executing some 
of the unfavourable decisions. This may take the form of delayed or 
even non-execution of the court's judgement at all.
A few examples may illustrate such reluctance: In Case Mo.
77/66 the HCJ denounced the decision of the Council of Ministers, by 
which the latter dismissed Mr. M.S. Safwan from his job as an engineer 
working far the Ministry of Public Works,
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The Minister refused to reinstate the said engineer in accordance with 
the court's decision. 3
In another case on 3.7.1973, the Martial Law Governor-General or­
dered the closure of all snooker and amusement halls in Jordan, revo­
cation of their licenses, expropriation and destruction of all the 
machines. The owners of the said places complained before the HCJ 
which readily denounced the order and described it as an arbitrary 
measure. C3S:* The Administration refused to execute the court's 
judgement and ordered the destruction of the said machines, As a 
result, the owners complained to the ordinary courts which were 
powerless to protect their right to continue with what had been their 
legally licensed businesses. In its judgement, the Supreme Court 
stated that the Administration had committed a gross violation of the 
law by refusing to execute a final judicial decision, yet it could do 
no more than order the payment of compensation. c£>e:>
In other cases, the administration just defers the execution of 
the judgement until it is too late, without declaring its intention of 
non-execution. In the Mango Company Case. the company filed a 
complaint with the HCJ against the Minister of the Economy and the 
Director of Supplies (Modeer al-Tamween) for refusal to issue a 
license to the said company to import Nasser cars from Al-Nasser Car 
Manufacturing, Egypt, in accordance with a contract signed by the two 
companies on the 13th May, 1971. Although the court had declared the 
administrative decision void, the Administration did not issue the 
license until several months later when it was certain that the 
contract had run out and the license was thus useless.
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2) Exert lm . of In f loanee op the Judges.
Another form af intervention by the executive in the judicial 
function which may pose a considerable threat to the independence of 
the judiciary is the exertion of pressure on the judges themselves in 
order to make them more obedient and malleable instruments in the 
hands of the executive. In order to enable them to protect the rights 
and freedoms of the individual, the law should protect the judges from 
being abused,
However, it seems certain that despite all guarantees that may be 
provided for by law, the Administration will always be capable of 
coercing the judges to make them adopt a given point of view or to 
perform a desirable role.
As far as Jordan is concerned, the following examples may explain 
same of these practices.
In 1974, The Minister of Justice requested the Judicial Council to 
remove the president of the Court of First Instance of Amman, and des­
cribed him as being a danger to public security. He also threatened 
that the Government would invoke the Martial Law Regulations if the 
Minister's wishes were not granted. In 1975, the Minister of Justice 
threatened to pension the Chief of Public Prosecution and the
Attorney-General if they did not withdraw the protest which they had
submitted to the Government concerning the arrest of a lawyer by the 
traffic police. Furthermore, the same Minister sent a letter implying
some threat to the president of the HCJ because the court had pre­
viously revised a decision by the Council of Ministers.
According to a senior Jordanian judge, the letter aroused a great 
deal of displeasure and anger among judges and lawyers in general 
because it constituted a gross violation of the independence of the
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judiciary. The crisis was solved by the resignation of the Minister 
who had to leave his office upon the request of the Prime Minister. 
The first thing the new Minister did was to apologise for the deeds of 
his predecessor.
B. IFTBRVBNTIQff BY THE LEGISLATURE.
It has already been mentioned that the Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers requires the distribution of function between the main three 
branches of government and that each branch should exercise its funct­
ion independently without invading the jurisdiction of other branches 
of the government. It was also made clear that independence of the 
judiciary requires the latter to stand on an equal footing with the 
other two branches and that they must not interfere with the judicial 
function. Yet, as far as the legislature is concerned, experience 
tells us that in many countries, the legislative body sometimes as­
sumes a superior position to the other two branches, and seeks to 
intervene with them in many ways. There are various ways in which the 
legislature can intervene, all of which could effect the degree of 
independence that the judiciary enjoys and consequently, impairs its 
ability to be a vindicator of the individual's rights and freedoms.
It is true that the parliament as a political body lacks the 
privileges and the independence which the judiciary enjoys. As poli­
ticians, members of parliament cannot judge controversial issues with­
out including political considerations. Thus, if members of parlia­
ment are to exercise any judicial function, this would simply mean the 
deprivation of those tried by them from the right to be tried by an 
impartial and an independent body. One may argue therefore, that 
parliament should not be allowed to exercise any judicial power, even
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if it is restricted to the trial of its members and Ministers or any 
other specific group of people.
In Jordan, the Constitution does allow the Parliament to exercise 
a judicial function, though it is a limited one. The House of Repre­
sentatives impeaches Ministers by a two-thirds majority vote and the 
Senate tries them under Article 58.
Another form of intervention is when the legislature intervenes 
with the handling of cases by the courts, whether by discussing those 
cases in the Parliament or when the latter introduces a new law or 
amended an existing law solely to influence the outcome of a case 
still pending before a court. Parliament thus must abstain from dis­
cussing cases which for the time being are still being examined by a 
court of law. It also should not change the law in order to influence 
the court's decision in any particular case.
A few examples may explain the point in this argument with regard 
to the Jordanian practice. In Case Mo. 1563/73, before the Court of 
First Instance of Amman, Mr. Mahadeen claimed the right of pre-emption 
with regard to a piece of land in Amman, from the new owner Mr. Z. 
Kamal, to whom the land had been signed over by a society relating to 
the Armed Forces. In order to prevent this, the legislature amended 
the Law of Immovable Property by Law Io.31 of 1974, Article 2, of 
which prohibits the exercise of the right of pre-emption when the pro­
perty is being transferred from a housing society to one of its 
members, and specifically, stated that this provision applies to all 
pending cases "and those that have not received final judgements."
Again, in 1975, the Jordanian legislature amended the Labour Code, 
(Law Mo. 21 of 1960) by Law Mo. 71/75, which provides that, claims 
relating to the wages of overtime work and the time of leave and offi­
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cial holidays shall be inadmissible after three months from the date 
they become due, and that this provision shall apply to all claims 
submitted to courts before the publication of this law and have not 
yet been decided by a final judgement. Obviously, the purpose of this 
amendment was to destroy several claims brought to courts by workers 
of the STatural Resources Authority, seeking payment of overtime wages, 
in lieu of leave and official holidays.
Another example is Case Mo. 48/61, before the HCJ, where the 
latter has declared the decision of the Council of Ministers void 
hence it does not comply with the requirements of Article 9<b) of the 
law of Civil Aviation. * 100;> The said Article requires among other 
things, the Council of Minsters to state the specific reasons for its 
decision when terminating the registration of any Airline Company. In 
this case, the Council of Ministers terminated the registration of the 
Jordanian International Airlines Company, and disallowed it to carry 
on with commercial transportation under the Jordanian Flag, and other 
privileges.
When the decision of the Council was declared void for the above 
reason, the legislature intervened and amended the law to allow the 
Council of Ministers to terminate the registration without stating any 
reasons for its decision, in order to make the court ruling 
useless.c1013
Establishment of special courts or tribunals is another serious 
form of intervention with the judicial function by the legislature. 
By doing so, the legislature minimizes the effectiveness of the inde­
pendence of the judiciary to a considerable extent, If the legis­
lature is at liberty to establish special tribunals to try particular 
types of cases, or individuals, independent courts (regular) would
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lose a great deal of their general jurisdiction to those tribunals; 
and become powerless to protect the rights and freedoms of the in­
dividual from the unlawful actions of the State. This seems to be the 
case for most of the Arab countries, where a substantial part of the 
jurisdiction of the 'independent' courts has been transferred to spe­
cial courts and tribunals. Indeed, the latter lack any form of 
independence and in most cases, they are constituted of army personnel 
or government officials who lack independence not to mention legal 
qualifications and training.
Special courts are usually not required to observe the procedural 
rules observed by ordinary courts, and their decisions are to be sub­
mitted to an administrative authority who may accept it as it comes, 
amend or denounce it.
As a senior judge once remarked: "it is because of the spread of
these courts in the Arab World, that the judiciary has failed to 
perform its role as a vindicator of individual rights and freedoms." 
He added that these courts have executed many political thinkers 
simply because they could not agree with the rulers, and have im­
prisoned far many more innocent people because of their beliefs, If 
freedom and rights were ever to be restored in practice, such courts 
should be eliminated.
In Jordan, we have already mentioned that the Constitution permits 
the establishment of special courts and tribunals, and that there are 
several types of special courts in existence in Jordan, It is also 
true that their jurisdiction includes some issues relating to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.*1023
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—  Reorganization of the Judiciary,
As any other branch of government, the judiciary needs to be up­
dated and reorganized every so often, whenever the need arises. In 
some Arab countries, this fact has been abused and made into a tradi­
tional excuse for intervention with the judicial branch. What usual­
ly happens in practice is that a new piece of legislation is intro­
duced by the legislature providing the Executive with temporary powers 
to dismiss all undesirable judges, in the name of reorganization and 
updating of the judiciary. This task (reorganising and updating) 
should neither be entrusted to the legislature nor the Executive but 
indeed should be left to an independent body within the Judiciary it­
self.
Such interventions have proved to pose a serious threat to the 
independence of the judiciary, and in many cases have resulted in what 
is so-called 'massacre of judges'.c103* One can of course imagine the 
degree of independence that a threatened judge would enjoy.
In Jordan, four of these reform laws have been introduced so far 
under the present Constitution. The first was, Law Ho. 19 of 1955, 
Article 46 of which provided for the establishment of special commit­
tee under the chairmanship of the Minister of Justice. The Committee 
was charged with the task of reforming the judicial organization with­
in six months of its appointments, and was provided with absolute 
powers regardless of any other legislation. Its decisions were made 
final and unchangeable before any court of law. <10A:* Seven years 
later, the law of the Reformation of the Machinery of the Government 
(which includes the judiciary) was introduced and empowered the Coun­
cil of Ministers to dismiss any public officer or government employee 
if the Council was satisfied that he was no longer desirable or
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suitable for the post. Decisions taken under this law were also made 
final and irreversible in any sense whatsoever. c los*
Again, in 1970, a provisional law was issued by the Council of 
Ministers for the reformation of the judiciary. Articles 3 and 4 
guaranteed the Council of Ministers absolute powers to dismiss within 
four months any 'unsuitable judge' and as usual it declared the Coun­
cil's decisions to be final and irreversible.
Finally, and within less than two years the present LIJ,clc,eo was
introduced. Article 44 thereof provides that:
"Despite the provisions of this law or any other legis­
lation, and regardless of the provisions relating tD the 
appointment, dismissal discipline and transfer of judges, 
the Council of Ministers shall upon the recommendation 
of the Minister (Minister of Justice), dismiss any judge 
or transfer him to another department within one month 
of the entry into force of this law,"'10'50
According to a senior Jordanian judge, the aim of the above pro­
vision was to dismiss a large number of independent judges— action 
which has profoundly shaken the image of justice in the public con­
sciousness, and reduced the confidence of the people in the judi­
ciary. '103:1 He also added that; "it has to be explicitly admitted 
that the oppression which the judiciary has experienced over such a 
short period of time has entailed more internal complications in the 
judiciary, and this has been reflected in its performance in the ad­
ministration of justice. It has also jeopardized the independence of 
the judiciary, by making the executive appear as a mere instrument of 
oppression of the Judiciary, to the extent that it threatens justice 
itself with the most devastating danger.'1093
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< 1)
< 2 )
< 3)
( 4)
< b)
( 6)
< 7)
( 8)
< 9)
(10)
(10a)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
NOTES. (V. )
See Art, 2 of both Covenants 
I M d ,
See the works of Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist. ETo. 78, 
cited in R The Right to Access to Court1', F. At1 tar, op. cit, f 
p. 625
John Marshall, from "An Address to the Virginia State 
Convention of 1929-30", quoted in O'Donaghue V. United States, 
289 U.S. 516, 532 (1932).
See De I 1Esprit des lois, op. cit., Book XI, Chapter 6 
Arts. 97-110.
Arts. 24-27, Titled: 'Powers of the State-General Provisions'. 
Art. 24.
The Rational Assembly consists of The House of Representatives 
and the Senates,
Published in JOG No. 2383 of 1/10/1972, p. 1827. This Law has 
replaced the previous Law No. 19 of 1955, published in JOG No. 
1224 of 16/4/55, p, 341
See UN Doc. No, CCPR/C/SR.103, p.9,(in *) •
See Al-Suyuti, The History of the Caliphs Cairo, 1958,p. 266?
- Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni on Hanbali Jurisprudence, Cairo, 
2nd. ed., vol. 9, p. 45?
- Al-Mawardi, A Treatise on Islamic Jurisprudence, ed, by 
M. H. al-Sarhan, Baghdad, 1971, p. 145jand Constitutional 
Rules,ed. by Maximilian Enger, 1853, p. 133.
the Ottoman judicial system was based on the traditional
Islamic system, the former remained effective in Jordan until 
it was gradually replaced by the modern Judicial System.
Art. 27.
Art. 97.
Art.99, The Courts shall be divided into three categories:
1 - Regular Courts
2 - Religious Courts
3 - Special Courts
These are graduates of Sharia Schools (Islamic Law Schools) 
selected by the Sharia Judicial council and trained under the 
supervision of the qadi al-qudha (the Sharia Chief Justice).
4X2
C17)
(18)
(19)
(20) 
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(24a)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
Which is the established school of Islamic Jurisprudence in 
Jordan.
Art. 108. Among the recognised religious communities are:
~ Roman Orthodox
- Roman Catholic
- The Armenians
- Latins
~ Anglicans
See the Law of the Religious Communities Law No. 2 of 1938
A former Deputy Attorney-General of Jordan 1969-1973
See A. Al-Halasa, The Basis of the Legislation and the
Ju..d.i„cial System in Jordan, Arab League, Cairo, 1971, pp. 121- 
4, hereinafter referred to as Halasa.
See JOG No. 1396 of 1/9/1958, p.722.
The supervising authority may sanction, alter, amend or dis­
regard the judgement of the court, as may be deemed appro­
priate.
For a full study of these courts and their role in Jordan see 
Judge F. Kilany, Special Courts, op. cit.t pp, 70-133,
See below Chapter VII*
In the official translation the word 'nedhmyh' , translated as 
'civil courts'. This is a manifestly incorrect and misleading 
translation and therefore, we prefer to use the terra 'regular' 
instead.
Law No. 26 of 1952, published in JOG No. 1105, 16/4/1952.
although the title seems to have been adapted from the British 
System, the function and the status of the Jordanian Judges 
are substantially different from that of the Justices of Peace 
in England.
See Art. 3 of of the Law of the Courts of the Peace, Law No. 
15 of 1952, as amended by Law No. 33 of 1968.
Art. 5 of the Law of the Courts of the Peace as amended by Law 
No. 23 of 1960.
Art. 136(3)
See Art. 4 of the Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts. 
I bM.
Ibid. Art.5.
Ibid. para. (2).
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<35) Ibid. para. (5).
(36) See the Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts, Art. 6, 7,
and 8.
(37) Civil Procedure Code, Arts. 205-232.
(38) In this case it consists of a President and two Justices only.
(39) The Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts, Art. 9(1).
<39a) Above Rote 37, see Art. 215-220.
(40) See below p,
(41) para. (1).
(42) para. (2).
(43) para. (3).
(44) Art. 15 of the Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts.
(45) LbM.
(46) Halasa, op. cit., p. 96.
(47) According to Art. 3 of the Law of the Independence of the
Judiciary, the terms 'judiciary', 'judge', 'judges', includes 
the President and the Justices of the Supreme Court, the chief 
and members of the Public Prosecution.
(48) In the past, Ashaire qadhies (tribal judges) used to charge 
’Fezga1 (fees) to be paid by the convicted party, The amount 
of the rezga was decided by the judge himself, according to 
the importance of the case.
(49) See Art. 15 of the Court Fees Regulations, Regulation No. 4 of
1952, as amended by Regulation Ho. 3 of 1985.
(50) See -f '
(51) See above, The Right to Public Trial, p
(51a) See in particular the remarks of Mr, Tarnopalsky, UR Doc. No.
CCPR/C/SR. 332, p. 12 (t^l) ‘
(51b) See UR Doc. Ro, CCPR/C/1/Add. 56, ( ^ ^  '
(52) Art. 97.
(53) See para. (1).
(54) Law Ro. 19 of 1955, published in JOG Ro. 1224 of 16/4/1955,
which has been replaced by the present law of the Independence
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of the Judiciary, Law Ho. 49 of 1972, published in the JOG. 
Mo. 2383, of 1.10. 1972.
(55) Hereinafter referred to as LIJ.
(56) Under the previous law, this seat was occupied by the senior
member of the Supreme Court. According to some Jordanian
lawyers this amendment is intended to give the Minister of
Justice a say in the formation of the Judicial Council, and to 
enable him to appoint a member who is most likely to obey his 
instruction,
See F, Kilany, Independence, op. cit., p. 116.
(57) Ibid. p, 149
(58) Case Ho. 77/74, JBR (1974), pp. 1157-63.
(59) Ibid. p. 1155.
(60) Ibid. p. 1162.
(61) See Art, 10 of the LIJ.
(62) LIJ, Art. 1.
(63) LIJ, Art. 6. Whereas there was no Law School in Jordan before
1976, most of the Jordanian judges have received their law 
degrees from other Arab countries, mainly Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq. Few Jordanian judges have received law degrees or legal 
training in the West, and even less in the East, Apparently 
this has influenced the legal thinking and affected their per­
formance to the extent that it is not unusual for a Jordanian 
court to fallow the track of an Egyptian one or almost to copy 
its judgement. Quotations from Egyptian legal textbooks are 
quite common in the rulings of the Jordanian court. In fact, 
the majority of the Jordanian judges and lawyers in general 
have graduated from Egyptian law schools. Over the years, 
this has resulted into a distinctive Egyptian colouring of the 
Jordanian legal system.
(64) Para. (2).
(65) Three of the four principle schools of Islamic jurisprudence
are of the opinion that women should not assume the position 
of a judge in an Islamic society. Abu Hanifa, the fourth 
school, dissented and submitted that a woman could lawfully be 
appointed as a judge but with limited jurisdiction. According 
to this opinion, her jurisdiction is limited to those matters 
in which the testimony of a female witness is acceptable. In 
other words, she may not assume criminal jurisdiction 
(Howdood).
(66) In Jordan, the judiciary is funded from the national budget 
via the Ministry of Justice.
415
(67) Syria for instance, see Art. 97 of the Law of Judicial Author­
ity of 1961.
<68) Egypt, The Law of the Judicial Authority of 1969. See also:
Lebanon, The Judiciary Act of 1973,
(69) The Law of the Judicial Authority of 1972,
(70) In 1977, Art, 21 was amended by Law la. 14 of 1977, published
in the JOG, Mo,2695 of 16/4/1977, p. 40. Paras. Cb and c)
were abolished, and the said Art. was rearranged to read as
follows:
"Judges shall be transferred from one post to another, by a 
decision from the Judicial Council and a Royal Decree,"
(71) Art. 23, para. Cl)
<72) Ibid. para. (2)
(73) Ibid. para. (3)
(74) Art, 29, "...if not convicted, the judge shall be paid back
all the deducted amounts."
(75) "...if no action has been brought before the Council within 15
days of the Minister’s request, the council itself may decide 
to initiate the proceedings by a reasoned decision."
See Art. 30.
(76) Art. 31.
(77) Art, 32.
(78) Art. 33.
(79) Art. 36.
(80) "Since the Act of Settlement, 1700, judges of the Superior
English Courts have held ....  during good behaviour, and not
at the pleasure of the Executive," See Wade and Phillips,
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th ed. , by A.W,
Bradley, 1977. p. 50.
(81) See Chapter 2.
(82) See the Constitution of Egypt of 1971, Art.168, and the Law of
the Judicial Authority of 1972, Art. 67.
Syria, the Constitution of 1973, Art. 136; and the Law of 
the Judicial Authority of 1974, Art. 92 
Kuwait, the Constitution of 1962, Art, 163.
(83) As quoted by Judge Kilany, Independence,op. cit.. p. 139.
Translated by the present author,
(84) Case Mo, 41/74, JBR (1974) p. 748.
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<85) See above p.3>§^> '
<86) See above p.3 <3 % '
<87) The Criminal Procedures Code, Art, 59-69,
<88) Independence, op, cit,f p. 81.
<89) See above p.lS^ and Cases No. 12/55 and 81/69 on p.l£3-
<90) Letter Ho. CB/A/5/1325) dated 19/7/1973, as quoted by Judge F,
Kilany, Independence, op. cit.. p. 91 translated from Arabic 
by tlie present writer),
<91) Letter Ho. <7/12/6439) dated 10/11/1974,
<92) In his reply, the President of the Court of Appeal stated:
11... regarding your letter Ho. 7/12/6439, dated 10/11/1974, ... 
Your Excellency knows that the court cannot consider any evi­
dence in a pending trial unless submitted by the party there­
to, Thus, ...hereby send the enclosed evidence to you."
<93) Art. 3<c) of the Law of Inspection of the Regular Courts. Law
Ho.105 of 1965.
<94) Case Ho. 77/66, JBR <1966), p. 387, Consequently the engineer
sued the Ministry for damages in Civil Courts and submitted 
application Ho. 269/68 to the Court of First Instance in 
Amman. The latter ordered the full payment of all due salar­
ies and bonuses from the date of his dismissal, but the deci­
sion of the HCJ was never been executed.
<95) Case Ho. 78/73, JBR <1973), p. 147.
<96) Case Ho. 304/73, JBR (1974), p. 212.
<97) Case Ho. 81/71, JBR (1971), p. 543.
<98) Letter Ho. <7/12/2446), dated 23/5/1976.
(99) "Ministers shall be tried by a High Council for offences which
may be attributed to them in the course of the performance of 
their duties." Art.57 provides that: "the High Council for
the trial of Ministers shall consist of the Speaker of the 
Senate as President and eight members, three of wham shall be 
selected by ballot by the Senate from among its members..."
<100) Law Ho. 11 of 1959.
(101) Case Ho. 46/61, JBR. (1961) p. 455.
(102) See above p.3^7- ’
<103) In 1969, the Egyptian Legislature introduced Laws Ho. 81, 82,
83, and 84 of 1969, known as the Judicial Reform Laws, under
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which 189 Judges were dismissed amongst whom was the President 
of the Highest Court in Egypt and fourteen other Justices of 
the Court of Cassation.
(104) See Art. 46.
(105) Law Ho. 4 of 1962, Art. 8 of the same law gave a period of 
three months for the Council of Ministers to use those powers.
(106) Law Ho. 49 of 1972.
(107) Art. 44(1).
(108) See F, Kilany, Independence, op. cit., p, 307
(109) Ibid.
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CHAPTER VI.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.
Speaking of protection and legal safeguards for human rights im­
plies that a threat to these rights exists. Indeed, human rights are 
always in danger of being violated, and upon closer investigation it 
immediately becomes apparent that the challenge comes from two main 
sources. The individual's rights may be violated by fellow private in­
dividuals in the course of their normal daily life on the one hand and 
by the public administration in its official capacity on the other.
Protection against the first type of violation does not usually 
raise great difficulties, for a man may always have recourse to a 
court to prevent his fellow private individual from violating his 
rights or otherwise to compel him to make reparation. Effective 
judicial protection should be made available with regard to the second 
type of violations, i.e. violations of the individual's rights by the 
public administration. It is thus within the role of the constitution 
and the domestic legislature to provide such protection by enabling 
the private individual to seek protection the courts when his
rights are being violated by public authorities. It is to this very 
safeguard that we intend to address ourselves in this chapter so that 
we may be able to assess the performance of the Jordanian legislature 
in providing such a protection. Several questions may thus be put 
forward, such as: under the present law of Jordan do Jordanian courts 
have the jurisdiction to review the validity of administrative action? 
Could the private citizen, who claims that his declared rights and
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freedoms are being or about to be violated by the public authorities, 
resort to the courts to prevent or to remedy such violations? If not, 
would Jordan be in breach of its legal obligations under the 
Covenants?
In order to answer the above questions, the following points ought 
to be considered:
1 - Judicial review of administrative action as a legal safeguard.
2 - Judicial review of administrative action under the law of Jordan
(its availability and scope)
3 - Restrictions on the right to judicial review of administrative
action in Jordan.
4 - Constitutionality of the laws abridging judicial review of admin­
istrative actions.
- Attitude of the Judiciary
- Attitude of Jordanian lawyers.
5 - Assessment.
1* JUDICIAL REVI E W  OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIOF AS A LEGAL 
S A F E G U A R D .
In regulated modern society, man is not allowed to take the law 
into his own hands and to defend his rights and freedom by physical 
force, 1:15 One of the striking features of our contemporary society is 
the formidable and complicated network of administrative departments, 
agencies and enterprises; and the ever expanding playground for ad­
ministrative action. The administration appears to be capable of 
monitoring almost every movement of the individual's conduct, and of 
interfering even with the most intimate aspects of his life. Modern 
administration is a monstrous creature,c2 * who may be inclined to
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encroach upon the individual's rights and freedoms, should they be an 
obstacle tD the official views or public policies. It would be unwise 
and unfair to free its hands to do what it deems necessary, without 
being accountable to an independent court of law, empowered to assess 
the legality of its actions.
One may agree with S. A. de Smith, that judicial review of
administrative action is 'sporadic' and 'peripheral' and that the task
of the administration is a cumbersome one. C3:> Nonetheless, one may
argue against the presumption that:
"...if their every act or decision were to be reviewable 
on unrestricted grounds by an independent judicial body 
the business of administration could be brought to a 
standstill";
and also against the conclusion based thereupon, i.e.
"the prospect of judicial relief cannot be held out to 
every person whose interests may be adversely affected 
by administrative action.
If the writer was objecting to judicial review being on 'un­
restricted grounds' , the presumption goes too far, because nobody has 
argued that judicial review should be freed of boundaries. Indeed, 
judicial review is circumscribed by the boundaries of the principle of 
legality, within which the court could not reverse the action of the 
administration.<e> When the latter steps out of these boundaries the 
court may and indeed should review the administrative action. ce:> To 
insist that, in order not to bring the business of administration to a 
'standstill', the latter should be allowed to step outside the bound­
aries of legality whenever administrative convenience so requireS^is 
to deny the rule of law and the fundamentals of lawful government. c7 * 
It is essential thus, that personal liberty and administrative conven­
ience must not be weighed on the scale against each other. If the
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objection were directed against the review being by an 'independent 
judicial body', the presumption would be far more extreme. It would 
be the equivalent of saying that, in order to enable the administra­
tion to function, the judiciary must be made dependent upon and sub­
jugated to it. In this case, judicial review would become merely a 
hopeless ritual, <e;> which could not impair the continuity of the ad­
ministrative function. Encroachment upon the independence of the 
judiciary means, firstly the destruction of the doctrine of separation 
of powers, and secondly the revocation of the role of the judiciary as
(<S)
the vindicator of human rights.
The conclusion, that in order not to bring the business of the
administration to a 'standstill', judicial relief cannot be guaranteed
to every person whose interests may be adversely affected by an admin- 
f I
istrative action, seems hard to justify because judicial review
only blacks unlawful actions, and presumably not all administrative 
businesses are unlawful, Thus, as far as lawful actions are con­
cerned, the administration need not fear judicial review, even though 
when those actions may adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
somebody. One should always bear in mind that the role of the courts 
in this respect is to serve only as a check on the legality of the 
actions of the administrative organs of government to guard against 
unlawful actions which violate the recognized rights of the 
individual. The role of the judge is to confine the administrator 
within the boundaries of legality, not tD determine for himself the 
wisdom of the administrative action in question. The judicial 
function is thus one of mere control, Judicial review is not 
designated to impede the administration from performing its lawful 
activities. It serves as a safety-catch on extension of the
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administrative arm beyond its lawfully granted authority and on the 
excessive assumption of power by the executive. In the words of Prof. 
L.L. Jaffe:
“only the frightened, timid, unenterprising administrator 
may hide behind judicial negative. But the positive and 
conscientious administrator will be freed from an ob­
sessive preoccupation with the limits of his power. And, 
since there is a form in which his alleged excesses may 
be adjudicated, he has a ready and persuasive answer to 
claims of usurpation.'"1115
Prof. L.L. Jaffe does not seem to agree that judicial review could
be prejudicial to the lawful discharge of administrative activities.
On the contrary he stated that:
“...its availability is a constant reminder to the ad­
ministrator and a constant source of assurance and 
security to the citizen."*1=25
He concluded that an individual whose interest is acutely and im­
mediately affected by an administrative action has a right to secure a 
judicial determination of its validity.
Lord Penning also does not seem to follow the other line of think­
ing, In his opinion, when a private individual claims that his pri­
vate rights have been interfered with, he is entitled to
"come to the court and ask that his private right be 
protected... If the law is to be obeyed —  and justice 
be done - the court must allow a private individual 
himself to bring an action against the offender in 
those cases where his private rights and interests are 
specially affected by the breach."*145
Judicial review of administrative action is an essential safeguard 
for the practical enjoyment of the modern international standards of 
human rights at the domestic level. Without this basic element, 
national government and administrations would be free to violate the 
minimum international standards, though they are enacted into 
municipal laws, since the compatibility of their actions with the
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municipal laws, could never be examined by the courts. If the declared 
rights are to be respected, national constitutions and laws must en­
able the person whose rights and freedoms have been adversely affected 
by an administrative action, to challenge the legality of that action 
before an independent court of law, and not merely to register a com­
plaint with the department concerned. Article 2(3) of the Political 
Covenant stipulates that:
"each state party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity.
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial administrative or legislative authorities, or 
by any other competent authority provided by the 
legal system of the state, and to develop possi­
bilities of judicial remedy."
The text of this paragraph may give rise to the question as to 
whether states parties are really under legal obligation to provide 
judicial review of administrative action or not' Some may argue that 
there is no such obligation and that if there is, it would be a gen­
eral one and would not necessarily include judicial review of adminis­
trative action, because sub-paragraph (b) speaks of:
"competent judicial, administrative or legislative author­
ities, or any competent authority provided by the legal
system of the state."
In other words, review by an administrative body (government de­
partment) would suffice. Although this argument seems correct on the 
surface, it does not withstand critical legal analysis. First of all, 
it should be remembered that the ’loose wording’ and the evasion of 
direct reference to judicial review of administrative action, was a 
technique intended to encourage states to sign and ratify the Cov­
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enant. (However, one should credit the drafters for reaching the same 
end indirectly.)
Secondly, the placement of the judicial remedy on the top of the 
remedies which may be introduced, and the emphasis in the same para­
graph on the development of the possibilities of judicial remedy 
("Each state party., undertakes..to develop the possibilities of judi­
cial remedy.") leaves little doubt that states are under legal obli­
gation to provide judicial protection to the recognized rights.
As to judicial review of administrative action, sub-paragraph (a) 
explicitly included administrative action among those for which an 
effective remedy should be made available; "to ensure that any person 
whose rights ...are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwith­
standing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity."
Thirdly, the Covenant requires the introduction of an 'effective 
remedy' and the most lawful and effective way to challenge illegal
administrative actions is through judicial scrutiny \>£J an independent 
court of law.
Finally and most importantly, the second sentence of paragraph (1)
of Article 14 provides that:
"In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law."
Although Article 14, deals with proceedural guarantees in criminal
cases, the provision of this sentence is clearly of wider application
and could be interpreted as guaranteeing a right to judicial review of
administrative action. It refers to "a suit at law" in general which
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undoubtedly includes suits brought by individuals against the official 
authorities.
Having agreed that states are under legal obligation to introduce 
a system of judicial review of administrative actions, we shall now 
turn to investigating the availability of such a remedy in the legal 
system of Jordan. We shall be focusing on the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions, fallowed by an analysis of 
the case law.
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2, J U D ICIAL R E V I E W  OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIQU TOPER THE LAV
Off JOED All,
This is an area in the law of Jordan which clearly reflects the 
contrast in its legal background; (the Islamic tradition, the English 
legal system and the French law). As far as the availability and the
scope of judicial review of administrative action is concerned, the 
distinction must be drawn between two stages.
The first era covers the period from 1922 until 1951/2. The sec­
ond era covers the developments under the present Constitution since 
the reforms of 1951/2,
A - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BEFORE 1951/2,
Until the end of the First World War, both Trans-Jordan and the 
West Bank farmed part of the Ottoman empire; and consequently the 
Ottoman judicial system was implemented in the two provinces, With 
some minor exceptions the Ottoman system was based on the traditional 
Islamic legal theory,C1S> Under the latter the administration and the 
sovereign in person are answerable to the ordinary courts. c le;> 
Islamic law does not recognise the notion of 'immunity of the Crown' 
or of 'the sovereign' as understood and implemented in the West, 
especially in England and the United States. < The Caliph
personally, his officials and the administration in general may sue 
and be sued in ordinary courts just like ordinary individuals.c1Q> 
Regular courts were thus empowered to pronounce upon all cases brought 
by or against the government,c135 except for those by virtue of 
special law made the jurisdiction of a special court.
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The same judicial system was retained after the establishment of 
Trans-Jordan under the British mandate. The laws of the formation of 
the regular courts of 1922 and of 1928 provided that:
"the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and the Courts of First 
Instance shall be defined by the law in force at the time this law 
comes into force" i.e., the old Ottoman law of the formation of the 
regular courts; and therefore the courts continued to entertain all 
cases brought by and against the Administration. ActionS were to be 
filed against the head of the department concerned, who may be re­
presented by one of the solicitors of the Public Treasury in accord­
ance with the Ottoman law of 1884 as amended in 1904.
An attempt to create a separate administrative court in Jordan was 
short-lived, In 1923 the Majlis al-Shoora (the Consultation Council) 
which was a mixed judicial and administrative body chaired by the 
Chief Justice was established. It consisted of some judges and high- 
ranking administrative officers, Its principal jurisdiction was to 
review the legality of the decisions of the local administrative 
councils, and other supervisory jurisdictions. Local administrative 
councils were never established and the council itself was eventually 
abolished in 1 9 2 6 . 5
When the first Constitution of Jordan was enacted in 1928, it 
followed the same rule as in the Islamic tradition and the Ottoman law 
and subjected the Administration and private individuals to the same 
law as applied by the regular courts. It stipulated that: "Civil
courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in Trans-Jordan,.. 
including civil cases brought by or against the g o v e r n m e n t c > The 
same Article was also re-introduced in the Constitution of 1946.
The only change was thus that the courts derived their jurisdiction
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directly from the Constitution and not from the Ottoman law or a 
statute ,
The major development at this stage was brought about by the Law
of the Government Proceedings of 1935 (Qanaon Da'awa al-Huokomh) which
was based on the British practice.C2U1> Notwithstanding the provisions
of the Constitution of 1928, this law had severely restricted the
accountability of the Government to the courts.
Article 3 of the law of 1935 provided that:
"The courts shall not entertain any action against the 
Government except in the following cases; 
a - claims for the recovery of movable property (ainwal- 
mangolh') or the payment of its values, 
b - claims relating to ownership, recovery or position 
of immovable property (amwal-gharman goalh) or the 
compensation in lieu thereof, 
c - claims relating to the payment of money or damages 
resulting from lawfully concluded contracts with the 
Government."
Furthermore, paragraph <3> of the same Article introduced a form
of fiat justitia for the first time in Jordan. It stated that:
"None of the above mentioned claims shall be admissible 
unless the plaintiff has previously obtained written 
permission from the Prime Minister allowing him to bring 
such an action."
The law also provided that the Attorney-General shall represent 
the government in all the above cases.
The central feature of the law in Jordan at this stage (1922-1951) 
was that the courts construed their jurisdiction in a rather restric­
ted manner.
1.- Despite the explicit provision of Article 47 of the Constitution 
of 1928, the courts abstained from pronouncing upon the constitution­
ality of Article 3 of the law of the Law of the Government Proceedings 
of '1935. Adopting a narrow interpretation of the doctrine of separ­
ation of powers, the Court of Appeal decided in Case No.59/35. that
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the courts lack jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of laws. 
It ruled that:
"The court is to apply the laws and regulations enacted 
by the legislature; it [the court] has no right to review 
or disregard them,"*37*
It seems that the Jordanian courts had adopted the tradition of 
the English courts in abstaining from reviewing the constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament, It might be justifiable for the English courts 
to take such a view under the principle of 'Sovereignty of parlia­
ment' , and the fact that there is no written constitution to limit the 
powers of Parliament, and against which the validity of English stat­
utes may be judged. The view of the Jordanian courts is difficult to 
understand, because there was a written Constitution, which had 
allocated specific jurisdiction to each branch of government. No such 
branch may expand upon its jurisdiction or take any action which is 
contrary to the provision of the Constitution, without being in breach 
of the Constitution.
2.- Even prior to the law of 1935 ( which ousted the jurisdiction of 
the courts and violated the Constitution > the Court of Appeal decided 
that the courts had no jurisdiction to quash illegal administrative 
decisions, to issue an order to the administration to perform a duty 
owed to the public (mandamus), or to prevent a public authority from 
carrying out an erroneous measure (prohibition), In Case No.39/35. 
the Court of Appeal interpreted the phrase 'civil cases brought by or 
against the Government' used in Article 47 of the Constitution to mean 
"only contractual liability and claims relating to the payment of dam­
ages or recovery of movable and immovable property unlawfully obtained 
by the administration,"<3e*
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The most illustrative and frequently quoted example of the
judicial practice at that time was The Case of Mr* T. Abu. al-Huoda
.decided by the Court of Appeal in 1935. Mr. Abu al-Huoda, who was
the director of the Agricultural Bank, was instantly dismissed by the
Council of Ministers allegedly for being incompetent and unfit for the
post.t2a:) He sued the Government for damages on the grounds that his
dismissal was unlawful. In his submissions he argued that he:
"Understands that the court lacks the jurisdiction to 
abrogate the decision of the administrative authority... 
and that it is not for the court to decide upon his 
competence or fitness for the post... but he believes
that it is for the court to decide whether the admin­
istration has observed the procedural requirements for 
the dismissal of public servants, as defined by the law 
and the regulations of the civil service or not; and 
thereupon the court may decide upon entitlement to 
damages .,,,'K3CO
In dismissing the application, the Court of Appeal again relied
on the narrow interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and decided that the courts may not extend their jurisdiction to
review the validity of individual administrative decisions (.al-qarart
al-Fardieh). It says:
"Since the relevant regulation has granted to the admin­
istrative authority, the power to assess the competence 
of the public servant and to dismiss him if deemed 
necessary for the public interest, the courts must not 
question its performance in order not to violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers... if the courts were to 
have the power to review the validity of the adminis­
trative actions, it has to be provided for by the law 
and there is no such a provision in the present law of 
Jordan."*315
As for Article 47 of the Constitution, the court upheld its pre­
vious restrictive interpretation*321* and ruled that:
"...it is true that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of 
the judiciary includes all civil cases, except for those 
by law made the jurisdiction of a special court, but this 
rule does not include actions brought to challenge the 
validity of administrative measures applied by the 
Executive Council, far instance, acting within its lawful
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jurisdiction as defined by the law.,.it only includes 
civil controversies which can be adjudicated in accord­
ance with enacted laws and regulations and which have 
not been made the jurisdiction of a special court... 
freedom of the administration in implementing the laws 
and regulations which it is empowered to implement is a 
requirement of the principle of separation of 
powers."*335
Obviously, the court had misconceived three basic issues.
Firstly, the court failed to notice that the applicant was not asking 
the court to invalidate the administrative action; he was merely 
seeking payment for damages for failure to observe prescribed proced­
ural requirements on behalf of the administration. Secondly, the 
court misconstrued the legal nature of the administrative action by 
implying that it was not a controversy which can be adjudicated in ac­
cordance with previously enacted laws and regulations. Finally, it 
misapprehended the doctrine of separation of powers itself by deciding 
that it guarantees absolute freedom for the administration in inter­
preting and applying the laws relating to administrative activities, 
Thus, the position in Trans-Jordan with regard to judicial review 
of administrative action, in the period between 1922 and 1951 could be 
summed up as fallows: the legislation did not explicitly authorize
the courts to review the legality of the acts of the administration. 
The courts, led by the Court of Appeal, denied themselves the right to 
control the constitutionality of laws, and consequently jurisdiction 
to review the legality of administrative actions,
In Palestine (West-Bank) the position was somewhat different. 
Whereas the British ruled Trans-Jordan indirectly through H.R.H. The 
Amir and the local administration, they ruled Palestine directly 
during the mandate, A new judicial system akin to the British system 
was therefore developed. Before the mandate Ottoman regular courts of
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Palestine had jurisdiction to entertain any civil case brought by or 
against the Government without a prior fiat by the administration.
Under the British administration, Article 50 of the Palestine
Order in Council of 1922 (sometimes referred to as the Constitution
of Palestine) provided that:
"No action shall be brought against the Government of 
Palestine or any department thereof unless with the 
written consent of the High Commissioner previously 
obtained .,K3e>
Under the courts ordinance of 1924, C3e:> the hierarchy of courts 
consisted of the Magistrate Courts, District and Land Courts, the 
Court of Criminal Assize and a Supreme Court which functioned as a 
Court of Appeal and as a High Court of Justice. The existence and the 
jurisdiction of the latter court constituted one of the principal dif­
ferences between the legal systems of Trans-Jordan and Palestine at 
that time. It has also made a noticeable impact upon the present ju­
dicial and legal system of Jordan.
Article 5 of the aforesaid ordinance provided that the Supreme Court
sitting as a High Court of Justice shall consist of not less than two
judges of whom one shall be a British judge. According to Article 43
of the Constitution of Palestine, C37:* the Supreme Court sitting as a
High Court of Justice had jurisdiction to:
"hear and determine such matters as are not, causes or 
trials, but petitions or applications not within the 
jurisdiction of any other court and necessary to be 
decided for the administration of justice,*335
Under Article 6 of the courts ordinance, however, the High Court 
was accorded exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the following mat­
ters:
a) applications (in the nature of habeas corpus proceedings) for
orders of release of persons unlawfully detained in custody;
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b) orders directed to public officers or public bodies in regard to
the performance Df their public duties and requiring them to do or
refrain from certain acts;
c) questions concerning change of venue of actions in the Court of 
Criminal Assize, District Courts and Land Courts.
Another element of the British practice introduced into the laws
of Palestine was the requirement of prior consent of the administra­
tion before a private individual could bring an action against the 
government.
The same Article also excluded the High Commissioner, the Resi­
dence, their officials and their properties from the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts.
Further restrictions were also imposed on the jurisdiction of the 
courts to review administrative actions by the Crown Action Ordinance 
of 1926. c*15 The ordinance categorically defined the types of action 
which may be brought against the Government of Palestine (the Crown); 
and the procedure to be followed therein, Under Article 3, no claim 
whatsoever, against the Government or any department thereof may be 
considered in any court unless it be a claim for obtaining relief, 
other than that in the nature of specific performance or injunction 
against the Government or a government department in respect of:c*2>
1 - the restitution of any movable property or the compensation to the
value thereof;
2 - the payment of money or damages in respect of any contract law­
fully entered into on behalf of the Government;
3 - the possession or restitution of any immovable property or com­
pensation to the value thereof.
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Actions by the Government against private individuals were to be 
brought by the Attorney-General or on his behalf or by any officer au­
thorized by law to take such action on behalf of the Government. 
Actions by private individuals against the Government were to be 
brought against the Attorney-General as a defendant or "such other 
officers as the High Commissioner may from time to time designate for 
that purpose."<AB* The action commences by the filing of a petition 
at the District Court or Land Court, as the case may be, and the de­
livery of a copy thereof at the office of the Attorney-General or the 
specified officer as mentioned above. Ho court fee is payable at this 
s t a g e . T h e  Chief Clerk of the court transmits the petition to the 
Chief Secretary and then it is laid before the High Commissioner. 
When the consent of the latter is granted, the petition should be 
returned to the court with the fiat endorsed thereupon, and the claim 
is then to be prosecuted upon payment of the prescribed fees. Ho
execution or attachment or process of that nature may be issued, 
Instead the party seeking to enforce the judgement must transmit a 
copy thereof to the High Commissioner who, if the judgement is for 
payment of money, by warrant under his hand, directs the amount to be 
paid. In the case of another judgement, he may take such measures as 
may be necessary to cause the judgement to be carried into effect.<A&J
Apart from these provisions, Article 8 of the Crown Action
Ordinance provided that:
"Safe as provided in this ordinance, all provisions 
contained in the Ottoman Code of Civil Procedure or in 
any enactment amending such Code and the practice and 
the course of procedure in the civil courts shall extend 
and apply to all actions and proceedings brought by or 
against the Government of Palestine and, in all such 
actions, costs may be awarded in such manner as in 
actions between private individuals.
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It is important to notice that the British laws did not imme­
diately abrogate all the previous Ottoman laws although most of them 
were repealed or emptied of their substance to fit the new legal sys­
tem and status of Palestine, Article 46 of Palestine Order in Council 
of 1922, provided that:
"The jurisdiction of the civil courts shall be exercised 
in conformity with the Ottoman law in force in Palestine 
on 1st November 1914, and such later Ottoman laws as 
have been or may be declared to be in force by public 
notice, and such orders in council, ordinances and 
regulations as are in force in Palestine at the date of 
the commencement of this order ,"ceo:*
Their application was only conditional upon conformity with 
substance of the Common Law and the doctrines of equity in force in 
England, as well as powers vested in, and according to the procedure 
and practice observed by or before courts of justice and justices of 
the peace in England. Ce15
With regard to judicial review of administrative actions, the 
civil courts were prohibited from admitting direct actions to chal­
lenge the legality of any administrative measure by the Crown Action 
Ordinance,tS25 Nonetheless, they acknowledge to themselves the right 
to examine the validity of the administrative decision in the course 
of a civil action before the court when, one of the parties relies 
upon such action for his claim, Should the administrative decision be 
found to be ultra vires or contrary to the law or to the Palestine 
Order in Council, the civil court could not abrogate or cancel it, but 
only put it aside and not apply it in the pending case.CB3> Thus, the
same decision may be applied by another court or even the same court
in a later case if none of the parties had impugned its validity.
Regular courts of Trans-Jordan had followed suit, and the same prac­
tice has been upheld by the present regular courts of Jordan. * 3
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As far as the High Court of Justice is concerned, it has already 
been mentioned that Article 43 of Palestine Order in Council of 1922 
had clearly stated that the court's jurisdiction was to hear and de­
termine:
"such matters as are not cases or trials, but petitions 
or applications not within the jurisdiction of any other 
court and necessary to be decided for the administration 
of justice,"
The court had therefore constantly held that its jurisdiction
was of a discretionary and residual nature i.e., it only entertained
applications when there was no other competent court to deal with the
application, and when the court was convinced that its determination
was necessary for the administration of justice, In Case No. 13/42,
S-QlQjaan HQrQ.W3.tg. v. Assessing Officer. Jerusalem District, for
instance, the court decided not to intervene and stated:
"...that the intervention of the High Court was not 
necessary for the administration of justice, as the 
Income Tax Ordinance contained ample and sufficient 
remedy for the petitioner,"<ss5
In Case No. l/39also ,the court ruled that:
"...and whereas the jurisdiction of the High Court was 
discretionary and the remedies which it could grant were 
not given unless they were necessary in the interests of 
justice, it was unnecessary to make any order,"<se>
The most illustrative example of the practice of the High Court of 
Palestine and of the manner in which it had excercised its 
jurisdiction was Case No. 147/42. where the court plainly stated 
that:
"<1)...before it [the High Court] decides to exercise its 
discretionary powers it must be satisfied that its 
intervention is necessary for the proper administration 
of justice and, in deciding this question it will con­
sider whether the normal channels of justice can 
reasonably and substantially dispose of the matters at 
issue between the parties.
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(2) that a mere allegation of a technical violation of a 
right was not sufficient to move it (the High court) to 
exercise its discretionary powers,"4575
However, despite the nature of its jurisdiction and the restrict­
ive provisions of the Crown Actions Ordinance46® 5 and the Palestine 
Order in Council of 1922; the latter and the Courts Ordinance as
amended in 1935 and 1940,4605 did guarantee some, though limited, 
jurisdiction for the court to receive 'directly', and entertain appli­
cations and petitions relating to the validity of some administrative 
actions. As far as those specified types of actions were concerned, 
the court was empowered to review the legality of the administrative 
action and to reverse it, if it was an unwarranted measure. Indeed the 
court displayed a great deal of jealousy of its limited jurisdiction 
and when it decided to intervene it made the most of it, through a 
broad construction of the provisions defining its jurisdiction.
Under Article 8(a) for instance, the court was empowered to issue 
orders "in the form of habeas corpus for the release of unlawfully 
detained persons. The court did not, however, limit itself to these 
cases where an unlawful administrative decision was issued detaining a 
person in custody only, but rather extended its jurisdiction to in­
clude those detained by virtue of invalid judicial orders, or even to 
a private individual who unlawfully kept a person in his custody.
In Case Ho. .89/27, the High Court ordered the release of the
detainee who was detained following an invalid warrant issued for his
extradition to Syria. It was held that :
"A writ of the nature of habeas corpus must issue to set 
aside the order of the president of the District Court,
Haifa, for the extradition of the accused."4615
and accordingly issued the following order:
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"Following the judgement of this court in..., the court holds that the 
legality of the petitioner's detention on a warrant which 
does not set out the name of the alleged victim of the 
offence of 'assassination' cannot be supported. The writ 
must therefore issue and the prisoner must be 
discharged."CSE >
In another case the court issued a writ against a private indi­
vidual £_a husband) who was married to an under-aged girl, to bring the 
wife before the High Court of Justice. <sai:*
As to the prohibition writs, (orders against administrative 
officers and administrative bodies to prevent them from carrying out 
an unlawful action), the court also adopted a wide interpretation of 
the term 'public officers or bodies' to include the Chief Executive 
Officers of the Courts; and therefore the court issued orders to pre­
vent them from executing judgement of the courts.c6-*3 Furthermore, 
the court considered the chiefs of religious communities as 'public 
officers or bodies'; and ruled that every person who has a duty, to 
act or to refrain from acting, under the law is a 'public officer or 
body' for the purpose of the writs of prohibition under Article 6(6) 
of the courts Ordinance. <ee;>
Finally, a noteworthy element of the work of the High Court of 
Palestine, for which the court adopted the traditional practice of the 
English courts, was the court recognised the right of the legislature 
to oust or suspend the jurisdiction of the court to review the legal­
ity of certain administrative actions when it so d e s i r e d , I n  
England where there is no written constitution defining the juris­
diction of the English courts, the latter have traditionally upheld 
the view that they are bound by the provision of the statutes when the 
Parliament makes clear its intention to prevent the courts from re­
viewing the legality of any administrative action,
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B - IUniCIAL-JRBXIE-W. OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AFTER THE LEGAL REFORMS
OF 1951/2. (THE PRESENT SYSTEM)
Following the withdrawal of the British and the establishment of 
the state of Israel in the greater part of Palestine, the remnant 
(known as the West-Bank), merged with the East Bank to form a part of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. <Ge:> Nonetheless, each part of the 
newly unified Kingdom retained its previous legal system, During this 
period several options were open to the Jordanian legislature for a 
unified judicial system for the two parts of the country. One of the 
options was the re-institution of the traditional Islamic legal system 
where both the administration and the private individual would be sub­
ject to the same court and the same law with no privileges conferred 
on the government. Another was to follow the English system where the 
administration and the private individual are also subject to the same 
court and law, but with special privileges and immunities for the 
administration (the Crown). The third option was to follow the French 
tradition as implemented in Egypt, and to create separate administra­
tive courts to adjudicate upon legal disputes involving the adminis­
tration.
The Provisional Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts of 
1951,C70:> favoured the English tradition and introduced a system 
similar to the one that the British had previously established in 
Palestine^ that is to say, a system of civil courts of general 
jurisdiction with a Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice 
with limited jurisdiction to review some administrative decisions. 
Under Article 11(3) of the provisional law of 1951, the same powers of 
the British High Court of Palestine were transferred to the new High 
Court of Jordan i.e.
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"to hear and determine such matters which are not cause 
or trials, but petitions or applications not within the 
jurisdiction of any other court and necessary to be 
decided for the proper administration of justice",
such as:
a) Application <in the nature of habeas corpus proceedings) for 
orders of release of persons unlawfully detained in custody.
b) Orders directed to public officers or public bodies requiring 
them to refrain from doing certain acts,
c> Orders directed to public officers or public bodies requiring 
them to act in execution of their public duties.
By the time the provisional law of 1951 was laid before the Par­
liament for approval and remitted to the legislative committee in ac­
cordance with the regulations of the House of Representatives, the 
Constitution of 1952 had already been proclaimed. The latter contains 
several provisions relating to judicial review of administrative act­
ion. It provides that judicial power shall be exercised by the var­
ious courts of law, C7’1 * and that the courts shall be open to all, and 
free from any interference in their affairs; and that, the
regular courts of the H.K. of Jordan shall have jurisdiction over all 
persons in all matters including cases brought by or against the Gov­
ernment .< 5
Article 100 specifically stipulates that:
"the establishment of the various courts, the definition 
of their categories and their divisions, the limitation 
of their jurisdiction shall be determined by a special 
law which shall provide for the establishment of a High 
Court of Justice."*7'**
Consequently, the special law referred to under Article 100 of the 
Constitution was enacted and known as the Law of the Formation of the 
Regular Courts of 1952. <7S:> As far as the structural aspects are
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concerned the new law followed its predecessor in echoing the British 
system in Palestine, It establishes a pyramid of regular courts of 
general jurisdiction with the highest court sitting as a Supreme Court 
of Appeal to review the decisions of the lower courts and as a High 
Court of Justice to review the legality of certain hinds adminis­
trative actions, The difference thus, resides in the nature of the 
jurisdiction of each branch of the Supreme Court. While the British 
Supreme Court of Palestine was a traditional court of appeal, with 
powers to re-open the whole case and re-examine the facts all over 
again, <7,s> the present Supreme Court of Jordan is a ' cour de 
cassation* , i.e. a court of law not of facts,c775 The facts are to be 
investigated on two levels by the courts of first instance and the 
courts of appeal. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jordan may 
thus be invoked only upon a point of law.
A substantial change has also been brought about by the Law of 
Formation of the Regular Courts with regard to the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court as a High Court of Justice, It has already been 
mentioned that the provisional law of 1951, established a High Court 
of Justice that was similar to the British one of Palestine, with 
identical jurisdiction. In 1952, the Jordanian legislature eliminated 
all the jurisdiction of the British High Court provided for by the law 
of 1951, except for the provision of Paragraph (a) of Article 6, 
relating to "applications (in the nature of habeas corpus 
proceedings) for orders of release of persons unlawfully detained in 
custody." Instead the legislature has borrowed some of the juris­
diction of the ' council d'etat1 of France, as introduced in the law of 
the 1council d'dtat' of Egypt of 1946.<eo>
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Article 10(3) of the Law of Formation of the Regular Courts of 
1952 defines the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice as follows: 
a - Application relating to the election of local administrative 
councils.
b - Disputes relating to the pensions of public officers or their 
heirs.
c - Actions brought by those adversely affected by final admin­
istrative decisions relating to appointments to public of­
fices, promotions and bonuses, 
d - Applications by public officers to impugn the validity of the 
final decisions of the disciplinary authorities, 
e - Applications by public officers to nullify final administra­
tive decisions dismissing them in a way other than that pre­
scribed by the law. 
f - Applications by societies and private individuals to nullify 
final administrative decisions affecting their interests.<el5 
g - Applications brought by an injured person to impugn the 
validity of any administrative measure taken in accordance 
with regulations which violate the Constitution or a statute, 
h - applications for awamer al-efragt (orders in the nature of 
habeas corpus to release unlawfully detained persons), 
Evidently, the Jordanian legislator has borrowed the first six 
paragraphs <a-f) from Article 8 of the law of the 'council d'&tat' of 
Egypt of 1946; and sub-paragraph (h) from the jurisdiction of the 
British High Court of Palestine; and added only one new sub-paragraph 
as <g). Assessing the jurisdiction of the HCJ, one would easily 
realise that the court has very limited powers to review the legality 
of administrative action. Its jurisdiction is strictly limited to the
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points enumerated under Article 10(3) of the Law of the Formation of 
Regular courts, and yet sub-paragraph <i) of the same paragraph 
explicitly provides that the "applications concerning decisions 
relating to A'amal al-Seydh (act of state), shall not be admissible."
Accordingly, it might be stated that the present HCJ of Jordan 
enjoys only a limited jurisdiction and therefore it might not be in a 
position to provide effective protection for most of those who may 
claim that the minimum international standards of their rights, which 
have been or may be provided for by the Constitution and the laws, 
have been violated by the administration.
Some may, however, argue that protection does not have to emanate 
from the HCJ; and that all that is required is a protection by an in­
dependent court of any name. The fact that the HCJ is a court of 
relatively limited jurisdiction does not necessarily entail a lack of 
protection for the said persons whom the HCJ could not protect because 
of lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary courts would intervene in such a 
situation and provide judicial protection in the form of judicial 
review of administrative action, especially when we know that the 
Constitution of 1952 has made them courts of general jurisdiction and 
specifically provides that:
"The regular courts... shall have jurisdiction over all 
persons in all matters... including cases brought by or 
against the Government,., except in matters which, by the 
provisions of the Constitution, or of any law for the 
time being in force, fall within the jurisdiction of 
religious courts or special c o u r t s . 5
i.e. unless it has been made by virtue of a special statute, a
jurisdiction of a religious or a special court, any justiciable legal
dispute must fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts,
whether it be the HCJ or any other regular court. In other words,
444
under Article 102 of the Constitution nobody with a legal claim, would 
find himself without a competent court to decide his claim and in due 
course provide judicial protection against abusive administrative 
action.
Although this is a well-founded and logical argument, neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Jordanian legislature views this matter 
accordingly. Both the Supreme Court and the legislature have failed 
to discern the difference between Article 102 of the present Con­
stitution and its predecessors in the two previous Constitutions. 
Whereas Articles 47 and 60 of the Constitutions of 1928 and 1946 
respectively provided that: "...regular courts shall have jurisdic­
tion. .. including civil cases brought by or against the Government...", 
Article 102 of the present fc’onstitution provides that: "....regular
courts...shall have jurisdiction in all cases,., including cases 
brought by or against the Government..." The normal meaning of the 
words suggests that ordinary courts (regular courts excluding the High 
Court of Justice ) do have jurisdiction to receive and entertain 
actions against unlawful administrative activities which fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the HCJ, and are not made the jurisdiction of a 
religious or special court by virtue of a duly enacted statute.
As far as the Supreme Court is concerned it repeatedly stressed 
the view that ordinary courts lack jurisdiction to entertain direct 
applications for judicial review of administrative action.
The leading case in this regard is Case Ho. 248/67. where the
Supreme Court in a plenary session decided that:
"...ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to examine 
the validity Df administrative decisions in order to 
award compensation...and, even those within the juris­
diction of the High Court of Justice but have not been
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nullified within the time limit (60 days) become immune 
from any kind of judicial review whatsoever..."'®3 *
The legislature also does not seem to have noticed the full extent 
of the constitutional changes under the present Constitution. That is 
to say, although the previous law, which required one to obtain
written permission from the Prime Minister in order to bring an action 
against the Government, was abolished in 1953,<e®* both the Law of 
Government Proceedings of 1953 and 1958, defined exclusively the types 
of actions that may be brought against the Government into ordinary 
courts. They are almost identical to those referred to under Article 
3 of the law of 1935 discussed above, <ee> i.e. cases relating to 
payment of money or compensation or to the recovery of property
unlawfully seized by the Government.<e7r:‘
Article 5 of the Law of Government Proceedings imposes an undue 
and unconstitutional restriction on the right of individuals to bring 
direct actions against the Government. It infringes Article 102 of 
the Constitution which provides for the right of the courts to receive 
and entertain all sorts of direct actions against the Government, 
whether it be civil or administrative action, Since Article 5 of the 
law of 1958 has not only reduced the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts to civil actions alone, but to a specified type of civil 
actions only, reconciliation with Article 102 of the Constitution
would be quite impossible.
Furthermore, despite the limited opportunities of judicial review 
of administrative actions in Jordan, and the fact that the juris­
diction of the courts to review the validity of administrative actions 
is severely restricted; the Jordanian legislature has adapted a 
special legislative technique, which in effect has made the chances of
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reviewing the lawfulness of the administration's activities, by the 
courts very rare, When the executive wishes to protect any 
administrative action from being examined by the courts, it adds a 
provision in the relevant statute stating that the administrative 
decision made under that particular statute shall be final and may not 
be called into question in any court of law,<ea> The frequent usage 
of this practice has created a substantial number of irreviewable 
administrative decisions, known as the immunized decisions (.al-qararat 
al-mohassnh).
3 " S1AII7.TQRY RESTRICTIONS _OHT THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL 
EiLY-.I.BW PF APWIHIfilBATJ.VE AQX I.ON IN JORDAN:
We do not intend to discuss the legislative provisions where the
legislator uses such apt and malleable language which indirectly makes
it impossible for the court to assess or decide upon the legality of
the administrative action, Nor are we able to discuss all the
statutory provisions which explicitly excluded judicial review of
administrative action by providing that the said action shall not be
questioned by any court of law, since this practice has become
increasingly far too frequent, Alternatively, we shall confine
ourselves to some illustrative examples from the contemporary
legislative practice under the present Constitution (1952), and only
to the cases where it is explicitly provided that the validity of the
administrative action shall not be examined by any court of law.
1.- The first instance in this trend was the provision of Article 
29 of the Law of Trade Unions of 1953, which prohibited all courts 
from entertaining any action, brought against a registered trade
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union, its members or employees, personally or on behalf of the 
members of the trade union, with regard to a violation which might 
facilitate or incite an industrial or labour dispute.
2.- Article 13(2) of the Law of Charitable Societies of 1956,
bestowed upon the Council of Ministers an unfettered power to 
refuse, or to allow any foreign society to function in Jordan or 
to impose any conditions on it or to revoke its licence; and 
provided that: "the decision of the Council of Ministers may not
be reviewed by any court in any sense.
3.- Article 8 of the Municipalities Law, as amended by Law Mo. 5
of 1963, provides that the term of the Municipal Council shall run 
for four years; and empowered the Council of Ministers —  upon the 
recommendation of the Minister of the Interior —  to dissolve the 
Council and appoint a committee to take its place for a period not 
exceeding one year, during which a new Council must be elected. 
The same Article provides that:
"the decisions of the Council of Ministers shall not be subject to 
any review."
4.~ The Law of Political Parties of 1955, made the Council of
Ministers the sole and final judge on all issues concerning polit­
ical parties such as licencing, revocation of licences, dissol­
ution and banning. Article 11 thereof provides that:
"the decision of the Council of Ministers under this law shall be 
final and may not be examined by any other authority."c91 *
5.- Article 16(2) of the Law of Print and Publication of 1973, has 
accorded an absolute discretion to the Council of Ministers acting 
upon the recommendation of the Minister of Information to grant,
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refuse or withdraw the licence of any publication or newspaper 
without laying down any r e a s o n . Y e t ,  it provides that:
"the decisions of the Council of Ministers,., shall be final and 
may not be reviewed by any court whatsoever... . "cs,;3>
6.- Article 89<3> of the Labour Code also provides that:
"the Council of Ministers may, upon the Minister's recommendation 
[the Minister of Labour], dissolve any trade union for reasons of 
security or public safety, and its decision in the matter shall be 
final and incontestable."c945
7.- Article 15 of the Law of Civil Pensions Mo, 24 of 1959 as
amended by the provisional Law Mo. 51 of 1976, provides that the 
decision of the Council of Ministers to force retirement upon 
public servants "shall be final and may not be challenged before 
any administrative or judicial body."<9e>
8.- The most serious example in his list is the provision of
Article 20 of the Instructions of Martial Law Administration of 
1967, which has paralyzed the High Court of Justice by ousting
almost all its jurisdiction. It reads as follows:
"From the date these instructions become operative, 
and until they are abrogated or replaced by another, 
all sub-paragraphs of paragraph (3) of Article 10 of 
the Law of Formation of Regular Courts of 1952, shall 
be suspended except sub-paragraphs a. and b. Mo con­
trary laws, regulations, or order may apply as long as 
it contradicts these instructions, or any order issued 
by the Martial Law Governor-General thereunder."
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Normally one would presume that the courts would adopt a hostile 
attitude towards such legislative practice, and would expect the 
judiciary to stand up to its role as the vindicator of human rights or 
at least to defend its own constitutional jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
the case law indicates the apposite and clearly reveals that the 
Jordanian courts (led by the Supreme Court and the High Court of Jus- 
tice) have explicitly approved of the above legislative practice and 
therefore by doing so have indirectly encouraged it.
It has already been mentioned that the Supreme Court has accepted 
the limitation imposed on the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to 
entertain direct actions against the administration by the law of Gov- 
ernment Proceedings of 1958, except for the limited cases referred to 
under Article 5 of the same L a w . E v e n  in the case of an 
admissible action the ordinary courts denied themselves the right to 
examine the legality of the administrative action and to award compen­
sation if deemed necessary. InCase No. 24/68. where the applicant 
sued the administration for compensation for arbitrary dismissal from 
public service; the Supreme Court ruled that:
"...the established view of this court which has been 
determined in several plenary sessions, is that 
ordinary courts may not question the validity of the 
administrative decision which may be raised during 
proceeding, unless it is a total nullity to the extent 
that it loses its capacity as an administrative deci­
sion. Thus, since the administrative decision of 
4/7/59 dismissing the applicant from public service 
from the 9/5/59, is an existing decision which has not 
been abrogated by the High Court of Justice, ordinary 
courts must not pronounce upon its validity in order 
to award compensation."c375
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In Case Ho. 230/74, before the Court of First Instance of Amman, a 
number of applicants submitted application Ho. 230/74 demanding pay­
ment of 165,300 JD in damages for the destruction of pin~ball machines 
and the closing of recreation and amusement arcades owned by them,
which had been ordered by the Prime Minister and carried out by the 
police. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the government, requested 
the court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on several 
grounds;
1) that Article 2 of the Defence Regulations Ho. 2 of 1939 (under
which the decision was taken) has placed the power to award any 
compensation in this case exclusively in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, and therefore ordinary courts may not entertain such 
applications.
Speaking for the court the president delivered the following 
judgement:
"Firstly, Article 2 of the Defence Regulations does 
not limit the power to award compensation for property 
seized by the Government to secure public safety, ex­
clusively to the Prime Minister alone, and does not 
oust the jurisdiction of the regular courts in this 
regard. It provides that, the Prime Minister may, if
he deems it appropriate, decide the payment of damages
for anything done under this Article, and in such an 
event he may decide the amount of damages payable,
This provision, meant only to define the adminis­
trative authority which may decide upon the amount of 
the compensation if any at all but, it does not in any 
sense exclude the jurisdiction of the regular courts 
to decide upon applications for damages under the 
provisions of that regulation.,,
One must not confer upon this provision a meaning 
wider than it really has, by assuming that it has 
granted an exclusive jurisdiction to the Prime Min­
ister in this matter and that it has ousted the juris­
diction of the regular courts, for in fact it does not 
go that far. Since the said Article does not prohibit 
the courts from deciding upon these cases, it would be 
incorrect to say that the courts lack jurisdiction in 
this matter.
Secondly, the judiciary has a general constitu­
tional jurisdiction to decide upon all legal disputes,
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and thus, neither the legislature by virtue of a stat­
ute, nor the Executive by virtue of an ordinance, may 
abridge this jurisdiction or any part of it. Since 
the courts derive their jurisdiction directly from the 
Constitution, exclusion of the judiciary would thus 
represent aggression on the Constitution itself,.. and 
consequently Article 2 of the said Defence Regulations 
would be unconstitutional,
Thirdly. .. the rule that ' al-qadha yatakhassass fe 
al-zaman wa al-makan wa estethna baiz al~khusuowatc^3,>
(the judge is confined by place and time, with the 
possibility to exclude certain disputes) is a rule 
derived from the Islamic tradition, and does not con­
form with modern constitutional principles. Modern 
judiciary is an independent branch of government, 
driving its jurisdiction directly from the constitu­
tion. The judge does not owe allegiance to or receive 
his authority from the legislature, the Executive or 
anybody else.1 c 1005
The court thus dismissed the request of the Attorney-General and 
declared the case admissible.c1015
Eventually, the Supreme Court seems to have been convinced by the 
view of the Court of First Instance. In Case Mo, 295/77, the court 
stated the following: Article 2 of the Defence Regulations Mo. 2 of
1939:
”... grants the Prime Minister the power to award com­
pensation if he deems it appropriate, ¥hen he does 
not wish to exercise this power, the ordinary courts 
regain their powers in this matter by virtue of their 
general jurisdiction."41025
The court construed the term 'if he deems it appropriate1 not as 
a choice between payment and non-payment of compensation, but rather, 
permission for the Prime Minister to act if he thinks fit.41035
In another case, the court held that, the standing view of the 
Supreme Court is, that Article 2 of the Defence Regulation Mo. 2 of 
1939, "does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to decide upon 
the amount of compensation, should the Prime Minister not wish to 
decide it himself."41045
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However, it is not yet clear, whether or not the courts would 
still have their jurisdiction to act, if the Prime Minister did exer­
cise his power, but decided to award unfair compensation.
As for the jurisprudence of the HCJ, it has constantly upheld the 
constitutionality of the laws abridging the judicial review of admin­
istrative actions.
The first recorded case in this regard was Case No. 41/55. con­
cerning the constitutionality of Article 46 of the Law of the In­
dependence of the Judiciary No. 19 of 1955, which provided for the 
establishment of an administrative committee, headed by the Minister 
of Justice for the reformation of the judiciary and .which also pro­
vided that the decisions of the said committee, should not be chal­
lenged before any judicial body. The court unconvincingly argued that 
the Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of the courts and 
delegated this power to the legislature to exercise it by a statute.
"there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the 
legislature from increasing or decreasing the juris­
diction of the courts at any time by a later statute.
This was exactly the case of Article 46 in question, 
which has excluded the jurisdiction of the courts by a 
constitutional instrument."<los>
Ever since this judgement, the legislature has made more frequent 
usage of this method, and the court has always upheld the constitu­
tionality of this legislative practice.c1065
In Case No. 34/77. the constitutionality of Article 2 of the pro­
visional law No, 51 of 1976,< 10:75 was challenged before the court 
(High Court of Justice). The latter held that:
"The view of this court which has been established and 
confirmed in many previous decisions is, that such a 
provision is a constitutional measure and does not in­
fringe any Article of the constitution.1005
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One of the most debated questions in this context was the con­
stitutionality of Article 20 of the Instructions of the Martial Law 
Administration of 1957, which in 1967 became Article 20 of the In­
structions of the Martial Law Administration of 1967, As has already 
been mentioned,c1095 this provision has deprived the HCJ of almost 
all its jurisdiction and prevented the court from reviewing any admin­
istrative decision issued by the said administration.
Until 1967, the court upheld the constitutionality of this provi­
sion and considered it to be an absolute ousting of its jurisdiction 
in this regard.
Consequently, it abstained from reviewing any of the Martial Law 
Administration's decisions, and rejected all such applications on the 
grounds of lack of jurisdiction.c1los
An attempt to attenuate the impact of the sweeping generalization
of this provision was made by the HCJ, when these Instructions were
re-introduced in 1967. The court, led by the President of the Supreme
Court, held that Article 20 of the Instructions (as it stands) was
unconstitutional and contrary even to Article 125 of the Constitution
which authorizes the King to issue such Instructions. In Case No.
44/67, the court distinguished between decisions which are prlma
faciae relating to the defence of the realm and those which are not;
and stated that: "immunity from judicial review may be granted to the
former only"; and then added that:
"....since Article 20 has prohibited the review of all 
kinds of decisions issued by the Martial Law Admin­
istration, notwithstanding whether they are related to 
the defence of the realm and public safety or not, it 
is thus an unconstitutional provision, and does not 
apply unless the court is satisfied that the decision 
was issued for the purposes of the defence and public 
safety, "c1113
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Shortly after, the court altered its views on the issue of consti­
tutionality and considered Article 20 to be a constitutional pro­
vision; but upheld the distinction between the decisions relating to
defence and public safety and those which do not; as explained in the
above case,<11Si> In a series of cases, the court repeatedly 
ascertained that; Article 20 of the Instructions of the Martial Law 
Administration of 1967 is a constitutional provision, but it applies 
only to the decisions relating to the defence of the realm and public 
safety. Nonetheless, in practice the court retained the general sense 
of this provision by adopting a wide interpretation of the phrase 
'defence of the realm and public safety', to the extent that it covers 
almost all the decisions of the Martial Law Administration. Accord­
ingly, it has become powerless to review such decisions.c 1
In 1979, when the university of Jordan dismissed a group of lect­
urers upon the recommendation of the Director of the General Intel­
ligence, the lecturers concerned submitted application No,10ft/79, 
challenging the validity of the decision of the Council of the Trust­
ees (No.24/79 dated 30/8/79) before the HOT.4114* On behalf of the 
university the defence raised the point that the jurisdiction of the 
court to entertain such an application was ousted by Article 20 of the 
Instructions of the Martial Law Administration of 1967, especially 
when the Prime Minister had testified that the decision was taken for 
security reasons, as mentioned in the recommendation of the Director 
of the General Intelligence, and that the disclosure of the reasons 
could be prejudicial to the public interest. The court upheld the 
constitutionality of Article 20. The majority of the court confirmed 
the right of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts at 
any time and with regard to any matter, It stated that:
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"...the court agrees that judicial review of adminis­
trative action is an essential guarantee for the 
protection of the rights of the individual against ex­
cesses of legality by the administration. This 
however, applies only when there is no statutory 
provision ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court 
of Justice to review the administrative decision; and 
Article 20 of the Instructions of the Martial Law 
Administration has ousted the jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Justice except for the provisions of sub- 
paragraph (a) and <b),
.,.The established view of this court as has been con­
firmed in several previous plenary sessions (44/67,
96/56, 26/67, 4/69 and 81/69) is that Article 20 is
applicable and does exclude the jurisdiction of the 
court to entertain applications challenging the valid­
ity of administrative decisions issued for the 
purposes of the defence of the realm as provided for 
by Article 125 of the Constitution."c1155
Accordingly, the majority declared the application inadmissible, 
for lack of jurisdiction.
In their dissenting opinion, Justices N, Rshadan and A. Mo'at\n,
disputed the conclusion and the reasoning of the majority. They
argued that Martial Law Instructions were intended to apply to matters
of national defence and not to ordinary crimes.*1160 They added that
what was decided by the HCJ in 44/67 and the decisions to fallow was;
"that Article 125(2) of the Constitution grants to the 
legislator (The King) precise and limited legislative 
power to secure the defence of the realm, and does not 
confer on him absolute power to prevent the courts 
from reviewing decisions which do not relate to the 
defence of the realm. . . the court has (in Case No.
44/67) limited the apparent generalization of Article 
20, so it does not exclude the jurisdiction of the 
court in all cases, but only those which without any 
doubt, relate to the defence of the realm, "c1
In their view, the decision of the university was not relating to 
the defence of the realm or the public safety within the meaning of 
Article 125 of the Constitution and therefore, the application was 
admissible.c11S°
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However, there are two important points in this rule-making judge­
ment!
a) The court has emphasized the constitutionality of Article 20
of the Instructions of the Martial Law Administration, and con­
firmed that this provision applies to prevent the court from re­
viewing the decisions relating to public safety and the defence of 
the realm, Nonetheless, the court did not provide us with a
specific definition of what might be considered as relating to de­
fence and public safety, As it will be explained in the next 
chapter, the court has adopted a rather broad interpretation of 
the phrase 'defence of the realm and public safety', to the
extent that in effect it has embraced almost all the decisions of
the Martial Law Administration and rendered them unreviewable by
the courts.
b) As a general rule, the court (the majority) has recognized the
right of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts in any 
matter, and to prevent them from reviewing the validity of adminis­
trative actions, including those violating the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution,
B.- THELATTI-TPPB OF JORDANIAN LAWYERS
Jordanian lawyers seem unanimous in their condemnation of the
above legislative practice, and voice similar disapproval of the
established view of the HCJ. They agree that the statutory provisions 
purported to exclude judicial review of administrative actions by the 
courts are unconstitutional. However, we shall choose a few repre­
sentative examples.41191 This shall include senior judges, practising 
advocates and academic lawyers.
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a) According to Judge F, Kilany,c120> the former President of 
the Court of First Instance of Amman, the Constitution has granted 
Jordanian courts general jurisdiction over all persons and in all 
matters, and therefore the legislature may not suppress part of 
this jurisdiction by preventing the courts from exercising their 
jurisdiction under the Constitution. c 1:21 3
b) S. Rshadat, the Secretary-General of the Arab lawyers League, 
starts from the point that the Constitution guarantees the rights 
of the individual^ as well as the right of the courts to exercise 
their jurisdiction. The legislature thus must not encroach upon 
these rights or prevent the courts from exercising their juris­
diction by providing that actions or decisions of one or another 
administrative authority may not be reviewed by any court of 
law.
c) Dr. H. Haddah, a practising advocate, also criticised the pol­
icy of the HCJ and stated that a distinction should be made be­
tween the absolute rights guaranteed by the Constitution, within 
which the legislature may not interfere in any way, and the relat­
ive rights which may be regulated by the legislature. He argued 
that if a given matter is within the jurisdiction of the courts by 
virtue of the Constitution, then the legislature may not exclude 
it by a later statute, without violating the Constitution 
itself.<
d) Another practising advocate is Mr. I. Beker,<1 who has 
criticised the established view of the HCJ, and the broad inter­
pretation of the phrase 'security and public safety' employed by 
the court so far.
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He also added that the statutory provisions abridging the right of the 
HCJ to review the validity of administrative action are contrary to 
the Constitution.c1255
e) In the words of Prof. A, AL-Hlari,
1 In our opinion the provisions which prevent the 
courts from adjudicating upon administrative disputes 
are unconstitutional, and the courts must disregard 
them unless such actions are protected from judicial 
review by the provisions of the Constitution 
itself."c1S!S:>
In his view the legislature should not deprive the courts of 
their jurisdiction, because it is for the Constitution to define 
the jurisdiction of each branch of the Government. The role of the 
legislature is only to provide rules describing the manner 
in which such jurisdiction may be exercised without reducing or 
increasing the constitutional share of any branch. He also 
criticized the established opinion of the HCJ and state that: 
"the court seems to have misconceived and distorted the principle 
of legality as a whole."<1275 
f) Similar conclusions were also reached by Prof. M. Al-Ghazwy. 
Although he did not criticise the HCJ directly, he submitted that 
the above legislative practice which has been approved by the 
courts, has done a great deal of damage to the rights and freedoms 
declared by the Constitution. *1;2e:>
As far as judicial review of administrative action is concerned, 
the present writer shares the view that both the legislative practice 
and the attitude of the courts are unconstitutional.
It has already been mentioned that before 1951/52, there was no 
HCJ to review the validity of the actions of the administration.
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Nonetheless, the courts were empowered by Article 47 and 60 of the
Constitution of 1928 and of 1946 respectively, to entertain all civil
cases brought by or against the government.c 1:2:9* It was also stressed
that a major change was brought about by Articles 27, 100, 101 and 102
of the present Constitution. What both the HCJ and the legislature
seem to have failed to notice is that Article 102 of the present
Constitution provides for the jurisdiction of the regular courts with
regard to all cases brought by or against the government and not only
"civil cases" as was the position under the previous two
Constitutions. To quote the provisions of Article 102 again, it says*.
"The regular courts in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
shall have jurisdiction over all persons in all 
matters... including cases brought by or against the 
Government, excepting matters which, by the provisions 
of the Constitution or of any law for the time being
in force, fall within the jurisdiction of religious
courts or special courts."
It is difficult to understand how such plain language could lead 
to such confusion. This Article is quite clear in stating that all 
legal disputes which arise in Jordan fall within the jurisdiction 
of the regular courts, except for those transferred by law to a reli­
gious or a special court, If the legislature is to remove any matter 
out of the jurisdiction of the regular courts (The High Court of Jus­
tice and the ordinary courts) without transferring it to a religious 
or a special court, but excludes the jurisdiction of all courts, it 
would be in plain violation of this Article (Art. 102).
Indeed, Article 100 of the Constitution has delegated to the 
legislature the power to define the jurisdiction of the courts, but it 
is merely a power to distribute the jurisdiction between the various 
regular courts, the religious courts and the special courts,
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Distributing the jurisdiction does not include the power to exclude a 
given matter from the jurisdiction of all courts.
It is also true that Article 100 empowers the legislature to 
establish the HCJ and to define its jurisdiction by a special law, and 
thus it may increase or limit its jurisdiction by a subsequent 
statute. Vhen the legislature exercises its powers to exclude any 
matter from the jurisdiction of the HCJ such a matter must come under 
the general jurisdiction of the ordinary regular courts in accordance 
with Article 102 of the Constitution.
It has already been mentioned that judicial review of adminis­
trative action did not exist in Jordan before 1951. Civil actions 
which were allowed to be brought against the government were limited 
by the law of Government Proceedings of 1935, to a few types of civil 
cases and for which previous written permission from the Prime 
Minister was required.
The provisional law of 1951, provided for the establishment of the 
first Jordanian HCJ, similar to its British counterpart in Palestine, 
and conferred on it powers and jurisdiction Identical to those of the 
farmer British court. This court was short-lived and was replaced by 
the present Jordanian HCJ. The latter has been vested with limited 
powers and jurisdiction to review specific types of administrative 
actions. Some of its jurisdiction was part of the jurisdiction of the 
British High Court of Justice, and the rest was borrowed from the 
jurisdiction of the 'council d'etat' of Egypt.
Despite the fact that the jurisdiction of the HCJ is confined (by 
Article 10(3) of the Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts of
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1952) to a limited number of administrative actions. Regardless of the 
broad provision of Article 102 of the present constitution, the 
regular courts of Jordan declared that they lack jurisdiction to ex­
amine the validity of administrative actions. They repeatedly ascer­
tained that their jurisdiction in this regard is limited to specific 
types of civil cases as defined by the Laws of the Government 
Proceedings of 1953 and 1958.
Contrary to the practice of the British High Court of Palestine 
the present HCJ of Jordan has adopted a policy of rather narrow 
interpretation of its already limited jurisdiction. Some illustrative 
examples may reflect such a restrictive policy. As far as awamer al- 
efraj (habeas corpus> are concerned, we have already mentioned that 
the High Court of Justice of Palestine had applied a broad meaning to 
the phrase 'illegally detained persons' to include any one who had 
been held in custody contrary to the law. The present Jordanian HCJ 
has limited the application of this remedy to those who have been 
detained by the administration and by virtue of administrative 
decision i.e., those who have been detained by the security forces, 
General Intelligence Agency, the Armed Forces..., without a formal 
administrative decision having been passed, could not apply to the 
court for awamer al-efraj (habeas corpus).< 130*
Another point is the definition of a 'public officer', whose act­
ion and decision may be reviewed by the court. Whilst the High Court 
of Justice of Palestine had applied this term to any person who had a 
duty under the law to carry out or to refrain from carrying out 
certain actions, to the extent that it included the Chief Executive 
Officers of the courts and the Chiefs of Religious Communities, the 
Jordanian HCJ has restricted this definition to apply to members of
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Official Government Departments only. Even within this limited scope, 
the court has ruled that it has no jurisdiction to review the deci­
sions of the inferior courts, tribunals, judicial committees, nor the 
orders or the decisions of the Chief Executive Officers.*1315
In addition to the narrow interpretation of its already limited 
powers, the Jordanian HCJ has expressed less jealousy towards its 
jurisdiction. Indeed it has recognized the right of the legislature 
to oust its jurisdiction at any time and with regard to any matter.
Such a policy has encouraged the legislature to suppress almost all 
the jurisdiction of the court. According to a leading Jordanian law­
yer the legislative practice has rendered the HCJ a 'hopeless temple'.
Ho reference to the above legislative and judicial practices has 
been made in any of the Jordanian reports to the HRC, although the 
latter has constantly ashed for information with regard to the 
availabilities of judicial remedies to persons whose declared rights 
and freedoms have been violated by the official authorities,c1325 On 
the contrary, when questioned specifically about this aspect of the 
law of Jordan, the Jordanian representative categorically stated that, 
"...there was nothing to prevent any Jordanian citizen from gaining 
access to the courts, from the Magistrate's Court up to the Court of 
Cassation". tl33>
Such an unequivocal assertion does not take account of the above- 
mentioned examples where judicial remedies have been totally excluded; 
nor of the manner in which the Jordanian courts have interpreted the 
provisions restricting their jurisdiction and the constitutional 
provisions (Articles 100-102) guaranteeing the right to access tD 
court.
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Another inaccurate statement by the representation of Jordan was
also made in 1982 when he was questioned by a member of the HRC (P.
Vallejo) on the availability of judicial remedies to those unjustly
treated under emergency powers. He stated that:
"In any case very few persons had been subjected to 
harsh measures under the emergency regulations and any 
person who considered himself wronged was entitled to 
appeal to the Court of Cassation against his 
conviction and sentence or against any administrative 
order made. If the Court were to find in his favour 
the conviction would be questioned or the order 
rescinded" .<!«>*>
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the representative of 
Jordan (Mr, Khouri) who was a judicial inspector in the Ministry of 
Justice, was not aware of the provision of Article 20 of the 
instructions of the Martial-Law Administration, which has ousted the 
jurisdiction of the courts and prevented them from reviewing the 
validity of the decisions of the Martial-Law authorities. It is also 
equally difficult to believe that Mr. Khouri was not aware of the fact 
that offences against these instructions were under the jurisdiction 
of the Martial-Law Court whose decisions may not be appealed against to 
any court, including the Court of Cassation.
Based on the above analysis of the legislation and the practice of 
Jordan, one could legitimately conclude that judicial review of 
administrative action is almost absent or at best unsatisfactorily 
limited.
Because of the said legislative practice and the attitude of the 
courts, it is not rare to find a person whose declared rights and 
freedoms have been seriously violated, without a competent court to 
turn to for justice. This does not only minimise the value of the 
Jordanian laws providing for those rights and freedoms, but indeed
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violates the minimum international standards of human rights, and 
places Jordan in breach of its legal obligation under the Covenants. 
One would have thus expected that the Jordanian legislature and the 
courts would have given up such practices, at least after 1976. The 
legislature and the courts should respect the right to access to 
court, and the legislature must provide a judicial remedy to anyone 
who may claim that his declared rights and freedoms have been violated 
by anyone especially by official authorities.
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(20) Special administrative councils were established in the
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CHAPTER VII.
RES TLR-I-GX IONS QM EMERGENCY P O W E R S .
Ordinary rules are designed to be applied in ordinary circum­
stances whereas extraordinary circumstances justify the introduction 
and application of a set of extraordinary laws. At any time in its 
history, a country might face exceptional circumstances, whereby 
ordinary laws would become manifestly insufficient to preserve public 
order and to secure the survival of the nation. In such circumstances 
the public authority (the Government) may legitimately assume some 
exceptional powers to do whatever is possible and necessary to ensure 
the survival of the nation regardless of the traditional limitations 
of the ordinary laws. Like any other organized group confronted with 
a threatening danger, the nation must submit to a strict form of dis­
cipline, which might even amount to a dictatorship. Individual free­
doms and rights should give way to the rights of the community to pro­
tect itself and to exist. A democracy threatened with annihilation by 
totalitarian aggression is the supreme paradigm of an organized group 
passing through a crisis on which life and death may depend. The 
nation must submit to a temporary 'dictatorship-of-the-occaslon'.c15 
This, however, must not be interpreted as giving licence to a perm­
anent and culturally destructive totalitarian method of Government, 
but rather as a necessary evil in time of serious crisis.
It is interesting to notice the distinction drawn by Prof. B. 
Malinowski between discipline as an inevitable quality of behaviour 
in crisis, and that pervasive discipline which prevents carrying out 
of independent activities, and the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. 
The coefficient of freedom as against bondage, he says.*
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"...depends upon the aims for which power is being mob­
ilized. It also depends upon the circumstances under 
which discipline occurs. When discipline is brought 
into being by a temporary inevitable crisis it must be 
accepted or else the group may perish. When disci­
pline is imposed upon a community and the culture as a 
whole, transforming thus the whole group into a pas­
sive instrument of power politics, it destroys the
very core of civilization."C25
It was also added that the fundamental difference separating a de­
mocracy in an emergency on the one hand from a totalitarian dictator­
ship on the other, resides in the fact that to the former discipline 
is a means to an end whilst to the latter it is an end in itself.
The severity of emergency powers may be justified in consideration 
of their purported aims, presumably the target is to bring the crisis 
under control as much as is humanly possible, When those powers, 
however, are mobilized solely to protect a dictatorial regime or are 
being applied in a manner likely to hasten rather than to prevent dis­
aster, they became the vanguard of oppression, If emergency powers 
were perpetuated or applied for purposes other than those prescribed 
by the law, they would constitute a formidable threat to the rights 
and freedoms of the individual, and might even threaten the organized 
existence of the community itself. In such instances the community 
would need to protect itself from those claiming to guard it. 
Experience tells us that unbridled and unrestricted emergency powers 
are far more dangerous than natural catastrophes or other man-made 
upheavals. They are probably more liable to abuse and misuse than any 
other legal regime.
Provision of reasonable restrictions on the emergency powers is
thus an integral part of the role of the Constitution and domestic law
in the implementation of the minimum international standards of human 
rights. It falls in the first place to the Constitution to strike the
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dividing line between the right of the community to protect its 
existence and to ensure its survival on the one hand and the declared 
rights of the individual on the other. The Constitution must contain 
certain legal safeguards in order to prevent the abuse of the rights 
of either side. The legislature should then maintain the balance be­
tween the right of the authorities to enhance public safety and na­
tional defence, and the right Df the individual to enjoy the 
guaranteed minimum standards of rights and freedoms, The latter may 
not be made subordinate to the former unless it is strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.
In this Chapter the intention is to examine the emergency powers 
provided for under the Constitution and laws of Jordan. we shall be 
assessing the manner in which they are being applied and measuring 
their impacts on the guaranteed minimum standards of human rights in 
practice, with special reference to administrative detention and other 
issues. An attempt shall also be made to question the constitution­
ality of those powers under the existing constitutional provisions, 
followed by same proposals to bring the law and practice of Jordan 
into line with the practice of civilized nations and the legal obli­
gations assumed by Jordan as a state party of the Political Covenant,
Before this, however, we shall be dealing briefly with the quest­
ion of derogation from the modern international standards of human 
rights under Article 4 of the Political Covenant.
Accordingly, the subject may be divided into four sections as fol­
lows:
1 - Derogation under Article 4 of the Political Covenant
2 - Emergency powers under the law of Jordan
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3 - Abuse of emergency powers in Jordan in terms of administrative de­
tention and other issues
4 - An Assessment,
1 - R.ERP-GA.TIQH. JIMD33R ARTICLE 4 OF THE...POLITICAL .COVENANT.
Derogation from treaty obligations, under exceptional circum­
stances, seems to be generally recognized practice in public inter­
national law and relations. There is no bar in international law
against contracting parties including a provision delineating those 
circumstances as under which they may suspend their obligations under 
the treaty, and the procedures to be followed thereto. Although some 
may argue that "any form of derogation, reservation or qualification 
is inappropriate in conventions for the promotion of human rights", 
all general human rights conventions have contained provisions 
relating to derogation under special circumstances.<s> The exception 
in this regard is the Economic Covenant. This, however, must not be 
interpreted in support of the argument that social welfare rights are 
not legal rights at all, but mere social and economic programmes, nor 
should it lead us to conclude that these rights are unenforceable or 
that derogation therefrom is impossible.
As far as the Political Covenant is concerned, Article 4 thereof 
provides that:
" (1) In time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the state parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the present Covenant to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not in­
consistent with their other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.
(2) No derogation from Article 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1
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and 9), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under this 
provision,
(3) Any state party to the present Covenant availing 
itself to the right of derogation shall immediately in- 
form the other states parties to the present Covenant, 
through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the provisions from which it has 
derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated,
A further communication shall be made, through the same 
intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such
derogation,"
This is a general provision permitting any state party (providing 
that the required conditions have been fulfilled) to suspend the
application of many of the rights recognised in the Covenant for any 
period of time as may be deemed necessary in the case of a public
emergency. This provision is different from other general qualifi­
cation provisions included in most of the major international human 
rights instruments which stipulate that nothing in the document may be 
interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to 
engage in an activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights and freedoms recognized therein or at their limit­
ation, to a greater extent than is provided for in the said instru­
ment. It may thus be viewed as an exception to the general
provision of Article 5(1) of the Political Covenant, It is justi­
fiable upon the existence of such exceptional circumstances and the 
compliance with the prescribed conditions. A distinction should also 
be drawn between the general provision of Article 4 and the qualifi­
cation clause with regard to the exercise of some specific right,
Several Articles in the Political Covenant permit the imposition 
of limitations on some of the civil and political rights in the inter­
ests of national security, 'order public', public safety, health and 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. <v:>
479
As far as the requirements of lawful derogation are concerned, 
distinction may be made under Article 4 between the substantive and 
the procedural conditions.
A -  THE, ,SlZBS.TAffTIV.B OTTOI T IQFS,
These are conditions relating to the gravity of the emergency 
situation, the nature of the measures taken to rectify the situation 
and the duties and obligations of the states parties under interna­
tional law and other instruments.
1) Public Emergency which Threatens the Life of the Nation.
The phrase 'threatening the life Df the nation' may cause some 
confusion as to the scope of the exceptional circumstances in the geo- 
graphical sense; and may give rise to question as to whether or not a 
public emergency in a part of the territory of the state party could 
justify derogation under Article 4. An incident of public dis­
turbance, a natural disaster or even civil war in a remote part of the 
country would not threaten the life of the entire nation. nonethe­
less, the national or the local government needs exceptional powers to 
deal swiftly with the situation in order to bring it under control and 
to restore peace and public order. It would be unwise to tie the 
hands of the municipal authorities with the normal bonds of the ordin­
ary laws on the ground that the crisis is limited to that part only 
and therefore it does not threaten the life of the nation.
Obviously the phrase was borrowed from Article 15 of the EHR, "In 
time of war or. , . threatening the life of the nation. . ." where in 
earlier cases both the EUCM and the EUCT seemed to take the phrase, 
'threatening the life of the nation' literally. In the case of 
Lawless v. Ireland, for instance, the EUCT stated that the natural
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customary meaning of these words is sufficiently clear, it refers to 
"an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the 
whole papulation and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the 
community of which the state is composed."4 The same criterion was 
also followed hy the EUCN in Denmark and others v. Greece. It was 
stated that the public emergency must be:
<1) actual and imminent;
<2) its effects must involve the whole nation;
(3) the continuance of the organized life of the community must be
threatened;
<4) the crisis or danger must be exceptional in that the normal meas­
ures or restrictions permitted by the EHR for maintenance of 
public safety, health, and order are plainly inadequate.
In a later case, namely Ireland v. United Kingdom, the 
requirements of the involvement of the whole nation seems to have been 
qualified. In this case the British Government argued that the 
exceptional measures introduced in Northern Ireland were justifiable 
under Article 15 of the EHR.<10> The significance of this case stems 
from the fact that the right of the United Kingdom to derogate under 
Article 15, was never disputed on the ground that Northern Ireland was 
only a part of the British nation and the life of the whole nation was 
not threatened as the said Article seems to require. It might be true 
that Northern Ireland is an 'integral' part of the United Kingdom, 
but, it is equally difficult to believe that the situation in Northern
Ireland constitutes a real threat to the life of the British nation as
a whole.
Explaining the position, Prof. R. Higgins state that: "the real­
ity seems to be that for purposes of Article 15 the whole nation is
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simply Northern Ireland."c11> As far as this presumption is concerned 
it might "be argued that Northern Ireland was not a nation in its own 
right and nor did it claim to be, and even if it did so, it was not 
the 'nation' of Northern Ireland which was derogating from the EHR, it 
was the British (the U.K. Government), which was not threatened in its 
entirety.
As for Article 4 of the Political Covenant, neither the prepar­
atory works nor the jurisprudence of the HRC provides a clear cut 
answer to this question. In its general comment on Article 4,C1:E:> 
the HRC described the obligations of the states parties under this 
Article in some general terms, and did not address itself to the above 
question or discuss the circumstances or the grounds upon which 
derogation might be permissible. Instead it was stated:
"Article 4 of the Covenant has posed a number of 
problems for the Committee when considering reports 
from some states parties. Vhen a public emergency 
which threatens the life of a nation arises and it is 
officially proclaimed, a states party may derogate 
from a number of rights to the extent strictly 
required by the situation.,. The Committee holds the 
view that measures taken under Article 4 are of an 
exceptional and temporary nature and may only last as 
long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened 
and that in times of emergency, the protection of 
human rights becomes all the more important, 
particularly those rights from which no derogation can 
be made, " <13 >
Until now, a number of states parties, including the United King­
dom have derogated under Article 4. Yet, when discussing reports of 
those countries, the HRC never seemed to have shown a great concern 
for the legitimacy or justifiability of the derogation as a starting 
point. The focus seems to have been always on the need for and the 
justifiability of the measures taken thereunder,c
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When considering the report of the United Kingdom, the HRC did ask 
for further information about the situation in Northern Ireland, but 
it did not examine the legitimacy of the derogation itself,<ie> 
although, as mentioned above, Northern Ireland is only a part of the 
state party and the danger does not threaten the life of the entire 
nation; the comments of the HRC on the said reports lack any dis­
approving remarks, c1
Even the few academic lawyers who have addressed themselves 
directly to this question have found themselves trapped by the wording 
of this phrase which explicitly requires involvement of the whole 
nation. Prof. Joan F. Hartman, for instance, who after stating in the 
text that:
"The 'life of the nation* clause signifies that the entire 
state rather than a discrete segment of the population 
must be menaced and that some fundamental element of 
statehood such as the functioning of the judiciary or 
legislature or the flow of crucial supplies, must be 
seriously endangered."
found it necessary to qualify this statement by adding (as a foot­
note) :
"However, when there is a substantial threat of detach­
ment or loss of control over an important region, with a 
significant impact on central institutions, this crit­
erion may be satisfied."0 7 *
Another inaccurate term is the word 'life' of the nation. Nations 
and states do not have life in a sense analogous to that of an ordin­
ary person. It is therefore difficult to envisage anything less than 
a nuclear war that might literally "threaten the life of the nation", 
but this implication was certainly not the intention of the drafters. 
What was more likely to be threatened in a case of public emergency 
is the normal and organized function of the state rather than the phy­
sical life of the nation.
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Considering this, it would have been much more clear and less pro­
blematic if Article 4(1) were warded to read;
"In time of public emergency which threatens the 
organized function of the state or any part of it. . . , 
the state party may take measures derogating from. .,"
What might constitute a threat to the organized life of the 
nation or any part thereof, is a matter which falls, in the first 
place, to the state party to decide, in the light of the exigencies of 
the situation and past experience. The state's appreciation is not 
final. It is subject to scrutiny by international institutions which 
may decide the opposite i.e. that there is not a public emergency nor 
at least, one which threatens the organized life of the community or 
any part thereof, and therefore the derogation is unjustifiable. 
Practically speaking and due to the present state of international 
law, international institutions cannot prevent a state party from de­
claring an unjustifiable state of emergency or from effecting an un­
justified derogation. The sole recourse would be to pronounce the 
state to be in breach of its legal obligations under the relevant in­
strument. c ie:’
Accordingly, it may be stated that despite the present text of 
Article 4(1), international practicec120 and the jurisprudence of the 
HRC, indicate that a state party to the Political Covenant may 
legitimately derogate from some of its obligations under the said 
Covenant whenever the organized life Df the community or part of it is 
seriously threatened. A serious threat means something plainly beyond 
the day to day difficulties i.e. a situation where the normal measure 
available under the ordinary law are prima faciae inadequate in 
restoring peace and securing the normal function of the official 
institutions or the regular flow of supplies. This may include, for
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example, political instability, war, civil disobedience or a natural 
disaster.
However, when the exceptional circumstances are limited to one 
part of the country, the derogatory measures must be limited to that 
part only, unless of course there is a reasonable possibility that it 
might affect some other parts of the nation. In such a case these 
parts may be included as well.
Application of the derogatory measures to some other parts of the 
country, would constitute a violation of another element of the same 
paragraph. Namely that the derogatory measures should be "to the ex­
tent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation".
2) "To the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation."
This is a crucial shackle placed upon the freedom of the govern­
ment of a state party derogating under Article 4 of the Covenant. The 
existence of an emergency and the right to derogate, does not mean 
that the state party is free to take any measure where and when it 
deems convenient. It was perceived from the very beginning that an 
authoritarian government would use the state of emergency as a pretext 
to fulfil purposes which could not be legally achieved under normal 
circumstances.C:KO* The phrase ’to the extent strictly required' 
imposes restrictions on the power of the state to take derogatory 
measures in more than one sense. In the geographical sense these 
measures should be limited to the areas where there is a genuine need 
for them. In the sense of the number and the kind of rights from 
which a state party may derogate it means that the number of those 
rights should be as limited as is reasonably possible. A public 
emergency resulting from a natural catastrophe may not require the
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banning of political parties and associations or the right to a fair 
trial for instance. Proportionality between the scale of the public 
emergency and the derogatory measures must be taken into consider­
ation. In other words the government must not overact in a case of a 
public emergency.
An incident of civil uprising, coup d'etat, natural disaster or even a 
war may not justify for instance administrative detention on a massive 
scale and for unlimited periods of time with no guarantees against 
abuse. In the sense of duration, it requires that the derogatory 
measures should be limited to the time of emergency. It should always 
be borne in mind that the derogatory measures are allowed as an ex­
ceptional system in order to enable the state party to bring the 
situation under control and to return to normality once the emergency 
is over. It is an exception and must remain as such. A government 
may be tempted by the conveniences of emergency powers and tends to 
perpetuate the state of emergency even after the exceptional circum­
stances ceased to exist,*215 In many cases this has resulted in an 
extraordinary position where the exception has become the rule.
As to what might be strictly required by the exigence of the 
situation is a matter for the government of the state party to decide 
in good faith. International instruments leave 'a margin of appre­
ciation' for the government concerned to judge the situation and to 
choose the more suitable measures to deal with it. This choice, how­
ever, is subject to international scrutiny by the international organs 
of control.<23J The nation of 'margin of appreciation' is an 
important concept in modern international law of human rights. It is 
applicable in cases where the international instrument permits the 
imposition of certain restrictions by the state party on the rights
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and freedoms enumerated therein in favour of given values. It 
basically confers a degree of freedom upon the government of the state 
party to take the measures which it deems necessary to bring the 
situation under control in the light of the domestic factors, In two 
'rule-making' precedents the European institutions (the ECUK and ECUT) 
have defined the elements of this concept and illuminated its broader 
lines, ts*** in both cases the states concerned were found to have 
exercised the margin of appreciation reasonably, and the measures 
introduced were therefore said to be justifiable under Article 15 of 
the EHR.
As far as Article 4 of the Political Covenant is concerned, the 
HRC's scrutiny of the manner in which states parties exercise the 
'margin of appreciation' and the ensuing measures taken thereby, seems 
less than effective. That is so because in most cases the information 
available to the HRC is limited to what is mentioned in the report 
submitted by the government concerned, or the answers provided by its 
representative if any at all. <2S:> In some cases the reports neither 
reflect the true factual situation nor indicate all the derogatory 
measures taken by the state party. In other instances the 
representative of the government (who is usually a diplomat or 
government official) may give misleading answers when questioned about 
specific measures, without the HRC being in a position to verify such 
information.
3) Ho Discriminatory Measures.
Article 4(1) stipulates that derogatory measures must not involve 
discrimination based solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, lan­
guage, religion or social origin. This is an important limitation on 
the concept of the 'margin of appreciation' and the freedom of the
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derogating state, Nonetheless, some may view this condition as con­
trary to the notion of derogation itself, and ash the following quest­
ion: would not a derogating state faced with a public emergency
caused by a group belonging to a certain religion or political party, 
be allowed to take discriminatory measures against this particular 
group? The answer is affirmative, and the crucial word is 'solely' 
because in this case the discriminatory measures would not be based 
solely on the mere belonging to that religion or political party.
4) No Inconsistency with other Obligations under International 
Law, <27r:’
In order to be justifiable under Article 4 of the Political
Covenant, derogatory measures must not be inconsistent with other
obligations owed by the state concerned under international law.
This, however, does not mean that a state party faced with a crisis 
can not take measures that are contrary to its obligations under
customary or conventional international law, In such a case the state 
party would have to seek justification for its action on other grounds 
either under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 or 
under the general principles of law.
5) Non-derogateable Rights.
There are a number of fundamental rights from which no lawful 
derogation may be made, These are considered so precious and 
fundamental that they should always be made available under any 
circumstances. Moreover, implementation of and respect for these 
rights could not be seen as a real obstacle preventing the state party 
from dealing swiftly and effectively with the crisis situation.
As far as the Political Covenant is concerned, the list includes: 
the right to life (Article 6), the prohibition of torture (Article 7),
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prohibition of slavery C Article 8C1&2) ), prohibition of imprisonment 
for civil debt (Article 11), prohibition of retroactive penal laws 
(Article 15), the right to recognition of legal personality (Article 
16) and the right to freedom of conscience and religion (Article 
18),
With some variation, a similar list has been include in almost 
all 'standard-setting' general international human rights instru­
ments, The idea of non-derogateable rights or the principle of
inalienability of certain fundamental human rights could be regarded 
as one of the general principles which has been generally recognised 
in practice by the international community and has been provided for 
in several international instruments. According to the Special Re­
porter of the United Rations Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrim­
ination and Protection of Minorities, it could be regarded as:
"A peremptory norm of international law within the 
meaning Df Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the law of treaties, whereby. . a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and re­
cognized by the international community of states as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permit­
ted. . . It therefore seems to us that the peremptory 
nature of the principle of non-derogation should be 
binding on every state, whether or not it is a party 
and irrespective of the gravity of the circum­
stances. "C30:*
Beside the above substantive conditions, lawful derogation
requires the derogating state to notify the other state parties
through the Secretary-General of the United Rations of the nature of
the exceptional circumstances and the rights from which it has
derogated. Article 4(3) provides that:
"any state party to the present Covenant availing 
itself to the right of derogation shall immediately
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inform the other state parties ... through the 
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United 
Stations of the provisions from which it has derogated 
and the reasons by which it was actuated. A further 
communication shall be made, through the same 
intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such 
derogation,"
Accordingly, a derogating state is not under legal obligation to 
inform all other states parties directly. The notice must be 
addressed to the Secretary-General who in his turn must notify the 
other states parties. The derogation notice must be forwarded 
1 immediately' to the Secretary-General. Undue delay in this regard 
could render the derogatory measures invalid and put the state party 
in breach of its obligations not only under Article 4(3) but also 
under any other Articles from which an unnotified derogation has taken 
place. However, there is no time limit within which the derogation 
must be notified, but the natural meaning of the word ' immediately' 
does not allow for extended periods of delay. The promptness of the 
notification procedures should thus be judged in every individual case 
on its own merits. It has to be admitted nonetheless, that in no 
circumstances could this period endure for as long as ten years. In 
the case of Jordan, for instance, the Covenant entered into force in 
1976 and the government is said to have been studying the possibility 
of forwarding a derogation notice ever since. Furthermore, the
notice must precisely indicate the provisions from which the state 
party has derogated and provide a full account of the reasons for such 
action,c325 Under Article 4(3) the powers of the Secretary-General 
are limited to receiving the notification and transmitting it to the 
other states parties, It has been suggested therefore that this 
provision should be interpreted in such a way as to empower the 
Secretary-General, when suspecting the regularity of the derogation or
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tbs validity of the grounds thereof, to inform the derogating state 
accordingly, and in case of a divergent reply, to bring to the know­
ledge of the states parties not only the derogation but also the ar­
guments exchanged on the subject of the regularity or the validity 
thereof. According to N. Questiaux, this
"would make the notification procedure a more effect­
ive element of international surveillance while re­
specting the principle of the sovereignty of states, 
since the depositary would have no other power than to 
bring his request for supplementary information and 
the reply, to the attention of the other state 
parties,"
Finally, it has to be noted that a derogating state party must 
also notify the other states parties through the Secretary-General, of 
the date on which it terminates its derogation.
In conclusion, and based on what has been said so far, it may be 
stated that, it has been commonly acknowledged that every country is 
liable to face an emergency situation at one time or another. It has 
also been acknowledged that in a time of emergency, the survival of 
the country and the continuation of the organized function of the com­
munity became the highest priority. That is to say, when the choice 
is between the organized existence of the community as a whole, on the 
one hand and the rights and freedoms of the individual on the other, 
the latter must give way to the former. The drafters of the Political 
Covenant have envisaged the possibility of a crisis and therefore 
acknowledged the right of the states parties to suspend or disregard 
the implementation of most of the rights referred to therein, in times 
of public emergency. States parties could therefore, legitimately, 
take derogatory measures contrary to their obligations in normal 
circumstances. What states parties should bear in mind is that, this 
permission is provided for only as an exception to the normal rule,
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for the sake of public interests in time of crisis and therefore it 
should be confined to the most critical and demanding situations.
Unfortunately, experience tells u.s that national government, espe­
cially .the Executive branch, is most likely to yield to the tempt­
ations offered by the convenience of the exceptional measures, by pro­
longing the state of siege or emergency. These exceptional powers 
have often been abused, and gross violations of human rights usually 
accompany the state of public emergency.
National constitutions and domestic laws could therefore play a 
crucial role in safeguarding the implementation of the modern inter­
national standards of human rights, during the state of public emer­
gency. The national legislature should always sustain the balance 
between the right of the community to survive and the right of the 
individual citizens to enjoy their personal rights and freedoms.
That is to say, to enable the government to assume emergency powers to 
deal with the crisis situation, and at the same time, to impose some 
restrictions on those powers in order to prevent abuse and to confine 
them to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation. Such restrictions may include the following:
1 - The Constitution must clearly < define the situations which may
justify the declaration of the state of emergency.
2 - The authority and procedures for declaring a state of emergency
should be defined by the Constitution.
3 - The ultimate decision to impose an emergency must be entrusted to
the body which normally best represents the interests of all seg­
ments of the national population namely the legislature,
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4 - The effects of the emergency powers on the rights of the indi­
vidual and the powers of various branches of government should be 
clearly determined.
5 - The Constitution must specify the duration of the state of emer­
gency, by defining the maximum period of a state of emergency or 
by providing for regular review of the need for the emergency 
powers by the legislature.
6 - The Constitution must prohibit the dissolution of parliament dur­
ing a state of emergency.
7 - The Constitution or the legislature should establish a list of
fundamental rights which may not be suspended during a state of 
emergency.
8 - Ordinary courts should continue to function in order to try those
charged with ordinary crimes, and to provide judicial remedies for 
violations of the rights which are not suspended by the emergency 
legislation.
9 - Emergency powers must not be used to remove judges, or to inter­
fere with the independence of the judiciary.
10- Special safeguards must be introduced to prevent the extension of 
emergency to spheres other than those defined by relevant legis­
lation.
11- Grounds for permissible administrative detention should be clearly 
defined by the Constitution or legislation, and should not be al­
lowed unless it is absolutely necessary for the protection Df na­
tional defence and public safety.
12- The law should stipulate that administrative detention orders must 
contain the grounds upon which they are based and a statement of 
the facts and circumstances justifying them.
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Having mentioned this, we shall now turn to the law of Jordan, in 
order to assess the emergency powers provided thereunder and the 
extent to which the above restrictions have been introduced in the law 
of Jordan,
2 - BMB-RGBMIX. PCTORS UIDEB_._T.HB L AM__DF J H M D A W .
A - THE CONSTITUTION.
Two Articles in the present Constitution (Constitution of 1952)
have been devoted to emergency powers. Article 124 provides that:
"In the event of an emergency necessitating the de­
fence of the realm, a law which shall be cited as the
Defence Law, shall be enacted giving powers to any
person, specified therein; to take such actions and 
measures, as may be necessary, including the suspen­
sion of the operation of the ordinary laws of the
state. The Defence Law shall come into force upon its 
proclamation by a Royal Decree based on a decision of 
the Council of Ministers."
Despite the generous wording and the sweeping generalization of
the clauses of this Article, the legislator added yet another Article
(Art.125) conferring even wider discretion on the administration to
take any measures deemed expedient under such circumstances and
freeing its hands from any legal bonds. Article 125 stipulates that:
"(I) In the event of an emergency of a serious nature 
to the extent that action under the preceding 
Article of this Constitution would be considered 
insufficient for the defence of the Kingdom, the 
King may, by a Royal Decree, based on a decision 
of the Council of Ministers, declare Martial Law 
in all or any part of the Kingdom,
(II) When martial law has been declared, the King
may, by a Royal Decree, issue such instruction as 
may be necessary far the defence af the Kingdom, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any law in 
force. Persons acting under such instructions 
shall not incur any liability for all acts done by 
them under the provisions of any law such until 
they are released from that responsibility by a 
special law to be enacted for the purpose."
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Obviously, the Constitution distinguishes between two types of 
emergency powers, the Defence Law referred to under Article 124 and 
the Martial Law Instructions referred to under Article 125.
B - 1M-.DJ3EM CB..LAV. m u m S L A l l S K & i
The Defence Law of Trans-Jordan was enacted in 1935,<3S> declared 
operative in 1939 and has continued until the present time. In
1948 it was extended to the lands occupied by the Jordanian army in 
Palestinec30> and is still applied by the Israelis in the Vest Bank. 
In reality it is an Arabic translation of the British-Palestinian 
(Defence) Order-in-Council of 1931. 4350
Article 2 provides that, in a case of public emergency necessi­
tating the defence of Jordan or 'affecting the public security' or the 
safety of the Armed Forces of His Britannic Majesty stationed in 
Jordan, c-a-o:’ the King may declare this law to be in force, and shall 
remain as such until "His Majesty declares by a high order that it has 
ceased to be in operation."c ?  According to Article 3, the term 
'enemy' includes all armed mutineers and armed rebels, armed rioters 
and pirates. The most important and permissive provision of this law 
is the provision of Article 4. It has vested the Administration with 
absolute powers to take any measure, when and where it deems necessary 
for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm. So long 
as this law is in force and regardless of any ordinary law in force 
during that time, Article 4 empowers the Administration to introduce 
special emergency (defence) regulations which may regulate a wide 
range of activities granting extensive powers to any officer or any 
other person in service of the Government of Jordan including the Arab 
Legion, By such regulations the Administration may make provisions
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with regard to any of the matters falling under the subjects enumer­
ated in Article 4,
Subjects referred to under this Article include:C43>
a) censorship and control and suppression of publications, writings, 
maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communica­
tion including 'radio sets';
b) arrest, detention, exclusion, deportation of persons whose acts 
may be considered harmful to the safety of Jordan and search of 
persons and of their premises;
c) control of harbours, ports, territorial waters of Jordan and the 
movement of vessels.
d) transportation by land, air or water and the control of transport 
of persons and objects.
e) appropriation, control, forfeiture and dispossession of property, 
and the use thereof.
f) each defence regulation may provide for special penalties for of­
fences or attempted offences against its provision and the proced­
ure to be followed thereto.
The same Article also authorizes the Administration to establish spe­
cial courts to try offenders against the defence law and regulations, 
which may impose punishment ranging from small fines to the death pen­
alty. Most importantly, paragraph <g) stipulates that any provision 
of any law or regulation of Jordan, which may be inconsistent with any 
regulation made under this Article "shall be suspended and become in­
effective so long as the said regulation is still in force. Legally 
speaking, this means that ever since the introduction of this para­
graph Jordan has been governed by unrestricted emergency powers.
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Furthermore, another set of strict emergency powers have also been
granted under Article 5. It says that; "when this law is declared to
be in force the fallowing provisions shall have effect:”
1) H.M. The King may order any person<s) to quit Jordan or any part
of or place in Jordan as may be specified by such order, and if 
the person refuses the order, H.M. The King may cause him to be 
arrested and removed from Jordan or from any such part thereof or 
place therein and for that purpose to be placed on board of any 
ship or boat or of any vehicle for transport by land or air.
2) H.M. The King may require any person to do any work or render any 
personal service which he may think necessary to order in aid of 
or in connection with the defence of Jordan.
3> H.M. The King may require any person to supply any animals, vehi­
cles, ships, boats, aircraft or other personal property belonging 
to or under the control of such person to the Government when con­
sidered necessary for the defence purposes, and in default of the 
person supplying the same, may seize and take possession of and 
retain any such property.
4) Any person who was required to render personal services or whose
property or goods were taken into possession (whether temporarily 
or otherwise), removed or destroyed by virtue of a defence order 
may not be compensated from any public funds except for such sums 
as may be determined in the Defence Regulation itself.
5) Any person authorized by H.M. The King in writing may enter upon
and into any ship or vessel, land, house, or other building in
Jordan, and examine and inspect such ship or vessel, or such land 
or building and any part thereof, and in case of opposition or 
obstruction, may use force to effect such entry, "and shall not be
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liable for any damage directly or indirectly occasioned by such 
action."
6) H.M. The King may suspend the execution of any judgement of any 
civil court for any period of time if he believes that the execu­
tion of that judgement could prejudice the defence of Jordan.
~ The Defence Regulations;
It has already been mentioned that Article 4 of the Defence Law 
authorises the Administration to introduce Defence Regulations with 
regard to a wide variety of s u b j e c t s . S o  far too many regulations 
have been introduced under this Articletsco Only two examples will be 
examined in this sub-section. Namely, Defence Regulations No. <1> of 
1939 and Defence Regulations No, 2 of 1939,
a) Defence Regulations No. 1 of 1939:
Article 1 of these Defence Regulations stipulates that it "shall 
be cited as the Defence Regulation relating to jurisdiction and 
procedure, and shall became operative upon publication in the Official 
Gazette." It was published and accordingly entered into force on 
2/9/1939,CS15 and has remained as such until the present time. Most 
of its 14 Articles deal with summary procedures to be followed by the 
courts when trying offenders under the Defence Law and Regulations. 
The most important provision thereunder is the provision of Article 
11, It provides that:
1 - Any member of the Arab Legion or any guard may arrest without a
warrant any person who behaves in a manner which may endanger pub­
lic safety, or who commits or who is suspected of committing an 
offence against any Defence Regulation,
2 - Any officer of the Arab Legion or any policeman, who has been del­
egated in writing by the Commander of the Arab Legion or any of
498
his deputies, may enter by force if necessary any premises or pla­
ces suspected of being used for any purposes that may expose 
public safety to danger, and may search such places or any part(s) 
thereof and seize anything found therein, if he believes that it 
could be used for the above purposes or in a manner to commit an 
offence against any Defence Regulations.
3 - Any member of the Arab Legion may search any person who he may
think to be in possession of or using or carrying any material, 
the position, usage or carry of which by such person is an offence 
against any Defence Regulation, and may seize the persons and any 
such material found on him.
4 - Any member of the Arab Legion may stop and search any vehicle if
he has reasons to suspect that it is being used for purposes harm­
ful to public safety or in violation of any Defence Regulation, or 
that it is carrying any material the possession, usage or carry of 
which is an offence against any Defence Regulations. He may con­
fiscate the said vehicle and the material found therein and keep 
it (wa an yahtaflz be'ha). 
b> Defence Regulations Ho. 2 of 1939:
This is considered the most serious and the most frequently ap­
plied of all other Defence Regulations. Article 1 thereof stipulates 
that it "shall be cited as the General Defence Regulation and shall 
became operative upon publication in the Official Gazette." It was 
duly published and became effective on 2/9/1939cS2> and like the 
previously mentioned Regulation, has remained in force ever since. In 
accordance with Article 2 and when there is a compelling need to se­
cure the defence of Jordan, the Prime Minister may take such measures 
as to;
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1) acquire any land and roads and may remove any trees, fences and 
hedges therefrom in order to support military purposes;
2) acquisition of any building or other estates including the water 
and electricity lines, and any other water resources;
3) order the destruction of any buildings or establishments or the 
transfer of any property from one place to another or its destruc­
tion;
4) take any measures to interfere with the personal rights relating 
to the aforementioned property and rights.
It has already been mentioned that the Prime Minister may, if he 
thinks fit, authorize the payment of compensation for any action car­
ried out under this Article and in such a case he may also decide upon 
the amount payable. <S3;>
The regulations authorize the Prime Minister to order all the in­
habitants of any area or any part thereof as may be defined by such an 
order to evacuate the specified area if their evacuation is considered 
a necessity for public security or the defence of Jordan. ***■> He (the 
Prime Minister) is also empowered to issue orders to prevent any 
gathering for 'sebaq al-khial* (horse-racing) or any other sport, 
celebration or procession of any kind, and to order its termination if 
it is already under way, if he is of the opinion that such action is 
in the interest of public safety or the defence of Jordan.cse>
However, the most extreme provision is the provision of Article 
9A, which authorizes the Prime Minister to order the detention of any 
person for an indefinite period of time without stating any reasons 
for such an order, save that, in his opinion the detention is in the 
interest of public safety or the defence of Jordan. It reads as fol­
lows:
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"The Prime Minister may order the detention of any 
person, and may also direct that such a person be re­
manded in custody or be released upon conditions
relating to his place of residence or requiring his 
regular appearance in the police station to prove his 
presence every day, or upon any other conditions as 
may be decided. "CS6,:’
Finally, Article 18 allows the Prime Minister, upon the approval 
of the King, to delegate his powers under these Regulations to any
Minister, civil servant or any officer of the Arab Legion. It has to
be mentioned that the Prime Minister has in fact delegated these 
serious powers to some army officers, security authorities and part­
icularly to the Minister of the Interior and the Administrative
Governors.
All the powers granted under the Defence Law and Regulation are 
being exercised through Defence Orders. Thousands of these Defence 
Orders have been issued by various competent authorities since 1939. 
As an example we shall translate two Defence Orders issued by the 
Muttasarref of lew1 a J!fadaba (the Administrative Governor of the 
Province of Madaba) during the Months of August and September, 
1984.
1, Defence Order No. 30 of 1984:
"A Defence Order issued in accordance with the provi­
sions of Defence Regulations No. 2 of 1939.
In accordance with the powers invested in me by his 
Excellency the Prime Minister, by virtue of Defence 
Order No. 7 of 1971, and in accordance with Article 9A 
of the Defence Regulation No. 2 of 1939, and for the 
preservation of peace and public safety, I have decid­
ed the following:
1 - detention of al-madaw (the so-called), ......  in
the prison of Madaba until further notice.
Dated 4th of august, 1984
The Nuttasarref of lewa* a Madaba
A'Al-Awa* ad"
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2, Defence Order No. 42 of 1984; dated 30/9/1984 whereby the
Muttasarref of lewa'a Madaba ordered the detention of the Mayor of
Na'in and 19 other notable personalities including all the members
of the Municipal Council, It reads as follows:
"In accordance with the powers vested in me by his Ex­
cellency the Prime Minister al~afkham (the right 
Honourable); by virtue of the Defence Order No. 7 of 
1971, and in accordance with Article 9A of Defence 
Regulation No. 2 of 1939 and for the preservation of 
security and public safety I have decided the deten­
tion of al-mthkuureen be adnab (those named below) in 
the prison of Madaba until further notice.
1- H, Hadadeen 20- A. al-Khaleel
issued on 30/9/84 
signed
A. Al-Awa'ad
The Muttasarref of lewa'a Madabac&3:>
In a case of a serious public emergency Article 125 of the Con­
stitution authorizes H.M. The King tD declare Martial Law by a Royal 
Decree based on a decision of the Council of Ministers. <eo:’ In 
practice Jordan has experienced Martial Law twice so far, The first 
occasion was in 1957/8 due to some internal disorder and the second 
was occasioned by the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. On the 5th of June 
1967 Martial Law was declared in Jordan and remained in force until 
the present time,<ei5 The instructions of the Martial Law 
Administration were introduced, published and became operative on the 
same day. Wide powers have been granted to the Martial Law
Governor-General and the Martial Law Administration as a whole by 
these instructions. Article 2 provides that a Martial Law Governor- 
General shall be appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers 
and the approval of the King, In order to secure the safety of the 
Kingdom and its defence, he shall exercise all the powers granted to
502
the King and the Prime Minister under the Defence Law and all other 
regulations and orders issued thereunder. The Martial Law Governor- 
General may appoint any person to be his deputy or a local Martial Law 
Governor in any district or province as may be determined regardless 
of the contemporary system of administrative structure,
The most permissive clauses are included in Article 4, it says:
"a> notwithstanding any other law or regulation the 
Martial Law Governor-General or the local Martial 
Law Governor may order the arrest, search, deten­
tion and remand in custody of any person for any
period of time, in any place in the Kingdom and
authorize entry of houses and other premises and
their inspection and search at any time, be it day
or night,
b) Any person whose arrest, detention or seizure 
has been ordered by the local Martial Law Governor 
must be referred to the competent Martial Court 
within a period not exceeding 15 days from the 
date of such order if a specific charge has been 
attributed to him. If the said order was issued 
for the preservation of security and public safe­
ty, it must be presented to the Martial Law Gov­
ernor-General within a period not exceeding 7 days 
for his a p p r o v a l <e4:>
Orders issued by the Martial Law Governor-General or the local 
Martial Law Governors are final and immediately executable and are 
immune from judicial review or any form of judicial examination by any 
court whatsoever including the HCJ.ces>
Special Martial-Law Courts are also provided for in these instruc­
tions. It says that "Each Martial-Law Court shall consist of a
president and two other officer all being members of the Army of a
rank not less than captain. <S7:>
Article 8 stipulates that Martial-Law Courts shall have
jurisdiction over all persons with regard to the following offences:
a) offences against the internal or external security of the state 
provided for under Articles 107-117 of the Penal Code of 1960;
503
b) offences against the law of the state official secrets (law No. 50
of 1971) or any other law which may replace it; ceo:’
c) offences against the internal security of the state provided for 
under Articles 135-149 of the Penal Code of 1960;
d) offences against public safety provided for under Articles 157-168 
of the Penal Code of 1960;
e) offences against Article 195 of the Penal Code of 1960;
f) offences against the Law of Firearms and ammunitions, Law No. 34
of 1952;
g) offences against the Law of Explosions, Law No. 13 of 1953;
h) offences against the Anti-Communism Law, Law No, 91 of 1953;
i) membership of any banned or unlicensed political party;
j) offences against the Defence Law or any regulations or orders
issued thereunder; 
k) communication or dealing with the enemy and acts of smuggling;
1) insults against Government Officials, members of the Arab Legion
or the Police, or obstruction of the 'execution of their official 
duties';
m) offences against the orders of the Martial Law Governor-General or
the local Martial Law Governors; 
n) any other matter which the Martial Law Governor-General may add to 
this by a proclamation to be published in the Official Gazette. 
Regardless of the provisions of any laws or regulations to the 
contrary, the Martial Law Governor-General may prescribe the effective 
punishment for any of the above offences.ces:*
A Martial-Law Court, it has been stipulated, is not bound by the 
procedural guarantees and requirements provided for by the Criminal 
Procedure Code or the Law of Evidence, and may hold its hearings at
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any place and any time as may be decided by its president. <70> In 
other words, should the president so decide, a hearing may be held in 
a tent in the middle of the desert and well after midnight. Further­
more, the court may disregard the right of the accused to be defended 
by a lawyer or to have sufficient time to prepare his defence. Ac­
cording to Article 12, the hearings should be public unless the court 
decides that they be held in camera for any reason, c'7"1 5
No further appeal whatsoever may lie against the Martial-Law 
Court's decisions. They are final and executable upon approval by the 
Martial Law Governor-General except the death penalty which requires 
the approval of the King upon a recommendation by the Council of Min­
isters.
Finally, Article 20 has ousted the jurisdiction of the HCJ to re­
view the validity of the administrative orders issued under these in­
structions as long as the said instructions shall remain in force.
Articles 124 and 125 of the present Constitution explicitly 
authorize the Administration to resort to emergency powers in times of 
public emergency, Although the Constitution has granted wide powers 
to the Administration and conferred on it wide discretion to introduce 
measures and Regulations, the Constitution nevertheless requires that 
these powers be limited to matters involving public safety, and 
defence of the realm. In practice the Administration has frequently 
disregarded this, and applied emergency powers to situations and cases 
which have no connection at all with public safety or the defence of 
the realm. In many cases these powers are used to carry out actions
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which cannot otherwise be lawfully carried out under ordinary law, 
though the subject matter bears no relation to the public safety or 
the national defence,
The best examples of such practices may be the cases where a per­
son is accused of an offence, tried and sentenced for his offence by a 
competent court, and on the day he completes his sentence and is due 
to be released, a Defence Order is issued whereby he may be detained 
for an unlimited period of time for the same offence, Under
ordinary law such detention would be illegal or even a crime. 
Emergency powers have also been used by the Prime Minister to dismiss 
undesirable judges, whereas ordinary law does not permit such an 
action. <7rs:*
Indeed, one may wander in what sense individual disputes between a 
man and his wife or a landlord and a tenant or any other two private 
individuals, could be considered a serious threat to public safety and 
national defence, to the extent that it justifies the application of 
emergency powers, In illustrating these practices, the writer shall 
refrain from citing any case which he has learned from personal ex­
perience or personal interviews. Instead we shall confine ourselves 
to cases which have reached the courts and therefore have been made 
public and to those presented to the writer by the administrative 
authorities themselves.
In Case Mo. 91/80, for instance, where there was a dispute between 
two private individuals, the Governor of I r b i d interfered in an 
attempt to settle the difference, As the injured party demanded pay­
ment of what was regarded as exceptionally high compensation, the 
Governor issued a Defence Order ordering his indefinite detention,
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allegedly to secure the public safety and the national defence in ac­
cordance with Article 9A of Defence Regulations No. 2 of 1939.
When the detainee applied to the HCJ for a writ of habeas corpus, on 
the grounds that his detention was not related to public safety, but 
merely a private matter and therefore the Governor had abused his 
powers under the said Defence Regulations, the court rejected the ap­
plication, stating that the Order was a legal measure and was neces­
sary for the preservation of public safety. cy"7>
In 1977, emergency powers were also invoiced to resolve a dispute 
between a man and his wife. As a result of the said dispute, Mr. A. 
Al-Hendy divorced his wife but refused to pay her the 200 JD decided 
by the arbitrators. Consequently, the Deputy Governor of the Capital 
issued a Defence Order, ordering his detention until further notice, 
in accordance with Article 9A of Defence Regulations Ho 2 of 1939.
When the detainee challenged the validity of his detention before the 
HCJ, the court pronounced the Defence Order null and void and con­
sidered it to be an abuse of power.
"The power delegated by the Prime Minister to the Ad­
ministrative Governors by virtue of Defence Order No.
7 of 1971, was intended for the preservation of public 
safety and not to resolve disputes relating to per­
sonal rights between private individuals, a power 
which was reserved to the courts by the Constitution.
The order of the Deputy Governor of the Capital 
detaining the applicant for non-payment of a sum of 
money to his wife is beyond the purposes of Article 9A 
of Defence Regulation Ho. 2 of 1939. "
On the 28th of June, 1975, the Governor of the Capital issued a
Defence Order detaining Mr. S.E. Sarreeh (a private individual) in
connection with a dispute between him and a private company (.Wafa1 a
Dajany). A case was therefore brought before the HCJ, who declared
the Defence Order null and ordered the release of the detainee. <7,so
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Another interesting case of obvious abuse of emergency powers with 
regard to administrative detention was the case of Mr. X, decided by 
the HCJ in 1977. Mr. X was a young man who was flirting with a girl in 
Amman and teasing her by tailing her car and flashing the lights of 
his car behind hers.<eo> The girl was annoyed with him and complained 
to the police who arrested him and referred him to the Deputy Governor 
of the Capital, In his turn, the latter invoked emergency powers and 
issued a Defence Order under Article 9A of the Defence Regulations Ho, 
2 of 1939, ordering his detention until further notice. An applica­
tion was therefore brought before the HCJ, challenging the validity of 
the Defence Order, and the right of the Administration to apply the 
defence powers to ordinary offences. Mr. X's council argued that:
"..even if the alleged charges against his client were 
to be proved true, they would remain ordinary charges 
punishable under the Penal Code and triable by the 
ordinary courts rather than Administrative Governor, 
who lacks jurisdiction to act in this respect. . . When 
he does act on such cases his action must be declared 
void."<en ?
In its decision dated 18th of October, 1977, the court unanimously 
decided that the Deputy Governor of the Capital had abused the defence 
powers and therefore his decision was totally void. It was stated 
that it was apparent from the facts of the case that the Deputy Gov­
ernor of the Capital, had ordered the detention of Mr. X on the 
grounds that he had threatened the safety of the Kingdom by flirting 
with and teasing Miss X. Indeed Administrative Governors are empow­
ered to invoke the emergency powers provided for under Defence Regula­
tion Ho. 2 of 1939 against any person who commits an action threaten­
ing the safety of the Kingdom, As to the action of Mr, X, i.e.
"flirting with or teasing of Miss X, even if proven 
true the danger would be limited to her and would not 
extend to the safety of the Kingdom. , , Actions causing 
harm to individuals in their personal capacity, could
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not be considered threatening to the said safety 
(safety of the Kingdom) within the meaning of Article 
9A of Defence Regulations Ho. 2 of 1939."
Martial Law instructions were also invoked to resolve a private 
dispute between a landlord and a tenant. As landlord a retired Gen­
eral Mr. T. Hussain, applied to the Governor of the Capital to order 
the eviction of the tenant Mr. H. H. Attameni, from the store owned by 
the General, on the grounds that the said store was about to collapse 
and that it was being used for storing papers without proper licence. 
In his capacity as the Local Martial Law Governor, the Governor of the 
Capital invoked his emergency powers under Article 6(1) of the Martial 
Law Instructions and ordered the immediate closure of the store. Con­
sequently the tenant applied to the competent authorities (the Muni­
cipality of the Capital) and obtained a valid licence to re-open and 
engage the place by staring waste papers.
Accordingly, the Local Martial Law Governor issued a new order on 
the 13/4/1975, stating that the tenant may re-open his store, but must 
not use it to store paper or any inflammable material, on the grounds 
that this would be hazardous and a threat to the safety of the public. 
When the tenant challenged the validity of this order before the HCJ, 
the court stated that:
1 - It was apparent from the letter of the Director of the Metro­
politan Police (Ho. 21/85/11731 dated 11/3/75) that the police had 
no objection to a licence being issued to the applicant to use the 
place for storing papers and that there was no danger in that re­
spect; and therefore a proper licence was issued to him.
2 - The Martial Law Governor had based his order on the alleged 
ground that the said usage was hazardous to public safety, whereas 
the dispute originated from the landlord's application for
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eviction, In view of the fact that there was no danger to the
safety of the public.
"The Governor of the Capital in his capacity as the 
Local Martial Law Governor had exceeded his powers and 
jurisdiction under the Instruction of Martial Law Ad­
ministration, and therefore his order was null and 
must be abrogated and therefore we pronounce it abro­
gated.
In the Defence Order Mo, 47, issued by the muttasarrif of Madaba, 
translated abave<QSi:* the muttasarrif ordered the detention of the 
twenty most notable personalities from the town of Ma'in in the prison 
of Madaba until further notice, Among the detainees was the Mayor and 
all the elected members of the Municipal Council and most of the 
potential candidates for the new term. Although it was stated that 
the reason for such a vigorous action was to enhance public safety and 
the defence of the realm, the actual reason was an allegation that a 
stone was thrown at the balcony of one of the potential candidates, 
As unofficially admitted by the muttasarrif, the real purpose was to 
terrorise everybody and to prevent any assault on individuals during 
the election campaign.
This may be a good reason for the Administration to take 
preventive measures under any of the various powers available to the 
Administrative Governors and the police, especially under the Law 
of the Prevention of Crime, when such assaults are most likely
to take place, but on no account could it justify the resort to 
emergency powers. By doing so, the muttasarrif had seriously abused 
the emergency powers and had diverted them from the purpose to which 
they were originally intended to apply, simply because they are more 
convenient and freed him from observing any other procedural 
requirements or legal justification for his arbitrary action.
5X0
4 - AN ASSESSMENT OF EME R G E N C Y  POWERS IN JORDAN,
As mentioned earlier every country is liable to face a state of 
emergency at any given time in its history, but Jordan is a
peculiar case in this regard. It is a country which has lived almost 
all of its life under a perpetuated state of emergency. The country 
has undergone rapid and remarkable developments, Kings and Governments 
have come and gone, many laws have been repealed or introduced, even 
the size of the country has been expanded and reduced again, but the 
state of emergency has outlasted them all and remains an unchanged 
feature of modern Jordan. It is almost fifty years old and there is 
no sign of its coming to an end. The state of emergency was declared 
in 1939, and the Defence Law and Regulations were put into effect and 
have remained until the very present time. During this period, Mar­
tial Law has also been introduced twice, once for a relatively short 
period in 1957/8 and again in 1967 and it remains effective until now. 
This has resulted in a situation where two types of emergency powers 
are applicable at the present time in Jordan.
In assessing these powers we shall be focusing on the question of 
constitutionality and compatibility with the obligations of Jordan 
under the Political Covenant.
The Constitution deals with emergency situations in two separate 
Articles. Article 124, which authorizes the Government to declare 
public emergency and introduce the Defence Law, and Article 125, deal­
ing with Martial Law and the Instructions of Martial Law Administra­
tion. <e“*> This itself makes the Constitution of Jordan so rare among 
other Arab constitutions, cee:* and reveals much about its legal 
backgrounds. It has been reported that, the method of the Defence Law 
and Regulations to deal with emergency situations is a British design
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which could be found in the English system and in most of the British 
colonies and systems influenced thereby; while Martial Law was 
originally a French theory adopted by France and most of its ex- 
colonies and other legal systems. Obviously, Jordan has adopted
both theories and implemented them side by side. The Defence Law of 
Jordan was introduced in 1935, during the British mandate on Jordan, 
and as already been mentioned, was merely an Arabic translation of the 
British 'Palestine Defence Order-in-Council of 1931'. On the other 
hand, it seems that Jordan has adopted the theory of Martial Law from 
the Ottoman or neighbouring Arab constitutions, especially the 
Constitution of Egypt of 1923.
Considering the provisions of Articles 124 and 125 of the present 
Constitution, the following observations may be made:
1 - Bath Articles refer to the event of emergency and measures to 
overcome the crisis. While Article 124 provides for an unequivocal 
authorization to the executive to take whatever actions and measures 
are deemed necessary to secure the defence of the realm, including the 
suspension of the ordinary laws of the state, Article 125 speaks of a 
situation where measures taken under the previous Article "would be 
considered insufficient for the defence of the realm". Such a con­
tradiction may not be understood unless one remembers that the two 
Articles have descended from two alien theories, each of which was in­
tended to operate sufficiently on its own, The Jordanian legislature 
tried to employ both of them but failed to qualify either to fit the 
other. The Constitution should have stipulated at least that when 
Martial Law is declared, the Defence Law and Regulations should cease 
to operate. Members of the HRC seemed confused by this dual system, 
and wanted to know which of the two sets of emergency powers was
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currently applicable in Jordan. teea:i Since 1967, the two systems have 
been operating simultaneously imposing further restrictions on the 
rights and freedoms of the individual and opening yet wider margins 
for abuse and arbitrary actions.
2 - The Constitution grants an unqualified authorization to the execu­
tive to take any necessary measures and to introduce legislation pro­
viding them with emergency powers of their own choice without any 
safeguards to prevent abuse of these powers or to limit them to what 
is really necessary in the exigencies of the situation. This, of 
course, has resulted in extraordinarily severe emergency powers which 
are widely abused in practice.
3 - Parliament has been totally excluded from the whole process; it 
has no role to play at all in the declaration, approval or termination 
of emergency powers. The consequence has been a permanent state of 
emergency and an ever-increasing emergency powers,
4 - Despite the fact that emergency powers are subject to no control 
whatsoever, the Constitution stipulates that they m y  suspend the 
operation of the ordinary laws and may supersede them in case of con­
flict, In other words the country has been primarily governed by 
these emergency laws ever since they have been introduced, regardless 
of any legislation introduced by Parliament. Emergency laws have 
ousted most of the jurisdiction of the regular courts and rendered it 
the jurisdiction of no court, or of special courts,
These two constitutional Articles have created chaos in the legal 
system of Jordan. To remedy the situation, the best solution appears 
to be a marriage between or abolition of the two Articles and the in­
troduction of a new provision, with a view to establishing a fair bal­
ance between the right of the community to act swiftly and effectively
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in a case of public emergency and the due respect for the minimum 
standards of the rights and freedoms of the individual as defined by 
the U.R. Covenants. Most of the modern constitutions of the world 
contain reasonable provisions dealing with the state of emergency and 
emergency powers, so why should Jordan be an exception? The Jordanian 
Constitution is extremely irregular in this respect.
Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958 for instance pro­
vides that:
"When the institutions of the Republic, the 
independence of the nation, the integrity of its ter­
ritory or the fulfilment of its international commit­
ments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner 
and when the regular functioning of the constitutional 
governmental authorities is interrupted, the Presi­
dent of the Republic shall take measures commanded by 
these circumstances, after official consultation with 
the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Assemblies 
and the Constitutional Council.
He shall inform the nation of these measures in a 
message. These measures must be prompted by the de­
sire to ensure to the constitutional governmental au­
thorities, in the shortest possible time, the means of 
fulfilling their assigned functions. The consti­
tutional council shall be consulted with regard to 
such measures. Parliament shall meet by right, The 
national Assembly may not be dissolved during the 
exercise of emergency powers by the President."<ee*
A closer example is Article 74 of the Egyptian Constitution of
1971, which reads as follows:
"If any danger threatens the national unity or the 
safety of the motherland or obstructs the constitu­
tional role of the state institutions, the President 
of the Republic shall take urgent measures to face the 
danger, direct a statement to the people and conduct a 
referendum on these measures within sixty days of its 
adaption, " c
Although less sophisticated than the French, the Egyptian approach
is far more reasonable than that of the Jordanian.
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Accordingly, a new draft Article may be proposed to replace both 
Articles 124 and 125 of the Jordanian Constitution; it reads as fol­
lows:
"1) In the case of an actual or imminent danger 
threatening the national unity or the safety of 
Jordanian sail or the normal functioning of the 
constitutional institutions of the state, His 
Majesty the King may declare, by a Royal Decree
based on a decision of the Council of Ministers,
Martial Law in Jordan or in any part thereof for a
period not exceeding 60 days renewable for similar 
or shorter periods by Parliament.
2) When such declaration is made and after
consultation with the President of the Supreme
Court and the Attorney-General, the King shall is­
sue such instructions as may be deemed strictly 
necessary to enhance national defence and the 
normal functions of the constitutional institu­
tions of the Kingdom, regardless of the provisions 
of any law in force, and he shall address a mes­
sage to the nation.
3) Both the declaration and the said instructions
shall be placed before Parliament for approval 
within two weeks of their proclamation. They 
shall cease to have any legal effect if they are 
not submitted to or not approved by Parliament
during the two week time limit.
4) Parliament shall not be dissolved during the Mar­
tial Law period, and shall be informed weekly on 
all the measures taken thereunder and supplemented 
with complete lists of detained persons and their 
whereabouts."
As far as the Defence Law and Regulations are concerned, the crit­
icisms have been centred upon their constitutionality, the lack of
safeguards, and indeed, on the need for such laws in the first place.
A great controversy has been made about the constitutionality of 
the Defence Law, especially after the proclamation of the Constitution 
of 1952. There was no provision in the Constitution of 1928 nor in 
the Constitution of 1946, authorizing the introduction of such a law. 
When the present Constitution (1952) referred to it in Article 124 it 
referred to it in the future sense, "In the event of an emergency 
necessitating the defence of the realm, a law which shall be cited as
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the Defence Law shall be enacted.,.." i.e. a Defence Law which may be
enacted in the future not the existing one which is unconstitutional
from the beginning. Accordingly, Jordanian constitutional lawyers are
almost unanimously of the opinion that the present Defence Law (the
law of 1935) is unconstitutional. <s?0> They still hold this opinion
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed its
constitutionality,* on the grounds that Article 128 of the present
Constitution states that:
"All laws and regulations and other existing legis­
lation in force in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at 
the date of the enforcement of the Constitution shall 
continue to be in force until they are repealed or 
amended by legislation."
Furthermore, the court has recognized a superior status to the De­
fence Law and Regulations with regard to the ordinary laws of the 
state; and ruled that in a case of conflict the farmer should super­
sede the latter,
When the battle aver the constitutionality was lost, the struggle 
against the Defence Law continued in and outside the parliament. 
According to I. Bakr, lawyers have attempted to attenuate the
harshness of the Defence Law by subjugating all the decisions and
measures taken thereunder to the control of the HCJ. Here again the 
attitude of the HCJ has been very disappointing. As determined in a 
series of cases, the established view of the court has been the fol­
lowing: The Defence Law does not require the administrative authority
to state the reasons for the detention of any person. All that is re­
quired is to state that the detention was for the sake of the public
safety.<94) Nothing in the said law or any of the regulations issued 
thereunder requires the competent authority, when applying Defence 
Regulation No. 2 of 1939, to conduct any enquiry about alleged of-
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fences and it may rely upon a letter from the police authorities to 
punish the person concerned, if it be deemed satisfactory. The
Prime Minister (or any person delegated by him) has absolute dis­
cretion in deciding upon what may justify the application of the 
Defence Powers and upon what may come under the subject of public 
safety and the defence of the realm. The HCJ has no right
to examine his discretion; and the term ’public safety' should be
interpreted in its widest meaning in order to include all matters re­
lating to public security.
However, in more recent cases the court seems to have adopted a 
more sympathetic and realistic approach, and assumed the power to con­
trol the discretion of the administrative authorities in this regard. 
In Case Ho. 45/71, the court ruled that the Defence Order Ho. 10 of 
1971 prohibiting the sale of fruit and vegetables in the old market of 
the city of Irbid, was not issued for the sake of the public safety or 
the defence of the realm, but rather introduced to limit the sales to 
the new market only. In using its discretion the administration must 
confine itself to the purpose for which the defence powers were ori­
ginally intended to be applied. Merely stating in the Defence Order 
that it was issued for the sake of public safety and public security 
may not suffice, especially when it is inconsistent with the real pur­
poses which can be derived from the order itself. The Defence Order 
was therefore void and accordingly nullified by the court.
In 1986, the court explicitly recognized its right to control the 
discretion of the administrative authority in applying the Defence 
Powers, and adopted a narrow definition of the term 'public safety'. 
In Case Ho. 107/85, the court ruled that:
"Although the defendant was lawfully delegated by the
Prime Minister to apply the defence powers... provided
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for under Defence Regulation No, 2 of 1939, against 
any person who has committed an offence against the 
public safety and the defence of the realm, the meas­
ure he takes under these powers is subject to the 
control of this court, especially with regard to the 
grounds upon which it is based.,. The phrase 'public 
security' which may justify the application of these 
powers must be limited to material actions injurious 
to public interests and which may adversely affect the 
safety of the public in general. Actions which may 
affect specific persons in their personal capacity are 
not contained within the meaning of the safety of the 
Kingdom referred to by the said regulations,"<100>
Whether this is a new policy meant to be observed in future cases 
or merely one of those occasional impulses, no definite answer can be 
given at the present time.
Inside the Parliament, the Defence Law and Regulations have always 
provoked heated arguments, On several occasions the representatives 
of the nation have debated with discontent and disapproval the 
harshness and the abuses and indeed the need for the defence powers.
It has been reported that in 1950, the legislative committee of
the House of Representatives had inserted in the draft Constitution
(the present Constitution) an Article stating that "the administrative
authority may not order the detention of any person except during
Martial Law and in accordance with the provision of a law enacted by
Parliament." The draft Article was attacked by the Government and
eventually withdrawn. During the discussion of this Article Mr. T.
Abu-Al-Huda, the then Prime Minister of Jordan made the following
statement in the House of Representatives:
"I can assure you that the Government is very much in­
clined to preserve the freedom of the individual and 
the communities; and to enable them to express their 
opinions and wishes verbally and in writing; and 
agrees with you that the exceptional laws are far too 
many and that they have been brought about by circum­
stances which now have disappeared,.. Indeed this 
should be taken into consideration and these laws must 
be thoroughly examined in order to abolish the per­
petuated exceptional legislation, and to keep only
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what may be necessary to preserve law and order in a 
case of extraordinary circumstances. . . from my own ex­
perience I would like to admit to my brothers the Re­
presentatives that, most of the time, exceptional laws 
have been applied in a manner which is unfair, unjust 
and contrary to the public interest.
As an example, I recall a case which was brought 
to my attention recently. A man was detained and when 
1 inquired about the reason for his detention, I was 
told that he was a communist and propagating communism 
and was found in possession of a communist pamphlet 
and other papers. When I received his file, the said 
pamphlet was nothing more than an ordinary political 
pamphlet similar to any pamphlet which could be found 
in the pocket of any person at any time. . . I had to 
'beg' the Minister concerned to release him,,, and I 
only blame the person who did not understand the 
meaning of those papers. Experience, therefore, makes 
me believe with you that there is an urgent need to 
abolish most of these laws and to retain only what is 
strictly necessary."c1015
Thirty-seven years have lapsed since this statement, and the 
Defence Law and Regulations are still very much in operation; on the 
contrary, they have been increased and strengthened on several occa­
sions ever since.
Another attempt to pressurize the Government into abolishing the
Defence Law and Regulations was made in the Senate House in 1951. the
same Prime Minister stated that;
" I did not refuse to abolish those laws in the past, 
but as I said the matter needs more study and con­
sideration, and that there is an intention to abolish 
all the perpetuated exceptional laws. " c 10:25
As far as Martial Law is concerned, the principal criticism is not 
the constitutionality or the harshness of the powers provide there­
under, but rather the permanent status which it has acquired over the 
years since 1967. One may agree that the Constitution does authorize 
the Administration to take all the necessary measures to deal with a 
situation as serious as a war. Perhaps one may also agree that all 
the powers guaranteed under The Martial Law Instructions of 1967 were
519
justifiable during the war and were strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation at that time. What is indeed difficult 
to justify or even to understand is the continuous enforcement of 
these instructions after the war actually ceased to exist. The war 
lasted for less than a week during 19b?, after that or at least since 
1970 military operations have completely stopped. Hot even a single 
shot has been fired across the Jordanian-Israeli borders since 1970. 
In Israel itself Martial Law was lifted long ago, despite the hostile 
operations on their other borders.
Some, however, may argue that, from a legal point of view Jordan 
is still at war with Israel, and therefore that the state of war has 
not yet ended. This might be true, but still does not justify the 
continuation of Martial Law, because emergency powers are not con­
nected with the mere legal existence of a state of war; they are ex­
ceptional measures intended to enable the government to face practical 
difficulties resulting from an overwhelming crisis, and not from a 
theoretical situation.
Others may say that, the situation in the Middle East in general 
and the political instability of the area is a valid reason in favour 
of the continuation of the state of emergency.c 1035 This is a highly 
unconvincing justification, because the stability of the area is not 
the concern of any individual state on its own, and every individual 
state should consider its respective circumstances. Of course, every 
state in the region is entitled to impose Martial Law within its re­
spective borders when there is a threat to its territorial safety or 
to law and order, but it must consider its own circumstances only. 
Hone of the Vestern European countries has imposed Martial Law on its
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own citizens because of the situation in Greece, Cyprus or Turkey or 
any otlier country,
Accordingly, it could be concluded, that the provisions of the 
present Constitution of Jordan, have created chaos in the legal system 
of Jordan, and that the present emergency legislation is beyond justi­
fication. The laws of Jordan provide the Administration with vast, 
and sweeping emergency powers, which go far beyond what is strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation or even beyond what would 
be reasonably required under the most demanding and critical situ­
ation. As the Prime Minister of Jordan himself has admitted, these 
powers are arbitrary, unjust and unfair, and above all out of date and 
not required, As he also has admitted they are widely abused, misin­
terpreted and misapplied.
Emergency powers, especially the Defence Law and Regulations and 
the Instructions of the Martial Law Administration, could be held 
responsible for most of human rights violations in Jordan, They are 
also one of the principal reasons for the failure of Jordan to fulfil 
its obligations under the United Rations Covenants with regard to the 
minimum standards of human rights.
Clearly, Jordan is in breach of its international obligations un­
der the Political Covenant. Filing of a notice of derogation under 
Article 4(3) thereof as was promised by the representative of Jordan 
and accepted by the HRC would not remedy the situation, <10A:* since 
the existing emergency powers in Jordan are indeed not limited to the 
"extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" as re­
quired by Article 4 of the Political Covenant,
If the laws and practices of Jordan were ever to be made consist­
ent with its legal obligations with regard to the minimum internation-
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al standards of human rights and be brought into line with the provi­
sions of the Political Covenant, the present state of emergency must 
be brought to an end. That is to say the following steps must be
considered:
1 - The present state of Martial Law should be lifted in order to 
put an end to abuse of power and all other arbitrary practices.
2 - The long-lived, unconstitutional and unneeded Defence Law and
Regulations must be abolished immediately.
3 - The provisions of Articles 124 and 125 of the constitution
ought to be amended as suggested above in order to provide some 
restrictions on emergency powers should the need for them arise in 
the future.
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OHAJPTEIR V I I I .
This chapter is called 'General Conclusions' because roost of what 
is usually included in the concluding chapter has already been 
mentioned somewhere else in this work, and therefore there is no need 
for repetition, It has been the policy throughout our work to include 
the conclusion of each topic in its relevant place within that 
particular chapter or section, Nonetheless, there are some important 
points which need to be specially stressed and some conclusionary 
remarks and observations to be made here.
In this chapter, we shall confine ourselves to a general 
assessment of the role of the constitution and domestic laws in the 
implementation of the modern international standards of human rights, 
and the present system of international scrutiny of the domestic 
legislative measures; a general assessment of the legal system of 
Jordan and of its performance as a state party.
1 ~  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
DOMESTIC LAWS:
As far as the undertaking to take legislative measures is con­
cerned, we have mentioned from the very beginning that the role of the 
constitution and the domestic laws, in this regard, consists of two 
main parts:c15
a) Adoption of equivalent standards at the domestic level. This re­
quires the inclusion of special legal provisions providing for the 
same rights and freedoms in the Constitution and the statutory law of 
each state party. Such legal provisions should declare the rights re­
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ferred to in the Covenants as human rights, and also provide the 
necessary rules for their exercise and enjoyment at the domestic level 
by those who are subject to its jurisdiction. In addition to the gen­
eral provisions relating to the general framework of the legal system 
of the state party, each substantive right requires special legal pro­
visions intended for that particular right. The right to equality be­
fore the law requires different legal provisions from those required 
for the right to life for instance. Accordingly four substantive 
rights have been chosen from each Covenant in order to explain the 
role of the constitution and the domestic laws in the implementation 
of each of them and to define the legislative measures required for 
that purpose.<25
However, two basic facts must be kept in mind, firstly, that at the 
entry into farce of the Covenants in 1976, all states parties posses­
sed their own respective legal systems which, with marginal varia­
tions, provide for almost similar rights and freedoms as those in­
cluded in the Covenants. Secondly, what is guaranteed under the 
Covenants are only the minimum international standards of rights and 
freedoms which states parties are under legal obligation to ensure or 
seek to ensure as the case may be. There is, therefore, no penalty on 
states parties whose constitutions and domestic laws stipulate for a 
larger number of rights or higher standards than those guaranteed un­
der the Covenants. Every state party should thus carry out a
comprehensive survey of its Constitution, laws, and legal practices, 
and measure them against the provision of the Covenants. If they fall 
short of the requirements of the latter, the state party should 
introduce the necessary legislative provisions in order to meet at 
least the minimum standards as designated under the Covenants.
531
In the present work we have conducted a model assessment In the 
case of Jordan with regard to some selected rights, In some cases the 
Jordanian legislation exceeded the minimum international standards,
minimum standards. In such cases we have highlighted the gaps between 
the two systems and have also suggested the required legislative mea­
sures in order to bridge those gaps.(4J
b) Introduction of sufficient domestic legal standards:csa
Whereas the aim is to ensure the enjoyment of the declared rights 
and freedoms at the domestic level, mere introduction of domestic 
legal provisions stipulating for equivalent standards would not real­
ise that aim in practice. It is therefore a substantial part of the 
role of the constitution and domestic law to provide effective legal 
safeguards in order to ensure the exercise of those rights and
freedoms by individuals. Such legal safeguards may vary in kind and
quantity from one state party to another according to its respective 
legal system and domestic circumstances. However, there are some 
fundamental legal safeguards which have to be introduced in every 
state party irrespective of its own circumstances and the nature of 
its legal system, if the practical implementation of the modern
international standards of human rights is ever to be secured on the 
ground, The first and foremost legal safeguard is the independence of 
the judiciary. Without an independent and enlightened court to
which the individual may complain when his declared rights and
freedoms are violated, these rights and freedoms cannot be protected. 
An ignorant or corrupt court or one which could easily be influenced 
from outside could cause harm to, rather than, protecting human 
rights. It is therefore for the national legislator to establish the
right to life^ } in many others it fell seriously short of those
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judiciary as an independent branch, of government and to protect its 
independence from violation and outside influence,
Furthermore, an independent judiciary cannot perform its role if 
the individual, who claims that his rights and freedoms have been 
violated by the official authority, is denied access to court. The 
second fundamental legal safeguard would thus be the right to judicial 
review of administrative action. C7:> Without this guarantee the 
declared rights and freedoms cannot be ensured for long. They will be 
implemented or denied at the pleasure of the administrative 
authorities.
The third fundamental legal safeguard, is the imposition of re­
strictions on emergency powers.<ss There are some states parties who 
have lived almost all their life under continuous state of siege or 
public emergency, where the ordinary rules of legitimacy disappear or 
at least take second place after the emergency legislation. In a case 
of public emergency, protection of human rights becomes of extreme 
importance, Experience of many countries shows that human rights suf­
fer from the detrimental effects of unrestricted emergency powers. 
Emergency powers are open to abuse and the state of emergency may be 
used as a pretext for violating human rights. Every country is liable 
to face a state of public emergency at a given time of its life. In 
such circumstances the public authorities must be provided with spe­
cial powers to enable them to bring the situation under control again. 
A fair balance must thus be maintained between the rights of the 
individual and the right of community to defend itself against de­
struction. It is, therefore, the role of the constitution and 
domestic laws to protect the rights of the individual in the case of 
*\ public emergency by imposing reasonable restrictions on the right of
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the Administration to declare a public emergency and on the emergency 
powers when they are actually put into action in order to prevent them 
from being abused by the public authorities.
Ve have investigated the extent to which the Constitution and the 
laws of Jordan have provided such legal safeguards and found them to 
be almost absent or very limited to the extent that they are unable to 
perform their role. As far as the independence of the judiciary is 
concerned, it has already been mentioned that although the Constit­
ution has instituted the judiciary as an independent branch of govern­
ment, and stipulated that the judges shall be subject to no authority 
other than that of the law, independence of the judiciary has fre­
quently been interfered with by the Executive and the Legislature as 
well. The constitutional and statutory guarantees for the inde­
pendence of the judiciary have been undermined by exceptional 
legislation which has been used against judges to threaten their 
tenure of office.
One’s right to one’s natural jurisdiction is not provided for by 
the Constitution of Jordan as a constitutional right. The right to 
judicial review of administrative action has been seriously restricted 
under various pieces of legislation and entirely eliminated by Article 
20 of the Martial-Law Instructions of 1967 contrary to the explicit 
provisions of Article 102 of the Constitution. Despite the 
restrictive interpretation of this Article by the HCJ, most of illegal 
administrative actions which violate the rights and freedoms of the 
individual are considered final and unchallengeable before any court 
of law. Consequently, it is not surprising at all, in Jordan, to
find a person whose constitutional rights and freedoms have been 
violated by an illegal administrative action, but nonetheless he is
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unable to seek justice by a court of law because all the courts bave 
been excluded either by a special law or by special provisions in the 
ordinary laws. As far as emergency powers are concerned, there are no 
limitations or restrictions of any kind whatsoever. Declaration
and termination of a public emergency and the emergency powers 
themselves are all matters of absolute discretion by the Executive. 
As long as the state of emergency remains the Executive is a 'self- 
empowering machine' . That is to say it can invest itself with unlim­
ited powers and an unfettered discretion. This has resulted in sweep­
ing powers being enacted and implemented without any restrictions.
It is the inadequacy of the fundamental safeguards in the legal 
system of Jordan which can be held responsible for most of the viola­
tions of human rights, rather than the lack of legal provisions pro­
viding for these rights.
m ^ E R A lJD M A L  ^ SCRUTINY . m ^ T H B ^ o m S T I Q  ^
As mentioned earlier, every state party has pledged itself to take 
legislative measures for the implementation of the rights and freedoms 
referred to under Covenants. This has raised, almost from the very 
beginning, the question of international scrutiny and supervision of 
these legislative measures. At least with regard to the Political 
Covenant, this task has been assigned to the HRC. However, the pres­
ent method of international scrutiny by the HRC seems less than 
effective; consequently it could not have much impact on the role of 
the constitution and domestic laws at the domestic level. It is so, 
because in most cases the information available to the HRC is limited 
to what is included in the official report of the state party and the
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answers provided by its representative if any at all. There is no 
guarantee that the report would reflect the true situation of human 
rights in that particular country and its legal system. lor is there 
any guarantee that the representative of the state party would give 
genuine answers to the questions posed by members of the Committee, or 
at least that he would not be ‘economical with the truth’ about human 
rights in his country.
Reviewing the reports and the answers provided by the represent­
atives of some states parties, one would immediately realise, that 
neither the reports nor the answers provided by the representatives, 
presents a clear picture of the legal systems or the whole truth about 
the human rights situation in those countries. A comparison between 
the laws and actual situations of human rights in some countries on 
the one hand and the information made available to HSC and the 
latter's comments on the other would show that the HRC has sometimes 
been grossly misled. One cannot, of course expect members of the HRC 
to be experts on the domestic legal systems of every state party. 
Methods such as ad-hoc and fact-finding bodies may be used to gather 
information and facts about the legal system and the situation of 
human rights in some countries, but nonetheless, there is nD guarantee 
that the state party concerned would co-operate or provide them with 
correct information, if any at all. The case of Chile is a good ex­
ample in this regard,c105 Other sources of information such as the 
NGQ's reports, private individuals or privately obtained information, 
can serve only as a general and unreliable background and therefore 
cannot be treated as hard evidence. It is, thus, important that the 
HRC seeks the assistance of an independent expert on the legal system 
of the state party whose report is under consideration. The expert
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should, cross-examine the representative of the state party and discuss 
the answers with him before the HRC. The independent expert could be 
an academic or a practising lawyer who may be, but not necessarily, a 
citizen of the state concerned.
3  —  TEE LEQAL_SYSTBM OF JORDAN: A GENERAL ASSESSMENT
Although almost all the major areas of the contemporary law of 
Jordan have been codified in large modern codes after the independence 
such as the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Labour Code, Civil Pro­
cedure Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, . , . etc., the previous 
political and historical developments have influenced the law of 
Jordan and left clear marks upon the whole legal system as it stands 
today. Contemplating the whole body of laws, one could discover 
astonishing contrasts and inconsistency between various aspects of the 
legislation as well as the other legal practices. Upon a closer look 
however, it becomes clear that these laws were derived from 
irreconcilably divergent legal systems and traditions, and that in 
many cases the Jordanian legislator did not even take the trouble to 
reconcile or co-ordinate the adopted laws. To mention only a few 
examples from the general framework of the law of Jordan one may refer 
to the following;
While the Constitution stipulates that "Islam is the religion of 
the state... (Article 2), the Jordanian legislature has issued a law 
regulating the sale of alcohol without prohibiting its sale to Muslims 
as required by Islam. Furthermore, the Jordanian legislation permits 
and regulates the payment of interest on financial loans even by or 
far the Government. The Penal Code and the Criminal Procedures Cade 
are based on Western theories rather than Islamic jurisprudence.
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However, the new Civil Cade 1976, which, replaced Majalet al-Ahkam 
al~Adleyh <the Ottoman Civil Code of 1876), is a French-styled Civil 
Code, similar to those of Syria and Egypt,c11 * but nonetheless is 
based on the Shari'a as interpreted by the Hanafi school. c 1 s * The 
Jordanian Civil Code is said to have combined the spirit of the 
Shari'a and modern terminology in a sophisticated Civil Code and 
therefore was recommended by the Legislative Committee of the Arab 
League to be developed as a unified Arab Civil Code.<13>
Accordingly, in the contemporary legal system of Jordan, pure 
Islamic law is now reduced to the law of personal status of Muslims 
and with regard to the matters within the jurisdiction of the Shari'a 
courts such as marriage, divorce, inheritance,... etc. In these mat­
ters the Shari 'a courts apply the provision of the Qur'an and the 
Shari*a directly without reference to statutes.
The Judiciary is an area where the legal and historical legacies 
of Jordan have clearly manifested themselves. Whereas the Shari'a 
courts are traditional Islamic courts, identical to those of the ear­
lier stages of the Islamic State and the Ottoman Shari'a courts, the 
regular courts are based an the Western legal tradition, at least 
with regard to their structure and jurisdiction. The Jordanian Magis­
trates, for instance, differ from their British and Islamic counter­
parts. They are different from the British Magistrates because they 
are professional judges, appointed by the Judicial Council, and like 
all other judges, are appointed for life and are eligible for promo­
tion to higher judicial offices subject to seniority and competence. 
Although they are called qadi al suleh (Justice of Peace), they differ
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from their Islamic predecessors because they are members of an in" 
dependent branch of government, and legally speaking, they do not hold 
their offices at the sovereign's pleasure, nor are they his agents as 
was the case with regard to the traditional Islamic qadis. Their
status and jurisdiction is comparable to that of the French County 
Judges. Contrary to the position in England, the preliminary 
examination of criminal cases in Jordan is the function of the Public 
Prosecutor whose role is, to a certain extent, comparable to that of 
the Investigating Judge in France.
The idea of a Supreme Court which sits as a Court of Appeal and 
also as a High Court of Justice, was adopted from the English legal 
system, especially the British Supreme Court of Palestine during the 
Mandate. Nonetheless, the present Supreme Court of Jordan, as the 
highest Court of Appeal, differs from the old Palestine Supreme Court 
and also from the Appeal Court of England. It is modelled on the 
French Cour de Cassation and performs similar function as that of the 
House of Lords. As a High Court of Justice it has borrowed from the 
British Court the title and only one element of its jurisdiction, 
namely, the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, The rest of its 
jurisdiction was borrowed from the jurisdiction of the €onseils d ’ktat 
of France and Egypt. Consequently the present Jordanian High Court of 
Justice turned out to be a somewhat strange creature. It is not a 
special court, because according to the law of the Formation of the 
Regular Courts of 1952,<ie> it is a regular court. Yet, it is not an 
ordinary regular court, because of the nature of and the limits an its 
jurisdiction. *165 It is meant to be Jfahkawat al-quasa’a al-edari*'17* 
(the adjudicator of the administrative cases) but it is different from 
the Egyptian and the French Honseils d'&tat with regard to its
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composition and jurisdiction. It differs from the English High Court 
of Justice especially with regard to its jurisdiction.
As the highest court in the country, the Jordanian Supreme Court 
is modelled on the Egyptian and the French cours de cassation. It 
sits on the top of the pyramid of the regular courts and is staffed 
with the most senior judges, who usually have long experience and have 
served in several lower courts before. As far as appeals from the de­
cisions of the Court of Appeal and the other lower courts are con­
cerned it possesses final authority, and one may appeal to it on a 
point of law only. In this respect, its role is comparable with the 
role of the House of Lords in England. The crucial differences how­
ever, is that the role the Jordanian Supreme Court is merely inter­
pretive. It does not create the law, it only Interprets the law as it 
stands and sets an example to the lower court, demonstrating how it 
should have been applied in the pending case. Due to the doctrine of 
judicial precedent, the decisions of the House of Lords are binding on 
all lower courts. A-judicial precedent is considered a binding law 
until it is changed by a later decision by the House of Lords or by a 
statute. In Jordan, the doctrine of the judicial precedent is not 
applicable and therefore decisions of the Supreme court are not 
binding on the lower courts in subsequent cases. Although the lower 
courts usually tend to follow the directions of the Supreme Court 
they may (as they sometimes da) disregard the opinion of the Supreme 
Court and run the risk of having their decisions overruled by the 
latter if it disagrees with the way they have interpreted the law.
However, it is extremely difficult sometimes to deduce firm prin­
ciples from the decisions of the Supreme Court of Jordan. Hesitation 
and lack of courage to formulate clear views on many important issues,
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are prominent characteristics of its work, and thus, it "befits the 
description "confused and confusing", It is so, because of the fre­
quent inconsistent decisions on the same issues without much justi­
fication or convincing reasoning, The court does not seem to follow a 
clear path and therefore, the task of the lower courts has been made 
much more difficult. We have already referred to the contradictory 
views of the Supreme Court on the right to public trial for in­
stance^160 When the Court of First Instance decided that the right 
to public trial was a constitutional right which could not be re­
stricted by a statute, it held the trial in public, contrary to 
Article 10 of the Juveniles Law. The Court of Appeal overruled the 
decision and decided that the trial should have been held in camera. 
The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal and supported the 
Court of First Instance. A few months later, and in a similar case, 
the Court of Appeal fallowed the decision of the Supreme Court on the 
previous case and upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance. 
The Supreme Court again overruled the Court of Appeal and departed 
from its previous decision. Similar criticism may be raised with 
regard to the views of the Supreme Court on the right to the pre­
sumption of innocence, the right to freedom from double jeopardy, the 
right to judicial review of administrative actions, definition of the 
term public safety and public security...etc.
The Jordanian legislature seems to have adopted the nation of the 
" Immunity of the Crown'' or of the ^Sovereign" from the Western 
legal systems especially the British. Islamic law does not confer any 
immunity on the Sovereign or on the Government from the jurisdiction 
Qf the courts of law. According to Islam both the Sovereign and the 
Government are accountable to the courts, just like any private indiv-
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idual, The Caliph personally is subject to all kinds of judicial pro­
ceedings including criminal proceedings. He is required to appear in 
person in the court if necessary, and always on an equal footing with 
private individuals. Nevertheless, Article 30 of the present Consti­
tution of Jordan stipulates that: "The King is the Head of the State
and is immune from any liability or responsibility". Despite the fact 
that Article 47 of the Constitution of 1928, which was derived from 
the previous Ottoman laws and the Egyptian Constitution of 1923, did 
not confer any immunity on the Government, but indeed provided that 
"The courts shall entertain all civil cases brought by or against the 
Government", the law of the Government Proceedings of 1935 introduced 
for the first time in Jordan the concept of the "Immunity of the
Crown" and the concept of 'fiat
The Jordanian law of 1935 was an almost word for word translation 
of the British "Palestine Crown Proceedings Act of 1931". As has al­
ready been mentioned, the courts were forbidden by this law from
entertaining any action against the Government or any department 
thereof, except in a few cases specified in Article 3 of the same law.
Although this alien concept was introduced during the Mandate, it is
still very much alive and applicable in Jordan at the present time. 
It is quite paradoxical to observe that, there has been a noticeable 
trend amongst Western legal systems (even in England) to relax the 
concept of the Immunity of the Crown, to enable individuals to bring 
actions for tort and damages against the government, whilst the
Jordanian legislature is still loyal tD this concept and has become 
even more orthodox than the Western legislatures themselves. Jordan 
is not only still holding on the rigid concept of the Immunity of the
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Crown, but also bas supported and strengthened it on several occasions 
in 1953 and 1958.
Another important aspect of the Jordanian legal system is the 
emergency legislation. It has already been mentioned that the 
Jordanian legislature has adapted the British practice of introducing 
a Defence Law and Regulations in order to provide the Administration 
with exceptional powers to deal with emergency situations. The
Jordanian Defence Law and most of the present Defence Regulations were 
adopted during the British Mandate of Trans-Jordan and were based on 
the British Defence Law and Regulations of Palestine. The Defence Law 
and Regulations were declared operative in 1939 and have continued 
until the present time. CS!3:’ Jordan has also adopted the French 
concept of Martial Law as implemented in the earlier constitutions of 
Syria and Egypt. Since the imposition of Martial Law in Jordan in 
1967, the two systems have been operating simultaneously.
Despite the fact that at the present time there is no real emerg­
ency to justify the existence of either of them, Jordan possesses two 
different sets of rules which were derived from two different sources 
to deal with the same issue. The result has thus been, conflicting 
jurisdictions and powers and ever increasing legal complications. It 
is too difficult, or even impossible, for any legal expert to define 
precisely the limits of the emergency powers in Jordan or who may 
exercise them or the issues that may come under the emergency powers. 
Consequently, the state of emergency has became permanent and the 
emergency powers have gone beyond any control or limitation; espe­
cially since 1967.
These are some of the principal elements of the general framework 
of the present legal system of Jordan. They bear great relevance to
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our subject because they present a picture of the legal environment 
within which the modern international standards of human rights are to 
be enforced.
As for the performance of Jordan as a state party to the U.R. Cov­
enants and its obligation to take legislative measure giving effect to 
the rights and freedoms declared thereby, the distinction should be 
made between: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (The Social
Welfare Rights) on the one hand, and the Civil and Political Rights 
on the other. Considering the fact that Jordan is a developing coun­
try with exceptionally limited economic resources, it qualifies to 
benefit from the principle of progressive realization. Under the 
Economic Covenant a state party of such circumstances is not required 
to guarantee the immediate and full realization of all the rights 
listed therein. Its obligation consists of seeking international as­
sistance and co-operation with international efforts especially in the 
economic and technical spheres, as well as the initiation of domestic 
programmes and plans, the adoption of legislative measures and the
taking of steps, to the maximum of its available resources with a view
■i k e
of achieving the full realization of/social welfare rights. As
far as the latter are concerned, the examples studied in chapter IV 
above suggest that the performance of Jordan in this field seems, so 
far, satisfactory. That is to say that, although not all the social 
welfare rights are fully implemented at the present time, Jordan seems 
to have complied with the above requirements and that there has been a 
noticeable progress towards the full realisation of these rights. 
Available records, researches, statistics, and f i g u r e s , i n d i c a t e  
that there has been continuous development planning and programming 
and that massive resources have been committed to social welfare
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rights, Jordan has fully co-operated with the international efforts, 
and has sought every possible international assistance and benefitted 
from it through intelligent development planning and social program­
ming. A series of ambitious development plans have been executed
and have achieved remarkable rates of economic growth, social and 
cultural development. Health care, social security and education
are being given top priority in the successive development plans. C2:7':* 
Important steps and legislative measures have been taken, some before 
and some after 1976. Some minor gaps between the Jordanian legisla­
tion and the provisions of the Economic Covenant have been indicated 
in the relevant places in this work, and thus is no need to mention 
them again here.
However, the records are not as glamorous and the picture is not 
as bright when it comes to civil and political rights. The selected 
examples studied in chapter three revealed some serious gaps between 
law of Jordan and the minimum international standards of human rights 
as defined by the Political Covenant. Under the latter, a state party 
is under legal obligation to guarantee the immediate and full reali­
zation of the civil and political rights and where not already pro­
vided for by existing laws, to take all the necessary legislative 
measures to give effect to these right at the domestic level. In the 
case of Jordan the entry into force of the Covenant in 1976 passed 
almost unnoticed, and without any substantial changes in the existing 
laws nor in the legislative, administrative or judicial practices.
As far as the Constitution is concerned, it was mentioned*1235 
that the second chapter of the Constitution of 1928 which provided for 
the rights of the people, was re-introduced in the Constitution of 
1946 under the same number (chapter 2). With limited adjustments and
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expansions inspired by the adoption of the UIDR in 1948, the same 
chapter has been re-introduced again in the present Constitution 
(1952). It was also observed that despite the frequent amendments to 
the various Articles of the Constitution since 1952, chapter two has 
remained untouched, even after 1976. The question raised then was 
whether this means that the provisions of this chapter are in perfect 
harmony with international standards or mere carelessness on behalf of 
the Jordanian legislature?c305 As we were unable to answer the 
question at such an early stage, we postponed the answer to this 
place. Upon a critical legal analysis of the relevant provisions of 
chapter two of the present Constitution they fell short of the re­
quirements of the modern international standards of human rights, and 
therefore the Jordanian legislature should have ameliorated these 
provisions to meet at least those minimum standards provided for by 
the Covenants. However, it is not only the Constitution which should 
have been revised in 1976, for our comprehensive survey of the exist­
ing (and of some of those previously repealed) laws has uncovered many 
gaps and defects in the whole body of Jordanian law. It could thus be 
concluded that, as far as the undertaking to take legislative measures 
is concerned, Jordan is in plain violation of its obligation under the 
political Covenant, and that the role of the Constitution and domestic 
law of Jordan is yet to be fulfilled.
Before addressing any specific recommendations or proposals to the 
Jordanian legislature in order to remedy the situation, some general 
observations on the present situation of human rights in Jordan and on 
some of the practices and policies which have crucial impact on the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights, may be pointed out:
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1 - A study of the types and the nature of human rights violations in 
Jordan would suggest that there is not an official general anti-huraan 
rights policy there, Upon further analysis it becomes quite evident 
that there is no systematic pattern of human rights violations, and 
that the surrounding circumstances da vary considerably from one case 
to another. In most cases these violations could be attributed to the 
unwarranted individual behaviour of some government officials acting 
against the law or even sometimes against the instructions of their 
superiors, In many other cases they could be attributed to confusing 
and out-dated legislation, as well as judicial and administrative 
methods of thinking, and above all general ignorance of the modern 
concepts of human rights.
2 - The degree of ignorance of the very basic concepts of human rights 
in Jordan is a shocking reality to any human rights researcher. The 
element of ignorance is not limited to the general public and layman 
only, but is also found among lawyers and judges not to mention the 
other law-enforcement officers, Reviewing the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court and some other Jordanian courts since 1952, the present 
writer has failed to find a single case where an international in­
strument of human rights has been cited by the courts or even referred 
to or invoked by the lawyers, Cases where the provisions of the 
Jordanian Constitution and other laws relating to human rights were 
invoked are truly few and far between. This shows the degree of im­
portance attached to these provisions by the Jordanian lawyers,
Amongst other law-enforcement officers such as the Police, and General 
Intelligence Officers and the Administrative Governors, ignorance of 
human rights seems commonplace. It is so because most of them do not 
hold law degrees, and those who do, graduated during the fifties and
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the sixties when human rights were not taught at all or at the most 
taught as an optional subject. Even today, in the law school of the 
university of Jordan, human rights are still an optional subject. In 
other words the majority of our future judges, lawyers, and law-en­
forcement officers graduate from the law school without even a basic 
knowledge of the legal system of human rights.
From among the various interviews conducted by the present writer 
in Jordan, one example may be mentioned here. We have already refer­
red to some of the Defence Orders issued by the Nuttasarife of Lewa'a 
Nadaba by means of which, the personal liberty of a number of 
Jordanian citizens was unlawfully violated.<31? In an interview with 
the Muttasarife and his deputy, in September 1986, the present writer 
asked them whether they have a list of the international instruments 
of human rights to which Jordan was a party: the answer was negative. 
We asked whether they had received special instructions from the 
Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Interior with regard to the 
implementation of any international human rights instruments at all: 
the answer was again negative. Another question was whether they had 
received any instructions from the King, the Prime Minister, the Min­
ister of Interior or any higher authority, to be oppressive or to dis­
respect the rights and the freedoms of the individual: the answer was 
also negative. When we asked them, how they handled day to day issues 
involving the fundamental rights and freedom of the individual, the 
answer was:
"As an Administrative Governor, one usually exercises 
his own judgement in accordance with the laws under 
his hand. . . and does what he thinks necessary for the 
preservation of peace and law and order."
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An Administrative Governor of the rank of a Mutiasarife enjoys
enormous power and almost unfettered discretion in accordance with
those "laws under his hand". He is empowered to order administrative
detention of any person indefinitely and without trial. All that is
required is that he mentions that he believes that it is in the
interest of public safety and public order. He may also issue orders
to stop and search any person or any vehicle at any time or place and
orders to enter and search any place at any time, day or night, and
order the closing of any public or private place or any part thereof;
and above all he is empowered to conduct summary trials and to pass
sentence at his own discretion, In most cases his discretion is final
and unchallengeable before any court of law. When we asked a person
who enjoys all these powers, and who is indeed in direct daily contact
with the public, about his conception and understanding of the minimum
international standards of human rights which aught to be guaranteed
to every individual, he stated that:
"These are matters relating to maternity and child 
care, care for elderly, widows, handicapped and ment­
ally ill and homeless people. 3,23
3 ~ Jordan has signed and ratified the Covenants without any reserva­
tion whatsoever. It is important to observe, that there are some
legal provisions in the law of Jordan which are irreconcilable with 
the provisions of the Covenants. In this we are referring to the 
provisions relating to the statutes of women in the Shari'a law which 
are applicable in Jordan, particularly the Qura'nic verse relating to 
the distribution of inheritance. It grants the male brother twice as 
much as the share of his female sister. In an Islamic society this
m y  be regarded as a justifiable distinction or even a required mea­
sure in order to maintain equality between men and women. This how­
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ever, would not eliminate the apparent contradiction between this 
provision and the explicit provisions of the Covenant, and therefore, 
at least at the international level it could be regarded as a dis­
criminatory legislation and a gross violation especially of Article 3 
of both Covenants. Considering the fact that this is a Qura'nic pro­
vision which the Jordanian legislature cannot review or repeal, Jordan 
should have reserved the right to interpret the provisions of the Cov­
enants in the light of the provisions of the Qura'n and the principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence.
4 - In Jordan, H.M. The King and H.R.H. The Crown Prince play a 
prominent role in the redressing of human rights violations, whether 
committed by the various governmental agencies or by private indiv­
iduals. This has been an established Hashemite tradition, based on 
the traditional practice of the head of the Islamic state making 
himself accessible to private individuals and to receive even the most 
humble member of the public to hear any complaints he might have.
This practice goes back to the days of the Prophet and has always been 
observed by the Hashemite Monarchs. In Jordan any private individual 
may present his case before the King or the Crown Prince and have it 
settled once and for all.*3®0 Many human rights violations resulting 
from a defect in the law or a wrongful action by the administration 
are being redressed in this way, This practice has made quite an im­
pact on the situation of human rights in practice and on the overall 
record of Jordan in this field, despite the numerous defects in the 
laws and the sometimes arbitrary administrative actions. Of course 
this is a most welcome practice and something Jordan would always be 
proud of, but nonetheless it is not a legal remedy and therefore does
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not release the Jordanian legislature from its duty to provide suffi­
cient legal remedies. Given the ever-increasing number of human rights 
violations and the increase of the duties and and responsibilities of 
the head of the modern state, one cannot expect the King and the Crown 
Prince to receive every single member of the public and listen to his 
complaint in person.
It is therefore the legislature's role to adjust the laws and to 
Establish sufficient legal safeguards to prevent human rights viola­
tions in the first place and to provide legal remedies to deal with 
them when they actually occur.
5 - Reviewing the legislation and the practices of Jordan in the field 
of human rights, one observes the paradoxical contrast between a com­
mendable record in the field of social welfare rights, and a defective 
legislation and disturbing practices in the area of civil and polit­
ical rights. Whereas the implementation of social welfare rights 
requires huge funds and money to be spent, implementation of the civil
and political rights is less costly and mainly requires the introduc­
tion of legislation and respect for the law and human rights in prac­
tice. In a country of exceptionally limited economic resources one 
would normally expect the opposite i.e. better performance of the less 
costly rights.
We have already concluded that Jordan is in breach of its ob­
ligation under the Political Covenant, and that upon comparison be­
tween the existing laws in Jordan and the provisions of the Covenant 
one sees that the former has fallen seriously short of the latter. It
could thus be confirmed that the role of the Constitution and the dom­
estic laws of Jordan in the domestic implementation of the modern
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international standards of human rights is yet to be fulfilled. Most 
of the gaps between the two systems have already been highlighted and 
remedies were also suggested in the relevant places in this work. 
However, in order to improve upon the situation of human rights in
general and to bring the laws and the practices of Jordan into line
with the provisions of the Covenants the following actions and 
measures must be considered*.
1 - A comprehensive review of the whole body of the laws currently 
in force is urgently needed in order to co-ordinate those laws and 
to alter those which are inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Covenants, and to introduce equivalent standards at the domestic 
level. Special attention should be given to the following parts:
a) Chapters two and six of the present Constitution;
b) The Criminal Procedure Code of 1961, especially Articles 44-
269.
c) The Law of Print and Publication, Law Mo. 33 of 1973.
d) The Labour Code of 1961 especially Articles 68-89.
e) The Law of the Independence of the Judiciary, Law Mo. 49 of
1972
f) The Law of the Formation of the Regular Courts, Law No. 26 of 
1952
g) The Law of the Government Proceedings, Law No. 18 of 1958.
h) The Law of the General Elections, Law No. 26 of 1986.
2 - A new provision must be added to the Constitution, providing 
for the right of everyone to his natural jurisdiction and to have 
his complaint decided by a competent , impartial and previously
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established court and that Parliament may not sanction any law 
abridging this right.
3 - Independence of the judiciary must be protected from outside 
influence, perhaps by inserting a special provision in the Penal 
Code stipulating that interference with the independence of the 
judiciary shall be a criminal offence punishable on conviction by 
imprisonment.
4 ~ The Defence Law and all the Defence Regulations made there­
under, which are unconstitutional and unnecessary and above all 
widely abused in practice, as was admitted by the Jordanian Prime 
Minister himself in 1958, must be repealed.
5 - Martial Law which has been imposed since 1967, and the In­
structions of the Martial Law Administration of 1967 may be term­
inated in order to enable the Ordinary law and the Regular Courts 
to function freely.
6 - Article 124 and 125 of the present Constitution, relating to
the declaration of the state of public emergency and the emergency
powers, should be replaced by the draft Article suggested above, 
in order to prevent the abuse of the emergency powers and to pro­
vide the administration with sufficient emergency powers should 
there be a genuine need for them in the future.
7 - The jurisdiction of the HCJ to issue writs of habeas corpus 
must not be suspended under any circumstances,
8 - Article 5 of the Law of the Government Proceedings of 1958 may
be amended, not only because the notion of the ' immunity of the 
Crown' is an alien concept to the law of Jordan, but also in order 
to enable the individual to sue the Government for damages and to 
seek justice by the courts.
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9 - In order to overcome the apparent contradiction between some 
of the applicable Shari'a Laws and other provisions based 
thereupon such as Article 28 of the Constitution on the one hand 
and the provisions of the Covenants relating to equality between 
the sexes on the other, Jordan should file a reservation stating 
that it shall interpret these provisions in accordance with 
Quranic Law and the general principles of Islamic jurisprudence.
10 - These legislative measures should be supported by some prac­
tical measures in order to promote awareness of and respect for 
human rights in practice. Without the latter the farmer cannot 
have much impact on the actual situation of human rights and on 
the day to day enjoyment of these rights. Such practical measures 
may include the following;
a) Strict administrative instructions to all government offi­
cials and to the law-enforcement officers, especially the Pol­
ice and the Administrative Governors to respect the declared 
rights and freedoms of the individual and to avoid arbitrary 
actions which may infringe these rights.
b) More space and time in the mass media in order to educate 
the public about human rights and to publicize them through 
special programmes, articles, symposiums and documentaries,
c) Inclusion of a course on the modern international stand­
ards of human rights in the curriculum of the high schools and 
universities.
d) Human rights must be made a compulsory subject in all the 
law schools in the universities of Jordan.
e) Special courses must be arranged and made available to all 
Jordanian lawyers, and made mandatory for all administrative
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governors, police officers and all other law-enforcement of­
ficers.
These are some of the legislative and practical measures which the 
present writer thinks might help to bridge the gap between the 
existing laws of Jordan and the modern international standards of 
human rights as embodied in the United Nations Covenants on human 
rights of 1966.
Whether the Jordanian legislature will take any action which 
corresponds to the measures suggested remains to be seen. However what 
must be emphasised here is that the law of Jordan as it stands at 
present falls short of the standards required under the United Nations 
Covenants and that the Jordanian legislature should carry out a 
comprehensive review of the existing laws and practices in order to 
bring them in line with the United Nations Covenants.
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TOTES (VIII.)
( 1) The Introduction p. 3.
( 2) See Chapter III, and IV, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.
(3) As was the case in the laws of Jordan with regard to the right
to life for instance, see p. $  ST-
< 4) See above note No. 2.
< 5) See Part Three, Chapters V, VI, and VII.
( 6) See Chapter V.
( 7) See Chapter VI.
< 8) See Chapter VII.
< 9) See Chapter VI, p •
<10) This method was employed in the case of Chile, ECOSOC decision
233 (LXIII) of 13 May 1977 and also in the case of South 
Africa with regard to many issues. See 19 Bulletin of Human 
Rights Jan.-March 1978, pp. 25-38.
(11) For the debates in the House of Representatives concerning the 
new Civil Code and the views of those who were in favour of 
the old pure Islamic Civil Code, see The Official Records of
the. House—  Qf . Representatives. Vol. 8, pp. 757-769, debate of
1/3/1964; see Al-Halasa, op. cit. f p. 65, and the other 
references cited in the same page under note 2.
(12) In Islamic Law there are four major schools, namely, the
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali,
(13) The Sixth Meeting, Cairo, April 1977.
(14) See above p.^y-d? sn-i,
(15) See Arts. 1 and 10.
(16) IMd.
(17) See above Chapter VI.
(18) See above p.f X ^ —  2 S '
(19) See Chapter VI.
(20) Ibid.
(21) See H. Nadah, op. cit., pp. 128-132.
(22) See Chapter VII.
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(23) IMA,
(24) See Chapter IV.
(25) Numerous agreements and accords have been conducted between
Jordan and the United Nations, Specialized Agencies and other 
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